(EXPANDED FROM 5/20/2022)
Let’s take the time to unpack six myths about one of the most misunderstood post-war American cars — the 1953-54 Plymouth. This an important exercise because it brings to light some key elements of Detroit groupthink. Automotive historians tend to view the Plymouth with a lingering — if perhaps unconscious — fealty to the U.S. auto industry’s holy trinity of bigger, glitzier and more powerful cars.
The 1953-54 Plymouth is one of the most important cars of the 1950s. It was the first attempt by a Big Three automaker to champion a space-efficient family car at a time when lower, longer and wider styling was trendy.
Even so, the 1953-54 Plymouth gets little respect from historians. Paul Niedermeyer (2012) summed up the general vibe by stating that these cars “almost sunk Plymouth.”
That’s an example of one myth. After a little background, we will discuss all six myths commonly ascribed to the 1953-54 Plymouth.
The 1953 low-priced field had an unusual range of approaches, such as Plymouth’s more efficient packaging and Studebaker’s “European” styling. Click on images to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
K. T. Keller’s final legacy: A space-efficient family car
For 1953 the Plymouth was given new sheetmetal but was still based on a platform that dated back to 1949. The basic design reflected Chrysler head K. T. Keller’s philosophy, which was to “shun fads in favor of stolid practicality” (Langworth and Norbye, 1985; p. 137). Chrysler resisted the industry trend toward bigger and lower-slung cars in favor of practical designs that were tall enough to allow passengers to wear hats.
Lester “Tex” Colbert became Chrysler president in late 1950. However, for a time Keller still had a strong influence on product design in his role as chairman of the board (Grist, 2007). The 1953-54 models represented the last hurrah of the Keller era.
In some respects the 1953 models’ new look was less conservative than previous Plymouths. Height was chopped almost three inches and Keller reportedly stopped vetoing what he saw as “gimmicks,” such as a curved windshield (Grist, 2007; p. 69). Stylists even took some risks, such as with an orthodontic grille that wrapped around the front fenders.
The most controversial part of the car’s design was that its front and rear overhangs were not stretched to keep up with its increasingly long competitors. The 1953 Plymouth was six inches shorter than a Chevrolet and nine inches shorter than a Ford.
What’s wrong with that? Plymouth’s “smaller on the outside, bigger on the inside” design was out of step with post-war consumer tastes, suggested the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2013). Lanny Knutson (2014) of allpar.com insisted that the public viewed the 1953-54 models as a “dog” that pushed Plymouth “out of its ‘rightful’ third place in sales, down, not to fourth, but to fifth place in sales.”
Richard M. Langworth summed up most forcefully the case against Keller’s basic design philosophy:
“In direct opposition to the concepts of GM and Ford, Chrysler shunned the lower-longer-wider approach to build beautifully-engineered, good-handling, relatively compact machines with minimal styling changes — none of any substance between 1951 and 1952. Chrysler had concentrated on building value into the cars. Besides quality interiors, rugged chassis and efficient power plants, rust on a 1949-52 Chrysler body was almost a physical impossibility. And as soon as the seller’s market expired, the public shunned Chrysler products in droves” (1993a; pp. 101-102).
These narratives are not completely wrong, but they are colored by reality distortions. Let’s assess the factual basis for each of the six myths commonly ascribed to the 1953-54 Plymouth.
Myth 1: The 1953 Plymouth was a dramatic shift
Some historians have criticized the 1953 Plymouth so harshly that you would think that it was a radical break from business as usual. In actuality, this was an evolutionary design with some positive features.
As a case in point, Michael Lamm and Dave Holls painted the Plymouth (and its sibling Dodge) as partisans in the car-size wars of the 1950s. The dimensions for both brands were “slightly downsized” in response to marketing surveys that asked: “Does your neighbor want a smaller car?” The authors then drew upon sales data to argue that neighbors “might have wanted smaller cars, but the buyers themselves wanted bigger ones, and the 1953-54 Plymouths lost market share to Ford and Chevrolet” (1996, p. 165).
This line of reasoning is confusing because Lamm and Holls stated that the “Plymouth and Dodge became an average of 670 pounds lighter for 1953” (1996, p. 165). That’s a lot of weight. As a point of comparison, General Motors took out an average of 750-800 pounds when downsizing it big cars in 1977 (Wikipedia, 2015).
I can’t tell how Lamm and Holls came up with that number. The shipping weight of the entry-level 1953 Plymouth Cambridge four-door sedan shrunk by only 85 pounds from the previous year. This made the car lighter than the equivalent Ford by 132 pounds and Chevrolet by 232 pounds. Meanwhile, the base two-door club coupe grew heavier by 50 pounds. That made the car lighter than the Ford by 103 pounds and Chevy by 197 pounds.
Plymouth had both weight losses and gains because its bifurcated lineup was consolidated onto a 114-inch wheelbase. From 1949-52 the brand had taken the unusual step of fielding a trio of two-door models on a 111-inch wheelbase, while other body styles such as a four-door sedan were placed on a 118.5-inch wheelbase.
The latter wheelbase was 3.5 inches longer than Ford’s or Chevrolet’s. This made the Plymouth sedan unusually roomy for a low-priced car. However, the entry-level Cambridge was priced higher than its Big Two competition.
The 1952 Cambridge four-door sedan listed for $1,822. This topped the equivalent Ford by $292 and Chevrolet by $163. For 1953 Plymouth cut the Cambridge’s price so it was nestled between Ford and Chevy. Prices were similarly cut for the high-end Cranbrook series.
One can rightfully complain about the Plymouth’s quirky looks, but putting the entire line on a shorter wheelbase, giving it more distinct sheetmetal and lowering prices were arguably good steps forward. They may have also saved the brand from an even-bigger sales decline in 1954.
The key thing to keep in mind about the 1953 Plymouth is that it wasn’t an appreciably “smaller car.” The length was shorter than a Ford or Chevrolet, but the car’s width and wheelbase were similar. In addition, the body styles that shifted from the 118.5-inch wheelbase had virtually the same front and rear overhang as the previous year.
The Plymouth wasn’t narrow enough to be considered a “compact” like an early-50s Studebaker or the 1956 Rambler. The footprint of 1953 models was more akin to mid-60s “intermediates” such as the 1964 Chevrolet Chevelle.
The Plymouth’s unforgivable sin was that its front and rear overhang did not grow in sync with the Big Two’s.
Myth 2: The 1953 Plymouth was not very popular
If the 1953 Plymouth was out of step with what the public wanted, wouldn’t it have been a sales disaster? Instead, the opposite occurred. Production surpassed 650,000 units, which was almost 40,000 higher than Plymouth’s previous all-time records set in 1950-51.
In addition, Plymouth’s share of total domestic industry output reached 10.7 percent. This was the brand’s highest level since 1948, which was before post-war auto sales had ramped up. More importantly, only once — in 1957 — would Plymouth ever again top this figure.
The numbers look less rosy when focusing only on the low-priced field. Here we will include Chevrolet, Ford, Plymouth and Studebaker. For 1953 Plymouth held 19.2 percent of that market. This represented a modest, .1 percent decline from the previous year, and half a point below 1951.
As a point of context, Plymouth’s market share of the low-priced field was 1.7 percent lower than Chrysler Corporation’s overall proportion of the domestic market.
If these numbers sound bad, note that Studebaker saw its market share drop almost in half to 4.5 percent in 1953 despite introducing a more substantial redesign than Plymouth’s. Ford was the big winner, increasing its market share by four points to almost 37 percent — only two behind Chevrolet.
The Plymouth’s utilitarian body was shared with all other Chrysler brands. Thus, the whole automaker would presumably have suffered if the basic design did not appeal to the public. Yet in 1953 total production hit what was then a post-war high of 1.27 million units.
Also see ‘Historians fuzzy on Exner’s impact on 1953-54 Plymouths’
Even the flamboyant “Forward Look” 1955 designs failed to break this record (although they came close). In fact, Chrysler’s market share in 1953 was 3.2-percent higher than in 1955.
Please reread the last paragraph. Now consider this: Many of the Chrysler Corporation’s 1955 models did not do all that well sales-wise. How could that have happened in a booming market given the automaker’s huge investment in the flashy designs of new styling chief Virgil Exner?
Output rebounded from the depths of 1954, but only Plymouth hit a post-war record. Compared to 1953, Dodge production was down 13 percent, DeSoto fell 12 percent and the Chrysler brand was off by 10 percent.
A newly launched Imperial generated 11,500 units in 1955. However, that did not make up for Chrysler’s three premium-priced brands declining by almost 76,000 units from 1953. To make matters worse, for 1956 both market share and output fell almost halfway back to 1954 levels.
Say what you will about the dowdy styling of Chrysler’s 1953 models, but they racked up 20.9 percent of the U.S. market. That record was never beaten — not even in other peak years such as 1955, 1957, 1966 or 1968.
This is not the typical view of auto histories I have read. For example, Lamm and Holls did not acknowledge that 1953 was a good year for the Chrysler Corporation. Instead, they stated that Plymouth and Dodge together lost roughly one percentage point of market share that year (1996, p. 165).
Perhaps their numbers are different than mine because they use calendar-year rather than model-year figures. In contrast, my calculations show the two brands hitting a post-war peak of 16 percent in the 1953 model year. That was 2.2 percent higher than their combined market share in 1955. More ominously, in 1956 market share dropped to 12.7 percent — which was the same as the bad old days of 1954.
Also see ‘1955-56 Chryslers: ‘Forward Look’ wasn’t as successful as sometimes assumed’
Meanwhile, Aaron Severson (2013) noted that 1953 sales were “initially decent” but were ultimately overpowered by factors such as the brand’s lack of an automatic transmission and the beginning of a price war between Ford and Chevrolet.
This basic argument goes in the same direction as that of Langworth’s (1993a). He minimized the success of the 1953 models by arguing that the postwar seller’s market didn’t subside until the end of the 1953 model year, when the “Ford blitz” began. This is when the automaker attempted to challenge GM for sales leadership by shipping large numbers of cars to dealers “whether they had ordered them or not.” This put the customer “in the saddle” — and they turned away from the boxy, practical cars Chrysler was offering (Langworth, 1993a; p. 101).
That strikes me as a stretch. Others have suggested that the seller’s market slackened in 1952 (Flammang and the auto editors of Consumer Guide, 1995). Or, to be more generous, the end of Korean War-related government limitations on auto production could be pointed to as a milestone. That occurred less than three months after the 1953 models were unveiled (Gunnell, 2002; Nevins and Hill, 1962).
Another indicator that the seller’s market had subsided by the start of 1953 is the collapse of independent automakers. In 1952 they racked up 14.3 percent of domestic output, but only one year later their market share had fallen to 8.5 percent. During that same time period Chrysler’s market share grew by 1 percent — slightly more than GM’s .9-percent increase.
One could argue that Chrysler’s gain was a reflection of weak sales from the prior year. However, it says something that the automaker did well at the same time that the independents saw their market share plunge.
For 1954 the low-priced brands tended to highlight added performance and creature comforts. Plymouth pointed to “longer, lower-sweeping lines.” Click on images to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
Myth 3: The 1954 Plymouth’s sales were terrible
Historians tend to use strong words when describing Plymouth’s 1954 sales. For example, Richard Langworth and Jan Norbye stated, “If Dodge’s 1954 sales performance wasn’t great, Plymouth’s was poor. . . . This was a serious setback because Plymouth was the Mopar breadwinner, and trouble here spelled real trouble for the entire company” (1985, p. 153).
Plymouth production was almost as low as in 1952. The brand’s share of the low-priced market dropped to 16.3 percent, which was a half percent under the previous low in 1949. Plymouth output also fell by more units than any other Chrysler brand — roughly 187,000. That was more than Dodge’s drop of roughly 165,000 units.
I would still argue that Langworth and Norbye had it backwards. Dodge production fell 52 percent — far more than Plymouth’s 29 percent. Plymouth’s decline was also lower than the rest of the automaker’s brands. DeSoto was off by 41 percent and Chrysler by 38 percent.
In other words, Chrysler’s biggest problem was its premium-priced brands. Their combined production fell almost 46 percent. In comparison, the industry as a whole saw output drop by only 20 percent.
To their credit, Langworth and Norbye (1985, p. 152) stated that Plymouth maintained its third-place status in the 1954 model year.
Also see ‘Was the ‘Ford blitz’ to blame for the collapse of independent automakers?’
This is not the case with the How Stuff Works website, where Consumer Guide auto editors (2013) used calendar-year data for 1954 to paint a darker picture than I would argue is fair. That’s because calendar-year production included the beginning of the 1955 model year, when Plymouth lost its third-place standing despite a brand-new design.
Here Langworth and Norbye also pushed their narrative too far. They stated that Buick and Oldsmobile surpassed Plymouth in calendar-year output because the automaker’s “long-running policy” to “build comfortable cars with lots of height and visibility . . . now ran smack into a public that seemed to prefer land yachts of the sort produced by General Motors” (Langworth and Norbye, 1985; p. 152).
Yes, GM’s premium-priced brands sold exceptionally well in 1955. However, Chrysler ended up falling behind them even though it tried to beat GM at its own game. The Exner-designed 1955 Plymouth was almost 15 inches longer than the bad-old 1953 Plymouth and eight inches longer than a 1955 Chevrolet.
Myth 4: The Plymouth’s key problem was its size
The auto editors of Consumer Guide (2013) summed up this myth as starkly as anyone: “The problem was size. Though Plymouth sat an inch lower than (a 1954) Ford, it was five inches shorter. It showed, aggravated by body lines that weren’t integrated somehow.” The fine folks at allpar.com echo this sentiment, noting that Plymouth downsized “when upsizing was popular” (Knutson, 2013).
Granted, the Plymouth looked awkward even with the 1954’s cleaner grille and new bumpers that stretched the car four inches. Might the brand have sold better with proportions and styling that mimicked Ford and Chevrolet?
One way to test out that hypothesis is to compare the 1953-54 Plymouth and Dodge. The latter was closer to what the Plymouth could have looked like if its models had grown like the rest of the low-priced field.
The Dodge’s two-door hardtop was based on the Plymouth’s 114-inch wheelbase but overall length was stretched to 196 inches. This was close to Ford’s and Chevrolet’s. The more conventional proportions were matched with styling that did not excite but also did not take as many risks as the Plymouth.
Meanwhile, Dodge’s four-door sedan and two-door club coupe were placed on a 119-inch wheelbase and the trunk was stretched 9.5 inches. This resulted in typical proportions for a brand at the low end of the premium-priced field.
Given all that, how do we explain Dodge’s 52-percent drop in output, which was the greatest of any Big Three brand?
One factor could have been that both Plymouth and Dodge moved upmarket in 1954. The Plymouth Belvedere was expanded from a two-door hardtop model to a full line — which edged close in price to Dodge’s entry-level Meadowbrook. Dodge, in turn, tried to shift buyers from the Meadowbrook to a mid-range Coronet nameplate by giving the latter a broader range of body styles. A third, top-end Royal nameplate was added.
Output for the Coronet and Royal fell only 24 percent compared to that of the previous year’s Coronet series. The biggest problem was with the Meadowbrook, whose production plunged by 87 percent.
Up to 1960 many Plymouth and Dodge dealers were paired. The auto editors of Consumer Guide (2014) thought this was more of a problem for Plymouth. However, for 1954 this may have worked in the other direction. Some buyers who might otherwise have purchased a Meadowbrook may have instead gone with a Belvedere.
Dodge’s supposed advantages didn’t just include a more conventional size and appearance. Even entry-level models offered an optional V8 engine and an automatic transmission. Plymouth didn’t get a V8 until the 1955 model year. Automatics showed up at the end of February 1954 (Gunnell, 2002). This brings us to our next myth.
Myth 5: Lack of a V8 was a severe liability
One of the most pervasive examples of Detroit groupthink is the myth that a V8 engine had become essential to survival. For example, Langworth stated in a history about Hudson, “The importance of a V-8 in any automotive lineup around 1953 or 1954 cannot be underestimated” (1993b, p. 126).
To what degree did the lack of a V8 impact Plymouth’s 1954 sales? Dodge appeared to benefit from offering a V8 because production of this engine type fell by only 36 percent — half that of six-cylinder models. However, almost three times as many Meadowbrook sixes were produced as V8s. This is despite Dodge’s eights having a lower list price than all of its competitors except the Olds 88.
Another data point is Studebaker, the only low-priced brand besides Ford to offer a V8 engine in 1954. Studebaker also had two other advantages over Plymouth: An automatic transmission for the entire model year, and a sedan body that was lower, longer and less stodgy than Plymouth’s.
Why then did Studebaker’s production drop by almost 55 percent — almost twice as much as Plymouth’s? The above advantages may have been offset by other factors. These included quality issues in the previous year’s models as well as the fear of buying a car from a financially shaky automaker. Another factor could have been that Plymouth held back from price increases for its lower-end models whereas Studebaker did not.
Studebaker’s weak output compared with other independents is harder to explain. The production of full-sized Hudson, Kaiser, Nash and Packard models fell 53 percent — 2 percent less than Studebaker’s. Yet none of them had a V8 and all had older bodies.
As another point of comparison, in 1954 Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler saw their production drop 46 percent. This was only 7 percent less than the above-listed independents. How could that be when all of Chrysler’s premium brands offered V8s?
Add in output for compact models and the above-listed independent brands saw a collective decline of only 41 percent. This is not much higher than for Chrysler Corporation as a whole, which was off by 38 percent.
I am not suggesting that a V8 was irrelevant. Pontiac and Mercury make as good of an apples-to-apples comparison as any. They were somewhat similarly placed in the lower end of the premium-priced field. For 1954 both had only minor design changes. Yet Mercury saw its output drop 15 percent whereas Pontiac’s was double that amount. A major factor would appear to be that all Mercurys came with a V8 whereas Pontiac still offered only straight sixes and eights. However, Mercury may have also benefited from the Ford blitz.
One might speculate that the importance of a V8 grew as you went upmarket. By 1954 Packard was the last brand in the high end of the premium-priced field with a straight eight. George Hamlin and Dwight Heinmuller (2002) pointed to this as a major reason for the brand’s 65 percent output decline.
It’s true that Packard’s volume fell 10 percent more than the lower-priced Studebaker. However, Nash and Hudson saw the greatest volume declines for their least-expensive full-sized models.
Nash’s entry-level Statesman was off by 64 percent — almost twice as much as its top-end Ambassador — even though the latter competed against popular V8-powered models such as the Buick Century. Hudson saw a similar pattern. The entry-level Wasp declined by 35 percent while the top-end Hornet was down less than 9 percent.
The primary reason why entry-level models of premium brands took the biggest hit was likely that Ford and Chevrolet were locked in a take-no-prisoners price war in the midst of a recession. This resulted in the two brands together producing 47.5 percent of total U.S. automotive output. This was almost 10 percent higher than 1951-52. Almost every other brand felt the squeeze.
A few brands did not do so badly. Buick was down by only 9 percent and Oldsmobile actually went up six points. The reason why may be that both brands (along with Cadillac) received the only major redesign for 1954. The cars’ lower bodies and wraparound windshields proved to be trendy.
Yet even here we find another anomaly. Buick’s entry-level Special received its first V8 in 1954, yet volume was down almost 13 percent. In contrast, Oldsmobile’s 88 models saw an 11-percent jump in production even though they already had V8s.
The moral to this story: A V8 may have mattered to full-sized cars in 1954, but it was often less important than other factors (go here for a similar but more detailed discussion of this topic).
For 1955 even more emphasis was placed on performance and stylishness. Plymouth touted having the “biggest car in the low-priced field — 17 feet long!” Click on images to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
Myth 6: Plymouth should have kept up with Ford
Knutson (2014) described Plymouth’s loss of third place as “its greatest humiliation yet” and a turning point in the brand’s history. “Although Plymouth would regain third place several times in future years, it would never again put together the unbroken string it had, from 1931-1954, of third place in sales,” Knutson lamented.
This critique seems to assume that if Keller hadn’t held Chrysler back from embracing bigger and glitzier designs that Plymouth would have kept up with the Big Two.
Also see ‘Did a rumor cause the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge?’
One need not be an apologist for Keller to see how some historians push this argument too far. For example, the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2014) noted how Plymouth went from nipping at Ford’s heels in 1940 to being outsold two-to-one in 1950 and by 1954 trailing “Ford by an astonishing 71 percent.” They refer to this as “Plymouth’s postwar plunge.”
The following graph tells a different story. Plymouth didn’t plunge so much as Ford and Chevrolet output skyrocketed after 1948. Plymouth hovered within a fairly narrow band of 340,000 to 760,000 units whereas the Big Two rose above 1.5 million by 1962.
You could argue that Plymouth should have done a better job of keeping up with the Big Two. But in doing so, you might also consider that Chrysler was going to have a tougher time in the 1950s regardless of its products.
This is because the company’s prior success was made possible because of the Ford Motor Company’s decline under an aging Henry Ford in the 1930s and 40s (Nevins and Hill, 1962). Ford quickly zoomed ahead of Chrysler in 1949 model-year output once Henry Ford II’s modernization efforts began to take hold. The giant had awoken.
Colbert launched an aggressive effort to make Chrysler more competitive by emphasizing bigger, glitzier and more powerful cars. The restyled 1955 Plymouths did see a 52 percent increase in output over the previous model year.
That boost was short lived. By 1958 volume fell below 1954 levels — and did not rebound until 1963-64. This is when Plymouth once again emphasized efficient design to a greater degree than the Big Two. These Plymouths have also been widely misunderstood.
Fake Plymouth: Not such an ugly duckling
The point of this essay is not to dismiss the problems with the 1953-54 Plymouth. The car did look frumpy. However, the key issue was not its size, but rather the design quality.
Consider the comparison below of a real and fake 1953 Plymouth. The photoshopped version holds closely to the original’s design cues but its height has been reduced by roughly four inches. This was achieved by lowering the cowl, squaring off the car’s teardrop shape and flattening the roof.
You may notice some other changes. For example, the orthodontic grille is replaced with a chrome blade, the bumpers are smaller, and the front and rear fender blisters better align.
The result is hardly racy, but it does offer more conventional proportions — without increasing the car’s length. Reducing the height shouldn’t have impacted trunk space but headroom would no longer be unusually generous.
What if Chrysler had stayed the course?
Let’s play out our fake Plymouth one more step. What if Chrysler had maintained the car’s trim size through the rest of the 1950s? I’d argue that this would have left the automaker in better shape.
If Plymouth had refused to join the bloat brigade in the mid-50s, it would have fit nicely between a 1955 Ford and the post-1955 Rambler. As the Big Two’s standard models grew in 1957-59, the Plymouth’s more practical size could have become an increasing advantage. And as discussed here, smaller wouldn’t have necessarily meant dowdy. Keller’s practicality and Exner’s stylishness were not incompatible.
The strong sales of the Romney-era Rambler hints at the potential. Note in the above graph that Rambler volume ran neck and neck with Plymouth during 1960-63. This was despite Rambler fielding a weaker dealer network and some of the oldest designs in the American auto industry.
Also see ‘1962-64 Plymouth: The odd case of prescience interruptus’
I suspect that there was nothing Chrysler could have done to keep Plymouth from falling behind the sales growth of Ford and Chevrolet. However, I do think Keller understood better than his successor that an automaker will be more successful over the long run if it builds cars which meet people’s real needs. Colbert’s obsession with glitzy styling — with its tragic impact on quality and practicality — was arguably the prime cause of Plymouth’s collapse in the late-50s and early-60s (e g., Howley, 1993).
Of course, you can’t seriously consider this view without questioning the above six myths. That’s why the unassuming 1953-54 Plymouth could help automotive historians see the post-war U.S. auto industry in a fresh, new way.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted November 25, 2015, expanded on July 17, 2020 and May 20, 2022, and updated on July 19, 2024. Market share for brands was calculated from figures listed in Wikipedia (2013). Market share, production figures and body specifications for individual nameplates were calculated from base data from the auto editors of Consumer Guide 2006) and Gunnell (2002). All data is supposed to be for model rather than calendar years. In instances where data from one source appeared to be erroneous, data from the other source was substituted. Specifications are from the above sources and the Classic Car Database (2015).
Figures on 1954-55 Plymouths were particularly inconsistent, e.g., Gunnell lists total model-year production in 1954 / 1955 as 433,000 / 672,100 whereas Wikipedia states 463,148 / 705,455; Consumer Guide publications range from 520,385 / 705,455 in Over 100 Years: The American Auto (2010) to 463,148 / 401,075 in the model-year production totals included in the 1993 edition of the Encyclopedia of American Cars. When adding up production broken out for individual models, the 1993 edition has a slightly higher total for 1954 than the 2006 edition: 463,148 versus 462,698. For 1955, both editions tally 704,445 units.
What made the most sense to me was to add up Gunnell’s production data on individual models; these totaled 463,148 / 704,464 for 1954 / 1955.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2002. Cars of the Sizzling ’60s: A Decade of Great Rides and Good Vibrations. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- ——–; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- ——–; 2010. Over 100 Years: The American Auto. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- ——–; 2013. “1951-1958 Plymouth Belvedere.” How Stuff Works. Accessed Nov. 20, 2015.
- Classic Car Database; 2015. “Search for Specifications.” Accessed Nov. 20.
- Flammang, James M., and the Auto Editors of Consumer Guide; 1995. Cars of the Fabulous ’50s: A Decade of High Style and Good Times. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Grist, Peter; 2007. Virgil Exner, Visioneer. Veloce Publishing, Dorchester, England.
- Hamlin, George and Dwight Heinmuller; 2002. “America’s New Choice In Fine Cars: The Twenty-Sixth and the Fifty-Fourth Series, 1953-1954.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 562-581. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
- Howley, Tim; 1993. “1940-48: Pride of the K. T. Keller Years.” Collectible Automobile, pp. 8-23, June issue.
- Knutson, Lanny; 2013. “Plymouths of 1953 and 1954: Hy-Style and Hy-Drive.” Allpar.com. Accessed Nov. 20, 2015.
- Lamm, Michael and Dave Holls; 1996. A Century of Automotive Style: 100 Years of American Car Design. Lamm-Morada Publishing Co.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993a. Chrysler & Imperial 1946-1985: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- ——–; 1993b. Hudson 1946-1957: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, Il.
- Nevins, Allan and Frank Ernest Hill; 1962. Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933-1962. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2012. “Curbside Classic: 1955 Plymouth Belvedere Suburban — Suddenly It’s . . . 1956.” Curbside Classic. Posted Feb. 2; accessed November 15, 2015.
- Severson, Aaron; 2013. “Looking Forward: Chrysler’s Early Fifties Transformation, Part 1.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted Jan. 29.
- Wikipedia; 2013. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed July 5.
- ——; 2015. “Downsize (automobile).” November 25.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- aaca.org: Plymouth (1953)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Buick (1954); Chevrolet (1953 1954, 1955); Dodge (1953, 1954); Ford (1953, 1954, 1955); Oldsmobile (1954); Plymouth (1953, 1955); Studebaker (1953, 1954)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Plymouth (1954); Dodge (1954)
PHOTOSHOPS:
- Author’s photoshops: “Fake 1953 Plymouth: Not such an ugly duckling”
Interesting to note then Chrysler Australia used the basic 1953-54 body with some design updates for the Australian Chrysler Royal until 1963 when the Valiant arrived Down Under.
https://www.allpar.com/threads/the-australian-chrysler-royal-plainsman-and-wayfarer.229662/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chrysler_Royal_(Australia)
Good point — they had some interesting permutations.
Speaking of permutations, Dodge offered some Canadian Dodge models also known as “Plodge” got Dodge front clip with a Plymouth body like the Regent and Mayfair.
http://www.oldcarbrochures.org/Canada/Chrysler-Canada/Dodge/1953-Dodge-Brochure-/index.html
Cool. You clearly possess a remarkable breadth of knowledge about the international auto industry. By the way, thank you for linking to Indie Auto stories. That has brought some new readers our way.
In light of the above and the recent Curbside Classics article on Chrysler’s decline from the 1950s-1980s, am interested in Chrysler’s history in the US since the chaotic periods had a negative impact on the survival of Chrysler Europe (previously Rootes, Simca, etc) as well as likely prevented the company from acquiring Borgward despite being considered a possible savior.
What could Chrysler have done to either butterfly away or mitigate its problems and which individuals within Chrysler could have been potential candidates to lead them down a competitive along with bolstering/approving and eventually integrating their sub-divisions?
https://www.curbsideclassic.com/analysis/charts-and-analysis-big-car-market-share-1955-1984-did-quality-sink-chrysler-after-1957/
I enjoy your articles very much! It’s refreshing from decades of puff piece “car magazine” fodder, and give much food for thought.
However:
Compare a ‘52 Ford to a ‘52 Plymouth. Night and day: prewar holdover to latest word modern. Then compare a ‘53 Ford to a ‘53 Plymouth. The Ford, with a year old body, looked fresher, absolutely more modern than the New Plymouth, and offered a modern OHV 6, along with the flathead V8 (which was the burgeoning hot rod crowd’s hop up favorite; no matter how hoary it was).
Demographic of buyers? I’ll speculate older, “unhip” (to borrow later slang), traditional Plymouth/Chrysler product buyers. Ford? The youth market….(put Bunkie Knudsen’s famous quote here). That’s it, in a nutshell.
In ‘54, when Plymouth (with the ancient flat 6) FINALLY offered an automatic, mid-year… Ford offered power steering, brakes, windows and seats.
Which car offered the most perception of value?
Sales figures in a vacuum don’t show cultural “ins” and “outs”. The Plymouth was “out”. The 53-4’s are STILL “out”.
That’s why it’s considered a failure. It was a mechanically outdated car with an unimaginative body, unhip, downsized at precisely the wrong time.
It was, and still is, an old mans car.
the flayhead is better then fords v8
As a life-long student (and practitioner) of mass communications since the late 1950s, especially radio-television, looking at classic TV and listening to the radio commercials of the times, I think Chevrolet, Ford, Buick and Oldsmobile clearly had the best advertising / marketing campaigns of the era, which helped shaped buyer decisions in terms of image. (For example, the 1965 Mustang was a rebodied Falcon, but image sold the car to thousands !) Dodge after 1956 caught on, but was not in the same league until the mid-1960s. Pontiac in the 1960s caught up to the leaders with their advertising and marketing. Wells-Rich-Greene had great ads for AMC, but after 1967, it really didn’t matter. Bunkie Knudsen was right about selling a youthful car to all. The 1953-54 Plymouths (and Dodges and DeSotos), for all their K.T. Keller virtues, were frumpy cars !
Great article! I bought a ’54 Savoy earlier in the year. Wasn’t really looking for anything specific and the car wanted to come home with me.
I’m enjoying reading your articles, which I just discovered today. Your perspective and ability to challenge the “conventional wisdom” in automotive history – the myth busting – is refreshing and backed up by sound research. You have a new fan!
Welcome to Indie Auto, Bill. Thank you for your kind words.
Excellent overview of a critical time in Chrysler Corporation’s history.
Regarding the size of the 1953-54 Plymouth, instead of asking whether its size hurt its competitiveness, perhaps we should instead ask whether its size helped its competitive position. And the answer would be “no,” primarily because Chevrolet and Ford had not yet grown to land-yacht size in 1953-54. Many reviewers believe that the Chevrolet and Ford of those years were the ideal size for most Americans – not too big, not too small. The trimmer dimensions of the Plymouth thus were not enough to sway buyers into choosing a Plymouth over the “Big Two.”
Rambler sales took off in 1958 because, by that point, the Low-Price Three had grown to land-yacht size, and an increasing number of buyers did not want a car that big. The Rambler’s size differential with its competition had become noticeable enough that it was now a competitive advantage.
It didn’t help that the Plymouth looked short and dumpy next to the competition – particularly the Ford. Slightly smaller size didn’t have to be a handicap, but it would have helped if the car’s styling didn’t accentuate the difference and make it look old hat. Even if the cars didn’t get bigger, it would still have helped if Virgil Exner had been given a free hand in styling the 1953 line.
While the lack of a V-8 wasn’t critical to Plymouth before 1955, I do believe that the lack of a fully automatic transmission WAS a serious omission by 1953. Both Chevrolet and Ford had offered fully automatic transmissions since 1950 and 1951, respectively. Even the independents had beaten Chrysler to the punch on this one. That was a serious sales handicap, and was one reason Plymouth failed to keep up with its Big Two rivals. It made the cars look old-fashioned and out-of-step with market trends.
Another factor was that the 1953 Plymouth and Dodge were a distinct step down in build quality and materials compared to their predecessors. Motor Trend noted this in a test of both cars – and this was at a time when the magazine wasn’t particularly critical of the vehicles that it reviewed. Meanwhile, the Chevrolet was noted for its good build quality during those years, and the 1952-54 Ford was a big step up from the 1949-51 generation in that regard.
The quality point may be an important one, and may relate to another Chrysler issue, namely outsourcing of most Plymouth bodies to Briggs before it was purchased by Chrysler in late ’53.
It seems in hindsight that Plymouth’s reputation for high build quality in its early years may have owed more to Briggs.
But at the same time, outsourcing bodies resulted in a constraint on expanding production capacity during the postwar seller’s market.
The years between ’46 and ’49 may have been crucial for Chrysler. Had it been able to scale up production while Ford was still weak, it could perhaps competed better in the mid ’50s sales war.
I am still of the opinion that the advertising and marketing of the 1953-1954 Plymouths and Dodges lacked the sparkle of the Chevrolet and Ford advertising. I agree, a two-speed automatic would have helped, too. The 1953 Chevrolet face-lift aged quickly, in my opinion, but the 1952-1954 Fords were timelessly styled. Looking back, corporately, K.T. Keller ran a good company and built good cars. I especially think the 1953 Chryslers were great cars, perhaps better than their competitors. What I think about more now, is that Chrysler’s overall dealership strategy did not position the corporations cars as effectively as that of General Motors.
You make many good points. Advertising, marketing strategies, and the muddled dealer network were important detriments to the success of the ‘53-‘54 Plymouths.
Ultimately, Plymouth suffered because the corporation still viewed it – and treated it – as a “companion” car to Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler. There was no doubt that the Ford was the most important car at the Ford Motor Company, and GM always gave Chevrolet top priority.
That argument makes sense with one caveat: The 1953 Plymouth was better distinguished from its siblings than previous models. So Chrysler was at least trying. And in 1955 they differentiated Plymouth even more — and the brand saw a bigger sales bump than the rest of the Chrysler line. By 1959 Plymouth made up more than 60 percent of total Chrysler output. That represented around a 10 percent increase from 1953 (go here for further discussion).
I get that part of the problem was how the dealer networks were structured. But beyond that, could it be that Plymouth’s biggest problem was simply that Chrysler didn’t have anywhere near the resources needed to keep pace with Ford and GM in the 1950s?
Steve, I think that after the death of Walter P. Chrysler, K. T. Keller and Chrysler’s bankers did not ask the question about future capacity needs, given that W.W.II was on the horizon. Then, after 1945, issues of raw materials played a role until the real end of hostilities in mid-1953. So, it may have been that Keller, his board and the bankers never thought about expansion until Briggs came up for sale. Chrysler fully opened up a new Plymouth plant in Evansville in 1959, but I don’t know when the board of directors approved this. Ford (under Henry the First) had always prioritized production capacity and G.M. because of its acquisition of suppliers built up its capacity before W.W.II, so it is true that Chrysler in 1952-1953 likely lacked the resources to compete with Ford and G.M. “Vun for vun”! to paraphrase in 1928 the rally cry of “Big Bill” Knudsen !
One final thought: The 1954 Mercury with its V-8 and Merc-O-Matic was a better competitor with the new B-body Oldsmobiles and Buicks.
Regarding Chrysler Corporation’s 1955 sales – perhaps the lackluster sales of Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler that year were the “canary in the coal mine” that forecast the collapse of the entire medium-price market in the late 1950s.
The effect was pronounced at Chrysler, because Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler dealers also held Plymouth franchises.
This meant that those lower, longer and flashier Plymouths with available V-8s were sold in the same showroom as the Dodges, DeSotos and Chryslers. If a buyer could get a stylish, sleek Plymouth with a V-8 and all of the goodies for less money than a comparably equipped Dodge, DeSoto or Chrysler…why not take that route?
It remind me of some old various articles from Collectible Automobile or other magazines who mentioned then Plymouth needed its own dealer network instead of being dualed with Dodge, DeSoto or Chrysler. The original setup where Plymouth was dualed with Dodge/DeSoto/Chrysler dealer was set during the Great Depression to offer Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler dealers something to sell during these hard times.
Seems then removing Plymouth from Dodge dealers (and giving them the Plymouth-sized Dart was the first step but homever; the end of DeSoto changed their plans and got Plymouth dualed into Chrysler-Plymouth. Also add then its in first year, Valiant was its own separate division until being a full Plymouth for 1961 (in Canada, Valiant stayed separate a bit longer).
Now we could wonder what if Chrysler had continued to offer Plymouth the 111″ wheelbase version for 1953-54 and what if Chrysler got a OHV 6 and a full automatic transmission more earlier? And for more “what if?” scenarios fantaisies, what if Chrysler menaged to trademark the Falcon name? Who was first used for a show car in 1955 and Chrysler wanted originally to name Falcon its upcoming compact but they forgot to keep the rights on the name and Ford grabbed it?