This 252-page paperback book has lots of useful product information and a fair amount of corporate history. I’ve found most useful this book’s coverage of the 1960s, which elsewhere hasn’t received the attention it deserves. A full-page dedication to Roy D. Chapin Jr., who as head of AMC championed the purchase of Jeep, gives an immediate sense of the book’s analytical tone.
Author Patrick R. Foster (2014) has published a newer book on Jeep that is shorter and more graphic oriented but fills in the gap between 1998, where Story of Jeep leaves off, and 2014. I find myself referring to both the older and newer book, depending upon what information I’m trying to track down. For example, the Story of Jeep offers considerably more detail about Willys-Overland’s management intrigues during the 1940s.
Foster’s analysis appears to be colored by Detroit groupthink at times, such as when he stated that Willys-Overland would eventually have gone out of business if it had relied solely on the small Jeep (p. 48). It makes sense to argue that the CJ had limited potential in the post-war era. However, Willys could have generated better economies of scale — and perhaps increased its overseas sales — if it had developed its first post-war, four-door wagon and truck off the CJ platform rather than going up a size.
The Story of Jeep
- Patrick R. Foster; 1998
- Krause Publications, Iola, WI
“Sorensen’s decision to use an appliance factory to stamp-out his sheet metal had a profound and lasting effect on Willys. It saved the company from having to rely strictly on the little Jeep for sales, a move that in all likelihood would have eventually sunk the firm. More significantly, it changed Willys’ whole product philosophy. The limitations of its tooling were going to force the design of vehicles that would be far different from anything else on the market. It was no longer possible for Willys to build conventional automobiles.” (p. 49)
“Another concern, if anyone cared to think further about it, was that nearly one third of Kaiser Jeep’s aforementioned profit had come as royalties on Jeep vehicles produced and sold overseas under license agreements. While royalties are not in themselves a bad thing, in Jeep’s case it can possibly be interpreted as an indication of complacency or stagnation. Jeep not expanding its own business overseas as much as it should have, despite the potential indicated by healthy royalties. Jeeps that year (1968) were being produced in thirty-two foreign countries.” (p. 126)
“Perhaps in an effort to divorce it from the CJ line, Wrangler didn’t offer a Renegade package. The CJ-7 was retired when the Wrangler arrived, a victim of the changing times and a glut of personal injury lawsuits by lawyers who evidently were shocked to learn that a tall, short-wheelbase, light-utility vehicle would actually handle differently than a long wheelbase, low-slung passenger car. These lawyers rejected the idea that people who refused to wear seatbelts had any responsibility for their injuries.” (p. 187)
OTHER REVIEWS:
RE:SOURCES
- Foster, Patrick R.; 2014. Jeep: The History of America’s Greatest Vehicle. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
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