International Harvester is the post-war U.S. automaker that has received the least attention from historians. Thus, Patrick Foster’s book, International Harvester: The Complete Story, is a particularly welcome addition.
The format is similar to his other recent books — an oversized hard cover with lots of big pictures (many color). The text in this 210-page book has Foster’s usual mix of product information and business analysis.
His narrative has a less dramatic tone than AMC: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker (Foster, 2013). However, this turns out to be a good thing. Foster is able to assess International’s management with greater detachment than AMC’s (go here for further discussion about the latter).
An unflinching critique of International
Foster offers a strong argument that International failed to adapt to dramatic changes that began sweeping the light-truck market in the early-60s.
Whereas light trucks had previously been used primarily for commercial purposes (such as by farmers and construction companies), sales began to soar for models that appealed to suburbanites. International did not quickly enough shift with the times, so essentially got left behind. To illustrate this, Foster noted that by 1969 both Dodge and GMC would roar past International in sales.
What was the truck maker to do? Foster states that International made a big mistake by rejecting a merger proposal from the Studebaker Corporation in 1963. Studebaker’s auto operations were teetering on the brink of death but the firm still “had approximately 2,000 automotive dealers, most of them in exactly the places where International needed to be” (p. 115).
Foster also points to International’s penchant for giving out big dividends regardless of economic conditions. This undercut the company’s ability to keep its product line competitive and long-term debt at reasonable levels.
Book offers interesting historical tidbits
The Complete Story is sprinkled with interesting historical tidbits. For example, a new logo introduced in 1953 was designed by Raymond Loewy. The logo consisted of a capital black letter H and a lower-case red i. The dot on the i represented the head of a farmer driving a tractor.
My biggest criticism of the book is that Foster is overly kind about the last International D-series pickup and Travelall. These were introduced in 1969. He described their styling as “clean, contemporary, and ruggedly handsome” (p. 131). In actuality, the design became obsolete within only a few years because International did not invest in what would soon become essential features such as curved side glass.
All in all, this is a workmanly effort about a firm that is surprisingly interesting even if one isn’t all that into trucks. Given the huge growth in truck sales over the last 50 years, International plausibly could have enjoyed Jeep-like success. Instead, management faced a test of leadership and “it would earn a failing grade” (p. 106).
International Harvester: The Complete Story
- Foster, Patrick; 2015
- Quarto Publishing Group, Minneapolis, MN
“Meanwhile, the company’s sales department kept pushing for more and more new models and variations of trucks, and production lines began to get snarled as a bewildering array of trucks came down the line with very specific requirements that tended to slow things down. . . . In comparison, the volume producers of light trucks — Ford, Chevy, GMC, and Dodge — didn’t offer nearly as many models, and their productivity was much higher and their costs lower.” (p. 89)
“When it was introduced the Scout seemed almost like a revelation. Priced at $2,139 for the four-wheel-drive model, it was the first real competition that Willys Motors’ CJ line had ever encountered, and it was the closest in concept to the Jeep of any American vehicle that would ever be produced. Over 28,000 of them were built during the first year.” (p. 110)
“To explain its abandonment of a key market, management said that it felt its light-duty trucks were far too robust for what it called the ‘second car’ market. They had researched the cost of redesigning the vehicles; however, the reality was that International had slipped too far behind its competitors to try to catch up now. It should have made its move during the 1950s or early mid-1960s, but management failed to grasp the changes the market was going through.” (p. 149)
OTHER REVIEWS:
RE:SOURCES
Foster, Patrick R.; 2013. American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker.MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN.
This is an updated version of a mini-review that was originally posted August 31, 2016.
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