This a visually appealing and well-balanced Studebaker history for those who don’t already have one on their shelf. For those who do, the main appeal of Studebaker: The Complete History may be its generous supply of large and often color images — particularly of proposed designs developed during the automaker’s dying days.
Author Patrick R. Foster devotes the final chapter of this oversized hard-cover book to proposals for the 1967-70 model years (pp. 178-184). The sketches and photographs of prototypes are historically interesting but Foster’s narrative arguably gives too much credence to the idea that Studebaker could have maintained a foothold in the automobile industry with relatively modest sheetmetal updates to a platform that was older than a Checker cab’s.
Foster weighs in on a number of debates, such as James Nance’s contention that he wouldn’t have become head of Packard and merged it with Studebaker without a prior deal from George Mason to merge Nash and Hudson into a four-brand automaker with Nance as president (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002; p. 557). Foster offers a convincingly detailed counter-argument (p. 92).
By the same token, Foster argues that Nance reneged on an agreement between a fledgling Studebaker-Packard and American Motors to purchase components from each other. Here Foster sidesteps the contention of Richard Langworth (1993) that AMC’s parts cost more than other suppliers by noting that Studebaker-Packard was charging AMC for a V8 engine roughly $200 more per unit than if it were built internally (p. 91).
Foster quite rightly paints Nance in a largely negative light. For example, he notes that Nance apparently scuttled a proposed three-way merger between Nash, Hudson and Packard because he would not have led the firm. “Nance had a greatly overestimated belief in his ability as an automobile executive” (p. 92).
Studebaker: The Complete History
- Patrick R. Foster; 2008
- Motorbooks International, Minneapolis, MN
“Grant’s (282,000-unit break-even) estimate was probably pessimistic, but it showed that Studebaker’s costs were too high. The problem wasn’t so much the rate of pay; rather, it was the low productivity. Too many workers doing too little work destroyed any chance for Studebaker to earn a profit.” (p. 91)
“One might ponder at this point how differently things might have turned out if Studebaker management had bought Kaiser Jeep (nee Willys Motors) as one of its acquisitions. Kaiser Industries was interested in selling, and if Studebaker had bought or merged with Jeep, there’s a good chance they would have survived as an automaker.” (pp. 167-168)
“The concepts illustrate how Studebaker might have continued into the 1970s, offering a modern car with distinctive styling. Certainly these cars would have appealed to Studebaker’s traditional customers, and if looks sell cars, the MHP proposals probably would have brought in conquest sales as well. Who can say how long the automobile line might have lasted?” (p. 182)
OTHER REVIEWS:
Autos.ca | StudebakerFamily.org | Amazon
RE:SOURCES
- Hamlin, George and Dwight Heinmuller; 2002. “All-New Contour Styling: The Twenty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth Series 1951-52.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 544-561. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1979, 1993. Studebaker 1946-1966: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
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