(EXPANDED FROM 11/13/2020)
Thomas E. Bonsall wrote one of the better Studebaker histories, but it suffers from flaws that undercut the book’s usefulness.
More Than They Promised, which was published in 2000, is a refreshing reprieve from the splashy coffee table books that currently dominate the publishing industry. Bonsall emphasized serious business analysis and included citations — but only a few black-and-white photographs.
Also see ‘Thomas Bonsall’s Edsel book is nuanced but suffers from groupthink’
Despite the scholarly look of the book, this is one of the more engaging Studebaker histories. Unlike all too many other authors, Bonsall neither talked down to readers nor disappeared into a fog of pedantic details.
In the introduction to More Than They Promised, Bonsall stakes out strong opinions about why Studebaker died. Subsequent chapters make his case in an admirably clear and compelling way. That said, his analysis is sometimes undercut by Detroit groupthink and some factual questions.
Bonsall made two particularly useful points
More Than They Promised performed a useful public service by arguing that the 1953 Studebaker product program was “one of the worst conceived and executed in the history of the industry. . . .” (p. 7). This is a helpful antidote to the glorification of the low-slung coupes designed by Raymond Loewy’s design firm. They may be timeless classics, but the cars also went a long way toward killing the automaker.
Oddly enough, Bonsall focused on the disastrous product launch rather than the key long-term problem: Studebaker’s volume wasn’t high enough to maintain the competitiveness of two distinct bodies — one for the sedans and one for the coupes.
Also see ‘Might Studebaker have survived if Sherwood Egbert had stayed healthy?’
Bonsall performed another public service by not fueling the fantasies of some Studebaker buffs that the automaker could have staged a revival in the mid-60s. Bonsall instead argued that “Studebaker was already effectively dead as an auto producer” in 1961 (p. 386).
Although Bonsall quite rightly criticized Studebaker management for effectively abandoning the truck market in the mid-50s, he didn’t point to the potential of transitioning to a truck manufacturer in the 1960s (here is my take).
Bonsall gave CEO James Nance a free pass
One of Bonsall’s biggest analytical missteps was arguing that the collapse of Studebaker-Packard was primarily caused by factors outside the control of CEO James Nance. Indeed, Bonsall wrote that “Nance’s instincts were generally right on target, but that he simply ran out of time and money necessary to fix the near hopeless mess he had inherited” (p. 7).
This general perspective is shared with historians such as James Ward (1995). However, a few others have raised major questions about Nance’s judgment. For example, Hamlin and Heinmuller argued that Nance contributed to Studebaker-Packard’s spectacular collapse because he “had never really learned how to retrench” (2002, p. 581).
Also see ‘Five (arguably) unresolved mysteries of postwar independent automakers’
An important example of Nance’s overreach was his decision to move Packard production in 1955 to a new plant. Bonsall quite rightly criticized the costly move but gave Nance an out: He “let himself be talked into” it (p. 287).
Bonsall also accepted uncritically Nance’s insistence that he would not have become the head of Packard if Nash’s George Mason had not agreed to a two-stage merger of Nash, Hudson, Packard and Studebaker. After the mergers were completed Mason was supposed to “retire from active management and turn the whole show over to Nance” but he unexpectedly died (p. 279). Patrick R. Foster (2008) has done a good job of dismissing the plausibility of this scenario in his own book about Studebaker.
Unions too heavily blamed for Studebaker’s decline
Another analytical misstep is that Bonsall placed too much blame for Studebaker’s demise on management’s decision to “buy labor peace with low productivity” (p. 468). He argued that this only worked during the peak of the post-war seller’s market.
Aaron Severson has offered the compelling counterpoint that “Studebaker’s productivity levels had as much to do with the antiquated layout of the South Bend factory as with their UAW deal.” In addition, he suggested that “making nice with the UAW was not a bad strategy at all” because work stoppages could be crippling to such a small automaker (2010, third comment).
Also see ‘1956 Studebaker Golden Hawk: A match made in hell’
One could also question some of Bonsall’s factual details. For example, he wrote that Packard bought the Conner Avenue plant (p. 288). This is contrary to other historians, who have stated that it was leased (e.g., Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002; p. 581; Ward, 1995; p. 124).
All and all, More Than They Promised is well worth adding to one’s bookshelf. However, the book’s analytical limitations and factual quirks keep it from being the definitive Studebaker history.
More Than They Promised: The Studebaker Story
- Thomas E. Bonsall; 2000
- Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA
“There is no such thing as a ‘complete’ history of a great industrial enterprise in the sense that every possible avenue is exhaustively explored. In this volume, there is a deliberate bias toward the business and marketing angles of the story, for, in the final analysis, it was the business and marketing acumen (or lack thereof) of those in charge that created both Studebaker’s greatest triumphs and its most crushing defeats.” (p. 8)
“Whether Grant’s estimate was correct or somewhat overstated, Studebaker’s break-even point was clearly too high and, as subsequent events would demonstrate, his analysis of the cause was all-too accurate. Even after Hoffman’s exertions in the spring of 1954, Studebaker’s real labor costs were still approximately twice the industry norm and getting them down would occupy a depressingly large amount of Nance’s time over the next few months.” (p. 286)
“It is important to note that the end when it came was not the result of a gradual decline that knowledgeable observers had long predicted. Rather, it came as a sudden, unforeseen collapse that, even in retrospect, almost leaves one gasping in disbelief. The cataclysmic events of 1953 had a tragic dimension to them that was, in the literal meaning of a much-abused word, awesome.” (p. 469)
OTHER REVIEWS:
Cambridge Core | The Atlantic | Amazon
RE:SOURCES
- Foster, Patrick; 2008. Studebaker: The Complete History. Motorbooks International, Minneapolis, MN.
- Hamlin, George and Dwight Heinmuller; 2002. “America’s New Choice in Fine Cars: The Twenty-Sixth and the Fifty-Fourth Series 1953-54.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 562–581. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
- Severson, Aaron; 2010. “The Once and Future Coupe: The Studebaker Hawk.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted April 21; accessed March 30, 2013.
- Ward, James A.; 1995. The Fall of the Packard Motor Car Company. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Studebaker-Packard (1956)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Studebaker (1953, 1960)
This is an expanded version of a review that was originally posted April 20, 2013 and expanded Nov. 13, 2020.
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