This is one of the better scholarly books about an auto company. Donald T. Critchlow achieves the rare feat of crafting a narrative that is engaging, analytically sophisticated and challenges industry groupthink in key respects.
The Life and Death of an American Corporation is more willing that most automotive histories — scholarly or not — to address the 800-pound gorilla in the living room: That the postwar American auto industry had become an oligopoly. This perspective contrasts with Richard Langworth’s narrative, which argues that Studebaker had only itself to blame for its failure — and even excuses the Big Three’s dealer raiding as “all very natural in the dog-eat-cat world that is the auto business” (1993, p. 165).
Critchlow also offers an unusual focus for an automotive history: The relationship between Studebaker management, its workers and the South Bend area. As a result, Life and Death provides what may very well be the most even-handed assessment of labor’s role in Studebaker’s downfall. This is a refreshing reprieve from glib anti-labor rhetoric of some other Studebaker histories.
Around the margins Life and Death is undercut by the kind of problems that tend to crop up more often with histories written by non-car guys. For example, Critchlow gets wrong the year when Studebaker introduced a four-door wagon (p. 153) and when American Motors first earned a profit (p. 165). Meanwhile, he stretches credulity in calling the late-50s Hawks “popular” (p. 168) and that Studebaker might have survived longer as an automaker if it “had developed the Avanti earlier” (p. 11).
One book can’t be expected to include everything, and Life and Death tends to emphasize management rather than product subtleties. As a case in point, Critchlow mentions that Studebaker aborted an update of its six-cylinder engine in the midst of a failed attempt to purchase engines from AMC (p. 145). However, he doesn’t note an important detail emphasized by Langworth: That the proposed conversion of Studebaker’s L-head to an F-head design lost favor because, according to an internal memo, it “will not be competitive with the overhead valve engines of the competition” (1993, p. 82).
Studebaker: The Life and Death of an American Corporation
- Donald T. Critchlow; 1996
- Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, IN
“Oligopoly characterized the automobile industry in the postwar era, even as new entrants such as Kaiser-Frazer, Tucker, and Crosley joined the industry, and independent manufacturers experienced a dramatic increase in market share in the immediate postwar years. In 1948, for example, independents claimed over 18 percent share of the passenger car market. By 1950, however, the Big Three — General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — had begun to reassert control over the industry. By 1955, Kaiser, Tucker, and Crosley had withdrawn from the industry, while the Big Three regained 94 percent of the market. . . .” (p. 121)
“Testifying before a congressional committee in late 1948 Vance declared that Studebaker had found a profitable niche within a highly concentrated industry. Even if Studebaker’s business fell by more than 50 percent, he told the congressmen, Studebaker would continue to operate profitably. Vance felt that Studebaker over the next few years could expect to gain 6 percent of the market. As Paul G. Hoffman’s biographer later declared, ‘What now stands out most striking about Studebaker’s postwar record is the disparity between contemporary and subsequent assessments.'” (p. 125)
“The Big Three had aggressively targeted Studebaker dealers with offers to set up ‘dual dealerships.’ Chrysler had been particularly aggressive, leading one Studebaker spokesman to call Chrysler’s policy a ‘flagrant’ violation of antitrust law. One survey showed that approximately 30 percent of all Studebaker dealers (accounting for 20 percent of all retail sales) were dualed with one or more of the Big Three. Yet Studebaker officials recognized that the problem was more than dual dealerships. As the head of sales at Studebaker noted, Volkswagen had 350 dealers and was selling 150,000 cars; Studebaker had 2,000 dealers and could not sell 100,000 cars.” (p.172)
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RE:SOURCES
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1979, 1993. Studebaker 1946-1966: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
Recently got the Michael Banks book on Crosley and from a quick glance, it is mentioned that even if the company had sold more cars it would have lasted only 3 more years at most.
Would that however have enabled Crosley have played a small part in the consolidation among the US independents during the mid-1950s? Could Crosley have made better decisions beforehand to become a more enticing prospect for takeover by the US independents or AMC beyond butterflying away the CoBRA or having CIBA become the basis for the US equivalent of the Coventry Climax FW/FWE and FWM/FWMA engines (essentially a more European influenced small block engine below the later AMC Straight-4)?
Kind of doubtful. Crosley coasted on the postwar seller’s market, and never made a real dent, even by independent standards. By the early 50s, the first generation true postwar cars were hitting the used car markets. Maybe work the Hotshot into an American iteration of contemporary MGs and Triumphs, but it would still need a major redesign,
Crosley was indeed a bit player by independent standards yet it could have provided some use upon being taken over by a newly formed AMC, be it the CIBA engine (that was said to be capable of growing to around 1050cc+) or at least the engineer who developed it (creating a successor to wean itself off the B-Series in the Metropolitan), the Hotshot name for a small Metropolitan/A40 Cambridge based AMC badged sportscar in a similar manner to the Datsun Sports (S211/SPL212) or some other worthwhile element Crosley possessed.