(EXPANDED FROM 8/28/2020)
Studebaker’s prospects for survival as an automobile manufacturer arguably ended when it shut down its South Bend plant in December, 1963. The biggest reason why is that the corporation’s board of directors reportedly decided to continue building cars for a while longer at its Hamilton, Canada assembly plant only to avoid lawsuits from dealers (Critchlow, 1996).
But what if the board had been serious about staying in the automotive business, albeit at a much lower production level than in the past? I bring up this question in response to a Curbside Classic comment by Stéphane Dumas (2018), who pointed to design proposals for post-1966 Studebakers. He linked to a story written by Bob Marcks (2009), who restyled the 1966 models. Marcks showed a photo of a 1967 prototype as well as sketches of redesigns for 1970.
(Out of respect for copyright, you will need to click on the above links to see the images.)
Was there any realistic hope that Studebaker could have scratched out a marginal existence if Marcks’ handiwork had reached production? In order to try to answer that question, we will need to talk about the appropriateness of his designs for an automaker with a production capacity under 40,000 units per year (Foster, 2008).
Marcks emulates the Mustang with 1967 redesign
A Marcks’ 1967 prototype included some interesting touches. Most notably, the rear bumper was moved upward on the body. This addressed what was arguably one of the biggest weaknesses of Studebaker’s styling — the rear bumper was a throwback to the 1950s.
Also see ‘1964 Studebaker: Brooks Stevens hammered final nail in the coffin’
The rest of the industry had long since switched to high-mounted bumpers that gave their cars a lower and wider look. Studebaker’s 1964 redesign gave the front end a more contemporary appearance, but the rear bumper was kept at the base of the deck.
Marcks’ solution was strikingly simple — he moved the bumper upward around four inches into an indent in the rear sheetmetal. Patrick Foster (2008) noted that the designer’s inspiration for the change was the Mustang’s unusually high-mounted bumper.
The proposed change looked jerry-rigged but might have worked okay except for a practical problem — the bumper apparently covered the gas cap.
Access to the gas cap was reportedly achieved by putting a hinge on the bumper, allowing it to pivot up and out of the way. Studebaker Drivers Club commentator Warren Webb (2008) pointed out the downside of this idea: “Imagine getting hit just lightly & throwing the bumper out of alignment or binding the hinges & not being able to put gas in it.”
Why not move the gas cap to the side of the car? Presumably that would have cost too much.
How do you update a body older than the Checker’s?
What to do with the rear bumper is a good metaphor for Studebaker’s dire situation. How can you update the oldest car body in the U.S. auto industry — yes, even older than the Checker’s — without undercutting its practical advantages over newer car designs?
As a case in point, even with revised sheetmetal for 1964, the Studebaker still looked old fashioned compared to its competitors. The problem wasn’t so much the Studebaker’s tall, narrow and boxy proportions, which were similar to the likes of the Chevrolet Chevy II, the Ford Fairlane and the Mercury Comet. What stood out more were archaic stylistic details.
By 1967 Studebaker would fall even further behind. At that point most of its competition in the mid-sized and compact classes had switched to curved side glass and more rounded, coke-bottle styling. Following suit would presumably have been well beyond Studebaker’s financial capability.
Also see ‘General Motors trumped Ford’s 1962 foray into mid-sized cars’
Marcks displayed admirable ingenuity in giving the proposed 1967 Studebaker a fresh look with inexpensive trim changes. The problem, as we will discuss in a moment, is that he was operating from the wrong paradigm. He was trying to style the Studebaker like typical Detroit fare when it needed to be more like Checker, Volvo or Jeep.
Marcks’ 1970 designs vainly tried to do brougham
Catching up with the Big Four automakers was an even bigger challenge for Marcks’ 1970 proposals.
Perhaps because he was involved in the design of the 1953-54 Studebakers, his sketches have a retro look. That included tapered rear ends reminiscent of the 1953 Starliner coupe. They look fine in as illustrations, where you can take liberties with perspective. However, you could not realistically graft such a low rear onto such a tall body even if you extended the deck.
And why would you even try? A sharply tapered rear would have further reduced trunk space, which was already a Studebaker weakness. Only the diehard Studebaker enthusiast would buy the car primarily based upon styling.
By the same token, one sketch had a brougham look that anticipated late-70s U.S. cars. Alas, the design had a half-baked quality because the cowl was too high and the side windows weren’t curved.
Marcks’ sketches are fun to look at. Even so, he seemed to be in denial that Studebaker’s significantly reduced production level would require a very different approach to product development.
Studebaker now was more akin to Checker than AMC
Let’s be real: If Studebaker had been still building cars in 1970, it likely could not have afforded a major restyling akin to what Marcks had proposed.
Here it is important to grok how big of a change the automaker went through when South Bend closed. The post-1963 breakeven point for the Hamilton plant was around 20,000 units. That was reportedly 100,000 lower than what was needed to generate a profit when South Bend was still in operation (Ebert, 2013).
Also see ‘Might Studebaker have survived if Sherwood Egbert had stayed healthy?’
The post-1963 Studebaker was more comparable to Checker than to American Motors. In the late-60s Checker’s total output was under 6,000 units per year whereas AMC hovered around 275,000 units.
If Studebaker had any hope of staying in the auto business, it was by building unusually slow-changing cars. Perhaps not quite as slow changing as the Checker, but certainly much less than Big Four cars, which usually received major redesigns every six years and a facelift or two in between.
Also see ‘Could Studebaker have come out of the 1970s as successful as Jeep?’
That, in turn, required Studebaker to deemphasize trendy styling in favor of the practical qualities of its products. The marketing for the 1965 Checker Marathon (see below) hints at the direction Studebaker needed to go.
In hindsight, Studebaker’s most promising option may have been to give its Wagonaire a four-wheel-drive variant. This could have been an ideal use of the automaker’s tall and boxy body. Studebaker could have carved out a decent market niche because its 4WD entry would have been smaller and more car-like than a Jeep.
Of course, one can debate what would have been the right product mix. But whichever body styles Studebaker emphasized, it could no longer afford to make annual styling changes.
Studebaker eschewed annual model changes in 1965
The only silver lining to Studebaker essentially becoming a Canadian automaker was that it could better distinguish itself from its bigger American competitors. The best way to have done so would have been to focus largely on improving the functionality of its cars rather than their styling.
Also see ‘Brooks Stevens’s 1965 Studebaker Lark concept: Almost a baby Continental’
For 1965 Studebaker tried to do this. Aside from switching to General Motors’ engines, the basic design was carried over. Advertising made a big deal about the lack of styling changes.
This put Studebaker in good company. Volkswagen sales were soaring in no small part because of the German automaker’s militant — and loudly advertised — rejection of planned obsolescence (go here for further discussion).
Marcks brought back annual model changes in 1966
Marcks was apparently too steeped in Detroit groupthink to see that annual restylings no longer made sense for Studebaker. To make matters worse, his 1966 redesign gave its cars an anonymous and cheap look.
Marcks’ biggest mistake was ditching the brand’s traditional trapezoid radiator grille flanked by dual headlights. The new grille was generic and the single headlights looked cheap. More austere side and rear trim added to the cost-cutting vibe.
The generic grille may have been partly dictated by a small redesign budget. Even so, Marcks could have gotten more bang for his buck if he had focused on practical improvements rather than stylistic change for the sake of change.
For example, the front end did not need a new grille. However, headlight wipers could have been helpful, and a stand-up hood ornament might have been moved to the grille for safety reasons. Adding black rubber strips to the bumpers would have given the car a more rugged look than typical of U.S. cars of that time. By the same token, side-marker lights would have shown early leadership in safety features.
Marcks could have applied this approach throughout the car. For example, the taillights could have been given amber turn-signal lenses. Rubber inserts on the lower-body side trim could have echoed the bumpers. Chrome trim on the C-pillars could have been replaced with flow-through ventilation exhausts.
Functionality didn’t mean Checker-like austerity
A focus on functionality would not have precluded improving the styling. As a case in point, moving the rear license plate up from the bumper would have given the car a more modern look. This change would have been easily doable. However, on the sedans the license plate assembly would have needed to lift up in order to reach the gas cap.
Trim choices could also have helped the Studebaker avoid Checker-like austerity. For example, a vinyl roof helped to offset the body’s tall and boxy shape.
Would a focus on practical improvements have led to better 1966 sales? Feel free to place your bets in the comments section. But at the very least, Studebaker’s final products would have been more distinctive.
NOTES:
This is an expanded version of a story first posted July 6, 2018 and updated Aug. 28, 2020. Production figures are from Gunnell (2002).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Critchlow, Donald T.; 1996. Studebaker: The Life and Death of an American Corporation. Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, IN.
- Dumas, Stephane; 2018. Commentator in “Auction Classic: 1966 Studebaker Cruiser — End of the Road.” Curbside Classic. Posted July 6 at 4.24 a.m.
- Ebert, Robert R.; 2013. Champion of the Lark: Harold Churchill and the Presidency of Studebaker-Packard, 1956-1961. McFarland & Company, London.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 2008. Studebaker: The Complete History. Motorbooks International, Minneapolis, MN.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Marcks, Bob; 2009. “Bob Marcks, Designer at Studebaker, Ford, and Chrysler.” Dean’s Garage. Posted June 22.
- Webb, Warren; 2008. “Design a Post-66 Studebaker Grille.” The Studebaker Drivers Club Forum. Posted Dec. 12, 11:51 p.m.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: Checker (1956, 1969); Studebaker (1965, 1966)
Speaking of Checker and inspired by an article on suggested merger between Checker and International Harvester, could Studebaker-Packard / Studebaker have also benefited from getting involved under the right circumstances depending of course when such a tie up happens and what beneficial changes happened prior?
Essentially Studebaker could have used the Scout as a basis for an American Range Rover rival along the lines of the Scout-based Monteverdi Safari and Felbar Oasis, it would have also allow the combine to get into the MPV and SUV segments based on IH’s real-life projects whilst proving engines and other mechanicals to Checker Cabs.
It would still be a US automotive minnow and probably even require a short-lived alliance with AMC in Studebaker-Packard’s case to replace its aging yet flexible platform (capable of spawning both a larger and compact car circa early 1950s) as well as a significantly improved Studebaker V8, yet allow the company to carve out its own niche outside of the prospect for all marques being absorbed into AMC.
That’s an interesting scenario. I think it reasonable to speculate that any investments Studebaker made during the 1960s in the light-truck or fledgling SUV fields could have paid off better than trying to survive in the passenger-car field. For example, the Champ pickup was a missed opportunity. It wouldn’t have cost that much to give it a cab shape more appropriate to a compact truck and a bed that matched the contours of the rest of the body.
Patrick Foster has written that International-Harvester should have taken over Studebaker because it would have given the truck firm access to dealers in markets it was weak in (go here for further discussion). You add an interesting wrinkle to that idea — essentially using Studebaker as a high-end truck brand. That makes a lot of sense.
Thanks, was not aware of such a proposal for IH to takeover Studebaker in 1963.
Have been thinking of a similar scenario albeit in the context of a thriving Studebaker-Packard concern with a SBC like Studebaker V8.
The latter would not only spawn a V8-based 90-degree V6 if need be (in the manner of the GM 90-degree V6 or Buick V6) to replace its old Sixes, but also taking a cue from IH would also go on to form the basis of a IH Comanche 4 (and Pontiac Trophy 4) inspired V8-based Slant Four engine with scope for displacements as low as 1655cc / 101 cubic inches (essentially half a 202 V8 had the latter been approved for production).
Have also contemplated if a SBC-like Studebaker V8 would have been a better (read lighter and cost effective) basis for a V12 in place of Packard’s real-life post-war V8-based V12 project. Both the Packard V8 and stillborn V8-based V12 seem to be relative White Elephants with little else going for them apart from having scope for excessive displacements that would soon become irrelevant by the time of the fuel crises.
Could see a thriving Studebaker-Packard also benefiting from a short-term alliance or partnership with AMC (as Romney himself was said to have envisaged) to allow them to switch to modern platforms, before going their own way and taking over/merging with International Harvester (that itself acquired Checker Motors) to further strengthen their position relative to AMC enough to better resist a takeover from the latter.
Also had the following articles in mind.
– https://www.hemmings.com/stories/2013/01/21/international-harvesters-passed-over-people-movers
– https://www.hemmings.com/stories/2016/12/30/newly-released-document-details-proposal-for-checker-and-international-harvester-merger
In Checker Motor’s case it seems they would no longer need to source their engines from outside manufacturers such as Continental, Chevrolet or Oldsmobile and could actually benefit from what International Harvester were planning, potentially leading to an early SUV Taxi.
It is also my understanding that IH looked at dieselized versions of their Comanche 4 and SV V8 engines in real-life for the stillborn Scout III project (and related models), something they never got a chance to fully realize prior to Scout production being stopped. Perhaps a thriving combine would be able to successfully realise such a project and also apply it to the alternate Studebaker V8 engine family, without of course going down the same path as the Oldsmobile Diesels which were used in the Checker Marathon.
Otherwise no idea if they pursue some alternate equivalent to the FWD Galva and Galva 2 projects or whether they would even feel the need to.
I’m coming around to this idea. Studebaker as America’s Range Rover. Studebaker had a solid rep in Europe for their WWII trucks. However Jeep came out with the Wagoneer around the same time. I don’t know if the market was big enough for two upscale SUVs.
Kim, for me it’s partly a process of elimination. By the mid-60s the Studebaker body was obsolete as a sedan because it was too tall and didn’t have either a step-down chassis or curved side glass. However, those weren’t problems with a more truck-like wagon (or compact truck).
Of course, we can only speculate as to whether there was a big enough market in the late-60s for both a four-wheel-drive Studebaker and a Jeep Wagoneer. I don’t think they would have been direct competitors because the Studebaker body was quite a bit smaller and more car-like. Perhaps most importantly, Studebaker’s dealer network was much stronger in the suburbs than Jeep’s (go here for further discussion).
Studebaker was faced with the upcoming federal safety and pollution standards in ’68. Those were surely insurmountable; it may well have been the straw that broke the Conestoga’s back. Time to fold up the auto tent, and continue with the diversified portfolio of Studebaker-Worthington.
First of all, Bob Marcks did the best with what he had and it wasn’t much of a budget for those 1966 changes. Some of those 1966 changes were already in progress when Marcks became involved. When Studebaker Canada President Gordon Grundy went to the board with those 1967 model year proposals, he was told there wouldn’t be a 1967 model year.
Rumor has it that production halted sooner than expected for the 1966 model run when tooling for the trunk lids failed. Corporate wouldn’t fund replacement/repairs of the tooling and Studebaker Canada finished out the 1966 production run when the last remaining trunk lids were depleted. With that kind of thinking it’s no wonder the 1967 proposals went nowhere.
I happen to own a 1964 Studebaker Daytona Convertible (very similar to the one pictured in your article) and I would say that Brooks Stevens did a remarkable job modernizing the Lark on a shoestring. I will be the first to admit it was effectively lipstick on a pig, as that new sheet metal was riding on a 1953 era chassis. There are numerous sketches and proposals floating around for post-64 Studebaker models and of course some SDC members have taken liberties with their 64-66 restorations that make some sense in terms of design tweaks.
The Avanti, as dramatic as it was can be considered at best a misguided business decision. The money spent on the Avanti could have been better spent modernizing the Lark line and perhaps subtle improvements to the GT Hawk to make it a competitive personal luxury coupe.
While it’s interesting to speculate on what could have been, it is unlikely that Studebaker could have gone on much longer even with a better bread and butter Lark as the money simply wasn’t there for either a merger (be IH, Kaiser Jeep or Checker) or the much needed Lark line improvements. Could Studebaker return as a retro-mod fitted on an electric skateboard platform? That’s been my pipe dream since 1969!
First, it’s important to note that Studebaker had an even worse market share problem in trucks than they did with their cars. Second, given the year (1960), the Champ was a great looking truck, even with the mismatched bed sourced from Dodge along with a Lark bodied cab. However, the Champ was yet another example of the Studebaker parts bin recycling strategy to create an entirely new looking vehicle, albeit on an ancient platform (aka lipstick on a pig). The Champ’s platform dated back to 1949.
There’s a lot of similarities between the Jeep Wagoneer and the Studebaker Wagonaire. after all, they were both designed by Brooks Stevens. It’s too bad Studebaker didn’t have the foresight to put the Wagonaire on a truck platform and make it a 4 wheel drive entry. In the end Jeep won, Studebaker lost. If Studebaker had bought Kaiser Jeep there’s a chance they might have survived but more so as truck maker, not a car maker. However, we can’t undo what happened or relive the past.
The automobile market was changing dramatically during the 1960s and Studebaker was ill equipped to survive unless they were willing and able (and they weren’t) to change their platform and invest in other engineering changes. From a purely business perspective, the diversification program begun in the late 1950s was their future, not automobiles (or trucks).
Robert, your point about diversification being their future is interesting. Part of what I like about Donald Critchlow’s book about Studebaker is it focuses on the relationship between the corporation and the South Bend community.
If we believe that the primary point of a corporation is to earn the highest returns regardless of how it is done, then diversification made the most sense. However, part of what had made Studebaker unusual among automakers was its long-time commitment to the community from which it sprang. Diversification undercut, and ultimately destroyed, that commitment. The film, Studebaker: Less Than They Promised, suggests that one reason why the board pulled the plug on the automotive division was to get out from under its pension obligations to Studebaker workers. That was back in the days before the U.S. government provided protection against pensions going bust.
I agree with you that it was too bad Studebaker did not give the Wagonaire a four-wheel-drive truck chassis . . . and tie up with Kaiser-Jeep. That strikes me as the most plausible way to have kept the automotive operations of South Bend alive.
I’m less positive than you about how the Champ turned out — I’m hard-pressed to think of another post-war U.S. vehicle that looked like such a mishmash of spare parts. This strikes me as too bad because a more integrated design might have done a lot better in rebuilding Studebaker’s standing with trucks and pioneering the compact truck market.
Why ? Stop beating a horse that was truly dead. Studebaker effectively was on death-row by 1963. As much as I believe that the 1963 and 1964 cars were interesting, they were “old” new cars. The real “common-sense” car in 1965 in the U.S. was a G.M. intermediate with a Chevrolet 230-cu.-in. six or 283-cu.-in V-8.
Steve:
Actually, the Studebaker relationship with labor started fraying in the 1950’s. Studebaker employees were less productive than their counterparts at the other manufacturers. A strike was taken, some concessions were made while another strike occurred in the early 1960’s further deteriorated labor management relations. Also, Egbert wasn’t a favorite with labor. The bean counters were clearly driving the boat at Studebaker by this time. It is highly likely that Burlingame killed South Bend to minimize pension expense and kept production alive in Canada only to minimize dealer liabilities. It is interesting to note that Studebaker’s South Bend shut down resulted in pension reforms that created the federal agency that now insures failed pension plans.
Although I am a fan of Studebaker, it’s clear that Studebaker fell into a long, steady decline after the post-war sales boom dried up; their fate was driven in large part by poor business execution despite their design leadership.
Robert, I don’t disagree with anything that you’ve said — and your concluding statement hits the nail on the head.
Studebaker is fascinating to me partly because it is such a complex story. For example, one of the most energetic debates about the 1950s revolves around how Studebaker management should have dealt with the automaker’s labor costs. I tend toward Aaron Severson’s perspective and would further argue that Studebaker’s supposedly high break-even point may have had more to do with other management decisions (go here for further discussion).
As you indicate, after the Packard merger, management-labor relations mostly went downhill for the next decade. For example, my impression from the film, Studebaker: Less Than They Promised, was that both labor and management allowed their egos to get in the way of problem solving during the 1962 strike. The automaker was arguably too far gone by that point, but the strike hardly helped.
While one cannot blame all of the Studebaker’s problems on uncompetitive labor costs, they were certainly a factor in the company’s decline. Hoffman and Vance made a conscious decision to accept high wages…but they also tolerated low productivity and the retention of uncompetitive practices, such as overstaffing (more union workers mean more dues for the union local) and paying workers via piece rate methods. Studebaker had too many workers doing too little work for their pay.
The plant layout was also antiquated, which hurt productivity. I’ve read that Vance went to the board around 1948-49 and asked for funds for plant improvements, but was turned down. The board instead voted for a rather generous dividend.
The pot of money available to Studebaker wasn’t bottomless. The board chose to spend it on dividends, while Vance and Hoffman chose not to confront the union during the postwar conversion (as GM did) to get costs back into line, so they ended up spending it on higher wages.
Just as the independents needed to be smarter than the Big Three in wringing the most use out of a platform, they needed to be more careful about keeping costs in line and productivity at very high levels. There wasn’t much room for error in any of those areas.
The root of the problem here is that the postwar seller’s market lulled them all (except for George Mason at Nash) into a false sense of security. They came to believe that was going to be the new norm, and it ultimately wasn’t.
Perhaps it’s time for me to update my 1951 Studebaker story because it delves into these questions. Thomas Bonsall wrote that Studebaker’s collapse was unusually rapid and spectacular; I think the reason why was because the automaker’s management made too many big mistakes in rapid succession.
For example, if Studebaker’s ONLY problem had been its higher labor costs, then the automaker might have had a much easier time during the 1954 recession and Ford Blitz. Alas, Studebaker had also overextended itself with too much assembly-plant capacity, a costly V8 and automatic transmission, and unusually rapid redesigns. In addition, in 1953 Studebaker split its already strained resources on two distinct bodies and moved the brand upmarket. The overall strategy proved to be an unmitigated disaster.
The ironic part is that Ford had approached Studebaker about buying its automatic transmission, but was rebuffed by Vance. If that had happened, Studebaker could have spread the development costs over a larger volume, which would have lowered per-unit costs. But Vance wanted Studebaker to have exclusive use of it for at least a year, which ultimately did nothing for the company’s long-term competitive position.
With the V-8, Studebaker should have shopped it to other independent manufacturers. Kaiser was in serious negotiations with GM to use the Oldsmobile V-8 in the Kaiser. During the negotiations, GM raised the quoted cost per unit, supposedly because of higher production costs, although some suspect because the Rocket V-8 in the relatively light Kaiser would have made quite a performance car. Negotiations then stopped.
Studebaker’s V-8 should have been a good fit for the Kaiser, which would have, again, enabled Studebaker to lower it’s per-unit cost for the engine.
I believe it was Bonsall who suggested that, for 1953, Studebaker should have retained the 1947-52 body shell for the sedans and convertibles, but facelifted it, while bringing out the Starliner and Starlight coupes as separate models. That probably would have preserved sales of the sedans, which declined for 1953, but it still would have left Studebaker supporting two separate platforms. Coupe sales were very good for 1953, but then collapsed for 1954, along with the sales of the other body styles.
I had to wait a few days to calm down before I replied to this topic – and had to check if this was one of the “sponsored”/fake topics as have been posted in the recent past. But apparently it’s not. My gosh! CRAZY! Where to begin?!
I know I must keep this short, and can’t comment on it all. But, anyway, here l am:
The ’64 (’65,’66) Studebaker “Lark-type” is not a pig (the title was just an eye-catcher to get us all riled up to comment, right?). Please look at the article’s 3/4 rear view of a Jet Green Cruiser model. Compare it to a ’75-’80 Ford Granada 4 door which was a very successful product for Ford. They are very comparable in style (yes the Stude had a stand-up hood ornament too!) and dimension. Lengths of 4 door models within 4 inches (Stude shorter), wheelbase within 4 inches (Stude longer), and width within about 2 inches (Granada wider). l owned a ’76 Granada from new and ironically, the front fenders rusted through in 3 years! l had a 2 door and, funny enough, the door window frame styling was a dead ringer for the same part on a ’47-’52 Studebaker!
The ’64 Stude also had a very attractive rectangular driver-centered instrument cluster – which was also “featured” on the Granada. But Studebaker gave you 5 instruments – the Granada gave you two ! So, if a ’64 Stude was a “pig”, so was a very successful ’75 Granada (which has never, ever, been presented anywhere as a pig).
Last week I talked to a former Studebaker executive who was present for the product planning of the ’66 and proposed ’67 models. He is in his 80’s, but shrper than l could ever hope to be when l (hopefully) reach the same milestone. Asked about the gas cap location on a raised-bumper ’67, he could not specifically remember. But speaking about quad headlights, he said they agreed to just 2 headlights on the ’66 model since Mustangs were selling like proverbial hotcakes with no customer objections about no quad lights. (An aside: the tent shown on the Wagonaire page of the ’66 brochure was his own family’s tent! The park shown in the brochure picture of a Daytona at the beginning of this article was on Hamilton Bay, just west of the Stude factory)
Studebaker stylists DID put together a clay model of a 4 door sedan using the coupe’s “design criteria” and lower silhouette (picture P. 58 of Richard Langworth’s “Postwar Years” book) and although deemed more attractive, but it was seen as less practical for other important sedan requirements of the day and didn’t offer much interchangeability after all.
l’m going stop here (for now?) except to say that it would have been an interesting thing if Studebaker had picked up Willys in ’53 instead of Kaiser (IH was too proud a company to hand it’s light truck bizz over to someone else yet). On the other hand, 1966 was a good time for a large, diverse company with a long-ailing auto manufacturing division to close that part of the business. But it would have been another tragedy if the Willys story would have had to close then too.
Happy Trails.
Stewdi, to have these kinds of conversations it is really important to separate out our personal views of a car from a detached assessment of how well it did in the marketplace. For example, the Avanti is one of my personal favorite designs but I would also acknowledge that — at best — it did not help Studebaker survive longer as an automaker.
Know that I don’t mind longer comments if they use sufficient paragraph breaks, are civil and on topic.
I appreciate your sharing the views of the Studebaker executive. This makes me wonder how seriously the automaker took the idea of a raised rear bumper for 1967.
The coupe-based sedan you make reference to is an interesting concept. I don’t know how well it would have done because it would have not been very roomy, partly due to the lack of a step-down chassis. Meanwhile, the low and unusually rounded deck would have resulted in a rather small trunk. The car would thus have had to be sold primarily on its trendy styling, which would have aged relatively quickly given how fast the Big Three automakers were restyling their passenger cars in the second half of the 1950s.
I agree with you that it would have been interesting if Studebaker had picked up Willys (as long as it didn’t sink both automakers during Studebaker’s mid-50s cash crunch!). However, I would still question why the 1966 Studebaker needed a redesign grounded in planned obsolescence. For example, why get rid of the 1964-65 grille — which had an iconic Studebaker look — in favor of an unusually generic design? And why ditch dual headlights — which almost all of its mid-sized competitors had by 1966 — for cheap-looking singles?
Steve, l VERY much like Indie Auto, it’s discussions – and it’s attention to the independent manufacturers is wonderful to me. That’s why l’m here.
l’m a 43-year member of the Studebaker Driver’s Club, been actively involved in our two local SDC chapters for almost all of that time and have a running/driving Lark hardtop and a Champ truck in my garage right now. l have owned 10 Studes from ’47 to ’64 over the years, travelled many thousands of miles in them and my son has a beautiful, licensed, Power Hawk. l also owned a open buggy and still have a goat wagon (Studebaker Junior). My baby book says that my favorite toy was a “blue Studebaker” (1/43rd Dinky of a ’52 Land Cruiser) and the family’s first Stude was my great-grandfather’s 1913 Model AA35 Touring. My Dad had 3 Studes in a row when l was young – a ’53 sedan and 2 Hawks. l wrote to the company in South Bend when l was still a youngster l and still have the wonderful reply from Studebaker framed and on my wall. l’m telling you all this to help explain why detached, un-personal views of Studebaker topics is, for me, particularly difficult.
l’m sorry that you felt you had to include an admonition in your reply, but l remain unapologetic because the inflammatory “Lipstick on a Pig” title of this “Design Notes” subject would surely “bait” an emotional response from any life-long Studebaker fan.
Historians now know that the ’64 Studebaker Lark-type was “dead in the water”, especially after Dec. 9th, 1963 (the announcement day of the closing of the South Bend plants). The majority of company directors wanted an exit from auto production, and with the ensuing product line no longer being what Studebaker had also been about (no Hawks, no Avanti, no performance engines, no convertibles, no trucks). Also lost was 50% of American and 25% of Canadian dealers and all production for export after 1965. A significant number of Americans began to think of the car as foreign-manufactured (although the vast majority of company stockholders were, of course, still American,
and most major components of the car were still decidedly American designed and/or built) and that helped tank sales too. This “Design Notes” was fun, and l’m sorry if my reply above seemed too emotional (Indie Auto IS, l believe, hobby-driven and in my experience, emotion plays a big part of almost any hobby).
The End: We likely have all subscribed, at some time or another, to the old adage “imitation is the sincerest form of flattery”. As a “Just the facts, mam!”, non-“personal-view” rebuttal to the highly provocative title of this Indie Auto “Design Notes” and to prove that the “face” of a ’66 Stude was not that of a styling “pig”, l submit that you please Google a look at the “face” of a successful (and “universally” reviewed as good looking) 1967 Chevrolet C10 pickup. SAME face!
Stewdi, I wasn’t admonishing you. I just want to acknowledge that Indie Auto is different from the usual auto history sites, which tend to focus on discussions of interest to collectors. In contrast, I have gravitated to nerdy topics such as corporate strategy. Not a recipe for high readership, but I see a gap in the literature that I am helping to fill.
I would agree that the 1964-66 Studebaker front end was reasonably contemporary — and it did indeed look similar to a 1967 Chevy pickup. The problem was that the rest of the Studebaker body was not terribly competitive as a passenger car. This is why I have suggested that Studebaker’s most plausible path forward was in the compact truck and SUV markets, where flat side glass and an upright body were not disadvantages (go here). The 1964-66 front end would have looked great on a Champ pickup.
There’s quite a history behind Studebaker Motors ! Probably , the biggest reason for Studebakers failure was ” lack of budget .” You can plainly see that just by looking at the designs and lack of features in their last new models . The 1966 really looked ” cheap” , like there was little effort achieved in features or body design ! They likely didn’t even break even in their final year of production . While Ford and GM were breaking sales records ,Studebaker could no longer compete with the big three automakers. Sadly , they produced the last car on March 17, 1966 and as the sayings goes ,The rest is history !” Happy Motoring !
I believe that Bendix Automotive on the west side of South Bend (by the airport) was the source of Studebaker’s brake systems, (including the “Hill-Holder” from Bendix Brake in 1936). While the manual transmissions were from Borg-Warner and automatic from Detroit Gear between 1951 and 1954, (after that Studebaker purchased the automatic from Bendix (which ironically was the Ford-O-Matic) and that like the Packard Twin-Traction limited-slip differential (1956), Studebaker had an exclusive on the Detroit Gear auto for the first couple of years. Back in the 1950s, Warner Gear in Muncie and Dana-Spicer (Eaton) were big suppliers to G.M., Ford and A.M.C. as was Bendix.
The late great Andy Granatelli of Gran-Cor, Novi and Scientifically Treated Petroleum promotional fame’s comments in “Novi: The Legendary Indianapolis Race Car, Volume Two” (George Peters and Henri Greuter, Bar Jean Enterprises-publisher, 1998, out-of-print) about the demise of Studebaker Corporation as an automobile manufacturer when he was put in charge of the Chemical Compounds Division (S.T.P.) products reveal how important his division was corporately as S.T.P. was generating big profits which Studebaker bought in 1961 for 70 % of the Chemical Compounds Company of St. Joseph, MO for $ 10-million shinolas ! Granatelli was a known quantity at Studebaker because the corporate board had purchased Paxton Performance Products from Andy (who remained as President) in March, 1962, for $ 275,000, which included $ 125,000 of S.-P. stock ! By the way, the executive V.P. at McCullouch Industries who sold Paxton to the Granatellis was, you guess it, Sherwood Egbert. (Pp. 179-180).