This is the final of a three-volume corporate history that runs more than 500 pages of dense text and few photographs. The authors were arguably at their best in presenting in vivid colors the deterioration of Ford during the late-30s and 40s. However, Ford’s revival in the 1950s is uneven in its depth.
For example, the Korean war was given detailed attention but the company’s expansion into the premium-priced and luxury fields was glossed over and the intense power struggle among top executives in the late-50s ignored.
Detroit groupthink colored the analysis, such as by giving greater weight to the perspective that a small car was not viable in the 1950s. However, the authors do shed light on corporate thinking. For example, they quote research from the Ford Division in 1953 that concluded, “To the average American our present car and its size represent an outward symbol of prestige and well-being” (p. 379).
Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933-1962
- Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill; 1962
- Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY
“During the nineteen-thirties 167,742 miles were built, of which 160,000 were of ‘high type’ (presumably concrete or asphalt). During the same period the mileage of state highways rose from 315,000 to 560,000. The increase in roads was more than quantitative, for it gave the automobile new power as well as new places to go. Cars went faster, and in addition valiant efforts were made to make them go safer. Signs for guidance of a motorist were now a norm — not only those telling him distances and destinations, but also those which warned of bad curves and of intersections.” (p. 130)
“Henry Ford, meeting Sorensen on April 2 at Willow Run, sourly remarked that the strike could not have been averted and might do more good than harm. On his orders, Sorensen kept clear of the Rouge, and soon flew to Miami. Edsel came back from Florida only to receive strict orders from his father to leave the labor situation to Bennett. Nevertheless, Edsel succeeded in exerting a decisive influence in the situation. All the older executives were in a truculent mood: Sorensen had the bizarre idea that the union had produced the strike by terrorism, Henry Ford wanted to arm the non-strikers and use tear gas if necessary, and Bennett was eager to put Ford’s service gangs behind Henry’s commands. Edsel was alarmed by the possibility of a pitched battle. He pleaded with his father, he kept Bennett on the telephone, he argued, he protested, and as Bennett puts it, he ‘insisted’ on a moderate course.” (p. 162)
“In this atmosphere of glowing confidence Reith studied the problem of the E Car, and on April 15, 1955, presented to the Board of Directors an overall plan for the company’s future product offerings. He first reminded his listeners of certain basic facts which they already knew. He showed, for example, that in the field of popular low-priced cars Ford made 43.1 per cent of all sales, but in the middle and upper-priced range, its Mercury and Lincoln obtained a 13.6 per cent. In the portion of this upper field not covered by Lincoln (at the top) or Mercury (at the bottom), the $2400 to $3100 price range, General Motors was selling three cars, and Chrysler two. Ford of course had none. Partly because of this gap the company had far fewer dealers than its rivals, and was especially weak in the middle-priced field. The time, Reith pointed out, was as auspicious as could be imagined. Population was growing, consumer income was rising, and more families than ever before owned cars.” (pp. 384-385).
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