The 1962-64 Plymouth is one of the most prescient U.S. cars of the 1960s. Aside from the 1953 Plymouth, the 1962 redesign represented the first serious effort by a Big Three automaker to emphasize a space-efficient design for a six-passenger family car.
Although it took more than a decade for the rest of Detroit to follow suit, the late-70s Caprices and LTDs were remarkably similar in size to the 1962-64 Plymouth. One might even speculate that Plymouth influenced Ford to put its full-sized cars on a more modest diet in 1965, when they lost almost 300 pounds and three inches of width.
Despite that legacy, the downsized Plymouth has frequently been dismissed as a disastrous wrong turn for Chrysler. As a case in point, Cars of the Sizzling ’60s describes the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge as “an ill-timed move to compact dimensions that sets the divisions back years” (auto editors of Consumer Guide, 2002; p. 94).
1963-64 Plymouth was actually a big success
Would you be surprised to learn that once the mid-sized body received a reskinning in 1963-64 that almost 20 percent more were produced than the 1960-61 full-sized Plymouths? Indeed, for 1964 volume surpassed 297,000 units, which was higher than annual production for big Plymouths during the entire 1970s. Hey, wasn’t bigger supposed to sell better?
For 1964 the base Plymouth Savoy two-door sedan was only $30 more than the equivalent mid-sized Ford Fairlane but closer in roominess to the big Ford, which listed for $240 more. Pictured is a top-of-line Sport Fury (Old Car Brochures).
Aaron Severson (2009b) argued that the “fundamental problem with the ’62 Mopars was not their size; it was that they were ugly and seemed like poor value next to their Chevrolet, Ford, and AMC competition.” He also suggested that Chrysler “made no great effort to educate buyers on the virtues of a smaller big car, like ease of parking, or the better gas mileage and performance made possible by the reduced curb weight. Instead, the company simply dumped these cars on the market as if they were business as usual, expecting their dealers and salespeople to sort it out.”
This is a thoughtful perspective that goes a ways toward challenging industry groupthink. I’d like to present a handful of follow-up points.
Plymouth marketing downplayed downsizing
Severson was correct that Plymouth soft-pedaled the advantages of trimmer dimensions.
As a case in point, a 1962 brochure noted, “Thanks to a number of improvements, Plymouth now delivers better gas economy. Probably the best mileage you can get in any full-sized car, as a matter of fact.” Probably? In a car weighing 500 pounds less than a Ford Galaxie? And might those “slender new dimensions” have contributed to better mileage? Do tell!
No can do. The brochure instead focused on the car’s styling. “Look over Forward Flair Design and draw your own conclusions. We’re confident you’ll conclude Plymouth is the best-looking low-price car you ever saw — and the right car for you in ’62.”
Ads tended to focus even less attention on the car’s practical features. For example, the above ad only discusses styling.
Dodge marketing trumpeted ‘the new lean breed’
The Dodge Dart offered an interesting counterpoint. The car was very close to the Plymouth in size, styling and price. However, marketing placed more of an emphasis on the engineering advantages of the downsized body.
For example, a Dodge brochure declared the Dart/Polara “the new lean breed.” Copy writers bashed Detroit’s bigger + glitzier = better groupthink with relish:
“We’ve engineered out the dead weight. Gone is useless sheet metal, overhang and chrome. Gone is flashiness and fat. What’s left is pure muscle — nearly two tons of hard, lean, lusty road machinery. The new Dart 440, with standard V8 and stick shift, accelerates 9 percent better than last year’s comparable model from zero to 60 . . . .”
Dodge’s 1962 advertising insisted that “the era of juke-box design is dead. That status symbolism is dull. That to butter up a car with ostentatious nothings is to cover up stale bread” (Old Car Brochures).
Plymouth’s output fell slightly less than Dodge’s
Which marketing approach worked better? Plymouth’s 1962 production declined 12 percent whereas the Dart line dropped by 19 percent.
Dodge’s marketing might have lost credibility because it wasn’t fully in sync with the product. As a painfully obvious case in point, why did Dodge rail about “juke-box styling” when the Dart was a poster child for the genre?
One could argue that Plymouth’s somewhat cleaner and more mainstream styling trumped Dodge’s stronger efforts to educate buyers about the practical advantages of the “lean breed.”
The 1962 Plymouth and Dodge looked similar because they shared door sheetmetal. However, the Dodge had a much uglier front and a more gimmicky rear (Old Car Brochures).
Note that the above production comparison does not include the 1961 Polara, which was a top-of-line stretched version of the Dart. Nor does it include the Custom 880, which was a mid-1962 return of the full-sized body.
Custom 880 production hit 17,500 — a 25 percent increase over the similarly priced 1961 Polara. If you combined Dodge’s mid-sized and big-car production, it was still off 16 percent — four points more than Plymouth’s.
Dodge referred to the 1962 Dart as “new size” once big cars were again offered. The Custom 880 was lauded as offering “the kind of comfort and luxury that only a big car can give you.” Click on image to enlarge (Old Car Brochures).
Dodge begins to compete against Plymouth
As context, it may be helpful to know that up through 1959 Dodge was strictly a premium-priced brand that competed with the likes of Pontiac. However, in 1960 Dodge entered the low-priced field with the Dart, whose entry-level models cost only $20 more than the equivalent Plymouth. The Dart was such a hit that it outproduced the senior Plymouth line by more than 60,000 units.
David Zatz (2013) of allpar.com suggested that the Dart sold better because Dodge was viewed as a more prestigious brand than Plymouth. To the degree this was true, the added status would presumably wear off as people began to see Dodge as naught but a slightly tarted up Plymouth. Indeed, for 1961 Dart production dropped below Plymouth’s again even though the latter’s styling was weirder. Behold, the infamous shark-nose front!
The 1961 full-sized Plymouth proved so unpopular that it was outsold by the dowdy senior Rambler. Nevertheless, Plymouth’s production of roughly 207,000 units beat Dodge’s by around 10,000 units (Old Car Brochures).
I suspect that a more important factor was Chrysler’s reorganization of its dealer networks in the early-60s. Launching the low-priced Dart was an outcome of the decision to stop selling Plymouths at Dodge dealers (Watson, 2013). Might at least some 1960 Dart sales have resulted from previous Plymouth owners who stuck with their existing dealer when it only offered Dodges?
In 1961 the full-sized Plymouth once again outproduced the Dart. However, the Chrysler Corporation now had two brands competing directly against each other in the low-priced field. This all but guaranteed that Plymouth’s sales would be depressed, particularly in relation to Ford and Chevrolet.
Dodge dealer network proved to be weaker
Plymouth did possess a key advantage over Dodge. Pairing Plymouth with Chrysler dealers offered a broader range of passenger cars than Dodge did. That could have been particularly important in the first half of the 1962 model year, when only the Chrysler brand offered a full-sized entry. Production for the lowest-priced Chrysler, the Newport, jumped 46 percent over 1961.
Dodge dealers complained loudly enough that they received the Custom 880. Even so, the revived full-sized Dodge was consistently outsold by the Newport by more than three-to-one during the 1962-64 period.
Plymouth was biggest of mid-sized cars
During the post-war era the Big Three had a tendency to offer products that were strikingly similar in dimensions. However, for 1962 the mid-sized (or “intermediate”) field was so new that Detroit’s usual groupthink had not yet congealed. An unusually diverse range of cars were considered mid sized. These included the Chrysler twins, the new-for-1962 Ford Fairlane and Mercury Meteor, the senior Ramblers and the Studebaker.
The Fairlane was the closest mid-sized competitor to the Plymouth. Although the Plymouth’s wheelbase was only a half inch longer than the Fairlane’s, in all other respects it was a step up in size: five inches longer, four inches wider and more than 160 pounds heavier. That translated into hip room halfway between a Fairlane and a Galaxie, and legroom very close to the latter.
By the same token, the 1962 Plymouth was halfway between the Valiant and its full-sized predecessor in width, weight and hip room. This was not merely a “stretched” compact body.
Plymouth’s pricing was in sync with its size
Plymouth’s pricing strategy aligned with its dimensions. An base Savoy two-door sedan was priced lower than the 1961 model (by $54) and a 1962 Galaxie ($247), but more than a Fairlane ($52) and a Valiant ($276).
If you didn’t mind the somewhat smaller size, the 1962 Plymouth was arguably a better value because of its superior engineering. This included torsion-bar suspension, the bullet-proof slant six engine, and a three- rather than two-speed automatic transmission. Lawrence Jones (2012) of Curbside Classic quite rightfully described the 1962 Plymouths as “some of the best balanced, best driving cars on the road.”
Sales were nevertheless terrible in 1962 — but then jumped 45 percent in 1963. The Valiant saw a similar increase. Not so coincidentally, both cars were given more conventional styling.
Plymouth Valiant output increased roughly 43 percent in 1963 (top image) once the car’s sci-fi styling from 1962 was ditched for a more conventional look. Pictured are the top-of-line Signet two-door hardtops (Old Car Brochures).
Soaring sales for both the Valiant and Plymouth after 1962 could also be attributed to a greater focus on quality, such as with a new five-year, 50,000-mile powertrain warranty.
Was it a mistake to downsize rather than add a line?
Jeffrey Godshall (1996) has criticized Chrysler for downsizing its big cars rather than adding an extra line. Ford did the latter in 1962 and GM followed suit two years later. Was that a better way for Chrysler to go?
How you answer that question depends on whether you view model proliferation as a good thing or not. I tend to think it isn’t for smaller automakers such as Chrysler. In the end it all comes down to economies of scale.
When the compact Valiant was introduced in 1960, production of big Plymouths fell 45 percent — and never recovered to even the depressed level of the late-50s. This was not an atypical situation. Severson (2009a) noted that sales for the Ford brand stayed relatively flat despite the introduction of the Falcon and Fairlane.
Detroit groupthink suggests that by 1964 Plymouth was at a marked disadvantage to Ford and Chevrolet because it didn’t offer a three-tiered line up of compacts, mid-sized and large cars.
I grant you that Plymouth’s 1965 return to matching the Big Two model for model resulted in the brand’s best year since 1957. However, trying to keep up with Ford and Chevy ultimately became Plymouth’s undoing because it spread the brand’s resources too thin.
Plymouth’s 1964 output was higher than in 1975-79
Up through the mid-70s Plymouth production tended to hover in the 700,000-to-800,000 range. However, from 1970 onward that was primarily driven by high sales of the Valiant/Duster line of compacts. From 1975-79 total Plymouth production never surpassed 1964’s output of almost 550,000 units. That was despite offering a broader range of cars.
The 1963 Dodge was stretched three inches to in wheelbase and six inches in length (116 and 208 inches, respectively). This hints at how Plymouth could have gone upmarket without a full-sized platform (Old Car Brochures).
As with Chrysler’s aggressive efforts in 1955 to become more like the Big Two, short-term success would lead to long-term failure.
Chrysler could have placed all of its larger cars on a single modular platform that straddled the mid-sized and full-sized markets. That would have resulted in considerable cost savings while offering a more efficient alternative to the Big Two’s land yachts (go here for further discussion).
Chrysler gave up on the lean breed too quickly
The downsized 1962s were not introduced as part of a long-range corporate strategy akin to Chrysler’s decision in the early-80s to concentrate on smaller, front-wheel-drive cars. Historical accounts typically describe this as an 11th-hour, tactical move demanded by corporate President William Newberg when he thought GM was planning to shrink its full-sized Chevy.
Newberg was soon gone, his intelligence proved to be inaccurate and sales of the lean breed were initially weak. No one of Lee Iacocca’s stature emerged to calm dealer nerves and focus on perfecting the styling, marketing and product range of the lean breed. Not surprisingly, Newberg’s successor Lynn Townsend insisted that Chrysler return to mimicking GM and Ford model for model.
The 1977 Plymouth Gran Fury sold so poorly against the newly downsized Chevrolet — less than 50,000 units — that it was discontinued for 1978 (Old Car Brochures).
For 1965 the Fury nameplate graced a new full-sized range while the Belvedere was kept as a separate mid-sized line. For the next decade Chrysler largely aped the Big Two’s product decisions.
Chrysler was slow to downsize big cars in late-70s
Even after the first oil crisis of 1973 the company was slower to downsize its full- and mid-sized offerings than GM. Chrysler bet too heavily on “useless sheet metal, overhang and chrome.” (Go here for an essay on the 1969-77 full-sized Plymouths.)
Five decades later, Newberg still doesn’t receive adequate credit from automotive historians for anticipating the future.
Chrysler Corp. finally did in the late-70s what it could have done in 1962-65 — concentrate on a lineup based on a compact and mid-sized platform. Click on image to enlarge 1980 ad (Old Car Advertisements).
One might reasonably argue that he was an accidental visionary. But even if that were true, I still think it fair to say that Newberg was unlucky to inherit a chief designer who was past his prime. If the 1962 Plymouth had the better styling of the 1963-64 models, it might have been able to convince more skeptics that Americans would buy an efficiently sized family car.
NOTES:
This story was first posted on July 30, 2013 and expanded on Aug. 28, 2020 and Aug. 25, 2023. Market share and production figures for individual nameplates were calculated from base data from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2002) and Gunnell (2002). Prices and most exterior dimensions are from Gunnell; interior dimensions from automaker marketing materials. Weight figures are for base four-door sedans.
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9 Comments
Had the 1962 Plymouth received the 1963 design earlier, things could have been different. There was also a photo of a clay model showing a proposed 1962 DeSoto based on a rendering by Don Kopka who was very Mercury lookalike (not a coincidence since Don Kopka moved from Chrysler to Ford) who could have made a nice Plymouth as well (and maybe Elwood Engel got the inspiration from Don Kopka’s proposed DeSoto when he supervised the roofline of the 1965 Chrysler Newport and Dodge 880 4-door sedans its 6 window version). https://auto.howstuffworks.com/1960s-chrysler-concept-cars.htm
Right. I am skeptical of the idea that Exner didn’t have time to rethink the styling of the 1962 models when he was ordered to downsize them. As discussed here, the engineering department managed to do much more than a simple nip and tuck.
Engel had a better sense than Exner of what kind of styling would sell, but he arguably stuck with the boxy look too long. The six-windowed full-sized cars didn’t come off so bad, but the 1966-67 Plymouth Satellite looked like a brick . . . at the same time that “coke bottle” styling was becoming quite popular.
Now then you mention it, I wonder if the brick look of the 1966-67 Belvedere/Satellite/Coronet had arrived a couple of model years earlier like 1963 or 1964 if things could have been different?
One thing to keep in mind is that the 1963 Chrysler line-up – including the full-size Plymouth – was the work of Exner. They had already been completed when Engel joined the company.
When Engel first saw the 1963 line-up, he told Townsend that they were good-looking cars. He made only minor changes to them (the most notable was raising the rear deck lid and quarter panels on the Valiant). This suggests that what Exner needed was management strong enough to reign in his tendencies to explore offbeat themes. Such things may be good for show cars designed to “wow” the audience, but not production vehicles that had to be sold to Middle America.
That’s a really good point — the 1963 Plymouths were nicely done. So too were the Valiant and Dart compacts (particularly the latter). The medium-sized Dodges still had a weird front end, but the overall design was a big improvement.
I assume that Exner was axed partly because Townsend felt like he needed to make a big personnel move to ease the anxiety of dealers. However, I could also see how Townsend didn’t want to have to micromanage styling. Exner had a quirky enough design sensibility that he apparently pressed hard for a weird asymmetric rear for the 1962 Plymouth.
One point was completely missing, and another glossed over.
Chrysler was still reeling from the quality control- or lack of it- hangover from the rushed and shoddily built 1957’s. Remember, also, Chrysler narrowly averted bankruptcy in 1961. The public was aware.
Rambler was still riding high on its “economy” reputation, and high resale value, though that would soon tumble with the introduction of Ford, Chevy, and BOP “Rambler sized” cars, especially after the introduction of the GM ‘64’s.
Second, the 63-4 Plymouth and Dodge line were just as peculiarly styled as the 62’s. I dare say even more so. Why did they sell?
The big difference:
The 5 year 50,000 mile warranty.
Period.
It was unprecedented, and reassured the public.
When they were introduced, I hated the 62 Dodges and Plymouths- (but I like them today, because they are so….60’s). Except for the high beams in the grille, the Dodge front was vaguely similar to the 65 Mustang, in a fashion.
I thought, as a young kid, that the 64 Plymouth was a poorly-executed attempt to copy the 63 Chevy grille and force it upon that body. Both 63-4 Plymouths and Dodges were ham-fisted. Compare either to a 63-4 Galaxie or Impala; both are extremely good looking cars, no apologies necessary.
Since then, we’ve seen Hyundai successfully resurrect a poor reputation by introducing the 10 year, 100,000 mile warranty. History does repeat itself, if one looks.
Good point about shoddy assembly quality. My vague recollection is that Consumer Reports was complaining about that beginning in 1955, although it sounds like problems dramatically escalated in 1957.
Chrysler’s brush with bankruptcy is worth mentioning; I just don’t have a sense of how much that might have influenced sales. Surely the drip, drip, drip of bad news in the press couldn’t have helped, but I could see how at least some might have assumed that Chrysler was “too big to fail.” Thus, less fear of buying an orphan. It didn’t seem to hurt Chrysler brand sales.
Your point is well taken that the five-year, 50,000 warranty was a big deal. I suspect that it was such an effective marketing move partly because it reinforced the automaker’s already good reputation for its drivetrains.
Styling is always a difficult topic to debate because aesthetic taste can vary so widely. I certainly wouldn’t give the 1963-64 Plymouths any design awards, but they were more conventional than the 1962 models. At least to my eyes, the fuselage look on the 1962s didn’t work very well without curved side glass. I do think that the 1962 Plymouth came off a lot better than the Dodge, particularly in the front end.
When I was a kid I had the same reaction as you did to the 1964 Plymouth’s grille — not a very good imitation of the 1963 Chevy’s.
Hindsight is almost always correct, but I think reasonable can agree: Chrysler’s problems began in the fall of 1959, which is when the De Soto should have ended and when Dodge been set up with the line-up of Darts, Matadors and by the summer of 1960, the Lancer. The 1960-1961 Plymouths featuring the ridiculous ’60 fins and “cars that ate Tokyo” front-clips should have been nixed by management. Surely, Exner could have come up with something similar to the Dodge, but evolutionary with ties to a ’59 Plymouth utilizing the new unit-body shell.
As has been noted by others earlier and in other “Indie Auto” discussions, the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth “intermediates” were too much like the Valiant / Lancer. If you liked the Chrysler compacts, then the 1962 “intermediates” were probably attractive to you. The 1963 Plymouth was more conventionally styled than the ’63 Dodge and the 1964s were both the best of the three-years, with the Plymouth resembling the 1963 full-size Chevy, at least to my eye.
I think the problems at Chrysler began in 1955-1956. If the corporation had held the 1957 cars to the fall of 1957, the quality issues of the 1957s might not have been so pronounced with snapping torsion-bars and rampant rust. And G.M.’s 1959 cars might have not appeared until 1960. Chrysler’s dealer realignment might have better taken place in 1960 and the unit-body cars come on-line in 1960 (Valiant) and 1961. The Slant Six could have still hit in the fall of 1959. My sense is that L. L. “Tex” Colbert made promises to his bankers that as his time at Chrysler progressed, he could not reasonably keep. And while few people in 1955-1956 could predict that the U.S. economy would cough in 1958, my sense is that Alfred P. Sloan’s staff was more on top of it as he was leaving G.M. than Ford, Chrysler or Studebaker-Packard.
In hindsight, the Detroit automaker groupthink just could not admit contraction and that smaller, more rational cars could sell. George Romney came to this conclusion in 1955-1956-1957, and it must have been mentally painful. Studebaker was forced to that conclusion in 1956-1957-1958 to focus on the Lark. While I admire Ed Cole for spearheading the Corvair through G.M., as much as I like the G.M. compact, Cole swung for the fences while Robert McNamara’s team focused on simplicity and a more accessible, conventional car in the Falcon. The folks at Highland Park seemed to me to think that they had a magic touch, but the fickle automotive buying public was not responding in 1958 as they did in the fall of 1954. Why Chrysler did not consolidate its divisions as Ford did in 1957-1958 is beyond me? Ford even had to shutter Benson Ford’s precious Continental Division. All Chrysler had to do was tell Groucho and George Fenneman “thank you and good night”!
While I can certainly agree that the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth package size was a breath of fresh air (in export markets, anyway), I could never understand what Exner was aiming for with the style of the ’62s. Yes, I’ve seen the pictures of the sketches and clays, but to me they just don’t make sense. To have a sort of smooth fuselage-like body section interrupted with almost-random flat planes – it just made me go ‘Huh?’
So often automotive style advances seem gradual, growing out of what we’ve seen before. There may be a big step in style or proportions, but we can see the relationship to what went before; we nod and think ‘Yes, this is good’. The ’62s just seemed to come out of nowhere. They are just so different, but not in a particularly pleasant way. They are so far from the mainstream of the time that they seem disconnected from it, like we’re skipping a few generations. The shoulderless C-pillar treatment is great, and a definite advance; it reappeared later in the sixties. I kind of like the front fender-to-door treatment, with that horizontal plane joining the two and adding some tension. But the rear fender of the Dodge seems overly-fussy, while the treatment on the Plymouth just seems weird, almost unfinished somehow. Then there was that funny squarish hop-up in the rear side window.
Usually when you look at early sketches you can grasp the theme the designer is going for, and see the refinements. You look at the production vehicle and think – yes, lower it a bit, go a size larger or two for the wheels, take off some of the scripts, and that would probably be what the designer intended. But with Exner’s ’62s, there are so many things that just seem a bit… strange.
It almost makes me wonder….was he really over that heart attack, or did he perhaps go back to work too soon?
Had the 1962 Plymouth received the 1963 design earlier, things could have been different. There was also a photo of a clay model showing a proposed 1962 DeSoto based on a rendering by Don Kopka who was very Mercury lookalike (not a coincidence since Don Kopka moved from Chrysler to Ford) who could have made a nice Plymouth as well (and maybe Elwood Engel got the inspiration from Don Kopka’s proposed DeSoto when he supervised the roofline of the 1965 Chrysler Newport and Dodge 880 4-door sedans its 6 window version).
https://auto.howstuffworks.com/1960s-chrysler-concept-cars.htm
Right. I am skeptical of the idea that Exner didn’t have time to rethink the styling of the 1962 models when he was ordered to downsize them. As discussed here, the engineering department managed to do much more than a simple nip and tuck.
Engel had a better sense than Exner of what kind of styling would sell, but he arguably stuck with the boxy look too long. The six-windowed full-sized cars didn’t come off so bad, but the 1966-67 Plymouth Satellite looked like a brick . . . at the same time that “coke bottle” styling was becoming quite popular.
Now then you mention it, I wonder if the brick look of the 1966-67 Belvedere/Satellite/Coronet had arrived a couple of model years earlier like 1963 or 1964 if things could have been different?
One thing to keep in mind is that the 1963 Chrysler line-up – including the full-size Plymouth – was the work of Exner. They had already been completed when Engel joined the company.
When Engel first saw the 1963 line-up, he told Townsend that they were good-looking cars. He made only minor changes to them (the most notable was raising the rear deck lid and quarter panels on the Valiant). This suggests that what Exner needed was management strong enough to reign in his tendencies to explore offbeat themes. Such things may be good for show cars designed to “wow” the audience, but not production vehicles that had to be sold to Middle America.
That’s a really good point — the 1963 Plymouths were nicely done. So too were the Valiant and Dart compacts (particularly the latter). The medium-sized Dodges still had a weird front end, but the overall design was a big improvement.
I assume that Exner was axed partly because Townsend felt like he needed to make a big personnel move to ease the anxiety of dealers. However, I could also see how Townsend didn’t want to have to micromanage styling. Exner had a quirky enough design sensibility that he apparently pressed hard for a weird asymmetric rear for the 1962 Plymouth.
One point was completely missing, and another glossed over.
Chrysler was still reeling from the quality control- or lack of it- hangover from the rushed and shoddily built 1957’s. Remember, also, Chrysler narrowly averted bankruptcy in 1961. The public was aware.
Rambler was still riding high on its “economy” reputation, and high resale value, though that would soon tumble with the introduction of Ford, Chevy, and BOP “Rambler sized” cars, especially after the introduction of the GM ‘64’s.
Second, the 63-4 Plymouth and Dodge line were just as peculiarly styled as the 62’s. I dare say even more so. Why did they sell?
The big difference:
The 5 year 50,000 mile warranty.
Period.
It was unprecedented, and reassured the public.
When they were introduced, I hated the 62 Dodges and Plymouths- (but I like them today, because they are so….60’s). Except for the high beams in the grille, the Dodge front was vaguely similar to the 65 Mustang, in a fashion.
I thought, as a young kid, that the 64 Plymouth was a poorly-executed attempt to copy the 63 Chevy grille and force it upon that body. Both 63-4 Plymouths and Dodges were ham-fisted. Compare either to a 63-4 Galaxie or Impala; both are extremely good looking cars, no apologies necessary.
Since then, we’ve seen Hyundai successfully resurrect a poor reputation by introducing the 10 year, 100,000 mile warranty. History does repeat itself, if one looks.
Good point about shoddy assembly quality. My vague recollection is that Consumer Reports was complaining about that beginning in 1955, although it sounds like problems dramatically escalated in 1957.
I say a bit more about defects resulting from the rushed engineering of the 1957 models in a companion piece, “Did a rumor cause the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge?”
Chrysler’s brush with bankruptcy is worth mentioning; I just don’t have a sense of how much that might have influenced sales. Surely the drip, drip, drip of bad news in the press couldn’t have helped, but I could see how at least some might have assumed that Chrysler was “too big to fail.” Thus, less fear of buying an orphan. It didn’t seem to hurt Chrysler brand sales.
Your point is well taken that the five-year, 50,000 warranty was a big deal. I suspect that it was such an effective marketing move partly because it reinforced the automaker’s already good reputation for its drivetrains.
Styling is always a difficult topic to debate because aesthetic taste can vary so widely. I certainly wouldn’t give the 1963-64 Plymouths any design awards, but they were more conventional than the 1962 models. At least to my eyes, the fuselage look on the 1962s didn’t work very well without curved side glass. I do think that the 1962 Plymouth came off a lot better than the Dodge, particularly in the front end.
When I was a kid I had the same reaction as you did to the 1964 Plymouth’s grille — not a very good imitation of the 1963 Chevy’s.
Hindsight is almost always correct, but I think reasonable can agree: Chrysler’s problems began in the fall of 1959, which is when the De Soto should have ended and when Dodge been set up with the line-up of Darts, Matadors and by the summer of 1960, the Lancer. The 1960-1961 Plymouths featuring the ridiculous ’60 fins and “cars that ate Tokyo” front-clips should have been nixed by management. Surely, Exner could have come up with something similar to the Dodge, but evolutionary with ties to a ’59 Plymouth utilizing the new unit-body shell.
As has been noted by others earlier and in other “Indie Auto” discussions, the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth “intermediates” were too much like the Valiant / Lancer. If you liked the Chrysler compacts, then the 1962 “intermediates” were probably attractive to you. The 1963 Plymouth was more conventionally styled than the ’63 Dodge and the 1964s were both the best of the three-years, with the Plymouth resembling the 1963 full-size Chevy, at least to my eye.
I think the problems at Chrysler began in 1955-1956. If the corporation had held the 1957 cars to the fall of 1957, the quality issues of the 1957s might not have been so pronounced with snapping torsion-bars and rampant rust. And G.M.’s 1959 cars might have not appeared until 1960. Chrysler’s dealer realignment might have better taken place in 1960 and the unit-body cars come on-line in 1960 (Valiant) and 1961. The Slant Six could have still hit in the fall of 1959. My sense is that L. L. “Tex” Colbert made promises to his bankers that as his time at Chrysler progressed, he could not reasonably keep. And while few people in 1955-1956 could predict that the U.S. economy would cough in 1958, my sense is that Alfred P. Sloan’s staff was more on top of it as he was leaving G.M. than Ford, Chrysler or Studebaker-Packard.
In hindsight, the Detroit automaker groupthink just could not admit contraction and that smaller, more rational cars could sell. George Romney came to this conclusion in 1955-1956-1957, and it must have been mentally painful. Studebaker was forced to that conclusion in 1956-1957-1958 to focus on the Lark. While I admire Ed Cole for spearheading the Corvair through G.M., as much as I like the G.M. compact, Cole swung for the fences while Robert McNamara’s team focused on simplicity and a more accessible, conventional car in the Falcon. The folks at Highland Park seemed to me to think that they had a magic touch, but the fickle automotive buying public was not responding in 1958 as they did in the fall of 1954. Why Chrysler did not consolidate its divisions as Ford did in 1957-1958 is beyond me? Ford even had to shutter Benson Ford’s precious Continental Division. All Chrysler had to do was tell Groucho and George Fenneman “thank you and good night”!
While I can certainly agree that the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth package size was a breath of fresh air (in export markets, anyway), I could never understand what Exner was aiming for with the style of the ’62s. Yes, I’ve seen the pictures of the sketches and clays, but to me they just don’t make sense. To have a sort of smooth fuselage-like body section interrupted with almost-random flat planes – it just made me go ‘Huh?’
So often automotive style advances seem gradual, growing out of what we’ve seen before. There may be a big step in style or proportions, but we can see the relationship to what went before; we nod and think ‘Yes, this is good’. The ’62s just seemed to come out of nowhere. They are just so different, but not in a particularly pleasant way. They are so far from the mainstream of the time that they seem disconnected from it, like we’re skipping a few generations. The shoulderless C-pillar treatment is great, and a definite advance; it reappeared later in the sixties. I kind of like the front fender-to-door treatment, with that horizontal plane joining the two and adding some tension. But the rear fender of the Dodge seems overly-fussy, while the treatment on the Plymouth just seems weird, almost unfinished somehow. Then there was that funny squarish hop-up in the rear side window.
Usually when you look at early sketches you can grasp the theme the designer is going for, and see the refinements. You look at the production vehicle and think – yes, lower it a bit, go a size larger or two for the wheels, take off some of the scripts, and that would probably be what the designer intended. But with Exner’s ’62s, there are so many things that just seem a bit… strange.
It almost makes me wonder….was he really over that heart attack, or did he perhaps go back to work too soon?