American Motors: The Last Independent

This book was published in 1993 but still offers the best balance of product information and corporate history about American Motors, written in an accessible prose that sometimes hints at Patrick R. Foster’s stint as a salesman at an AMC dealer.

Better than most historians, Foster explains CEO George Romney’s genius as well as the key reasons why American Motors lost its independence. However, he largely sidesteps answering the single most important question of the 1970s: What was going on in AMC’s management culture that led to a series of production-planning mistakes which ultimately proved fatal (e.g., Matador coupe and Pacer)?

This gap in Foster’s analysis results in a perplexing dichotomy: He is harsher in his direct criticisms of CEO Roy Abernethy than Roy Chapin Jr. even though the latter made similar mistakes, only on a larger scale.  (For further discussion of Abernethy and Chapin go here and here).

Foster’s more recent AMC book (2013) is a good read and visually impressive, but I tend to find myself reaching for The Last Independent when doing research on the company. This book often offers more factual details because it has an old-school format, with a greater emphasis on text.

American Motors: The Last Independent

  • Patrick R. Foster; 1993
  • Krause Publications, Iola, WI

“Mason, for all his foresight, had planned on emphasizing the big Nash and Hudson cars, of course sharing a more cost-effective single chassis/body. But even with that, he would be competing directly against the Big Three automakers. Mason planned to keep the Rambler as a lower-priced compact car, a companion model that could be sold by both dealer organizations. Mason, although a believer in small cars, did not feel the company could survive selling only compact cars. This is where Romney and Mason were fundamentally different.” (pp. 20-21)

“Looking back on the models offered, it’s obvious that the big emphasis for 1974 was on the new Matador coupe. Estimates vary, but it’s a safe bet that about $40 million were spent on tooling for the coupe. The cost to the corporation was even higher, for the money spent on the new Matador meant that the Gremlin/Hornet series would have to wait for two more years before any funds could be released for restyling them.” (p. 188)

“Contemporary writers and historians have always been quick to drag out the tired line that AMC’s demise was proof positive that it is impossible for an independent automaker to survive in the American market. That is utter nonsense. What has been proved by all this is that an independent automaker could survive and prosper in the American market if it was willing to do things differently from its big competitors.” (p. 293)

OTHER REVIEWS:

Amazon | Goodreads


RE:SOURCES

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.


*