Among my favorite features in Collectible Automobile magazine are the profiles. The June issue included an interview Patrick Foster conducted with Bob Nixon, who played a major role in the styling of American Motors cars and trucks.
Nixon has an unusual capacity to offer important background about AMC’s history because of his experience with projects that ranged from the 1964 Rambler American to the original Grand Cherokee. Foster’s question-and-answer interview with Nixon did cover a lot of ground. However, I sometimes found myself questioning the accuracy and thoroughness of Nixon’s comments.
Unlike Collectible Automobile, we are not restricted by page-size limits, so let’s really dig into key parts of the interview.
Pacer? Oh, that was a little project in the back shop
Foster asked Nixon a question that any good journalist would: “One of your better-known designs was the AMC Pacer. We’ve heard it came in wider and heavier than it was supposed to be” (2014, p. 78).
Nixon’s answer was a particularly banal example of ass covering: “The Pacer design was never a priority project at AMC and I don’t remember who the principal designer was. As it was originally designed, the concept was narrower in overall width, and it was a light, fleet-looking car. But at the 11th hour, Engineering/Product Planning said the new government side-impact laws would require us to widen the vehicle considerably — turning the design into a rolling bathtub. In my opinion, the Pacer was the ugliest of all AMC products” (Foster, 2014, p. 79).
I’m trying to picture how Nixon could say with a straight face that the Pacer was not a corporate priority. The initial hatchback body style cost $60 million to develop (Foster, 1993; p. 298). Aaron Severson (2008) noted that this “was a lot of money for a cash-strapped company.”
Even when you don’t add in the cost of a subsequent wagon, the Pacer was easily one of AMC’s three most expensive redesigns of the 1970s, ranking with the 1970 Hornet and 1974 Matador.
Also see ‘Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors’
The reason the Pacer cost so much was because it was not merely a restyling of an existing platform. The Pacer had an all-new body and chassis that included technology new to AMC, such as rack-and-pinion steering and a front subframe (Wikipedia, 2014).
American Motors was small enough that it couldn’t afford to do special one-off designs. Presumably the Pacer’s new-generation platform would have been the basis for a broader line of cars if it had not turned out to be so obese — even compared to Detroit compacts prior to being downsized.
As a case in point, the 1976 Pacer was heavier than a downsized 1978 Chevrolet Malibu (by roughly 80 pounds) and a Ford Fairmont coupe with a six-cylinder engine (by more than 400 pounds).
More ominously, the Pacer was slighter heavier than a Plymouth Volare and a Ford Granada coupe even though these were “old-school” designs that were more than two feet longer.
Is it true that the Pacer’s unusual width was an 11th-hour response to the feds? I question whether it was fair for Nixon to solely blame side-impact standards for the car’s width and weight. The Pacer’s 77-inch width — right up there with the mid-sized Matador — appears to be mostly driven by stylistic considerations. The car’s sides were given an unusually extreme rake, culminating in an exaggerated crease in the middle of the doors.
Contrary to a myth cultivated by AMC marketeers, the Pacer’s width did not translate into an equivalent increase in interior space. Although the Pacer was six inches wider than AMC’s Hornet and Gremlin, it only had two-and–a-half inches more front shoulder room — and one inch more hip room. In contrast, the Matador sedan had five inches more shoulder and hip room. In the Pacer, space efficiency took a back seat to space-age styling.
The exaggerated side crease didn’t just make the Pacer unnecessarily wide — it also contributed mightily to the car’s “rolling bathtub” look. In addition, a huge fake rollbar visually split the car in half, thereby making it look shorter and wider. The Pacer was also bestowed with an exceptionally large, rounded butt with a roofline that swept all the way down to the bumper. Now add a rounded front end with inboard headlights reminiscent of the original Ramber — which also looked like a bathtub.
Were all of these stylistic decisions dictated to the design team from upper management? Mike Rosa’s (2013) story includes illustrations and photographs of Pacer concepts that deviated to varying degrees from the bathtub look. What happened to them?
By the same token, the car’s weight was partly a product of the unusually large amount of glass and the front subframe. The latter was the engineering team’s business, but the amount of glass used would presumably have been the purview of the stylists.
Also see ‘Richard Teague’s styling helped to kill American Motors’
This suggests a follow-up question: Did Nixon think that the Pacer’s exceptionally curved windshield base and ultra-low glass area in the rear of the car have withstood the test of time from a styling standpoint? I don’t. They gave the car awkward proportions and weren’t very practical either.
More modest use of glass could have saved some weight, reduced the bathtub look and toned down the greenhouse’s heat-trapping predilections. A less cab-forward design would have also given AMC more flexibility with its engine choices.
I find it shocking that earlier versions of the Pacer were apparently not designed to fit at least the in-house six-cylinder power plant. After all, the rotary engine had huge contingencies ranging from cost and availability to fuel consumption and reliability.
I suppose it’s understandable that Nixon can’t remember who was responsible for a car that was arguably the final nail in AMC’s coffin. However, if he needed a bit of help in jogging his memory, Nixon might have referred to Foster’s prolific writings about American Motors.
In his 2013 book, Foster included a photo of “the four great designers who are most responsible for the Pacer program” posing next to a bright-yellow X model: Vince Geraci, Bob Mashigan, Bob Nixon and Richard Teague (p. 140). In a 2005 article for Hemmings, Foster notes that the project was assigned to Mashigan’s Advanced Styling studio. And in his 1993 book, Foster focused more on AMC design chief Richard Teague, who he described as “well pleased” with the initial success of the car because “he had championed the Pacer program, daring the company to take another risk on unique styling” (p. 193).
AMC management certainly took Teague’s dare to heart. Meyers stated, “Everything that we do must distinguish itself as being importantly different than what can be expected from the competition. Otherwise there would be very little reason for somebody to consider American Motors products. . . . ‘Me too’ is wrong for American Motors” (Foster, 2005).
I am not implying that upper management should be given a free pass on the Pacer’s implosion. As a case in point, their gamble on the rotary engine represents a remarkably reckless business decision for such a small and financially fragile automaker.
My main reaction is to Nixon’s apparent unwillingness to own up to any mistakes made by the design team. I’m also perplexed that he would call the Pacer “the ugliest of all AMC products” (Foster, 2014). Uglier than a 1974 Matador sedan?
Matador coupe: Meant to sell big — not to race
Nixon’s Pacer comments weren’t the only ones that raised questions. When Foster (2014) asked whether the 1974 Matador coupe’s swoopy shape was specifically created to better compete in NASCAR, he said no. “Racing was never a factor in deciding the styling direction.”
Car and Driver (1973) offered a different take: “The AMC public relations department is sworn not to admit it, but there’s more than an aesthetic reason to why the Matador’s lines look like the handiwork of an aircraft designer. The racing contingent in American Motors has its eye on the Winston cup for 1974, and aerodynamics are very much a key to success in Grand National Stock Car racing.”
It’s too bad Nixon wouldn’t say more about the internal discussion about the car’s financial viability. Foster (1993) estimated that the Matador coupe would need to sell more than 80,000 units per year to amortize the high costs of its unique sheetmetal. That’s almost as much as AMC’s entire annual production of Matadors and Ambassadors in both 1973 and 1972 — and higher than in 1971.
Also see ‘Should AMC have given the 1974 Matador coupe a luxury spin-off?’
How did AMC management think they could achieve such high sales when the market for sporty mid-sized coupes had been shrinking since 1970? The brands that had done the best in the mid-sized field were emphasizing opera-windowed luxury models. Even the wedge-shaped Dodge Charger got into the act — with terrific results. Yet the Matador coupe was not given a flexible-enough design to allow it to effectively pivot toward the luxury market.
Nixon chose to stay mum. However, when Foster (2014) asked whether the Matador coupe’s introduction had been delayed, he said yes — for financial reasons — but did not recall for how long. Nixon’s reluctance to be more specific is understandable, because the only decent answer would have been that the Matador coupe had been delayed at least seven years. If it had instead come out in 1967, the market for sporty mid-sized coupes would still have been good for three years.
Also see ‘Was Mac’s Motor City Garage wrong about the 1974-78 Matador coupe?’
Not only was AMC’s timing terribly off, but the company arguably shouldn’t have gambled so heavily on a styling exercise so specialized that — even in a better-case scenario — it was not likely to sell at a consistently profitable volume throughout its life.
When asked how he felt about the Matador coupe’s design today, Nixon responded by saying that “I think for its place and time it was pretty good.” As what: A concept car?
Yup, them big family cars were doin’ just fine
When asked by Foster (2014) whether AMC ever considered doing a sedan or wagon version of the Matador coupe, Nixon said no because AMC was already “getting a decent share of the sedan and wagon market.” That wasn’t the case with two-door models.
It’s true that AMC had traditionally sold relatively few two-door coupes, hardtops and convertibles on its larger platform, which was used for both its mid-sized Classic/Rebel/Matador and full-sized Ambassador models. This is in contrast to the Big Three, where coupes represented a significant proportion of mid-sized sales.
What Nixon did not say was that by the beginning of the 1974 model year, the basic body used for the sedan and wagon had been in production seven years — one year longer than Detroit’s typical product cycle. To make matters worse, that platform did not receive the usual full reskinning after two or three years. As a result, by 1970 sedan and wagon sales fell below 100,000 — less than half their output in 1965 (go here for further discussion).
The sales collapse of what used to be AMC’s most popular products goes a long way toward explaining why the company struggled to make a profit until the first gas crisis spiked sales of its smaller cars in 1973.
Also see ‘Proposed 1972-73 design could have saved AMC from ill-fated 1974 Matador coupe’
Nixon also didn’t mention that the large cars AMC unveiled in 1974 were very different than a redesign proposal which had reached the prototype stage in 1970. Foster (2013) shows photos of two- and a four-door models, which suggests that the entire line would have been revamped. While less trend-setting than the 1974 Matador coupe, the more conventionally styled prototypes would likely have sold much better through their entire product cycle.
But can we all agree that the Marlin really sucked?
Nixon criticized upper management for moving a proposed compact sporty coupe called the Tarpon onto AMC’s mid-sized platform, where it was renamed the Marlin. He argued that the Marlin “was too damn big” and that the fastback roofline “went on forever” (Foster, 2014; p. 76). I agree! (Go here for further discussion.)
What’s confusing is Nixon saying that “Dick Teague was a strong advocate of the Marlin” (Foster, 2014; p. 76). This suggests that the AMC design chief supported a mid-sized fastback — which goes against what Teague and others have recalled (go here). Is that what Nixon meant or was he using the Marlin name interchangeably with the Tarpon?
Perhaps due to space limitations, Nixon’s comments focused on dismissing the Marlin rather than explaining how the Tarpon might have been more successful. For example, his argument that the Marlin “was just too much fastback” could also have been said of the Tarpon. This particular design proposal also had a weird sheetmetal uptick at the base of the rear-quarter windows.
Also see ‘Might the Rambler Tarpon have sold better than the Plymouth Barracuda?’
One of the main reasons AMC head Roy Abernethy reportedly pressed for the larger Marlin was that the company’s compact platform would not have a small-block V8 available until possibly a year after the Tarpon would have been launched. Nixon implies that the Tarpon would have been fine without the V8 initially, but it would be interesting to hear whether he thought that might have influenced how the car was designed.
For example, did Nixon see the Tarpon as similar to an American 440H in targeting an older and more conservative demographic? Or as a lower-priced and import-centric alternative to the Mustang — which might have appealed to the “youth market?”
Also see ‘AMC’s Roy Abernethy was confronted with three big threats in 1960s’
Or did Nixon not give those kinds of questions much thought because he saw his role primarily as making a car look good? Under this scenario, I could see him feeling entirely comfortable giving the Matador coupe a thumbs up for its styling even though it was a market failure that contributed to AMC’s demise. Then again, affirming the Matador’s styling could have also been a bureaucratic defense maneuver: Never admit a mistake unless you have to.
What would you do with an interviewee who spins?
All interviews leave questions unanswered. The questions that loom largest in my mind about Nixon’s interview are summed up in the last paragraph.
My overall impression is that Nixon’s primary goals were to burnish his legacy, say thank you to a few key people and settle some scores. I suppose that a certain amount of spin is inevitable with oral histories, but he really put his foot on the gas at certain junctures.
That raises some basic journalistic questions. What responsibility does a professionally produced auto history publication have to present accurate information? When an interviewee offers a controversial view at variance with what other credible sources have stated, does that media outlet have a responsibility to note the competing perspectives? Or is it purely the reader’s job to separate truth from spin?
Also see ‘Collectible Automobile puffs up the 1971-74 AMC Javelin’
These questions inevitably lead to the biggest one of all: Is automotive history a serious field of inquiry or is it naught but infotainment for bored retirees?
Note that these questions are not aimed at Foster — who can point out Nixon’s inaccuracies, obfuscations and redirects with much greater nuance than I can — but rather at Collectible Automobile’s editors. They decide what readers do and don’t get to see.
NOTES:
Production figures calculated from the Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975 (Gunnell, 2002). Only total output available for 1966 Ambassador; body style volume proportions extrapolated from 1965 data. Dimensions and weights are from the Automobile Catalog (2014), Gunnell (2002) and the manufacturers.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Automobile Catalog; 2014. “Search Automobile Catalog.” Accessed October 4, 2014.
- Car and Driver; 1973. “Matador X: It’s unquestionably, this year’s style leader. Published November.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——–; 2005. “American Motors’ Pacer: A Piece of Tomorrow.” Hemmings. Posted March; accessed October 4, 2014.
- ——–; 2013. American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker. MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN.
- ——–; 2014. “Bob Nixon: Designer of Iconic AMCs.”Collectible Automobile, pp. 74-81. June issue.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Rosa, Mike; 2013. “You only ride like a Pacer if you’re wide like a Pacer.” Autos of Interest. Posted January 28; accessed October 4, 2014. Website appears to have been subsequently discontinued.
- Severson, Aaron; 2008. “High, Wide, and Handsome: The AMC Pacer.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted April 8; accessed October 4, 2014.
- Wikipedia; 2014. “AMC Pacer.” Accessed October 4, 2014.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: American Motors Ambassador (1974): American (1965); Matador (1974, 1978); Pacer (1975, 1976, 1978); Dodge Charger (1973)
PHOTOGRAPHY:
- Author’s photo gallery: “AMC: Assisted suicide”
Part of the challenge here is that former stylists, executives, product planners and others aren’t obligated to talk to anyone after they retire.
The writer for Collectible Automobile (or Hemmings Classic Car, etc.) could question the Bob Nixons of the world aggressively.
But then these publications risk having other retirees, who most likely also read these magazines, simply refuse to sit down for an interview. These publications can’t have a court issue a subpoena and force these people to give interviews.
Collectible Automobile’s use of the “Q and A” format doesn’t help in this regard. If anything, it makes it worse. No one wants to look like he or she is being hard on a genial grandfather or great uncle who agreed to sit down for an interview.
Special Interest Autos writers would often interview the person – or rely on old media interviews – and then have the writer interpret said interview in view of actual facts as part of the final story. (For example, how did the vehicle in question actually sell? Does what this person is saying fit in with known development timelines? Is he or she now contradicting contemporary press accounts or corporate boardroom minutes?) If accurate history is the goal, this would seem to be the more productive approach in the long run.