At least on paper, the VIP luxury series suggested that Plymouth was keeping up with the Chevrolet Caprice and Ford LTD in the late-60s. However, the car’s terrible sales suggest that something was wrong. And not just a little.
The VIP’s numbers are dismal no matter how you slice them. As a case in point, even in its peak year of 1967 the top-of-line Plymouth garnered less than a 7.5 percent share of a nascent brougham market. Even AMC’s Ambassador 990 outsold the VIP.
The Chevrolet Caprice (top image) led the Ford LTD in sales for the last time in 1967. Brougham-style models had quickly grown to 10 percent of full-sized, low-priced production — and would more than double by 1971 (Old Car Brochures).
You can’t blame the VIP’s weak numbers on Plymouth’s third-place status in the low-priced, full-sized field. In 1967 the brand’s overall share of that field was 13.2 percent — almost twice as high as the VIP’s.
And it was all downhill from there. In the VIP’s dying year of 1969, less than 14,000 units left the factory. More than twice as many Ambassador SSTs were produced that year. How could even tiny American Motors do better than Plymouth in one of the faster-growing fields during that time period? Let’s take a look at each of the potential reasons why the VIP proved to be unimportant.
Was the VIP not ‘brougham’ enough?
Yes and no. For example, output of the 1966 models fell only 1,500 units shy of the 1967 record even though the exterior of the VIP looked very little different than a Fury III. In contrast, the 1967 and 1968 VIPs were easily recognizable due to a thick chrome band on the lower-body sides. In 1969 that band was colored black, which helped to give the car a cheaper appearance.
From top to bottom, the 1966-through-1969 VIP two-door hardtop (Old Car Brochures).
One could point out that the 1969 VIP did have a fancier grille than most Fury models, but it wasn’t nearly as upscale as the LTD’s, which featured hidden headlights from 1968-70.
Ford’s 1969 LTD presents a stark contrast with the VIP. The styling inside and out was more upscale. So too was Ford’s marketing, which had a family resemblance to Lincoln-Mercury’s (Old Car Brochures).
On the inside, 1967 models had the most ostentatious appearance, replete with oversized bronze emblems, lots of fake wood grain and rather loud seat upholstery. VIP sales reached their peak despite a 15-percent decline in the brougham market, so clearly Plymouth was doing something right.
The 1966 Plymouth VIP’s (top image) interior was a distinct step up from the Fury III but not as gaudy as the 1967 VIP (middle image) and less subdued than 1968 models (Old Car Brochures).
Could it be that the 1968 VIP declined in popularity partly because its interior was tasteful but too understated compared to its competitors?
In 1969 the big Plymouths received an all-new “fuselage” design. Although the styling was more modern, it also looked rather bulky. Perhaps more importantly, the new models reeked of cost cutting, such as with greater use of plastics. Even the marketing photograph of the VIP’s interior looks cheaper than in previous years.
One could argue that the 1967 VIP did brougham best. However, that doesn’t explain why sales were still weak relative to the rest of Plymouth’s full-sized line.
The 1969 VIP (top image) looked chunky and plain compared to an LTD, Caprice and Ambassador (Old Car Brochures).
Was the Plymouth VIP priced too high?
So then what about pricing? For 1966-67 a VIP four-door hardtop was priced below the LTD but above the Caprice. However, in 1968 the VIP was given a hefty price increase to $120 above the LTD and $55 above the Caprice. In 1969 that price gap widened to $155 above the LTD and $87 above the Caprice.
It’s true that the Fury III was also higher priced than its Big Two competition, but the price gap was less than half the size of the 1968-69 VIP’s. So the VIP’s pricing probably didn’t help sales. But if list price was that important then why didn’t the 1966-67s sell a lot better?
Did the VIP take a back seat to Chrysler’s Newport?
Aaron Severson (2010) has argued that the key problem was that Plymouths were sold in the same dealers as Chryslers. This put the VIP in competition with a somewhat similarly priced, entry-level Newport.
It would make sense that a typical salesman would try to steer a potential customer to a Newport, particularly when the brand’s slogan was to “move up to a Chrysler.” Advertisements such as the one below stated that Newport models were “priced just a few dollars a month more than the most popular smaller cars, comparably equipped.”
The Newport made up 47 percent of Chrysler output rom 1965-73. Pictured is a 1967 model (Old Car Advertisements).
The factory may also have had a strong motivation to push the Newport over the VIP. Even though Chrysler was a niche brand, the Newport was far and away its biggest seller, hitting almost 168,000 units in 1966. The Newport was the corporation’s second-largest-selling big car after the Fury (when you include the Newport Custom series). Why risk undercutting the Chrysler brand’s viability by aggressively marketing the VIP?
Did weak big Dodge sales influence the VIP’s direction?
Meanwhile, the full-sized Dodge was being squeezed in two directions. Perhaps most important was cannibalization by the mid-sized Coronet, which was introduced in 1965. Production of senior Dodges (including the Custom 880) dropped from roughly 281,000 in 1964 to less than 135,000 in 1965 — and never cracked 160,000 again.
That’s not terribly high volume for a full line with unique sheetmetal. To add insult to injury, the full-sized Dodges were often outsold by the more-expensive Chrysler brand by more than two-to-one during the late-60s and early-70s.
Dodge attempted to appeal to potential buyers of low-priced brands with its Polara, but sales never surpassed the higher-priced Chrysler Newport and Custom series (Automotive History Preservation Society).
Might management have decided that building sales for the big Dodge was more important than bolstering the VIP’s competitiveness? Indeed, might the VIP’s price hike in 1968 have been part of a strategy to keep the nameplate from becoming more than a niche player?
Over time a chicken-and-egg situation may have developed. Plymouth was hesitant to do brougham. The public thus didn’t come to associate luxury with Plymouth to nearly the degree that it did with Ford. So Plymouth was not very successful when it belatedly tried to up its game.
This wasn’t just the case with full-sized cars. The 1970-71 Barracuda Gran Coupe and 1971 Satellite Brougham both sold poorly enough that they were quietly discontinued.
For 1971 Plymouth added a Brougham four-door sedan to its Satellite line. Only 3,020 units were built, so the model was dropped in 1972 — the same year that Ford’s Gran Torino four-door sedan topped 102,000 units (Old Car Brochures).
Hey, how about if Plymouth went sporty instead?
Since 1962 the Sport Fury had been Plymouth’s competitor to Ford’s XL and Chevrolet’s Impala SS. Even though the Sport Fury was only offered in a two-door hardtop (sometimes in two versions) and convertible, it consistently outsold the VIP. However, production steadily fell from almost 45,000 in 1965 to under 18,000 in 1969.
For 1970 Plymouth eliminated the VIP and expanded the Sport Fury to include a four-door sedan and hardtop that adopted some of the VIP’s features. Hidden headlights better distinguished the series from the rest of the big Plymouth line but the rest of the car had a less luxurious look than the 1969 VIP.
The 1970 Sport Fury offered a Brougham package that looked cheesy even without the crown (Old Car Brochures).
Sport Fury prices were similar to the old VIP, but marketing was schizoid. Even though a Fury brochure’s tag line was “Luxury you can afford,” sporty coupes received an unusual emphasis for a big car. A pair of halo, high-performance models were added above the Sport Fury: the S-23 and Fury GT.
Shifting the Fury in a sportier direction presumably gave Dodge more room to do brougham with its top-of-line Monaco.
For 1970 the Monaco came the closest of the Chrysler Corporation’s big cars to competing directly against Ford’s LTD, whose output hit 265,000 units — and was only one year away from outselling its lower-priced sibling, the Galaxie 500.
Although the Dodge’s list prices were from $100-160 higher than the new top-of-line LTD Brougham, the 1970 Monaco had a somewhat more luxurious vibe than the previous year’s models. Indeed, the car was reminiscent of the 1968 VIP, with a thick chrome band on the lower body and understated but luxurious interior appointments.
At least in theory, it made sense for the full-sized Plymouth to adopt a more sporting persona so Dodge and Chrysler could cater to luxury-oriented buyers. The Chrysler Corporation arguably wasn’t big enough to allow its brands to compete against each other rather than General Motors and Ford products.
Plymouth goes in opposite direction of Ford
Meanwhile, Ford’s marketing was much more narrowly focused. A brochure stated that, “The 1970 Ford has quietly become one of America’s great luxury values. It gives you the elegance, meticulous engineering and styling distinction of costlier cars . . . at far below the premium price.” Even the XL was presented as “luxury making a sporty proposition. . . .”
The 1970 LTD Brougham roughly matched the Monaco’s features but cost less (Old Car Brochures).
Plymouth’s new gambit worked sort-of okay in 1970. Sport Fury production declined 19 percent compared to combined volume for the 1969 VIP and Sport Fury. However, that was better than the 29 percent drop for the entire big Plymouth line.
It’s hard to say whether the VIP’s demise had a positive impact on Dodge and Chrysler. For 1970 Monaco sales were down only 14 percent, but the Newport was off by 29 percent. The fall off in sales may have partly reflected a recession that negatively impacted the full-sized car field. However, Chrysler Corp. had more sizable declines, perhaps partly because of quality issues and a backlog of unsold cars from the previous year (Fortune, 1970).
Ford’s better idea turned weakness into strength
The problem with killing the VIP was that Plymouth stepped back from the low-priced luxury market just as it was taking off. For 1971 Sport Fury production fell to under 16,000 even though overall big Plymouth volume held steady. More significantly, the king of brougham — the LTD — was up a whopping 31 percent to over 347,000 units.
Largely led by Ford, production of luxury models more than doubled between 1966 and 1973. In addition, their share of the full-sized, low-priced market tripled to almost 34 percent.
Not surprisingly, for 1972 the Sport Fury was replaced with a luxury-oriented Gran series. Although it sold much better than the VIP, it garnered an even smaller percentage of the mushrooming market.
Ford appeared to have the better idea. After failing to beat the Impala at its own game, Ford instead emphasized the higher-priced LTD. Not only did that throw Chevrolet on the defensive, but it also put pressure on GM’s premium-priced brands as Chevy moved upmarket to maintain its sales leadership.
Ford’s LTD outsold Chevrolet’s Caprice by as much as three to one. Pictured is a 1973 model (Old Car Brochures).
Detroit groupthink had long held that Ford was at a disadvantage because it fielded only three brands. Yet Ford’s weakness, which played out most prominently in the premium-priced class, ultimately allowed it to outflank GM and Chrysler. That Ford happened to develop the brougham look is incidental to the more important strategy of turning a competitor’s greatest strength — a large number of brands — into a weakness.
VIP’s failure suggests Chrysler had too many brands
The VIP’s short and unhappy life was evidence that Chrysler was saddled with too many brands to adapt to a changing market. Yet it would take another 30 years — and a “merger” with a foreign company — for Chrysler to bury the Plymouth brand.
In Tom Klockau’s Curbside Classic (2013) article on the VIP, Geeber commented that “Chrysler wrote Plymouth’s death warrant when it gave the full-size Dart to Dodge dealers in 1960, and, at the same time, failed to give Plymouth its own dealer network.”
This is a sophisticated argument that gets at a crucial question: How could the Chrysler Corporation have better managed its dealer networks, which were the root cause of brand overlap problems?
In 1960, management made the fateful decision to stop combining Plymouth and Dodge franchises. The result, noted historian Richard Langworth, was that by the 1970s there was a “Dodge equivalent to nearly every Chrysler-Plymouth product, and vice versa” (1993, p. 192). Dodge eventually won out as the automaker’s entry-level brand.
Dealer integration: Better late than never
I suspect that Chrysler was never large enough to support two dealer networks. That’s why one of the best moves management has made in recent years was to launch a dealer-integration effort called Project Genesis.
The goal was to “cut out redundant models between the Chrysler, Dodge and Jeep brands, which would also mean consolidating its entire product line into one dealership which offers all three marques” (Korzeniewski, 2008).
If that step had been taken in the early-60s, Chrysler’s lineup could have been streamlined. That would have saved significant product-development and marketing dollars. This, in turn, would have reduced the automaker’s tendency to overextend itself. Downturns might have been less traumatic.
Under that scenario a VIP-type model might have been restricted to Dodge. But whatever Chrysler did offer could have had more room to grow into a serious competitor to the likes of the LTD.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on July 17, 2013 and expanded on July, 31, 2020 and March 7, 2023. Market share and production figures were calculated from base data provided by the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002), and Wilson (2013a, 2013b, 2013c). Figures for luxury models do not include wagons. In instances where data from one source appeared to be erroneous, data from another source was substituted. Prices were primarily drawn from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006) because they appeared to have fewer errors.
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7 Comments
As always, Plymouth did not have stand alone stores. Look at that chart, with the difference between the top line Dodge and Plymouth 30 to 50 dollars. In a day of brand consciousness and meaning, moving up a step for 30 bucks was a no brainer. It’s hard to compete when your strongest competitor shares a showroom.
It was always my assumption that these luxury oriented low priced “Broughams” were the Big Threes answer to supply a well appointed vehicle to the aging WWII vets – who were still primarily bread and butter brand loyalist – who didn’t want the presumptuous aura of a Buick, Oldsmobile, or Chrysler, but were maturing in their financial resources. In other words they could afford a bit more luxury but were never the type to drive a Buick or Chrysler. Those willing to move up bought Chryslers and Buicks (hence move up to Chrysler worked on them).
I believe the VIP never caught on simply due to it’s goofy name. “VIP” which most knew was the acronym for “Very Important Person” was simply to assuming for a traditionally low cost brand customer to accept. Where as “Limited” or LTD and Caprice (which just sounded good but had no meaning) was better able to market it’s “hidden” luxury appointments to a traditional buyer. A Plymouth Fury Premier I believe would have done better. The 1968 Plymouth VIP was an attractive commanding car…it’s a shame it did not catch on.
Another name then Plymouth could have used was Belmont. It was used for ones of Exner’s dreams cars in 1954 and it could have been used for a full-size luxury Plymouth or had Plymouth got a personnal luxury coupe as it was originally planned instead of becoming the Chrysler Corboda. The Belmont nameplate could have been used for it as well.
The real answer is the number $ 2964.00. When I was a teenager growing up in, IN, every day in the newspaper in the dealer ads and on radio ads from the area Chrysler dealers, it was: “$2964”! That was the price of a Chrysler Newport. The Plymouth VIP was a much better looking car than the 1967-1968 big Dodges, with an awful grill and bizarre tail-light shapes. Plus, Chrysler’s big cars were not the best examples of quality, with sheet metal and paint issues that most shopppers could see on the dealership floor.
Once again, the interdivisional feuding between Chrysler-Plymouth and Dodge killed Plymouth, at least in the full-size market. Dodge should have emphasized performance, Plymouth should have emphasized its traditional solid transportation. There was nothing wrong with a Sport Fury option, or a Fury III with a premium interior option, but with a Chrysler Newport available in the same showroom for $ 2964.00, it is only a couple of options to make that Newport a Newport Custom with a nicer interior. Who wanted a full-size Fury when one could own a Chrysler Newport ? This is Lynn Townsend’s biggest failure as Chairman. Townsend and his executives did not fortify each car line’s brand identity and position. Too many similar cars and brand overIap has driven first Chrysler, then G.M. and then Ford into trouble.
In 1979 Alan Ries and Jack Trout advanced the concept of “positioning” to the American Association of Advertising Agencies (and later wrote a series of great books about advertising and marketing), placing an image of a consumer product into the mind of the consumer as well as establishing a hierarchy of relative value. What was the brand position of a Fury VIP in the mind of the average full-size car buyer ? Certainly it was much weaker than that of a Chrysler ! While I personally find the 1967 Plymouth a sleeker car than the 1967 Chrysler Newport, for a few dollars more, I am buying the Chrysler !
Short of reorganizing the dealer network, the best solution for Plymouth would have been to try something that broke through the ‘groupthink” that this site has correctly noted ruled the American auto industry during this period.
Ford and Chevrolet had the low-price brougham market sewn up with the LTD and Caprice, respectively. The AMC Ambassador sold reasonably well in the 1960s because it offered AMC loyalists a chance to move beyond a Classic or Rebel. (The problem here was that the Ambassador didn’t expand total AMC sales – it appears to have simply cannibalized sales from the Classic and Rebel.)
Instead of offering its own version of the LTD or Caprice, Plymouth should have built upon its reputation for better handling and performance by offering a true sporting version of the Fury. Tighten up the suspension and steering, make power front disc brakes standard, and get rid of the fender skirts. Offer stylish wheels and unique grille and taillights, and a premium bucket-seat interior, as standard equipment. The buff books would have loved it, and it would not have stepped on the toes of the Chrysler Newport.
Unfortunately, Chrysler went in the opposite direction. It softened the suspension tuning of the C-body cars after 1965, and began chasing a smoother ride. The problem was that if people wanted a car as “Jet Smooth” as a Chevrolet…they could simply buy a Chevrolet. (Another problem was that even the post-1965 Plymouths weren’t as smooth or quiet as a Ford or Chevrolet.) Instead of building upon its strengths, Chrysler moved away from them.
Regarding Project Genesis, I think it was too little, too late. It was launched long after the Great SUV Epoch had begun. This only served to demonstrate how absolutely clueless the Cerberus crew was regarding the high costs of developing, manufacturing and selling automobiles.
On the face of it, this idea was a great plan if had been launched in 1989. That was the time that Chrysler could have trimmed models and ultimately the Plymouth Division. By the time Project Genesis actually surfaced, Jeeps, SUVs and trucks were the only vehicles that sold well and was the only thing keeping the Corporation going.
Why else would have Daimler been interested in the first instance? Surely, they were intrigued by the sophisticated engineering of the Plymouth Neon and had to purchase the company (a la Victor Kiam).
At that time, sedans were an ever-larger stone around the neck of Chrysler with no easy way out. How could they (Cerberus) announce such a plan with a straight face? Maybe it was just another part of the sham show and a way to pump the stock some more…
True. That’s essentially the story of all U.S. automakers — they have tended to be slow to take even the most basic steps to evolve, e.g., GM had to implode in 2009 before it got more aggressive in killing off excess brands.
As always, Plymouth did not have stand alone stores. Look at that chart, with the difference between the top line Dodge and Plymouth 30 to 50 dollars. In a day of brand consciousness and meaning, moving up a step for 30 bucks was a no brainer. It’s hard to compete when your strongest competitor shares a showroom.
It was always my assumption that these luxury oriented low priced “Broughams” were the Big Threes answer to supply a well appointed vehicle to the aging WWII vets – who were still primarily bread and butter brand loyalist – who didn’t want the presumptuous aura of a Buick, Oldsmobile, or Chrysler, but were maturing in their financial resources. In other words they could afford a bit more luxury but were never the type to drive a Buick or Chrysler. Those willing to move up bought Chryslers and Buicks (hence move up to Chrysler worked on them).
I believe the VIP never caught on simply due to it’s goofy name. “VIP” which most knew was the acronym for “Very Important Person” was simply to assuming for a traditionally low cost brand customer to accept. Where as “Limited” or LTD and Caprice (which just sounded good but had no meaning) was better able to market it’s “hidden” luxury appointments to a traditional buyer. A Plymouth Fury Premier I believe would have done better. The 1968 Plymouth VIP was an attractive commanding car…it’s a shame it did not catch on.
Another name then Plymouth could have used was Belmont. It was used for ones of Exner’s dreams cars in 1954 and it could have been used for a full-size luxury Plymouth or had Plymouth got a personnal luxury coupe as it was originally planned instead of becoming the Chrysler Corboda. The Belmont nameplate could have been used for it as well.
The real answer is the number $ 2964.00. When I was a teenager growing up in, IN, every day in the newspaper in the dealer ads and on radio ads from the area Chrysler dealers, it was: “$2964”! That was the price of a Chrysler Newport. The Plymouth VIP was a much better looking car than the 1967-1968 big Dodges, with an awful grill and bizarre tail-light shapes. Plus, Chrysler’s big cars were not the best examples of quality, with sheet metal and paint issues that most shopppers could see on the dealership floor.
Once again, the interdivisional feuding between Chrysler-Plymouth and Dodge killed Plymouth, at least in the full-size market. Dodge should have emphasized performance, Plymouth should have emphasized its traditional solid transportation. There was nothing wrong with a Sport Fury option, or a Fury III with a premium interior option, but with a Chrysler Newport available in the same showroom for $ 2964.00, it is only a couple of options to make that Newport a Newport Custom with a nicer interior. Who wanted a full-size Fury when one could own a Chrysler Newport ? This is Lynn Townsend’s biggest failure as Chairman. Townsend and his executives did not fortify each car line’s brand identity and position. Too many similar cars and brand overIap has driven first Chrysler, then G.M. and then Ford into trouble.
In 1979 Alan Ries and Jack Trout advanced the concept of “positioning” to the American Association of Advertising Agencies (and later wrote a series of great books about advertising and marketing), placing an image of a consumer product into the mind of the consumer as well as establishing a hierarchy of relative value. What was the brand position of a Fury VIP in the mind of the average full-size car buyer ? Certainly it was much weaker than that of a Chrysler ! While I personally find the 1967 Plymouth a sleeker car than the 1967 Chrysler Newport, for a few dollars more, I am buying the Chrysler !
Short of reorganizing the dealer network, the best solution for Plymouth would have been to try something that broke through the ‘groupthink” that this site has correctly noted ruled the American auto industry during this period.
Ford and Chevrolet had the low-price brougham market sewn up with the LTD and Caprice, respectively. The AMC Ambassador sold reasonably well in the 1960s because it offered AMC loyalists a chance to move beyond a Classic or Rebel. (The problem here was that the Ambassador didn’t expand total AMC sales – it appears to have simply cannibalized sales from the Classic and Rebel.)
Instead of offering its own version of the LTD or Caprice, Plymouth should have built upon its reputation for better handling and performance by offering a true sporting version of the Fury. Tighten up the suspension and steering, make power front disc brakes standard, and get rid of the fender skirts. Offer stylish wheels and unique grille and taillights, and a premium bucket-seat interior, as standard equipment. The buff books would have loved it, and it would not have stepped on the toes of the Chrysler Newport.
Unfortunately, Chrysler went in the opposite direction. It softened the suspension tuning of the C-body cars after 1965, and began chasing a smoother ride. The problem was that if people wanted a car as “Jet Smooth” as a Chevrolet…they could simply buy a Chevrolet. (Another problem was that even the post-1965 Plymouths weren’t as smooth or quiet as a Ford or Chevrolet.) Instead of building upon its strengths, Chrysler moved away from them.
Regarding Project Genesis, I think it was too little, too late. It was launched long after the Great SUV Epoch had begun. This only served to demonstrate how absolutely clueless the Cerberus crew was regarding the high costs of developing, manufacturing and selling automobiles.
On the face of it, this idea was a great plan if had been launched in 1989. That was the time that Chrysler could have trimmed models and ultimately the Plymouth Division. By the time Project Genesis actually surfaced, Jeeps, SUVs and trucks were the only vehicles that sold well and was the only thing keeping the Corporation going.
Why else would have Daimler been interested in the first instance? Surely, they were intrigued by the sophisticated engineering of the Plymouth Neon and had to purchase the company (a la Victor Kiam).
At that time, sedans were an ever-larger stone around the neck of Chrysler with no easy way out. How could they (Cerberus) announce such a plan with a straight face? Maybe it was just another part of the sham show and a way to pump the stock some more…
True. That’s essentially the story of all U.S. automakers — they have tended to be slow to take even the most basic steps to evolve, e.g., GM had to implode in 2009 before it got more aggressive in killing off excess brands.