Imagine that you run Volkswagen’s American operations in 1959. Detroit has finally woken up to the public’s growing interest in small cars.
Studebaker and American Motors are already seeing dramatic sales increases after introducing compact models. In the next few years the Big Three plan to unleash one of the most aggressive product blitzes in the entire history of the American auto industry.
VW was Detroit’s biggest target because it dominated import sales in the late-50s (Hiott, 2012). Almost 120,000 VWs were registered in the U.S. during the 1959 calendar year (Gunnell, 2004).
What would you do?
Volkswagen doubles down on the Beetle’s uniqueness
One of Doyle Dane Bernbach’s first print advertisements in 1960 would prove to be its most famous. Click on image to enlarge (Automotive History Preservation Society).
Embattled automakers usually try to be more like everyone else. So it would have been understandable if Volkswagen of America head Carl Hahn had tried to “Americanize” VW. Instead, he went in the opposite direction by emphasizing the Beetle’s uniqueness.
Hahn continued to build VW’s dealer network, which was unusual among imports of that era by emphasizing quality of service and availability of parts.
He also didn’t press corporate headquarters back in Wolfsburg, Germany to give VW’s product line more modern styling. Hahn instead focused on additional rounds of functional improvements.
Where Hahn changed course was with VW’s marketing (Hiott, 2012). The brand’s steady growth during the 1950s had largely occurred by word of mouth. VW now needed a national advertising campaign, he thought. But not a conventional one. That’s why he ultimately turned to Doyle Dane Bernbach, a then second-tier ad agency that had a reputation for quirky approaches.
VW’s emphasis on quality of manufacture tapped into public frustration with Detroit workmanship. Click on image to enlarge (Automotive History Preservation Society).
In the book, Thinking Small, Andrea Hiott (2012) paints a fascinating picture of DDB’s VW campaign, which helped propel the brand to a 37 percent sales increase in 1960 despite a 27 percent drop in overall import sales due to the new Big Three compacts.
As a case in point, the spectacularly successful “Think small” ad almost received the bland headline “Welcome” because art director Helmut Krone was concerned that Americans were too enamored with bigness.
Krone was overruled by VW — and was so worried that “his whole career would be ruined” by the ad that he got out of town when it was first published in a February 1960 issue of Life magazine (Hiott, 2012; p. 364). The ad instead turbocharged his career.
Hiott paints a complex picture of why DDB’s VW campaign made such a big splash. However, the campaign’s most important quality was its simple honesty during an era when glitzy ad-speak dominated.
DDB’s approach was intentional. Krone took what were the standard rules of ad composition and layout and did the opposite as often as he could. For example, he used an unusually dense text block and a large amount of white space.
Challenging ad industry groupthink proved to be career making rather than breaking.
“DDB’s Volkswagen campaign is considered to this day to be the best ad campaign ever conceived,” says Hiott (2012, p. 367). “At the end of the 1990s, Advertising Age listed it as the number one in the Century’s Top 100 advertising campaigns. And as Jerry Della Femina, ‘the pundit of advertising,’ once said, ‘In the beginning, there was Volkswagen. That’s the first campaign that everyone can trace back and say ‘That is where the changeover began.'”
Ads used creative ways to show the VW’s unusual functional qualities, such as its air-cooled engine. Click on image to enlarge (Automotive History Preservation Society).
Certainly DDB deserves a lot of credit for the innovativeness of its ads. But what is less frequently noted is that the agency would have had far less license to be different if VW had not been the single most unconventional major automaker of the post-war period. A similar marketing strategy applied to, say, the 1962-64 “lean breed” mid-sized cars from Chrysler would not have had nearly as much impact.
This can be most obviously seen regarding VW’s militant rejection of planned obsolescence. The Beetle was sold in the U.S. for a remarkably long period of time — roughly a quarter century. Instead of downplaying that fact, VW ads emphasized it over and over with ad headlines such as, “We don’t have to start from scratch each year.”
VW’s messaging consistency was crucial to its success
A key theme of VW’s advertising was the automaker’s rejection of planned obsolescence and form over function. Click on image to enlarge (Automotive History Preservation Society).
I would argue that the key to the success of this message was its consistency — and conviction. At various points Studebaker and American Motors attempted to eschew annual styling changes, but they came off as short-term tactical moves grounded in desperation.
One could quite rightly argue that VW stuck with the original Beetle far too long. However, modernizing the brand’s product line could have gone hand in hand with a continued focus on practical improvements. To a certain degree VW did carry on this tradition after it switched to a front-wheel drive line up. What was lost in the transition was a commitment to offering unique products with substantive advantages over the competition.
By the 1980s, Japanese brands such as Honda and Toyota were offering economy cars that were more Beetle-like in their simple but elegant functionality than VW’s offerings.
This is why any agency would have had a much harder time developing distinctive advertising for VW once the Beetle era ended. The dirty little secret of the ad business is that it generally can’t perform a miracle. There’s only so much marketeers can do with an undistinguished product.
What contemporary vehicle would lend itself to an advertising campaign that so creatively emphasized its practical advantages? This is a 1961 ad; click on image to enlarge (Automotive History Preservation Society).
NOTES:
This article was originally posted on Aug. 15, 2014, expanded on Sept. 17, 2021 and updated on Sept. 20, 2023.
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7 Comments
VW now offers the same thrill-a-minute lineup of cros/suv/overs as every other car maker in the world, including the what-are-they-thinking Atlas Cross Sport. If ugly is the definition of a “distinguished product”, then this nightmare should be a sales superstar.
Volkwagen’s transformation is a particularly revealing example of industry groupthink. Pretty much everything that the automaker stood for in the 1960s has been turned on its head. They might as well have changed the name of the company.
I’ve critiqued the New Beetle a fair amount (such as here) because it is emblematic of VW no longer understanding what made the original so special.
You mention the Atlas Cross Sport; that’s a good example of how VW has recently played follow the leader with “me-too” cars.
The main ray of hope I see is VW’s championing of electric vehicles. For all the uncertainties of that market, I wouldn’t be surprised if that proves to be an excellent move.
First, I would challenge that Doyle Dane Bernbach was a “second-tier” ad agency. Yes, they were not J. Walter Thompson (Ford) or Campbell-Ewald (Chevrolet), but they were blue-ribbon Madison Avenue. DDB established much of VW’s ;ate-1950s / early 1960s branding in the U.S. via print ads, rather than television. The most memorable VW TV ad was that of the answer to the question: “What does the snow-plow driver drive to reach the snow-plow ?” As a 50-year-plus veteran of media communications, simplicity AND continuity are the keys to success as long as the product is outstanding. The problem for Volkswagen became when it developed a bigger line of cars for the U.S. beyond the Beetle, the bus and the Karman Ghia. (1500-411, then the Rabbit, Scirocco, 914, etc.) What is interesting is that in the U.S. in 1973, Honda really rose to prominence with the Civic and the message on radio, TV and print: “We keep it simple!”, which was what DDB said about the VW in the late 1950s and early 1960s !
Thanks for the great article and recommendations. I appreciate the new view on this which I had not considered before, especially the DDB side of things and how that is such a part of the VW story. Does not get told much. Glad to find a place it did.
In re-reading these observations, a couple of points came to mind: First, I think Carl Hahn’s job with Volkswagen U.S. was to pick up the ball from Max Hoffman. Hahn put together a stronger dealer network with an emphasis on training technicians for every dealership. I dated a girl briefly in the mid-1960s whose father opened a brand-new high-tech modern dealership on Indianapolis’ southside. Prior to that the only VW dealer in town was an old-line importer of British (Jaguars, MGs and Austin-Healys) and German sports cars. The Mercedes dealer had technicians who would work on VWs and Porsches, but it was by appointment only and very expensive. Building a strong, well-trained body of service technicians and installing them in dealers adhering to high standards, the consumer field perceptions matched the high quality of the advertising. Contrast that to the minefields encountered in most domestic dealerships service departments.
The second point, I believe, is that in the 1950s and 1960s, Volkswagen A.G.’s goal was that of putting its vehicles in every country in the world and replicating its success in the U.S. wherever possible. I remember people in my town buying new Renault Dauphines in the early 1960s, only to be stranded trying to get the car serviced or worse, trying to obtain parts. I think that the reliability of the dealer, the national VW parts network and the comprehensive training program made VW match the perceptions that had been created in the minds of the consumers.
James, you hit the nail on the head. Around 1960, I lived in Green Bay when VW came to town with a brand new dealership in a brand new building, larger than about half the established dealerships. It came with a German mechanic and even a souvenier shop! I recall Mercedes was sold by the local Cadillac (?) dealership. My father pointed out Renaults, and even Isettas and SIMCAs. I have no idea where they were purchased.
Going back to the article’s headline question of VW in 1959 I might say that they need not worry about whatever the American manufacturers did. VW was in major expansion mode not only in the US but trying to export to everywhere in the world possible. The German home market was still rebuilding. They had a labor cost advantage and an advantageous DM to $ exchange rate in their corner. The US dealer network footprint was in growth mode. VW’s big difference from most other competitive imports was a commitment to fully stocked spares and (even against everyone) was the requirement that the service side of a dealership has as much importance as the sales side.
One might also give thought to how when a potential buyer went to a VW store they were looking at a limited range (Beetle or Karman Ghia). Go to the Chevy store to see a Corvair and were they going to be pushed to what they didn’t want Biscayne?
To what extent it may be true or not, there is a story that the VW dealership owners were a different type of person than what one would find for the American makes. Some level of counterculture types has been the description told to me.
I remember from more mid 1960s that the VW dealership were standalone stores while many other of the import dealerships were multi-makes.
VW now offers the same thrill-a-minute lineup of cros/suv/overs as every other car maker in the world, including the what-are-they-thinking Atlas Cross Sport. If ugly is the definition of a “distinguished product”, then this nightmare should be a sales superstar.
Volkwagen’s transformation is a particularly revealing example of industry groupthink. Pretty much everything that the automaker stood for in the 1960s has been turned on its head. They might as well have changed the name of the company.
I’ve critiqued the New Beetle a fair amount (such as here) because it is emblematic of VW no longer understanding what made the original so special.
You mention the Atlas Cross Sport; that’s a good example of how VW has recently played follow the leader with “me-too” cars.
The main ray of hope I see is VW’s championing of electric vehicles. For all the uncertainties of that market, I wouldn’t be surprised if that proves to be an excellent move.
First, I would challenge that Doyle Dane Bernbach was a “second-tier” ad agency. Yes, they were not J. Walter Thompson (Ford) or Campbell-Ewald (Chevrolet), but they were blue-ribbon Madison Avenue. DDB established much of VW’s ;ate-1950s / early 1960s branding in the U.S. via print ads, rather than television. The most memorable VW TV ad was that of the answer to the question: “What does the snow-plow driver drive to reach the snow-plow ?” As a 50-year-plus veteran of media communications, simplicity AND continuity are the keys to success as long as the product is outstanding. The problem for Volkswagen became when it developed a bigger line of cars for the U.S. beyond the Beetle, the bus and the Karman Ghia. (1500-411, then the Rabbit, Scirocco, 914, etc.) What is interesting is that in the U.S. in 1973, Honda really rose to prominence with the Civic and the message on radio, TV and print: “We keep it simple!”, which was what DDB said about the VW in the late 1950s and early 1960s !
Thanks for the great article and recommendations. I appreciate the new view on this which I had not considered before, especially the DDB side of things and how that is such a part of the VW story. Does not get told much. Glad to find a place it did.
In re-reading these observations, a couple of points came to mind: First, I think Carl Hahn’s job with Volkswagen U.S. was to pick up the ball from Max Hoffman. Hahn put together a stronger dealer network with an emphasis on training technicians for every dealership. I dated a girl briefly in the mid-1960s whose father opened a brand-new high-tech modern dealership on Indianapolis’ southside. Prior to that the only VW dealer in town was an old-line importer of British (Jaguars, MGs and Austin-Healys) and German sports cars. The Mercedes dealer had technicians who would work on VWs and Porsches, but it was by appointment only and very expensive. Building a strong, well-trained body of service technicians and installing them in dealers adhering to high standards, the consumer field perceptions matched the high quality of the advertising. Contrast that to the minefields encountered in most domestic dealerships service departments.
The second point, I believe, is that in the 1950s and 1960s, Volkswagen A.G.’s goal was that of putting its vehicles in every country in the world and replicating its success in the U.S. wherever possible. I remember people in my town buying new Renault Dauphines in the early 1960s, only to be stranded trying to get the car serviced or worse, trying to obtain parts. I think that the reliability of the dealer, the national VW parts network and the comprehensive training program made VW match the perceptions that had been created in the minds of the consumers.
James, you hit the nail on the head. Around 1960, I lived in Green Bay when VW came to town with a brand new dealership in a brand new building, larger than about half the established dealerships. It came with a German mechanic and even a souvenier shop! I recall Mercedes was sold by the local Cadillac (?) dealership. My father pointed out Renaults, and even Isettas and SIMCAs. I have no idea where they were purchased.
Going back to the article’s headline question of VW in 1959 I might say that they need not worry about whatever the American manufacturers did. VW was in major expansion mode not only in the US but trying to export to everywhere in the world possible. The German home market was still rebuilding. They had a labor cost advantage and an advantageous DM to $ exchange rate in their corner. The US dealer network footprint was in growth mode. VW’s big difference from most other competitive imports was a commitment to fully stocked spares and (even against everyone) was the requirement that the service side of a dealership has as much importance as the sales side.
One might also give thought to how when a potential buyer went to a VW store they were looking at a limited range (Beetle or Karman Ghia). Go to the Chevy store to see a Corvair and were they going to be pushed to what they didn’t want Biscayne?
To what extent it may be true or not, there is a story that the VW dealership owners were a different type of person than what one would find for the American makes. Some level of counterculture types has been the description told to me.
I remember from more mid 1960s that the VW dealership were standalone stores while many other of the import dealerships were multi-makes.