(EXPANDED FROM 1/15/2021)
On A Clear Day You Can See General Motors ranks right up there with Brock Yates’ The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry (1983) in articulating where Detroit went wrong.
Although written by reporter J. Patrick Wright, the book reportedly presents the views of John Z. DeLorean. On A Clear Day wasn’t published until 1979 but was written in 1974-75. The book was ultimately published by Wright over DeLorean’s objections.
I am hard-pressed to recall another American automotive executive who has shared with the public such a trenchant critique of his colleagues. On A Clear Day’s remarkable account was partly reflective of the Vietnam Era, when questioning the status quo was at a high-water mark. However, it’s no accident that this book came from DeLorean rather than, say, Semon “Bunkie” Knudsen, another disgruntled General Motors executive.
DeLorean’s independent streak masked deeper issues
DeLorean was one of the most independent-minded American auto executives of the post-war period. Only George Romney of American Motors diverged more dramatically from Detroit groupthink. That’s why I wonder whether DeLorean would have still left General Motors even if it his ideas — and personal attributes — had found greater acceptance in the 1970s. The arc of DeLorean’s life suggests a man with the “high autonomy needs” of early captains of the industry, such as Walter Chrysler and Charles Nash.
The tragedy of DeLorean is that he performed brilliantly at GM but failed at running his own show. GM’s enormous bureaucracy may have constrained his frenetically creative spirit, but it mostly kept in check what some have argued was a darker side (Pappademas, 2018). If the negative stories about DeLorean are true, he sounds like he may have had a psychological affliction such as an antisocial personality disorder (Harvard Health Publishing, 2019).
Also see ‘1981-82 DeLorean illustrates Detroit’s failure to understand the rise of imports’
Howard Weitzman, DeLorean’s longtime attorney, stated after the auto executive’s death that his “arrogance and entitlement clouded his judgment. . . . I’ve represented many people over the years, but John DeLorean had one of the most warped views of right and wrong.” DeLorean was acquitted of cocaine dealing and later of embezzlement. Weitzman called the verdict in the latter case a “miracle” (Malnic, 2005).
DeLorean’s credibility is an important point to consider when reading On A Clear Day. His often indignant critique of GM can look hypocritical when compared to how he ran his own sports car company (Lapham, 2011).
Readers must separate spin from insights
The primary goals of On a Clear Day appear to have been to paint a heroic picture of DeLorean and settle old scores. To the degree that DeLorean disclosed any personal weaknesses or failures, he appears to have done so to engage in damage control. Forays into social issues raise the question of whether DeLorean was positioning himself to run for political office.
Those caveats aside, this is a fascinating read. That’s partly because Wright did an excellent job of keeping the story engaging. This could have been a tedious dissertation about GM’s internal operations.
Also see ‘1965-68 GM big cars: The end of different strokes’
Instead, the book railed against the social irresponsibility of GM’s management. For example, DeLorean argued that the automaker dragged its feet on downsizing its big cars “despite the needs of the public” and a “balance-of-payments deficit [that] was being built in large part because of the burgeoning sales of foreign cars” (p. 52). DeLorean also stated that Chevrolet Corvair’s “unsafe” handling was well-documented by GM engineers but ignored by top management. And when Knudsen became general manager of Chevrolet, according to DeLorean he had to threaten to resign from GM to get a $15 stabilizing bar installed on the 1964 Corvair (p. 54-56).
Of course, industry nerds will appreciate the level of detail DeLorean shared about the development and manufacture of automobiles. But what’s also noteworthy is that DeLorean’s anecdotes were grounded in a surprisingly sophisticated analytical framework about how a large corporation should be run.
Why DeLorean’s analysis is still relevant today
In reading On A Clear Day I often wondered how DeLorean would have assessed GM’s bankruptcy and subsequent restructuring. He died in 2005 at the age of 80 (Wikipedia, 2015). Most notably, did DeLorean think that the relatively decentralized management structure he espoused in the 1970s would still have worked in the 2010s?
One could reasonably argue that different times may require a different managerial approach. However, On A Clear Day is still relevant because it does such a good job of highlighting the dysfunctions that would ultimately lead to GM’s collapse.
Also see ‘Bigger didn’t prove to be better for General Motors in late-70s and 80s’
In addition, armchair historians will discover many interesting tidbits. As a case in point, On A Clear Day sheds light on the power struggle between DeLorean and GM design head William Mitchell (see further discussion here).
I found one minor fact error: DeLorean stated that he left Packard in the summer of 1956 when the automaker “was merging with the Studebaker Corporation” (p. 73). The merger had occurred two years earlier, so I assume what he meant was that Packard’s Detroit operations were being shut down and DeLorean was asked to shift to Studebaker’s headquarters in South Bend, Indiana.
Karl Ludvigsen writes about his involvement with book
Karl Ludvigsen’s Why Cars Are So Bad newsletter recently posted an essay about his parenthetical involvement with DeLorean’s book. For example, the veteran automotive writer had been asked to take a look at Wright’s manuscript. Ludvigsen (2022) recalls recommending a handful of changes, such as DeLorean “owning up to some fiascoes on his own watch.” The proposed changes were not integrated into the book Wright ended up publishing.
Ludvigsen (2022) still “vividly” remembers his “slack-jawed astonishment at that first reading of Wright’s raw manuscript in the winter of 1975-76, four years before it reached a wider public. It gave an unparalleled inside view of the damage a company and its people suffer when politics get in the way of decision-making. I recommend it unreservedly to today’s industry bosses.”
Also see ‘How might John Z. DeLorean have done as head of AMC?’
Unreservedly? I am perplexed by that given questions raised about DeLorean’s ethical predilections. Ludvigsen does not sound oblivious to them. For example, another project he discussed with DeLorean in 1976 included a book about management ethics — an idea Ludvigsen describes as “ironic in retrospect.”
That said, Ludvigsen’s essay does not meaningfully address DeLorean’s credibility as a source. Is this another example of how historians can have difficulties writing about people they have worked with? (Go here for further discussion.)
And now a word about this book’s meta message
The thing which most intrigues me about On A Clear Day is that more than 40 years later it arguably still stands as the most revealing insider’s view of a U.S. automaker. Yet the book was orchestrated by a man who may have been a sociopath. What do industry insiders with “high moral character” have to say about the issues DeLorean raised?
One of his major points was that GM’s organizational culture suffered from a debilitating level of conformity. How much has that changed since the 1970s?
On A Clear Day You Can See General Motors
- J. Patrick Wright; 1979
- Wright Enterprises, Grosse Pointe, MI.
“Despite John’s vacillations on the book for the past four years, one constant fact is apparent from our discussions: He believes the manuscript submitted to Playboy to be a factual representation of his thoughts and analysis of General Motors and American business.” (p. ix)
“Soon I found myself questioning a much bigger picture, the morality of the whole GM system. It seemed to me that there was (and is) a cancerous amorality about this system. The undue emphasis on profits and cost control without a wider concern for the effects of GM’s business on its many publics seemed too often capable of bringing together, in the corporation, men of sound, personal morality and responsibility who as a group reached business decisions which were irresponsible and of questionable morality.” (p. 5)
“The creation of the GM Assembly Division (GMAD) to build almost all GM cars in North America was explained as a move to build cars more efficiently, at less cost. But the ‘down time’ experience, when the division ‘got tough’ with the union locals in each plant it took over, cost the company more money than it would make up in savings for as long as a decade.” (p. 211)
OTHER REVIEWS:
Serenska.com | The Pop History Dig | Amazon | Goodreads
RE:SOURCES
- Harvard Health Publishing; 2019. “Antisocial Personality Disorder.” Posted March 13.
- Lapham, Edward; 2011. “DeLorean didn’t fit the GM mold.” Automotive News. Posted October 31.
- Ludvigsen, Karl; 2022. “The Book of John (Z).” Why Cars Are So Bad. Posted March 19.
- Malnic; 2005. “Maker of Futuristic Car Lived Fast Life.” Los Angeles Times. Posted March 21.
- Pappademas, Alex; 2018. “Demon Underneath: John DeLorean and the Invention of the Future.” The Outline. Posted December 11; accessed December 13.
- Wikipedia; 2015. “John DeLorean.” Page last modified Dec. 23; accessed Dec. 25.
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- wildaboutcarsonline.com: (Automotive History Preservation Society): Chevrolet Vega (1971); Pontiac Grand Prix (1962); Pontiac GTO (1968); General Motors (1968)
This is an expanded version of a review originally posted February 1, 2020 and expanded on Jan. 15, 2021.
Thanks for a thoughtful critique of John’s book, the result of his colloquy with Wright. Having worked at GM for five years in the 1960s and visited it regularly in the 1970s I was well placed to assess the veracity of John’s assertions. And the quote from my father is significant. The book is still essential reading for today’s motor moguls. Not easy to find, however!
Thank you for stopping by and sharing your thoughts, Karl. You are an exceptionally careful writer, so what you don’t say is as interesting as what you do.
I have been percolating on your essay and comment. My ambivalence about DeLorean’s book is grounded in the journalistic distinction between validating DeLorean’s overall critique and the many specific anecdotes he presented. I’m fairly comfortable with his overall critique because it has been echoed to varying degrees by others. Where I get antsy is with the veracity of his anecdotes, particularly when they are about one-on-one conversations with people whom DeLorean appears to have had an axe to grind (or a potential motivation to spin the situation in a certain way). It doesn’t help that substantial questions have been raised about DeLorean’s general truthfulness.
So while I get that you and your father have deep knowledge of GM, that’s not the same thing as being in the room when DeLorean was having a crucial conversation. And if you weren’t, then some “investigative reporting” would presumably be in order to verify claims.
I am not trying to annoy you — I just think that how we handle DeLorean’s book raises broader issues about the state of American automotive journalism. In general, my sense is that the field has suffered from too much permeability between reporting and public relations. One way that shows up in automotive history is an over-reliance on oral histories where the interviewee’s assertions are accepted as truth without much, if any, vetting process. Add to that the phenomenon whereby some key historical players have arguably been treated more gingerly when they have cultivated relationships with historians. This can end up distorting the historical record.
It sounds like you at least talked with DeLorean about doing some freelance work for him. It isn’t clear to me whether you merely made pitches for projects or were paid. Either way, if you were working for a major newspaper I could see you not being assigned to write stories about DeLorean because of your prior involvement with him as a freelancer.
Of course, your essay was published in your own blog, which is a different animal. Even so, it seems to me that acknowledging questions about DeLorean’s general truthfulness is relevant to an overall endorsement of his book.
Thanks a lot for your thoughts, Steve.
My experience of John was that he sometimes stretched the truth to an extreme — but the truth was still there.
If that makes any sense.
Appreciate it and all my best,
Karl L.
Karl, that does make sense. I would also imagine that DeLorean could be charismatic to the point where one really wanted to believe him.
This level of conversation is fine when chatting by the camp fire. The trouble is when one applies sort-of truths to the journalistic enterprise. Now, perhaps the joke is on me — automotive journalism will always be more grounded in myths than facts. So why not kick back, enjoy the stories and have another beer?
A penny here a penny there:
‘according to DeLorean he had to threaten to resign from GM to get a $15 stabilizing bar installed on the 1964 Corvair (p. 54-56).’
For perspective, a 1964 dollar is worth $9.15 today. The cost for that sway bar would have been $137.25 in today’s fiat. Multiply by perhaps 200,000 Corvair units.
https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/
[Corvair production for 1964: 191915.].
Where margins are low on small cars, declining demand for the Corvair and the cost of new-for-64 intermediates, DeLorean’s “offense” seems quite theatrical.
Regardless of the alleged sketchy handling of the Corvair, GM was not remiss in considering the cost of that part.
Do that sort of “it’s just $15.00 per” on every model of GM and see how soon the company sinks.
Always a good format for sensational sound bite or quote if wanting to demonize an entity or make a case for a new tax.
I’ve read this book and the others [“Grand Delusions”& “Dream Maker”]on DeLorean. I’d say you created a fair evaluation of the guy, Steve.
Another great piece.
I appreciate the kind words. You also make a reasonable point that cost considerations are important to the survival of any automaker. That said, I think there can be value in looking more closely at the specifics of the Corvair.
Was the addition of a $15 part going to sink GM? I can only speculate, but it may be useful to note that the 1964 Corvair was in its fifth year of production — and along the way had received relatively few changes. So might GM have had more wiggle room around costs in 1964 than when the Corvair was introduced in 1960?
In addition, after the Chevy II was introduced the Corvair was shifted upmarket into premium-priced, compact sporty coupe territory. New standard equipment that promised more sophisticated handling would seem to fit with the direction Chevrolet wanted to take the nameplate.
If Knudsen did threaten to resign, that sounds pretty risky even for a man of his pedigree. Would a rational person take such a rash step if they didn’t think there was a serious problem? And can we point to anything that suggests Knudsen wasn’t a very rational person?
Of course, we might instead argue that the Knudsen anecdote was made up. I don’t have enough background to weigh in on that one way or another. However, if the story is indeed true, Knudsen comes off looking better than a lot of GM executives when it came to the Corvair. Even if one flatly dismisses the allegations about the car’s safety, we can all presumably agree that the Corvair ended up being a massive public relations problem. Knudsen was smart enough to try to get ahead of it.
I tend to believe the story about Knudsen and the Corvair. He was passed over for the top spot in favor of Ed Cole…I can see the powers-that-be rejecting him because he wasn’t a “team player.” An objective look at the records of both Knudsen and Cole while they rose through the ranks at GM doesn’t necessarily favor Cole.
I have wondered why Knudsen was passed over in favor of Cole — who proceeded to show why he was a questionable choice.
I was just over at the Automotive Hall of Fame and noticed that Cole was inducted in 1977 and given a “Distinguished Service Citation Award” in 1963. A lengthy summary of his career noted that he “was the driving force behind the creation of the rear-engine, air-cooled Corvair (though that car later became infamous because of consumer advocate Ralph Nader).” Not mentioned was his championing of the problem-plagued Vega and corporate consolidation efforts.
In contrast, Semon Knudsen has only been given a Distinguished Service award (in 1974) and a rather terse summary of his career: “He is honored for loyalty to all phases of the automotive industry for General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company and White Motor Corporation.”
Cole was inducted the same year that he died in a plane crash. I can imagine how his untimely death might have fueled support for his induction, but it still raises questions about selection criteria. Cole arguably made outsized contributions to GM’s decline.
From what I’ve read, Cole was less willing to buck the 14th Floor. Knudsen was much less pliable.
For example, during the development of the Corvair, Cole argued against the inclusion of the sway bar, and said that fiddling with the recommended tire pressures was a sufficient solution to any handling issues. Granted, the sway bar and other changes weren’t necessarily cheap (in inflation-adjusted dollars), but Cole was willing to ignore both his engineering experience, as well his knowledge of how American drivers approach vehicle maintenance (they tend to do as little as possible), to get the Corvair into production.
Some may kick back and have another beer but I prefer to dig deep for the facts, which fortunately far outnumber the myths in the best automotive history.
Once Cole got to the 14th floor, he WAS the 14th floor.
I remember reading a quote by a high-ranking General Motors financial person regarding Ed Cole’s presidency – “No one is really president of General Motors. Ed Cole is just the chief engineer.”