Richard M. Langworth’s book about Hudson was first published in 1977, but it is still the best history of this quirky automaker. As with his other auto histories written during this time period, Hudson 1946-1957: The Classic Postwar Years, has a very different feel than more recent books.
If you have seen Langworth’s histories of Kaiser-Frazer (1975) and Studebaker (1979, 1993), you would feel right at home with the Hudson book’s format. The pages tend to be dominated by text, with relatively small black-and-white photos. Although car buffs will find lots of product specifications, the business analysis is more detailed than in more recent histories.
Also see ‘Richard Langworth’s website offers background on his auto histories’
Langworth displayed a careful eye for factual fine points and a journalist’s willingness to critique. For example, he noted that the 1953-54 Jet lost so much money partly because an outside vendor built the car’s bodies (p. 87; see second quote below).
Langworth’s take is sometimes perplexing
As might be expected, Langworth’s analysis was sometimes colored by the auto industry groupthink prevalent when he wrote the book. As a case in point, Langworth described the slow-selling Jet as Hudson’s “single greatest mistake.” The $16 million spent on the compact “could have more than paid for that V-8 engine Hudson needed so badly in its big cars” (p. 126).
This is a perplexing view or two reasons. First, a V8 by itself could not have saved Hudson’s aging big cars. A costly redesign would have also been needed. At another point he noted this but did not address how Hudson would have afforded both a V8 and a redesign.
Also see ‘How would a facelifted Hudson have fared in 1955?’
Second, he did not admit that investing in a V8 could have boxed Hudson into a deadly corner. If the automaker had come out with an engine big enough to maintain its performance leadership in the full-sized, premium-priced field, it wouldn’t have worked well in a smaller, lower-priced car. Yet Hudson would have arguably needed to shift downmarket to survive the collapse of the full-sized, premium-priced field in the late-50s.
Hudson 1946-1957 is still a cut above newer books
To be fair, Langworth did point out that Hudson would have been more viable if it avoided direct competition with the Big Three. Indeed, he argued that Hudson did not fail only because of the disadvantages that all smaller automakers faced. Hudson was also less adroit than Nash-Kelvinator — its arch-rival turned merger partner — in pioneering new markets. Top-notch engineering — as reflected in the Hornet’s legendary L-head six — was not enough (pp. 124-126).
Also see ‘Was the ‘Ford blitz’ to blame for the collapse of independent automakers?
Langworth may not have connected all of the dots, but he still offered a richly textured story of Hudson’s last years. This is why Hudson 1946-1957 towers above more recent books by Charles Hyde (2009) and Patrick Foster (2010).
Hudson 1946-1957: The Classic Postwar Years
- Richard M. Langworth; 1977, 1993
- Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI
“If any single physical quality of the Step-down could be singled out it would probably be its lowness. The new Hudson stood only 60 3/8 inches high — against close to sixty-seven inches for the contemporary Buick, for example, sixty-six inches for DeSoto and Chrysler, sixty-four inches for Packard, Mercury, Kaiser and Frazer. Even Studebaker, the only prewar company with a new postwar car at the Step-down’s introduction, measured close to two inches higher than the new Commodores and Supers.” (p. 35)
“The Jet had cost $12 million to tool, and Hudson had to pay for it. When the shortages arose there were repercussions among Hudson creditors. Murray was supplying Jet bodies — the first time an outside firm had built Hudson shells since the early thirties — on a delayed payment plan. Explains Roy Chapin, ‘As I recall, Murray tooled quite a lot of [the Jet] by amortizing by a charge of say $50 a body, thereby saving the manufacturer the initial capital outlay. As I can remember, there were serious hassles with Murray that the projected schedules were not met, and consequently Hudson amortization and recovering of its tooling costs were running way behind what it had anticipated.’ This helps explain the apparent anomaly by which Hudson could build 80,000 cars and make $8 million in 1952, yet lose $10 million on almost the same production in 1953.” (p. 87)
“As good as the Hornet and other Step-down models were, it must be admitted that Hudson management was nowhere near as far-sighted (as Nash). In the 1948 Hudson they created a wonderful automobile — solid, durable, roadable. In the 1951 Hudson Hornet they added the finest L-head six that had ever been produced, with performance that was startling. But the Step-down was almost impossible to alter, and annual face-lifts or restyles were the game a company had to play in order to remain in competition during the fifties.” (p. 125)
OTHER REVIEWS:
RE:SOURCES
- Foster, Patrick R.; 2010. Hudson Automobiles: An Illustrated History. Iconografix, Hudson, WI.
- Hyde, Charles K; 2009. Storied Independent Automakers: Nash, Hudson, and American Motors. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1975. Kaiser-Frazer: The Last Onslaught on Detroit. Princeton Publishing, Princeton, NJ.
- ——–; 1979, 1993. Studebaker 1946-1966: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
This is an expanded version of a mini-review that was originally posted April 13, 2013.
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