A few years ago Paul Niedermeyer (2017a) questioned the conventional wisdom that the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge were an 11th-hour accident of history. In an epic essay, the Curbside Classic publisher poked holes in the theory that the “lean breed” Chryslers were a rushed response to an inaccurate rumor that General Motors was planning to shrink its full-sized Chevrolet for 1962.
Niedermeyer did not categorically reject what I’ll call the “inaccurate-rumor theory,” but he raised questions about its timing and suggested that other factors may have played a bigger role in the decision to downsize the Plymouth and Dodge. Those included public frustration with the increasing size of U.S. cars, a financial crisis at Chrysler, and a battle over the automaker’s soul waged between champions of engineering and styling.
This is a compelling argument, so let’s see how well it has withstood the test of time compared with the standard inaccurate-rumor theory — and a few others floated by auto historians.
Why should we care? Because the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge represented the first serious attempt by a Big Three automaker to offer a space-efficient alternative to bigger, glitzier and more powerful “full-sized” cars. Historians have tended to dismiss these prescient designs — which Dodge ads referred to as the “lean breed” — as an evolutionary wrong turn.
I have challenged this narrative by suggesting that the problem was not the cars’ size so much as their styling and marketing (go here for further discussion). The primary point of this story is separate facts from rumor regarding why Chrysler shrunk its two most popular cars in a curious change of direction.
Inaccurate-rumor theorists assume Chrysler panicked
This theory centers around Chrysler executive William C. Newberg. He reportedly heard that the full-sized Chevrolet would be downsized for the 1962 model year. In response, Newberg demanded that the Plymouth and Dodge be shrunk to an “intermediate” size. A major redesign of Chrysler’s entire full-sized car line had almost been completed, so this was a last-minute change. A crash program was launched that resulted in a compromised design. Sales of the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge were terrible.
The crowning tragedy of this theory is that the rumor turned out to be false. What Newberg likely heard about — and misunderstood — was that General Motors would introduce a new compact called the Chevy II in 1962.
The above two paragraphs summarize the major agreed-upon elements by those who espouse the inaccurate-rumor theory.
The general assumption appears to be that Newberg panicked — and nobody stopped him. Curtis Redgap (2019b) summed up this view most pointedly in stating that Newberg “had not invested a penny to confirm what he had heard, which was not supported by any other rumors.” Chrysler’s board — “apparently without questioning” — went along with the decision.
Additional specifics can vary in big and small ways
The biggest question involves Newberg’s status when the downsizing decision was made. This, in turn, hinges on when it occurred. One school of thought holds that Newberg ordered the downsizing during the 64-day period when he was Chrysler president (Lamm and Holls, 1996; Redgap, 2019b; Severson, 2009). This was between April 28 and June 30, 1960.
Another school of thought suggests that Newberg made the decision prior to assuming the presidency. Peter Grist (2007) and John Katz (1995) wrote that Newberg ordered the downsizing in late summer 1959 when he was still a vice president. Jeffrey I. Godshall (1992) also implied that Newberg made the decision during the summer of 1959. Charles K. Hyde did not pinpoint when the decision was made, but stated that the cars were “hurriedly restyled in late 1959” (2003, p. 190).
In addition, writers have varied in the specifics of Newberg’s marching orders. One narrative is that designers were told the newly created platform — which was internally referred to as the B-Body — should be no wider than 72 inches at the door posts because that was identical to what Newberg heard the downsized Chevrolet would be (Katz, 1995). The wheelbase ended up being 116 inches because the Chevy would be “around 115 inches” (Redgap, 2019a).
Some have written that Newberg called for designers to draw upon major elements of Chrysler’s compact platform, which was called the A-Body (Redgap, 2019b; Severson, 2009). In contrast, Katz (1995) presented evidence that management called for the next-generation compacts to be based off the B-Body. Writers have also debated which components were shared.
Garden parties, asymmetric lights and downsizing’s wisdom
Minor variations among writers include whether Newberg was at a “Detroit garden party” or was playing golf when he overheard the rumor.
Some elements of the story have been addressed by only a few automotive histories. This includes when Exner’s asymmetrical styling on the Plymouth was ditched. Most of the authors who discussed this topic point to Lynn Townsend ordering a last-minute tooling change after he became president of Chrysler on July 27, 1961 (Godshall, 1996; Knutson, 2019). Katz noted that the odd design flourishes weren’t removed until shortly before production began, but he did not pinpoint who overrode styling head Virgil Exner (1995, p. 62).
Virtually everyone has an opinion on the wisdom of the downsizing. Most have declared it as out of step with what car buyers wanted. For example, the auto editors of Consumer Guide dismissed the lean breed as an “ill-timed move that sets the (Plymouth and Dodge) divisions back years” (2002, p. 92). Katz pointed to the B-Body as the third time Chrysler was “led down the garden path of downsizing to its later regret” (1995, p. 74).
Aaron Severson (2009) offered one of the few counterpoints to this view. He suggested that the “fundamental problem with the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth was not their size; it was that they were ugly and seemed like a poor value next to their Chevrolet, Ford and AMC competition.”
Eye-witness accounts point to inaccurate rumor
The biggest reason the inaccurate-rumor theory has gained credibility is that it has been espoused by a number of stylists who worked at Chrysler during that time period. Although some details of their recollections may vary, their stories are similar.
As a case in point, Cliff Voss was quoted as saying that Virgil Exner and Paul Ackerman were called to a meeting where Newberg ordered the downsizing. Exner headed the styling department and Ackerman led engineering. The meeting occurred the Monday after Newberg attended a garden party where he supposedly overheard the rumor (Godshall, 1992).
William Brownlie also pinned the decision on Newberg. However, his understanding was that it occurred after the Chrysler executive had played golf with Chevrolet Division manager Ed Cole. Writer Jeffrey I. Godshall paraphrased what Brownlie said happened next: “Newberg came into work the next day and said, ‘Stop everything — we’ve got to reduce the size of the Plymouth and Dodge right away!'” (1996, p. 73).
In an interview with Katz, Brownlie stated that the Chevy downsizing rumor was met with skepticism. Even so, another Chrysler source — this one anonymous — told Katz that the “only the person who challenged (Newberg) that I know of was Exner” (1995, p. 59). The source added that when “word finally seeped out that there was a big Chevy . . . boy, there were red faces around there. But it was too late” (1995, p. 62; original italics).
John Samsen (2019) wrote that a major redesign of all the automaker’s big cars “were about finished” when staff were “told to stop work” after Newberg heard the GM rumor. Samsen, who was then a Chrysler Corporation stylist, was assigned to the Dodge studio, where staff “worked in shifts around the clock” to complete the downsized cars “in record time.”
Designers tended to deflect blame for weird styling
Brownlie said that the development timeline was so compressed that they had to adapt the styling to the smaller cars rather than come up with a new look. In addition, Virgil Exner Jr. recalled his father discussing cost-cutting moves imposed by engineers, such as getting rid of curved side windows, reducing glass area and shortening the wrap-around bumpers (Katz, 1995).
As a result, the “downsized Dodge just didn’t have the finesse of the larger car,” lamented stylist Gerry Thorley (Godshall, 1992, p. 54). Meanwhile, the downsized Plymouth “really didn’t look like the original car,” argued Chet Limbaugh, noting that it ended up “too short and stubby and out of the mainstream.” Brownlie added that if the Plymouth had been on the longer wheelbase “it would have been a dynamite product” (Godshall, 1992, p. 62).
Criticism of Exner’s styling sensibility has been ginger. One of the strongest complaints was from the anonymous source, who did not find the asymmetrical features of pre-production Plymouths to be very “commercial.” This approach included offsetting the rear license-plate frame, resulting in the left side of the car having a single taillight pod whereas the right side had three (Katz, 1995, p. 59).
Some historians have offered alternative scenarios
Relatively few auto histories have presented alternatives to the inaccurate-rumor theory, but they have been advocated by prominent sources.
One of the largest publishers of histories, Consumer Guide Automotive, has sometimes blamed Exner for the downsizing. Here’s an example from the Encyclopedia of American Cars:
“Chrysler design chief Virgil Exner thought that if Americans liked compacts, they’d go for downsized ‘standard’ cars, too. But he was about 15 years ahead of his time, and these cars sold as poorly as the Lancer — aggravated by frankly odd Lancer-like looks.” (automotive editors of Consumer Guide, 2006; p. 326)
Meanwhile, Richard M. Langworth, one of the country’s most prolific auto history writers, sidestepped offering a concrete explanation for the origins of the lean breed. Instead, he quoted Virgil Exner Jr.’s description of his father’s reaction to the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge: “He always referred to them as picked chickens because somebody got a wild ass idea up there to make them low in cost” (1993, p. 155).
Colbert reportedly had ‘second thoughts’ about S-Seres
In another book Langworth coauthored, Lester “Tex” Colbert was said to have killed a major redesign of the Chrysler and Imperial but “couldn’t stop the new Plymouth and Dodge” after he once again become the company’s president after Newberg was fired (Langworth, Flammang and the auto editors of Consumer Guide, 1992; p. 116). The implication is that the B-Body was under development in parallel with the proposed new big cars, which were referred to as the S-Series.
Langworth offered more details about this theory in another book he coauthored with Jan P. Norbye, The Complete History of the Chrysler Corporation, 1924-85. Colbert had “second thoughts” about the S-Series, which Newberg had approved before he was fired. The proposed Chrysler and Imperial were deemed “too chunky.” Thus, their existing bodies were given a mild restyling that mainly included shaving off the fins.
However, Langworth and Norbye stated that Exner “got his way” on the styling of the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth, which carried over major elements from the S-Series (1985; pp. 187-188).
Niedermeyer’s theory connects dots in new ways
Niedermeyer’s (2017a) theory is distinctive even though he mixed and matched some of the above-mentioned elements. He didn’t categorically reject the idea that Newberg heard the GM rumor but argued that if it happened, it most likely occurred in December of 1959.
This scenario diverges from those who have suggested the summer of 1959. The decision to develop the Chevy II wouldn’t have been made until after the Corvair was introduced in October and a few months of sales figures made it clear that the car was uncompetitive with the Ford Falcon. This is why Niedermeyer (2017b) wondered if there was such thing as a Detroit garden party held in December, when the weather would presumably be much colder.
More significantly, Niedermeyer (2017a) suggested that the rumor — if it happened — was merely “the straw that broke the camel’s back.” He assumed that the entire S-Series, which photos show included mockups for all five Chrysler brands — Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto, Chrysler and Imperial — was cancelled at the same time. This was presumably because the platform would not have achieved adequate economies of scale without including the higher-volume Plymouth and Dodge.
Niedermeyer was skeptical that Newberg had the power to kill the S-Series. As evidence, he pointed to a Fortune magazine article written by William B. Harris (1958) that noted how Newberg was a third-tier executive. He was an executive vice president who reported to Edgar C. Row, the first vice president and chairman of the administrative committee. Row reported to Colbert, who at that point held the titles of president and chief executive officer.
Even if Row had retired by December of 1959, Niedermeyer thought that it was “unrealistic” for Newberg to have had the authority to make a “unilateral decision to completely change the direction of the development of the two largest-volume cars in the company.”
Niedermeyer went on to paint the picture of a perfect storm: A public backlash against increasingly big cars, internal recriminations over the disastrous quality of Exner’s dramatic 1957 redesign, and a deepening financial crisis all combined to kill the S-Series. It didn’t help that the cars would have been expensive to produce because of then-unusual features such as curved side glass.
Engineering advocates won second round in battle with stylists
Niedermeyer suggested that the lean breed represented Round 2 in a lengthy struggle for the soul of the Chrysler Corporation. Pitted against each other was an old guard comprised of acolytes of retired CEO K. T. Keller and a new guard led by Colbert and Exner.
The new guard won Round 1 when Exner was given the chance to build a styling department, which then took the lead in creating the flamboyantly-styled “Forward Look” cars of 1955 and 1957. However, the old guard prevailed in Round 2 . . . sort of. The B-Body was an engineering marvel in the tradition of the Keller era, but it inherited Exner’s increasingly weird styling.
Contrary to many accounts, the B-Body’s development did not take a “rushed and direct” route, Niedermeyer contended. For example, the asymmetrical styling features did not show up on the S-Series Plymouth but were included for a time on downsized mockups. This brought Niedermeyer to wonder whether asymmetrical features were cooked up by Exner to sabotage the B-Body’s looks.
Niedermeyer also rejected the narrative that the B-Body was significantly based upon the A-Body compacts. He instead suggested that the original goal was for the next-generation compacts to share components with the intermediate B-Body.
Finally, he challenged the conventional wisdom that the 1962 models sold poorly primarily because they were too small. “If Exner had toned the styling down, like he did for 1963, Chrysler most likely would have had reasonably decent success with them from day one,” Niedermeyer suggested. Indeed, the B-Body anticipated the long-term decline of the full-sized car market as buyers increasingly shifted to mid-sized cars.
Chrysler had easier choices than a radical downsizing
Ditching the S-Series for the B-Body was a radical decision for a number of reasons. The most obvious one was that downsizing the “standard” Plymouth and Dodge represented a sacrilegious violation of Detroit groupthink, which held that bigger = better. The 1962 Plymouth was 7.5 inches shorter, 4.5 inches narrower and roughly 350 pounds lighter than an equivalent model from the previous year.
Less obvious but equally important, U.S. automakers rarely pulled the plug on an almost completed redesign because that would have been a significant waste of money and time.
In addition, the B-Body wasn’t just a quick reskinning. The lean breed was an arguably more ambitious undertaking than Ford’s new-for-1962 intermediates. Whereas the lean breed was a relatively clean-sheet design, the Fairlane and Meteor borrowed components from the compact Falcon platform.
Chrysler’s existing big car was well suited to a nip and tuck
In theory, the automaker didn’t have to throw away the S-Series in order to downsize. Designers could have instead trimmed the length, width and wheelbase of the Plymouth and Dodge models.
Or, if saving money was the biggest consideration, management could have ditched the S-Series and given the existing full-sized body a reskinning that included pruning its dimensions. This would have allowed Chrysler to offer a stop-gap response to a downsized Chevy while waiting to see where the market was going before committing to a more substantial redesign.
Also see ‘General Motors trumped Ford’s 1962 foray into mid-sized cars’
The existing full-sized body was well situated to being a transitional design. Even though the 1961 Plymouth’s external dimensions were almost identical to its Big Three rivals, the base 1961 Savoy 4-door sedan was lighter than the equivalent Chevy (by 185 pounds) and Ford (by 275 pounds).
The 1965 Ford illustrates a more incrementalist approach than what Chrysler took. Ford’s base four-door sedan had the same wheelbase and length as the previous year’s model but was almost three inches narrower and 235 pounds lighter. These were meaningful numbers but not enough to have pushed the big Ford into the mid-sized class.
Instead, Chrysler engaged in the automotive equivalent of a moon shot. What led management to make such an ambitious change of plans? Let’s try to answer that question by first eliminating some theories.
Which theories are least plausible?
Right off the top let’s discard the idea that Exner championed the downsizing. There is no factual basis for this scenario. Consumer Guide staff should have known this because over the years a handful of writers for Collectible Automobile magazine have documented Exner’s grudging role.
What’s even worse is that this clearly erroneous information has been included in multiple editions of their flagship history book, the Encyclopedia of American Cars (1993, 2006).
Meanwhile, Langworth and Norbye (1985) stretch credulity by arguing that Exner “got his way” on the B-Body’s styling when it lost key features from the S-Series such as curved side glass. Perhaps it was not known when their book was being written that Exner had told management that the downsized cars were “uncompetitive and Styling should not be held responsible” (Godshall, 1992; p. 52).
Assuming that Langworth and Godshall have accurately dated photographs of B-Body mockups, we can also ditch the theory that Newberg ordered the downsizing while he was company president. The photos show a downsized Dodge reportedly taken in February of 1960 that looks close to what went into production. Newberg did not assume the presidency until late April.
Theories can gloss over economies-of-scale implications
The scenario that Colbert killed the S-Series Chrysler and Imperial after Newberg was fired needs more evidence to be plausible. In theory, Newberg could have kept the S-Series alive when calling for the Plymouth and Dodge to be downsized. In practice, it would have been financially prohibitive.
At issue is not just that the S-Series would have lost the high-volume models needed to achieve adequate economies of scale. It would also have been pricey to redesign both the big-car platform and launch the B-Body at the same time.
In addition, putting the S-Series into production would have eliminated the possibility of further amortizing the cost of the automaker’s two existing full-sized platforms. The body used for Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler would have been only two-years old at the end of the 1961 model year. That’s one year less than the typical industry practice of a major redesign every three years (Harris, 1958). Squeezing more production out of that body might have been doubly advisable because sales in 1960-61 were weak.
Meanwhile, the Imperial had a similar problem to the 1958-69 Lincoln — its unique body sold in such low numbers that squeezing as many years out of it as possible made financial sense. If the Imperial had been switched to the S-Series in 1962, its existing body would have been in production only five years.
In light of Chrysler’s deteriorating financial condition, I am surprised that the automaker even considered introducing the S-Series in 1962 rather than waiting at least another year. Thus, the scenario of launching both the S-Series and the B-Body in 1962 sounds too ambitious.
One topic that would benefit from more evidence is when the Plymouth’s asymmetrical styling was killed. The most popular scenario is that this occurred when Townsend became president. This was only two months before the cars were introduced to the public on September 28 — which doesn’t sound like a whole lot of time to be making sheetmetal changes. Designer Chet Limbaugh told Katz that the cars were still asymmetric “just within a few months of the time that the car came out” but those features were not on the early production models (1995, p. 62).
What of Niedermeyer’s (2017a) speculation that Exner sought to sabotage the B-Body Plymouth with asymmetrical styling? An anonymous Chrysler designer told Katz (1995) that the original S-Series Plymouths were asymmetrical and that Exner lobbied hard to keep this look until the B-Body was almost ready for production. This sounds credible. I would also question why Exner would risk sabotaging the lean breed during a time period when he could feel his power “slipping away from underneath him,” according to his biographer (Grist, 2007; p. 126).
Why wasn’t there time to fully restyle the cars?
I would like to mention a narrative that could be true but sounds suspiciously like an excuse. This is the contention by some Chrysler stylists that the timeline was too tight to do anything more than downsize the S-Series’ basic look. Why was that the case when the engineers were so ambitious in developing the B-Body? Could it be that Exner was too invested in the S-Series to create a fresh design better suited to a mid-sized car?
By the same token, I question the assumption of some that the S-Series’ styling would have been more successful than the lean breed’s. As a case in point, the S-Series Plymouth two-door hardtop had a pleasing look. However, aside from curved side glass, it was rooted more in the past than the future. Niedermeyer (2017a) quite rightly compared the design to a 1960 Oldsmobile. Exner missed the industry shift to more angular surfaces and coke-bottle shapes. If the S-Series Plymouth had reached production it would have quickly looked old hat.
The rest of the Chrysler lineup was even worse. Iterations of the S-Series Dodge that were documented in photographs show weirder front and side sculpting than on the B-Body. Meanwhile, the Chrysler’s styling was so bizarre that the 1958 Edsel looks conventional in comparison.
We can only speculate as to how well the overall S-Series line would have sold. However, the cars’ looks were odd enough that I could see Townsend ordering a restyling just as quickly he did with the B-Body.
The rumor theory sounds plausible — with some twists
The idea of a top executive overhearing a tantalizing rumor about a competitor has some credence. In a 1958 story about espionage in the auto industry, an anonymous source told Popular Science that:
“Some of the biggest leaks, I’m afraid, come from the top. The brass will be gathered at the Detroit Athletic Club or Bloomfield Hills Country Club, at a party or in a locker room, and accidentally let fly with some secret of more than passing importance.” (Jones, 1958; p. 135)
Despite the questions raised by Niedermeyer, I suspect that Newberg did order the downsizing and blame it on a rumor. A key reason I stick with this scenario is that I don’t see a way for all of the above-mentioned Chrysler designers to have been wrong.
In addition, Newberg strikes me as a reasonable point person to order the downsizing even before he became Chrysler president. He may have been third in the corporate pecking order, but Newberg might have had more tacit power because Colbert “removed himself entirely from operations to devote his time to policy,” according to Fortune magazine (Harris, 1958). All of Chrysler’s 19 vice presidents directly reported to Newberg.
This would not have been the last time that a lower-level Chrysler executive did such heavy lifting. Townsend oversaw massive budget cuts — which included eliminating 7,000 white-collar jobs — while he was administrative vice president during the first half of 1961 (Thimmesch, 1969).
That said, my thinking is somewhat different than Redgap’s (2019b). He suggested that Newberg benefitted from “the power of chaos” which had been swirling around the automaker. The higher-level executives who had the clout to challenge the downsizing proposal “were sidelined,” Redgap argued. Exner “was recuperating from a massive heart attack” and Colbert “was battling charges about sweetheart deals with suppliers.”
Other writers have painted a somewhat different picture. Exner’s biography stated that his “health was not good” but he was heavily engaged in the S-Series’ development (Grist, 2007; p. 124-5). Why wouldn’t Exner fight hard to protect a major redesign over which he had invested so much effort? By the same token, Colbert appears to have maintained his political standing until the summer of 1960, after Newberg was fired for conflicts of interest.
How could Newberg have acted so quickly?
Regardless of when the downsizing decision was made, I find it hard to believe that Newberg could have acted unilaterally. Even if he had been president, it would have been foolhardy to make such a big decision without covering his flanks. In addition, the Fortune magazine article offers the additional wrinkle that Row was the corporation’s point person on “planning” and that Newberg “carries out Row’s plans” (Harris, 1958).
Keeping that in mind, let’s ponder how Newberg could have heard the GM rumor on Sunday and gotten all of his political ducks lined up on Monday. A dramatic change in direction that would cost a financially struggling corporation tens of millions of dollars was made in one day? This sounds more like the script for a TV drama rather than how things typically work in a large firm that is not run by a domineering founder.
I could see a rapid-fire decision happening under only one scenario — that ditching the S-Series and downsizing the Plymouth and Dodge had already been decided by upper management. They merely needed a cover story.
Was the rumor part of a Machiavellian plot?
Under this scenario, the rumor didn’t need to be true. Nor did Newberg’s panic need to be genuine. He only had to play the role of henchman. Perhaps his subsequent elevation to the presidency of Chrysler was a reward for the efficiency with which he implemented the change in direction.
If part of Newberg’s designated role was also to take the political heat, he seems to have done his job well. Chrysler stylists quoted by various histories have focused their anger at him rather than Row, Colbert, the board and the engineering department.
For example, Godshall suggested that despite the “last-minute turnaround with all its concomitant confusion, there were those in Engineering who were happy to comply with Newberg’s new directive” (1996, p. 74).
This sounds like an understatement given that the tables were suddenly turned. Instead of Exner’s stylists driving the development process, the engineers were.
Katz painted the picture of an environment where the engineering department used heavy-handed tactics to enforce its direction. For example, a “four-man police force” of engineers was formed that measured stylists’ drawings to ensure that they adhered to a 72-inch body width (1995, p. 62).
Engineering was surprisingly ambitious for a crash program
Niedermeyer (2017a) had good reason to state that the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge were not merely a reskinning of the previous year’s designs, but rather a “revolutionary departure” from the typical full-sized American car. The B-Body displayed clever innovations that made the cars more space efficient and lighter weight. Changes included moving the engine farther forward, reducing the size of the automatic transmission and switching to a 100-percent unit-body construction.
These features were particularly impressive — and surprising — given that this was supposedly a crash program. Chrysler was clearly trying to reassert its engineering leadership. Perhaps not so coincidentally, Keller predicted this turn of events in a 1958 Fortune magazine interview:
“The present trend in cars has about another year or two to go. Then we’ll be back to design for function, and there’ll be more stress on utility. It takes more than styling to make a successful car. The car must be a good, dependable product. Right now we have quite a bit of gingerbread design — lots of jigsaw work. We’ll go back to simplicity of design, you wait and see.” (Langworth and Norbye; 1985 p. 196)
The styling of the 1962 models still displayed Exner’s typical “gingerbread,” but the engineering re-embraced Keller’s early-50s emphasis on practicality. That philosophy was shared by a “cadre of engineers and executives” at Chrysler who were “dismayed at the increasing bulk of American automobiles” (Godshall, 1996, p. 74).
One additional factor could have fueled the engineering department’s antipathy toward Exner and his stylists. The redesigned 1957 models suffered from embarrassing quality-control problems such as premature rust, faulty door seals and torsion bars that broke. This was reportedly the result of Colbert moving back the introduction of the new cars one year (Hyde, 2003). Exner opposed that decision, according to his biographer (Grist, 2007). Nevertheless, it would make sense if engineers came to feel that their reputation had been tarnished by an excessive emphasis on trendy styling.
Might all of these dynamics have culminated in a plot to kill the S-Series, which had even more outlandish sci-fi styling than the 1960-61 models? And rather than merely facelifting the existing full-sized cars, might the Kellerites have pressed upper management to return to Chrysler’s roots in producing space-efficient family cars?
Newberg’s rumor could have been serendipitous. Or it could have been fabricated. Either way, the apparent lack of due diligence by management in testing out the accuracy of the rumor may have been a feature rather than a bug.
Downsizing was most likely ordered in summer of 1959
Whether or not Newberg actually heard a rumor, I would agree with Niedermeyer that the entire S-Series was most likely killed when the downsizing was ordered. However, I would offer the friendly amendment that the decision was announced in summer or early fall rather than December of 1959. This is for three reasons.
First, because the Dodge mockup pictured in a February 1960 photograph appears to be too close to production-ready to have been started only a few months earlier.
Second, so many of the eye witnesses talk about garden parties, golfing and nice weather. Surely all of them couldn’t have misremembered the time of year the rumor supposedly occurred.
Third, a longer timeline would presumably have allowed for the considerable back-and-forth that Niedermeyer argued that Chrysler designers went through in developing the B-Body.
The biggest downside of my proposed scenario is that development of the Chevy II did not begin until after the Corvair was introduced in the fall of 1959. This opens up another can of worms.
What if the rumor wasn’t about the Chevy II?
If Newberg did hear a rumor, I wonder whether it was actually about the Chevy II. As we will see, timing isn’t the only problem with this scenario.
The Chevy II reportedly reached production in August 1961 after a crash program that took 18 months (Wikipedia, 2019). That means the decision to green light the car occurred somewhere around January 1960. This may have been a good three to six months after Newberg initiated the development of the B-Body.
Another problem with the Chevy II scenario is that the rumor Newberg thought he heard involved a mid-sized car — not a compact. Redgap (2019a) stated that the wheelbase for the rumored car was around 115 inches. That was five inches longer than the Chevy II’s but the same size as the intermediate Chevelle, which Chevrolet introduced in 1964.
Let’s take a step back and brainstorm the range of possibilities. One scenario is that Cole wanted to throw Newberg off track so he purposely made up a story about the big Chevrolet being downsized. While not very sportsmanlike, lying to a competitor doesn’t strike me as improbable in an era marked by a high level of espionage (Jones, 1958).
Another scenario was that Cole really did talk about downsizing the big Chevy. GM executives could have at least briefly considered that option given the complaints about how big U.S. cars had become. The automaker did end up offering a shorter version of the 1961 Cadillac.
Might GM have changed its mind about a 1962 mid-sized car?
A more likely scenario was that Cole hinted at GM’s early thinking about a new line of mid-sized cars — perhaps after learning about Ford’s. The latter automaker planned to launch a new intermediate platform for the 1962 model year. If the downsized Ford Fairlane and Mercury Meteor were on a more normal development timeline than the Chevy II, design work would presumably have been underway by the summer of 1959.
Might GM have initially planned to introduce an intermediate in 1962, but instead went with the compact Chevy II after seeing the Corvair’s inauspicious launch in the fall of 1959? Or did the creation of the Chevy II result in a domino effect that later led GM to upsize its premium-priced compacts to the mid-sized class in 1964?
The Chevy II represented a major mid-course correction. GM created a brand-new body rather than base the Chevy II on the new-for-1961 “Y-Body” shared by the Pontiac Tempest, Oldsmobile F-85 and Buick Special.
GM management presumably decided that its compact platform was too low and cramped to effectively compete against the hot-selling Falcon and Rambler. Whereas the Y-Body was more than three inches lower than the Ford compacts, the Chevy II was slightly taller.
If all this sounds like wild speculation, I would point out that none of the histories on the B-Body have provided any meaningful evidence that Cole was talking about the Chevy II. The only thing we can say with confidence is that GM’s decisions were unusually erratic during this time period.
As a case in point, after only two years the Y-Body received all-new sheetmetal — which was then discarded after only one year. Could it be that the original plan was to get two years out of the reskinning, but the 1962 intermediates from Ford and Chrysler sped up GM’s timeline?
This shows how GM’s erratic behavior may have been heavily influenced by its rivals’ sharp turn toward smaller cars. If Newberg panicked, he was unlikely the only U.S. auto executive who did during this time period. The zeitgeist was quickly shifting in unpredictable ways.
Component sharing became a longer-term goal
Niedermeyer’s (2017a) skepticism about component sharing between the A- and B-bodies is well deserved. An anonymous Chrysler designer told Katz (1995) that Newberg’s initial marching orders were not achieved even though they were only abandoned late in the design process. As Niedermeyer pointed out, cowls don’t lend themselves to stretching in width. The 1962 Plymouth was around five inches wider the Valiant.
A useful comparison may be American Motors’ attempt to share components between its mid-sized Classic and compact American. The new-for-1964 American didn’t share a cowl with the Classic because the latter was four inches wider. However, the two platforms did share inner-door hardware. For 1964 they even shared the same outer-door sheetmetal.
I don’t see how either the first- or second-generation A-bodies could have shared even its front doors with the B-Body. They appear to be too small given Chrysler’s advertised goal of giving the B-Body “chair high” seating.
The non-wagon lean breeds were a half inch taller than the first-generation A-Body and more than two inches taller than the second generation. Giving the compacts a lower, sportier look was presumably more of a priority than with the B-Body.
Chrysler appears to have followed in AMC’s footsteps when it redesigned its intermediates in 1966 and compacts the following year. In the promotional materials below, notice how the door-window frames appear be identical in the 1967 Plymouth Belvedere and Valiant.
Perhaps Chrysler designers were more willing to share doors in the next redesign cycle because maximizing interior room in the B-Body had become a lower priority. A new full-sized C-Body was introduced in 1965, which relegated the B-Body to junior status.
The B-Body didn’t fail because it was too small
Most auto histories suggest that B-Body sales were terrible in 1962 primarily because the cars were too small. Godshall offered the most pointed critique by noting that Chrysler deviated from the approach used by GM and Ford. When the Big Two introduced intermediates:
“(T)hey arrived not as replacements for larger cars, but as alternatives and supplements. The public certainly didn’t want to have smaller cars rammed down its collective throat. Choice was fine, but buyers didn’t want to be dictated to.” (Godshall, 1996; p. 74)
Godshall’s indignant tone is curious given that the “big” car was still a fairly new — and controversial — idea in the United States. The graph below shows how the Chevrolet and Ford grew by roughly a foot in length between 1955 and 1961. The Plymouth grew even more — 20 inches — if you go back an extra two years.
Weight increased by a commensurate amount — particularly for Chevrolet and Ford. Of course, as the pounds were added, components such as brakes needed to be beefed up. Fuel economy declined, as did maneuverability. Extra-cost options such as power steering and V8 engines were considered a necessity for a higher proportion of buyers.
The early-60s Fords were the biggest and heaviest of the low-priced field. The 1962 Galaxie four-door sedan was 11 inches longer, 3.3 inches wider and 477 pounds heavier than the equivalent 1955 model.
You would think that the Ford’s bigger footprint would translate into a much roomier and more comfortable interior, but that arguably wasn’t the case. Hip room was around three inches greater, but the lower seating position made sitting over the driveshaft hump less comfortable.
Cars got so big during the late-50s that even the business-friendly Republican Senator Alexander Wiley lectured auto executives about the negative impacts they were creating:
“I think you have got to consider the cities, the highways in relation to your cars. . . . You are going to make tremendous expenditures necessary if these cars keep growing bigger and bigger, and I think more and more people want medium-sized cars. . . . I have talked to municipal people who are very concerned about this tremendous car business, what it means in the life of the community, what it means in parking not only on the thoroughfares, but parking places, what it means for the convenience of the other fellow.” (Cray, 1980; p. 394)
The lean breed merely represented a correction from the stylistic over-exuberance of the late-50s. Yet those steeped in Detroit groupthink have treated these cars as a radical idea — and a gigantic mistake.
Auto histories downplay success of 1963-64 Plymouth
Historians tend to downplay or ignore a key fact: The 1963 and 1964 Plymouths outsold the standard-sized 1960 and 1961 models. Granted, the B-Body didn’t sell as well as the 1958-59 models, but that might have been at least partially because of cannibalization from the Valiant and a reorganization in 1960 that put a halt to dualed Plymouth and Dodge dealer (go here for further discussion).
Sales of the 1963-64 Plymouth may have increased for a number of reasons, including the introduction of a five-year or 5,000-mile powertrain warranty. However, the most obvious difference was more conventional styling Townsend had demanded.
In fairness, one could point out that the full-sized Plymouth, which was reintroduced in 1965, outsold the 1963-64 lean breed for the rest of the decade — albeit only modestly. What the above graph doesn’t show is that the 1963 B-Body had higher volume than the full-sized Plymouth from 1970 to its death in 1977.
Also see ‘1966-67 Plymouth Satellite was most anonymous-looking car of its era’
One could also argue that Plymouth was able to significantly increase its output in the second-half of the 1960s by offering a wider range of models that competed directly against Ford and Chevrolet. That’s true to a point, but as we will discuss shortly, Chrysler arguably didn’t need distinct compact, mid-sized and full-sized platforms to be competitive.
The 1963-64 Dodge was never outsold by its full-sized successor
Meanwhile, the B-Body Dodge output also rebounded during 1963-64. Indeed, volume in each of those two years topped 1958, 1959 and 1961.
More significantly, the 1963-64 lean breeds were never outsold by full-sized Dodges offered between 1965 and 1977, when they were discontinued. Indeed, only twice — in 1966 and 1968 — did the big Dodge outsell the “disastrous” 1962 models.
The full-sized Dodges did not live up to expectations despite heavy investments. They were given unique sheetmetal from 1965 through 1971, and two-door and four-door hardtops benefitted from distinctive rooflines. This stood in stark contrast to the 1962-63 B-Body Dodge, which shared door sheetmetal with the Plymouth and made do with one roofline for all hardtops and sedans.
Niedermeyer (2017a) argued with some justification that Dodge and Plymouth “never again fielded a truly successful full-sized car.” He also noted that after 1962 the market for full-sized cars began to shrink — particularly at the expense of mid-sized cars. This is why he viewed the lean breed as “rather prescient, if not brilliant.”
I agree, but that begs the question: What could Dodge and Plymouth have done to grow sales without a full-sized platform?
Chrysler should have developed a modular B-Body
Product proliferation was clearly an industry trend that Chrysler could not ignore. But that didn’t mean it had to slavishly copy its much bigger rivals. The B-Body could have been developed into a modular platform used for both mid-sized entries as well as those that competed indirectly against GM and Ford’s full-sized cars. For example, the Chrysler and Imperial brands could have been eventually shifted over to a stretched version of the B-Body.
Reducing the number of distinct platforms would have given Chrysler better economies of scale — which could have been crucial in evening out the automaker’s chronic booms and busts.
Even more importantly, the lean breed would have offered U.S. car buyers a meaningful alternative to what Brock Yates called “land arks.” These were cars that were “too large, too heavy, too clumsy and too inefficient to meet the needs of the modern driver” (1983, preface).
Alas, the opposite occurred. Under Townsend’s leadership, Chrysler largely matched GM and Ford offerings model for model, and inch for inch.
Chrysler’s re-embrace of “bigger = better” arguably contributed to its brush with death in the late-70s — and to Detroit’s slowness in responding to a rising tide of imported cars with more efficient designs.
So where does this leave us?
Niedermeyer has brought us a step closer to understanding the origins of the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge. He may not have nailed down all of the details, but his skepticism about key elements of the inaccurate-rumor theory has helped to shed light on where we need more hard evidence.
The biggest question that needs to be answered definitively is when the downsizing was ordered. My best guess is sometime in the summer or early fall of 1959. From that guess emerges another one — that Newberg didn’t really hear about the Chevy II. With currently available information one can only speculate as to whether he invented the rumor, Cole pulled his leg or GM ended up doing something different than what Newberg heard.
The Machiavellian scenario seems to be the best fit (thus far)
From here the logic chain could branch into a number of directions. For example, if we accept eye-witness accounts that Newberg ordered the downsizing after only one day of supposedly hearing the rumor, then I would lean toward the Machiavellian scenario.
In other words, top management was already planning to kill the S-Series and needed a cover story that minimized blowback from the styling staff. Newberg may have been the henchman but he likely wasn’t the only — or even the biggest — champion of the downsizing plan among top management.
This is essentially a souped-up version of Niedermeyer’s theory that the rumor was the “straw that broke the camel’s back.”
Again, these are merely guesses. Another round of primary research is needed to better document what happened. More detailed knowledge about the timelines for smaller-car programs at GM and Ford could be especially valuable.
Note that I am not minimizing the contributions of already-published articles and books. Historical research is a team sport. An individual author rarely gets everything right. More typical is that they add to knowledge incrementally — which others further build upon. That’s the goal of this essay.
Whatever facts ultimately come to the surface, Niedermeyer’s story shows how good historical analysis can often help us see an event in a new way. His theory undercuts the conventional wisdom that the B-Body was merely a historical accident caused by a panic-stricken executive. Instead, the lean breed is a microcosm of the internal conflicts afflicting all of the U.S. automakers in the late-50s and early-60s.
This is why further research on the B-Body’s origins could help us better understand a key moment in the decline of the American auto industry.
NOTES:
This is an expanded version of a story originally posted December 1, 2019. For simplicity’s sake the B-Body Plymouth and Dodge are referred to as the “lean breed” even though only the latter brand made use of that term in 1962 advertising. Production data and specifications are from the Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975 (Gunnell, 2002) and the Classic Car Database (2019). Dodge production data may be lower than other sources because it does not include Canadian or exported units.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2002. Cars of the Sizzling ’60s: A Decade of Great Rides and Good Vibrations. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
——–; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill. - ——–; 2019. “1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 Plymouths.” How Stuff Works. Posting date unknown; accessed August 16, 2019.
- Classic Car Database; 2019. “Search for Specifications.” Accessed October 20.
- Cray, Ed; 1980. Chrome Colossus: General Motors and its Times. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, NY.
- Fortune; 1958. “Chrysler’s Private Depression.” Republished January 5, 2014; accessed August 16, 2019.
- Godshall, Jeffrey I; 1992. “1962-64 Dodge: ‘The New Lean Breed.'” Collectible Automobile. Published October; accessed August 16, 2019.
- ——–; 1996. “Opportunity Knocked: The Super Sport Plymouth Could Have Made for 1962.” Collectible Automobile. Published December; accessed August 16, 2019.
- Grist, Peter; 2007. Virgil Exner, Visioneer. Veloce Publishing, Dorchester, England.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Harris, William B.; 1958. “Chrysler’s Private Depression.” Fortune. Posted January 5, 2014; accessed August 27, 2019.
- Hyde, Charles K.; 2003. Riding The Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Jones, James; 1958. “How the Auto Makers Spy on Each Other.” Popular Science. Published February; accessed September 8, 2019.
- Katz, John; 1995. “1962-64 Plymouth: Pivotal, Panic-Driven Mopars.” Collectible Automobile. Published April, pp. 57-69.
- Knutson, Lanny; 2019. “The 1962 Plymouths.” Allpar.com. Posting date unknown; accessed August 16, 2019.
- Lamm, Michael and Dave Holls; 1996. A Century of Automotive Style: 100 Years of American Car Design. Lamm-Morada Publishing Co.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993. Chrysler & Imperial 1946-1985: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, Il.
- Langworth, Richard M. and James Flammang; 1992. Great American Automobiles of the 60s. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2017a. “Automotive & Design History: 1962 Plymouth & Dodge – Brilliant Blunder, or Suddenly It’s 1977.” Curbside Classic. Posted December 4; accessed August 16, 2019.
- ——–; 2017b. “1962 Plymouth & Dodge Article Postscript #2: Do They Have Winter Garden Parties in Detroit?” Curbside Classic. Posted December 6; accessed August 21, 2019.
- Redgap, Curtis; 2019a. “1962 Plymouth Sport Fury car reviews.” Allpar.com. Posting date unknown; accessed August 16, 2019.
- ——–; 2019b. “Inside Chrysler: Corruption Topples the President.” Allpar.com. Posting date unknown; accessed August 18, 2019.
- Samsen, John; 2019. “The 1962 Chrysler products fiasco and Flite Wing — What might have been.” Allpar.com. Posting date unknown; accessed August 16, 2019.
- Severson, Aaron; 2009. “The Dodge That (Almost) Ate Detroit: Chrysler’s Disastrous 1962 Downsizing.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted January 11; accessed August 16, 2019.
- Thimmesch, Nick; 1969. “What’s Good for Chrysler is Good For Lynn Townsend.” Esquire. Published March 1; accessed August 20, 2019.
- Wikipedia; 2019. “Chevy II/Nova.” Page last edited October 27.
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chevrolet (1962); Chevrolet Chevelle (1964); Dodge (1962); Mercury Comet (1961); Pontiac Tempest (1961); Plymouth (1962)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Cadillac (1961); Dodge (1962, 1963); Dodge Dart (1963); Ford Fairlane (1962); Ford LTD (1965); Imperial (1961); Plymouth (1961, 1962, 1964); Plymouth Belvedere (1967); Plymouth Valiant (1960, 1967); Rambler American (1964); Rambler Classic (1963)
Steve, this is an excellent analysis and a fascinating story. I never bothered questioning the accepted reason for the downsizing, nor considered its broader significance.
After you rolled out all the possibilities, it struck me that it could have been Rambler’s incredible sales rise in 1959, its appeal helped by restrained dimensions and a space-efficient design, and promoted by Romney, in concert with his repeated attacks on the American auto industry’s dinosaurs. The idea of a group within Chrysler that was centered in Engineering, and that wanted a larger version of the Rambler, that was smaller than what the American car had become, seems totally reasonable, almost expected.
Thank you for your kind words, Paul. It must have been quite a shock to Chrysler management in 1959-60 to see the automaker’s market share fall despite all of the money spent on fancy styling during 1955-59 (go here for further discussion).
Meanwhile, the dowdy Rambler was doing unexpectedly well. I would imagine that this gave the Kellerites renewed leverage — and it would be fascinating to learn more about how it played out behind the scenes. It’s just odd to me that the 1962 downsized cars ended up being a weird hybrid of efficient packaging and stylistic overkill. Why didn’t management press Exner to do more than shrink the S-series look?
I think management had to discern the company’s late ’50s problems in successive stages, just as it had done throughout the early and mid-Fifties when it knew that appearance needed to drastically improve. In that instance, it allowed Ex to make modest changes for ’53, even more for ’55, and finally for ’57, to push Engineering to do things that their analytical minds knew were not, at some level, right for the customer. All this accomplished, by 1957 it was now time to circle back and innovate on the Engineering side… on behalf of the customer’s physical and economic needs.
Let’s think about the ever-deepening level of awareness within Chrysler as 1957-59 unfolded. We know that the company in 1957 had made the commitment to respond to Rambler, and by 1959 – even before launch – had learned from Valiant the power of unibody design and efficient packaging, and also the shift in Rambler’s sales to something very significant.
It is not hard to imagine a growing belief within Chrysler that such a design, if scaled up, could do wonders to Chrysler’s large cars.
Ex had proven himself in matters aesthetic, so the main focus of leadership’s attention was understandably back on the Engineering side. Build quality was a concern, which a unibody would improve. Weight savings and interior packaging were also important. The realization that Ex had ventured down a creative rabbit hole took some time for leadership to grasp, initially not able to rule out the possibility that it was their own inability to see true beauty which was giving them pause. But at some point, probably enough of them said no, it’s Ex and we have to do something about it.
What I find interesting is that the 1963 line-up was styled under Exner’s direction. He was responsible for the 1963 Dodge Dart and Plymouth Valiant, which were all-new, and the facelifted Dodge and Plymouth. Sales of the compacts took off – particularly the Dart – while sales of the standard Dodge and Plymouth also increased greatly.
This suggests that the problem with Exner was that he needed to be reigned in by top management. Allow him to run free, and we get the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth. With a stern warning and watchful eye from top management, we get the 1963 versions of those cars, which were both aesthetically and commercially much more successful.
Make no mistake that the 1957 Forward Look line was a huge success for Exner’s leadership of Design. That the engineering and manufacturing sides of the house failed is their problem and not Design.
Exner was one of the design masters of the time. GM led with Earl and then followed by Mitchell. Ford rarely showed design prowness under George Walker and then with Bordinat is was only by accident. Two politicians that were fine making their copies of GM’s latest. [The 1965 Ford is nothing more that the box the Pontiac came in.]
Exner on the other hand, was on a path that was not based upon following GM. His 1957s stopped GM in their tracks, It forced GM to make the 1958s a one year body and sent their entire 1959 lineup into total redesign.
As for these downsized Chryslers it needs to be understood the then typical development timelines. 3-5 years from start to finish. When someone decides to change the underlying package midstream, some design elements may not properly resolve to a new size. Transition surfaces need space to have the correct effect.
This article is also missing the internal Design politics during this model line’s development. Exner had a heart attack and that set in motion political jockeying inside Chrysler Styling. It is written how there was initially a concern that Exner might not return which created factions trying to be his successor. This was apparently going on during some of the development period for these downsized cars. Different people with conflicting visions of the path forward only to have Exner return at a later stage.
I would always have more faith in what the designers in the studio say happened – 1st hand reporting. Even Dave Holls would have more insight into what happens inside a studio; although a GM guy he was a designer that ultimately became #2 in Design under Chuck Jordan.
Jeff, this story is essentially a literature review. I’m always interested in other articles or books that might further illuminate the issues addressed here. So please share any additional written sources you may have come across.
I didn’t address Exner’s health in this piece but talked a bit about it here.
I would agree with you that first-hand recollections should be taken quite seriously. The basic challenge in any kind of historical research is that memories fade, individual participants may possess only partial knowledge of a situation, and self-interest can color recollections. The 1959 Studebaker “design theft” rumor is an example of how everyone’s stories don’t align (go here). And I have questioned whether former AMC designer Bob Nixon did some spinning in an interview with Collectible Automobile (go here).