The 1955 Packard’s styling was nicely done in many ways — but it was also an evolutionary dead end.
The designers of the last “real” Packards deserve credit for two things. First, that they managed to come up with a fresh, contemporary look. That was not an easy thing to do because Packard had the U.S. auto industry’s oldest full-sized car body.
Second, the design team led by Richard Teague achieved a pleasing balance between copying the Big Three and going weird like the 1955-56 Nash. This is why I would not describe the Packard’s styling as a failure.
Packard vainly tries to keep up with the Big Three
After years of slow-changing and conservative styling, Packard vainly tried to join the Big Three’s trendiness race with a full-court press of styling, engineering, manufacturing and marketing changes. No one could argue that Packard didn’t try hard enough.
For 1955 Packard attempted to update the brand’s conservative image with splashy new styling and engineering. Marketing emphasized that this was a revitalized and forward-looking brand (Old Car Brochures).
Alas, mimicking the Big Three proved problematic. For one thing, Packard’s success depended on not making any major mistakes with all of the shiny new technology rushed into production. Here Packard failed.
But even if Packard had experienced no teething problems with its new V8 engine, upgraded automatic transmission, electric “torsion-level” suspension and brand-new manufacturing plant, the automaker would still have held a losing hand. That’s because over the long run, Packard — like all other independent automakers — simply didn’t have the economies of scale to match its larger rivals in annual model-change excitement.
Big Three excesses left an opening for an alternative
In the latter-half of the 1950s each of the Big Three automakers focused so intently on outdoing each other in size, styling and horsepower that reliability, practicality and manufacturing quality suffered — sometimes catastrophically. Indeed, the more dramatic the redesign, the more likely that the brand would develop problems which undercut its reputation. As a case in point, here I discuss the ill-fated 1958 Lincoln.
The full-sized 1956-57 Nash and Hudson went a ways toward offering a clear alternative to Big Three glitz. These were roomy, practical and well-built family cars. Aside from teething problems with a Packard-supplied V8 in 1955-56, AMC’s big cars were refreshingly free of quality lapses. Unfortunately, ridiculously overamped styling worked against the practical persona of the Nash and Hudson (go here for further discussion).
The 1955-56 Nash’s front end sported in-board headlights that gave it a decidedly weird armadillo shape.
Packard had the opposite problem. The 1955’s new styling was reasonably contemporary but build-quality and reliability issues undercut the brand’s reputation at the worst possible time (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002). Go here for a discussion about Packard’s ill-fated switch to a new plant.
In this essay I would like to focus on the styling of the 1955 Packards, with an emphasis on senior models.
A new grille made the 1953-54 Packard look even more ponderous and generic than the 1951-52 models. Output in 1953 was okay — roughly 90,000 units — but fell to only 31,000 in 1954. That fueled a financial crisis (Old Car Brochures).
1954 Packard suffered from four design challenges
Packard’s basic design was five years old in 1955. This stood in contrast to the cars of General Motors and Chrysler, whose bodies were new or only a year old. And even though Ford and American Motors only reskinned their full-sized offerings for 1955, they used platforms that were one year newer than Packard’s.
That extra year made a difference because American styling was quickly changing. As a result, by 1954 Packard suffered from four major problems.
The so-called “high pockets” beltline was taller than newer competition.
The beltline was accentuated by an ungainly front end that also didn’t possess a sufficiently Packard bearing.
Rounded “outboard” rear fenders looked increasingly old fashioned compared to the slab-sided look of newer designs.
The A-pillar did not offer a panoramic view akin to the popular “dog leg” windshield GM introduced in 1954.
The 1955 Packard 400 (top image) looked remarkably different from the previous year’s top-of-line two-door hardtop, the Pacific, despite the lack of a full reskinning. Note that the wheelbase was five inches longer (Old Car Brochures).
Teague’s 1955 models tried to address each challenge
For 1955 Teague’s most important decision was to create the optical illusion of a lower car with unusually horizontal trim accentuated by a brushed metal appliqué on the Patrician/400 or three-tone paint on the Caribbean. The angularity of the look anticipated a dominant trend in late-50s design.
This was an exceptionally effective attempt to give an old car a trendy new look. However, Teague was also cautious. Instead of offering bold styling on par with Packard’s innovative engineering, the 1955 models often copied Cadillac.
The 1955 Packard borrowed numerous styling elements from the 1954 Cadillac (Old Car Brochures).
I give Teague credit for creatively masking the similarities, but it strikes me as a losing game to play follow the leader when you are a struggling independent automaker.
Front-end styling was even more generic
The overall look of the 1955 models was even less Packardesque than in previous years. The most prominent visual cue was in front — a modern rendition of the iconic hook that punctuated the upward arc of the grille’s center. However, this was subtle enough for the untrained eye to miss.
The 1955 Packard’s front-end styling was unusually clean and graceful for that era. However, its Packard DNA was rather subtle — particularly compared to the upright grilles of the classic era.
Meanwhile, Teague copied Cadillac’s front-wheel cutouts and wrap-around chrome character line but added distinctive “cathedral” headlamp housings and futuristic side-marker turn signals. He was also inspired by Cadillac’s bullet-shaped bumper guards and horizontal eggcrate grille, but gave the Packard a more thrust-forward look.
Side and rear styling also show Cadillac influence
A similar situation occurred with Teague’s updating of the outboard rear fenders. He squared them off at their leading edge and gave high-end models a variant of Cadillac’s gills — but upped the ante. Lights embedded in the gills turned on when a front door opened. This was a nice touch.
The 1951-54 Patrician’s rounded and understated rear fenders were reportedly ditched in response to an eleventh-hour redesign demanded by Packard head James Nance (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002a).
If that was indeed a last-minute change which only involved the rear fenders, I am curious as to how the side trim could have possibly meshed with the old rear-quarter panels. The upper trim piece on the senior 1955 models doesn’t appear to align very well with the “bull nuts” taillights. So was the side trim rearranged along with the fenders? Or have we discovered another urban legend?
Teague stated that the taillights were inspired by a church (Ward, 1995). To my eyes they look more like a jet fighter, replete with Cadillac-style exhaust holes in the bumpers. The taillights were distinctive and anticipated the 1957 Chrysler, but the rear-wheel cutouts and trim were similar to the Cadillac’s.
Management rejects more ambitious redesign proposal
Teague also didn’t take any risks when redesigning the windshield. He slavishly copied GM’s vertical dog leg look. Here Chrysler displayed more courage by tilting its A-pillar in a similar fashion to the step-down Hudson. In addition to looking better, this presumably gave the A-pillar greater strength.
The wrap-around windshield required new front doors. However, Packard rejected a more costly proposal that included all-new side sheetmetal that got rid of the outboard rear fenders in favor of slab sides and a horizontal crease that ran the length of the car (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002a).
Perhaps just as importantly, door glass area was increased by eliminating a beltline chrome strip that housed the door handles and switching sedans to thin door-window frames (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002a).
The latter could have given Packard a less-costly way to field a four-door hardtop. Instead of creating a new greenhouse, as was typical industry practice, Packard designers could have simply removed the B-pillar post and door-window frames, as American Motors did with its 1956 Rambler.
American Motors’ cars were unusual for the mid-50s because the door-window frames were thin and attached to the door rather than an integral part of the sheetmetal. This made it much easier to create a hardtop (Old Car Brochures).
It’s too bad that management did not go with the more extensive redesign, which could have made Packard more competitive in 1955-56 . . . and plausibly carried over to 1957. Scarce dollars were instead spent elsewhere, such as a disastrous move to a new assembly plant.
Packard showcased some interesting design details
The 1955 senior Packards had considerably more colorful interiors than the previous year. Note the body-colored band near the top of the seat backs.
Another interesting detail is that the front fenders bulged slightly outward. Was the intent to maintain the Packard’s turning circle despite the 1955 model’s lower wheel cutout lip? Or was Teague attempting to give the slab styling a bit more curvature?
All of these design elements added up to a car that was derivative but pleasing. One could also argue that the 1955 served to update Packard’s dowdy image.
Perhaps, but Packard arguably threw the baby out with the bath water. The brand’s styling DNA was diluted by its futile quest to keep up with Cadillac.
The Clipper vainly received more differentiation
To make matters worse, management undercut the prestige of its lower-priced offerings by starting to mask their Packardness. For 1955, Clipper models had a distinctive grille, taillights and side trim — and only a tiny Packard insignia on the rear deck.
In 1956 the Clipper would briefly become its own brand before a customer backlash and collapsing sales put an end to that idea (Hamlin and Heinmuller, 2002b). To my mind, this strategy was doomed to failure. As discussed here, Packard was too small to field two competitive brands.
The 1955-56 Clipper had a five-inch-shorter wheelbase as well as different rear sheetmetal and grille (and front fenders in 1956). Pictured are 1955 (top) and 1956 two-door hardtops (Old Car Brochures).
Yes, but what was left of Packard’s styling DNA?
Packard arguably had the hardest time of any established American automaker in adapting to postwar styling trends. This was partly because its most distinctive pre-war design elements revolved around a classical look that American automakers largely abandoned in the 1950s.
The Packard’s radiator grille evolved more slowly than that of other brands for good reason — this was the brand’s most recognizable feature during the era when it dominated the luxury field (Old Car Brochures).
Packard gyrated between perpetuating the brand’s traditional upright grille with the 1948-50 models and adopting a conventional horizontal look in 1951-56.
A 1949 Packard Super Eight limousine illustrates how the automaker attempted to maintain a vertical grille while attempting to make its cars look lower and wider — with mixed results.
A key factor that made it harder for Packard to settle on a consistent design language was conflict around whether the brand should primarily be grounded in the premium-priced or luxury-car class.
As a case in point, the rather bland, utilitarian look of the 1951 seemed to go hand in hand with a focus on the lower end of Packard’s product range.
A more horizontal look and lower-priced models were emphasized in 1951 to revive declining sales. A two-door convertible and hardtop were offered on a shorter wheelbase than senior Packards (Old Car Brochures).
Packard tries to move upmarket with 1955 redesign
In contrast to the 1951 models, a major goal in 1955 was to revive Packard’s presence in the luxury-car market. The stylistic emphasis was clearly given to senior models such as the Patrician four-door sedan, 400 two-door hardtop, and top-of-line Caribbean convertible. The latter epitomized Packard’s flashy new styling with its triple-color paint schemes.
For 1955 the Caribbean was Packard’s only convertible. It was given a stratospheric $5,932 price tag and much more flamboyant paint schemes than used by other luxury brands. A meager 500 units were produced (Old Car Brochures).
Nance’s aborted expansion plan for 1957 would have moved the brand further upmarket. The 1956 Predictor show car illustrated company plans with a vestigial radiator grille bifurcated by an otherwise strongly horizontal design.
Only Packard would get the vaguely Edsel-like prow, with the Clipper receiving different sheetmetal with trendy sci-fi styling that did not display a trace of Packard DNA (Hamlin, 2002).
The 1956 Predictor show car hinted at the look of a new 1957 body. Was the basic design “timeless” enough to remain competitive through a six-year production cycle? I suspect not (Old Car Brochures).
The gaudy styling of the proposed 1957 Packard and Clipper was a big step removed from the automaker’s 1951 models, which turned out to be its last full redesign. Although the cars had a fairly generic look, they were elegant in an understated way (go here for further discussion).
For 1951 the traditional cormorant graced the front of a Packard for the last time in its full-fledged form. As you can see from the banner photo, in 1955 the hood ornament looked more like a jet.
What would George Romney have done?
One way to make more concrete the strategic choices that Packard faced is to conduct a thought experiment: What if Packard had been successful in recruiting George Romney in 1948 to lead the company (Ward, 1995)?
Romney instead decided to join Nash-Kelvinator Corp., which merged with Hudson in 1954 to form American Motors. Under Romney’s leadership the company achieved unparalleled success for an American independent.
If Romney had run Packard he might have gone in a different direction than Nance in a number of ways. For example, Romney had a stronger understanding of economies of scale, so he might have focused on building Packard’s volume in the premium-priced field rather than trying to go upmarket.
Although the horrifyingly ugly 1956 Nash and Hudson happened on his watch, with a design director of Teague’s caliber I could see Romney championing a more practical and evolutionary approach to Packard styling.
Packard did not need three-tone paint, jet-like fenders and bullet bumper guards to look more contemporary. Those were a stylistic dead end for a such a small-volume brand. The 1956-57 Continental Mark II hinted at how Packard could have updated its trademark grille without lapsing into Edsel-like excesses.
The 1956-57 Continental Mark II hints at how understated styling was possible amidst a decade of excesses. Although the car didn’t sell well, I would blame that on a high price tag and the lack of a four-door body style (Old Car Brochures).
Overly ambitious styling helped kill Packard
Improving the 1955 Packard’s styling would not have single-handedly saved the brand. As Aaron Severson (2010) has noted, other factors such as Packard’s disastrous move to a new assembly plant weighed more heavily in its subsequent collapse than how the cars looked.
That said, the flamboyant 1955 Caribbean was only an early step in Nance’s vastly overambitious plan to join the “bigger, glitzier and more powerful” arms race. This was doomed to failure because Packard was far too small of an automaker to keep up with the Big Three’s increasingly fast-paced restylings. Packard might have had a greater chance of survival if it had stuck with more conservative and slow-changing styling.
This has not been a terribly popular viewpoint among Indie Auto commentators (for example, check out this letter to the editor).
I have a question for those who prefer the sci-fi look, particularly as embodied in the proposed 1957 design: How could Packard have afforded to keep its styling current over a product cycle that would likely have needed to stay in production at least until 1962 (a six-year run)? Design fashions changed dramatically during that time, and Packard would likely have struggled to generate adequate funds to pay for updates because of the collapse of the premium-priced market in the late-50s (go here for further discussion).
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on July 6, 2018, expanded on May 1, 2020, updated on Aug. 6, 2021 and slightly expanded on Jan. 20, 2023.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
Hamlin, George; 2002. “The Last of the Marque: The Fifty-Seventh and the Fifty-Eight Series 1957-1958.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 622-635. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
Hamlin, George and Dwight Heinmuller; 2002a. “Let the Ride Decide: The Fifty-Fifth Series 1955.” In Kimes, Beverly Rae, ed., pp. 582-601. Packard: A History of the Motor Car and the Company. Automobile Quarterly Publications.
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27 Comments
I think the 55/56 Packard’s were a tremendous re-design. I suppose this author prefers the 55/56 Mercury, or Lincoln which could have been built on the Packard line, they are that similar. But, of course he doesn’t criticize those cars. It’s so much more fun to rip a Packard. The planned 57’s would also have been ahead of their time, and what the public wanted…then. And, it was Edsel that would have been seen as copying Packard, not the other way around. Not only was Packard a full year ahead with much more elegant styling, but had been looking at the return of it’s vertical grill since the early 50’s, as well as another Ford copied feature, the rear reverse slant window.
Neil, I’ve edited out your snide personal attack; you can make your points just fine without it. You might want to read our comment guidelines (go here). Consider this a warning.
I read your article twice, and I kind of see your point. However, Romney at AMC had production levels and financial muscle Packard could only dream of. The problem styling wise with Packard was thus: Their prewar styling was timeless. However by 1940 timeless was no longer cutting it. If the prewar Clipper came out a year earlier the stying could have settled in, and have provided an excellent transition to the 1951s. The bathtub Packards just looked ponderous compared to contemporary Cadillacs. The 1951s could have use a lot of … something to keep them from looking like a generic GM premium car. Maybe something like a more contemporary take on the 1940 La Salle, with some sort of vertical blade in the grille. But honestly, the pictures of the 1954 vs 1955 ads kind of sums it up. While the 1954 Packard and the people around it look stodgy, like they’re attending a funeral of some Rotary Club member, the 1955 is not a traditional Packard at all. I think of some 50ish woman made up like a tart.
I am a fan of the 1955-1956 Packards and Clippers . . . but Studebaker-Packard barely survived 1957-1958. The loss of the Briggs bodies and the teething problems of the big V-8, Ultra-matic and the torsion-bar suspension created “too-many issues” all at once. Yes, George Romney would have made better management and production decisions if Studebaker-Packard had merged with A.M.C. and Nance moved into to something he knew about, SALES, but Nance did not succeed after he moved to Mercury-Edsel-Lincoln. It took former Whiz Kid Ben Mills to straighten out that mess, regardless of how one feels about the styling of the 1957-1960 Mercurys, the styling of the 1958-1960 Edsels and the baroque, overdone styling of the 1958-1960 Lincolns. Frankly, the U.S. economy did not really have a place for Packard anymore and Studebaker survived until 1966 because of amortized tooling backed on the 1953 Studebaker that was disguised as the Lark!
Interesting way to frame Packard’s final days and ultimate demise. I can see how your reasoning would also apply to Chrysler’s struggle with Imperial in going up against Cadillac. You have ex-DeSoto customers, Dodge & Plymouth buyers, moving up to Chrysler Newports in the early to mid-1960s, but were those buyers making the leap to Imperial? I’d argue that was too big a jump and an unnecessary one as the Newport was all the Chrysler buyers could want/afford. Then in the 80s/90s, with the exception of the Volare/Aspen-based Fifth Avenue, everything branded a Chrysler was a K-car, including a “re-imagined” Imperial sedan. Could you get any more down-market? Chrysler now makes one car. Will it end up like Packard?
Chrysler now consists of a full size sedan and a minivan. The people who are buying them, their next car will be a hearse. What is telling is they have no SUVs in their lineup. Somewhat OT, but I’d be curious to see what percentage of Chrysler’s sales are to fleets. My guess is that when Chrysler merged with FIAT, the plan was for FIAT/Alpha and Lancia/Maserati to fill in the gaps in the range. You can’t give the FIAT lineup away, and Stellantis can’t bring anything else over as the only thing American buyer dislike more than Italian cars are French cars.
Steve, I came across this older article and noted your comment:
“That said, the flamboyant 1955 Caribbean was only an early step in Nance’s vastly overambitious plan to join the “bigger, glitzier and more powerful” arms race. This was doomed to failure because Packard was far too small of an automaker to keep up with the Big Three’s increasingly fast-paced restylings. Packard might have had a greater chance of survival if it had stuck with more conservative and slow-changing styling.”
I agree, the ’55 and especially ’56 Seniors were laden with appliques detrimental to appearance. I get the argument that the wide mid-height horizontal element broke up the car’s tall sides, but there is a reason why Packard referred to the original design as having Contour styling. This more than anything else is what needed to be celebrated. Therefore, minimal horizontal trim strategically designed to cover unsightly ledges over the front wheels and coming off the top of the rear bumpers, and Packard’s customary rocker trim piece were all that was needed. Note that there was always trim over the front wheels for all ’55 and ’56 cars to cover the ledge.
The other thing needed by ’56 to compete with the new Sedan de Ville, and preferably arriving for ’55 was a 4-door hardtop. Here the high beltline could have finally been put to good use, enabling the rear windows to extend forward and articulate down. A 127 wb Four Hundred 2-door hardtop and convertible and a new, 5-inch longer sedan on a new 132 chassis would have stood up to Cadillac despite their tallness, and could have carried Packard through ’57. For both, the ’55 Clipper grill could have been chosen because it was the classiest front design of these years, minus the ship’s wheel ornament of course. The rear door lowers could have been carried over from ’54 to give the sides drama and forward movement. A optional leather top or the hypolon material used by the Caribbean hardtop would have given the car a rich Brougham look. (AACA)
Kimes’ Packard book has a photograph of a 1955 design proposal that included new doors with thin window frames. That would have made the addition of a four-door hardtop a lot easier. Indeed, that’s what Nash could have done with its big cars. Romney instead gave the new 1956 Rambler a four-door hardtop. It sold quite poorly even though the body style was prominently featured in advertising.
Steve, am not sure which photo in Kimes’ book you are referring to. If it is the one on Pg. 586 it is hard to tell how wide the B-pillar is given the angle of the car. Here is an image of a proposal with a chrome-trimmed, squared off B-pillar.
Am not sure it would have worked, because a limiting factor on the Contours was the front door handle’s push button location. The front door’s glass, be it on a full-frame door or hardtop, had to roll down forward of the button to clear it’s internal mechanism.
Here’s a pillared hardtop version of the earlier hardtop. I created when I created the 4-door hardtop. It’s B-pillar is as narrow as possible while keeping the rear door’s glass from extending beyond the rear door’s front edge. The glass would not be able to roll straight down, instead would need to articulate rearward and down.
At a minimum, I think this is what Packard needed to offer for ’55. While it was indeed the case that Rambler’s 4-door hardtop went nowhere, to compete with Cadillac there had to be at least a nod towards a 4-door hardtop in the form of a pillared hardtop. With it would come the hardtop’s faster backlight and slightly lower roofline. The old Patrician greenhouse could have hung around for those who wanted it, but there had to be alternative with a more style-forward design.
If Nance really wanted to differentiate Clipper from Packard for ’55 he might have done well to leave the ’54 Clipper front appearance alone for ’55 like he did its rear, and instead just add the wrapped windshield. Olds and Buick had conventional headlights and front fenders and sold just fine. The did have more modern bumpers like the ’55 Packards, so maybe those could have been added to the ’55 Clippers.
Packard really had a fundamental problem that the post WWII period brought home. Packard had made its reputation in the 1920s and 1930s with their superb senior series cars. By the end of the 1930s and into the dawn of WWII they were being out styled by GM’s march to a more modern look. Packard’s senior series clients were the traditionalists.
When Packard came out with the mid level cars they were trading directly on the reputation of the senior series. Although this saved the corporation it also changed the mentality of the operation as it became more volume focused.
Post WWII Packard had already killed its true senior series. With that loss it really lost the connection to what was the touchstone of its “brand”. I would argue that as time went on that “brand” connection became more and more tenuous. I would further argue that who diehard clients were the older traditionalists that were dying off and Packard was not able to be the aspirational brand for the younger affluent buyers in the booming post war economy. In contrast, this is what Cadillac did a perfect job of.
Packard still wanted to be what they had been in market stature. Unfortunately, they could no longer be that. The market was moving forward faster than they could afford to support. Too big to be a niche player but as a stand alone brand too small to have all the necessary resources. Packard really needed to have done the big merger when it was first proposed not later one with Studebaker – two broken brands depending upon the other for financial salvation.
You hit the nail on the head. Look at the Packard 110,115, and 120 series cars. They looked exactly like the senior series cars to the average Joe. This was the era of companion makes. It might have worked. However postwar , compare the bathtub Packards with the postwar Cadillacs. To my eye Packard did a poor job integrating a more horizontal look from their tombstone grill. Instead of making the car look wider, it made the car look bloated. Check out the 1949 Cadillac sedanette, or even better, look at the ZZTop custom Caddy. To the 1949 eye, that is how the car looked compared to the competition.
I think they could have survived on their own selling 100,000 cars per year as they did in ’51. They made good money that year but the cars had no staying power, were too conservative. That was their fundamental problem. They were aggressive all through the Twenties, taking risks that included replacing the old Twin Six with a volume Eight in 1924 based on the volume Six that launched two years earlier. Their aggressiveness culminated in a prototype FWD V12 that they wanted as a medium priced car that was very low for the era, but they couldn’t make the transmission reliable.
As the Depression proved to be a long term downturn Packard lost its edge. They were still taking risks but these were in production rather than product. The One Twenty saved them but it was an outdated design compared to GM’s new 1935 turret tops. This got Packard out of sinc with GM. The wider turret tops that Packard launched in 1938 should have come out in ’35, and the next move after that should have been a longer V12 in 1936 that was based on the One Twenty to replace their money-losing Seniors in 1936. Low-slung Clipper styling should have arrived for 1940. Instead, they launched a Six in 1937 that permanently put them off course.
There was nothing fundamentally wrong with Packard’s size so long as its products led the industry. Too often this didn’t happen and it began in the Thirties. The ’51s were the company’s last best chance to control its destiny. The leadership was simply not up to the task, nor was the leadership that followed it.
To lead the industry takes money, a whole lotta spending money. Money not only to bring the most advanced car to market, but to also fund dead ends like the FWD V 12 and the straight 12 they did around the same time. Around this time their choices started to narrow, and a shoot the moon gamble, or bringing some feature to market before all the bugs are worked out could kill the company.
If Studebaker could not survive on 200,000 vehicles per year, I doubt that Packard could survive on 100,000 vehicles per year. Hudson was in the same economic boat. G.M., Ford and Chrysler’s 1955 sales increases only made Packard’s future even grimmer.
I don’t think the 1955 Packard was a badly styled car; however, a technically inferior (on paper) car (the 1955 Buick) easily took sales from Packard in 1955, although the Buick division paid for its high production with quality lapses that affected sales from 1956 into the 1960s. I still believe that much of Packard’s problems were its dealer network and bad marketing, compounded by the production problems resulting from Chrysler’s purchase of Briggs.
The Packard Predictor for 1957 vaguely resembles the 1959 Pontiac. Having seen this car in the Studebaker Museum in South Bend, with the right dealer network, the right advertising and quality construction, perhaps a Predictor-based Packard would have outsold the 1957 Cadillac, Lincoln and Imperial. Instead, we got Studebakers for 1957.
I imagine we have all seen photos online of proposed 1957 Packard models and the cobbled together prototype. To me it looks like more than another reskinned 1952, but something all new above the frame. Hopefully by now the new running gear’s bugs are worked out by now. At this stage it would not be ready for the 1957 model year, and you would be doing good to be ready for the 1958. Looking at the scale models it reminds me of the 1958 Lincoln/Continental, which I like but other readers regard as ponderous. Rather than the Predictor front, it resembles a 58 Edsel with the horse collar replaced by a blade. Once again, something I like but considering the Edsel’s reception probably laughed off the market. Packard production for 1955 was 55k, 1956 29k. Do you think a warmed over 1956 would do better moving into a recession? Even if some banker had a brain aneurysm and lent Packard the money, it would be throwing good money after bad.
Looked at the drawings. This body style, in addition to being conservative, could have projected the image that Packard was above style; that ever changing, increasingly more garish styling was vulgar, low brow and tasteless, that people with real taste and discrimination were above all that, and wanted timeless and tasteful styling.
One should also ponder the idea of when a car company has the impression of being in financial trouble to what degree potential buyers start to be concerned that they would be buying a soon to be orphan? It happened to Chrysler in the period before their bankruptcy in 1979. I expect that Packard’s declining production and financials was a topic of the business press.
It might also be interesting to understand the dealer count changes during the post war and in the pre-merger with Studebaker if the dealership were standalone Packard or had another brand. The dealers had their own self-interest of financial viability to be worried about. Were Packard dealers switching to other brands?
It was a concern. I was a kid in the 50s, born in 1951. I heard the word “orphan” when adults were discussing cars. By the time I was really aware the Hudson, Kaiser, Nash, and Packard nameplates were history, however I knew they were around and I could sort of recognize them.
It’s my understanding that the number of dealers began declining in the 1949-50 period, when it was obvious that Packard would never hit the 200,000 annual production goal proclaimed by George Christopher. Maintaining the dealer body was a constant challenge for Nance.
Packard’s demise was due to management decisions. The six cylinder engine in the late 1930’s was a huge error. After WW2 ended, all Packard production should have been only the high priced models optioned to the hilt. Anything and everything sold then. Why were cheaper Packards even being built? The next major bad management decision was not designing an entirely new car for ‘48. The old Clipper bodies should have been replaced as Cadillac did.
The all new 1951 Packards looked old school when new. And now, Packard out of design sinc with GM. 1954 should have featured an all new Packard and not a redesign. Cadillac design was considered luxury and that’s why it was emulated. Packard was very late with a V-8. That hurt them badly. Instead, they spent too much money developing their own automatic transmission. Packard should have bought automatic transmissions from GM until their finances were better.
Nance should never have been hired. He sold refrigerators and not luxury automobiles! Studebaker should never had been bought. They were a terrible money pit. The Packard Automobile Company did not need to be all things to all people. And finally, Packard should have stayed in their old factory! Packard management was terrible. They could have survived with the correct management decisions.
Our own government could have bailed out Packard, but they refused. If I had a Time Machine, maybe I could save Packard? But it’s all just fantasy now.
Again, the Macauley regime in 1946 should have put Packard back on a two-car brand strategy after 1946. Six-cylinder cars could eventually be upgraded to a smaller displacement eight by 1948, but the less-expensive cars should have been branded “Clippers” and the senior Cadillac-competitors branded as Packards. I still think in 1947 or 1948, Packard, which was looking for a senior executive management team should have merged with Hudson, since integration would have been in the Detroit-area. But like most grave missteps in corporations, rancor in the boardroom put George T. Christopher in the president’s job after Max Gilman was fired by Macauley over an alleged adultery scandal in early 1942 against the board’s support of Gilman. Christopher, a competent production man, unfortunately did not understand the automobile marketing and selling process, and so his manta was to sell cheaper Packards after the war ended. With the success of the 1941 Clippers, then the war, production was the most important focus. But in late 1945, while resumption of production was important with steelworker strikes and materials shortages, cheaper production was Christopher’s message to Macauley. So, when Briggs offered to do all body structure production more cheaply, Macauley moved all Packard body production to Briggs, despite a background of labor stoppages and production problems, including a strike in early 1946. Macauley and Christoper cut the senior cars with the new Briggs-bodied 22nd Series “bathtubs” for 1948. Macauley resigned in 1948, then Christopher retired at the end of 1949. More boardroom battles and Hugh Ferry, Packard’s treasurer, with great reluctance, became President at the behest of the board. Then in 1951, entered James J. Nance, likely two-years too late. No wonder Packard was on its deathbed. https://automobilechronicles.com/the-real-reason-packard-died/
I think the 55/56 Packard’s were a tremendous re-design. I suppose this author prefers the 55/56 Mercury, or Lincoln which could have been built on the Packard line, they are that similar. But, of course he doesn’t criticize those cars. It’s so much more fun to rip a Packard. The planned 57’s would also have been ahead of their time, and what the public wanted…then. And, it was Edsel that would have been seen as copying Packard, not the other way around. Not only was Packard a full year ahead with much more elegant styling, but had been looking at the return of it’s vertical grill since the early 50’s, as well as another Ford copied feature, the rear reverse slant window.
Neil, I’ve edited out your snide personal attack; you can make your points just fine without it. You might want to read our comment guidelines (go here). Consider this a warning.
I read your article twice, and I kind of see your point. However, Romney at AMC had production levels and financial muscle Packard could only dream of. The problem styling wise with Packard was thus: Their prewar styling was timeless. However by 1940 timeless was no longer cutting it. If the prewar Clipper came out a year earlier the stying could have settled in, and have provided an excellent transition to the 1951s. The bathtub Packards just looked ponderous compared to contemporary Cadillacs. The 1951s could have use a lot of … something to keep them from looking like a generic GM premium car. Maybe something like a more contemporary take on the 1940 La Salle, with some sort of vertical blade in the grille. But honestly, the pictures of the 1954 vs 1955 ads kind of sums it up. While the 1954 Packard and the people around it look stodgy, like they’re attending a funeral of some Rotary Club member, the 1955 is not a traditional Packard at all. I think of some 50ish woman made up like a tart.
I am a fan of the 1955-1956 Packards and Clippers . . . but Studebaker-Packard barely survived 1957-1958. The loss of the Briggs bodies and the teething problems of the big V-8, Ultra-matic and the torsion-bar suspension created “too-many issues” all at once. Yes, George Romney would have made better management and production decisions if Studebaker-Packard had merged with A.M.C. and Nance moved into to something he knew about, SALES, but Nance did not succeed after he moved to Mercury-Edsel-Lincoln. It took former Whiz Kid Ben Mills to straighten out that mess, regardless of how one feels about the styling of the 1957-1960 Mercurys, the styling of the 1958-1960 Edsels and the baroque, overdone styling of the 1958-1960 Lincolns. Frankly, the U.S. economy did not really have a place for Packard anymore and Studebaker survived until 1966 because of amortized tooling backed on the 1953 Studebaker that was disguised as the Lark!
Interesting way to frame Packard’s final days and ultimate demise. I can see how your reasoning would also apply to Chrysler’s struggle with Imperial in going up against Cadillac. You have ex-DeSoto customers, Dodge & Plymouth buyers, moving up to Chrysler Newports in the early to mid-1960s, but were those buyers making the leap to Imperial? I’d argue that was too big a jump and an unnecessary one as the Newport was all the Chrysler buyers could want/afford. Then in the 80s/90s, with the exception of the Volare/Aspen-based Fifth Avenue, everything branded a Chrysler was a K-car, including a “re-imagined” Imperial sedan. Could you get any more down-market? Chrysler now makes one car. Will it end up like Packard?
Chrysler now consists of a full size sedan and a minivan. The people who are buying them, their next car will be a hearse. What is telling is they have no SUVs in their lineup. Somewhat OT, but I’d be curious to see what percentage of Chrysler’s sales are to fleets. My guess is that when Chrysler merged with FIAT, the plan was for FIAT/Alpha and Lancia/Maserati to fill in the gaps in the range. You can’t give the FIAT lineup away, and Stellantis can’t bring anything else over as the only thing American buyer dislike more than Italian cars are French cars.
Lunga vita a Chrysler!
Steve, I came across this older article and noted your comment:
“That said, the flamboyant 1955 Caribbean was only an early step in Nance’s vastly overambitious plan to join the “bigger, glitzier and more powerful” arms race. This was doomed to failure because Packard was far too small of an automaker to keep up with the Big Three’s increasingly fast-paced restylings. Packard might have had a greater chance of survival if it had stuck with more conservative and slow-changing styling.”
I agree, the ’55 and especially ’56 Seniors were laden with appliques detrimental to appearance. I get the argument that the wide mid-height horizontal element broke up the car’s tall sides, but there is a reason why Packard referred to the original design as having Contour styling. This more than anything else is what needed to be celebrated. Therefore, minimal horizontal trim strategically designed to cover unsightly ledges over the front wheels and coming off the top of the rear bumpers, and Packard’s customary rocker trim piece were all that was needed. Note that there was always trim over the front wheels for all ’55 and ’56 cars to cover the ledge.
The other thing needed by ’56 to compete with the new Sedan de Ville, and preferably arriving for ’55 was a 4-door hardtop. Here the high beltline could have finally been put to good use, enabling the rear windows to extend forward and articulate down. A 127 wb Four Hundred 2-door hardtop and convertible and a new, 5-inch longer sedan on a new 132 chassis would have stood up to Cadillac despite their tallness, and could have carried Packard through ’57. For both, the ’55 Clipper grill could have been chosen because it was the classiest front design of these years, minus the ship’s wheel ornament of course. The rear door lowers could have been carried over from ’54 to give the sides drama and forward movement. A optional leather top or the hypolon material used by the Caribbean hardtop would have given the car a rich Brougham look. (AACA)
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/1767084795_1955PackardBrougham132WB.jpg.7695046085792213222392f2e1d40e05.jpg
https://mmm.lib.msu.edu/record.php?id=25659#images
Put it on the standard 127 inch wheelbase and tried to give it richer colors.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/365365062_1955Packard127WB4DHardtop.jpg.b7ac1a0390deac10cf50de5d757b9d33.jpg
Kimes’ Packard book has a photograph of a 1955 design proposal that included new doors with thin window frames. That would have made the addition of a four-door hardtop a lot easier. Indeed, that’s what Nash could have done with its big cars. Romney instead gave the new 1956 Rambler a four-door hardtop. It sold quite poorly even though the body style was prominently featured in advertising.
Steve, am not sure which photo in Kimes’ book you are referring to. If it is the one on Pg. 586 it is hard to tell how wide the B-pillar is given the angle of the car. Here is an image of a proposal with a chrome-trimmed, squared off B-pillar.
https://mmm.lib.msu.edu/record.php?id=25161#images
Am not sure it would have worked, because a limiting factor on the Contours was the front door handle’s push button location. The front door’s glass, be it on a full-frame door or hardtop, had to roll down forward of the button to clear it’s internal mechanism.
Here’s a pillared hardtop version of the earlier hardtop. I created when I created the 4-door hardtop. It’s B-pillar is as narrow as possible while keeping the rear door’s glass from extending beyond the rear door’s front edge. The glass would not be able to roll straight down, instead would need to articulate rearward and down.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2023_01/134731883_1955PackardFourHundred127218.54DPHT.jpg.fbec346e407a5a988e113c3e4d93b944.jpg
At a minimum, I think this is what Packard needed to offer for ’55. While it was indeed the case that Rambler’s 4-door hardtop went nowhere, to compete with Cadillac there had to be at least a nod towards a 4-door hardtop in the form of a pillared hardtop. With it would come the hardtop’s faster backlight and slightly lower roofline. The old Patrician greenhouse could have hung around for those who wanted it, but there had to be alternative with a more style-forward design.
If Nance really wanted to differentiate Clipper from Packard for ’55 he might have done well to leave the ’54 Clipper front appearance alone for ’55 like he did its rear, and instead just add the wrapped windshield. Olds and Buick had conventional headlights and front fenders and sold just fine. The did have more modern bumpers like the ’55 Packards, so maybe those could have been added to the ’55 Clippers.
Packard really had a fundamental problem that the post WWII period brought home. Packard had made its reputation in the 1920s and 1930s with their superb senior series cars. By the end of the 1930s and into the dawn of WWII they were being out styled by GM’s march to a more modern look. Packard’s senior series clients were the traditionalists.
When Packard came out with the mid level cars they were trading directly on the reputation of the senior series. Although this saved the corporation it also changed the mentality of the operation as it became more volume focused.
Post WWII Packard had already killed its true senior series. With that loss it really lost the connection to what was the touchstone of its “brand”. I would argue that as time went on that “brand” connection became more and more tenuous. I would further argue that who diehard clients were the older traditionalists that were dying off and Packard was not able to be the aspirational brand for the younger affluent buyers in the booming post war economy. In contrast, this is what Cadillac did a perfect job of.
Packard still wanted to be what they had been in market stature. Unfortunately, they could no longer be that. The market was moving forward faster than they could afford to support. Too big to be a niche player but as a stand alone brand too small to have all the necessary resources. Packard really needed to have done the big merger when it was first proposed not later one with Studebaker – two broken brands depending upon the other for financial salvation.
You hit the nail on the head. Look at the Packard 110,115, and 120 series cars. They looked exactly like the senior series cars to the average Joe. This was the era of companion makes. It might have worked. However postwar , compare the bathtub Packards with the postwar Cadillacs. To my eye Packard did a poor job integrating a more horizontal look from their tombstone grill. Instead of making the car look wider, it made the car look bloated. Check out the 1949 Cadillac sedanette, or even better, look at the ZZTop custom Caddy. To the 1949 eye, that is how the car looked compared to the competition.
I think they could have survived on their own selling 100,000 cars per year as they did in ’51. They made good money that year but the cars had no staying power, were too conservative. That was their fundamental problem. They were aggressive all through the Twenties, taking risks that included replacing the old Twin Six with a volume Eight in 1924 based on the volume Six that launched two years earlier. Their aggressiveness culminated in a prototype FWD V12 that they wanted as a medium priced car that was very low for the era, but they couldn’t make the transmission reliable.
As the Depression proved to be a long term downturn Packard lost its edge. They were still taking risks but these were in production rather than product. The One Twenty saved them but it was an outdated design compared to GM’s new 1935 turret tops. This got Packard out of sinc with GM. The wider turret tops that Packard launched in 1938 should have come out in ’35, and the next move after that should have been a longer V12 in 1936 that was based on the One Twenty to replace their money-losing Seniors in 1936. Low-slung Clipper styling should have arrived for 1940. Instead, they launched a Six in 1937 that permanently put them off course.
There was nothing fundamentally wrong with Packard’s size so long as its products led the industry. Too often this didn’t happen and it began in the Thirties. The ’51s were the company’s last best chance to control its destiny. The leadership was simply not up to the task, nor was the leadership that followed it.
To lead the industry takes money, a whole lotta spending money. Money not only to bring the most advanced car to market, but to also fund dead ends like the FWD V 12 and the straight 12 they did around the same time. Around this time their choices started to narrow, and a shoot the moon gamble, or bringing some feature to market before all the bugs are worked out could kill the company.
If Studebaker could not survive on 200,000 vehicles per year, I doubt that Packard could survive on 100,000 vehicles per year. Hudson was in the same economic boat. G.M., Ford and Chrysler’s 1955 sales increases only made Packard’s future even grimmer.
I don’t think the 1955 Packard was a badly styled car; however, a technically inferior (on paper) car (the 1955 Buick) easily took sales from Packard in 1955, although the Buick division paid for its high production with quality lapses that affected sales from 1956 into the 1960s. I still believe that much of Packard’s problems were its dealer network and bad marketing, compounded by the production problems resulting from Chrysler’s purchase of Briggs.
The Packard Predictor for 1957 vaguely resembles the 1959 Pontiac. Having seen this car in the Studebaker Museum in South Bend, with the right dealer network, the right advertising and quality construction, perhaps a Predictor-based Packard would have outsold the 1957 Cadillac, Lincoln and Imperial. Instead, we got Studebakers for 1957.
I imagine we have all seen photos online of proposed 1957 Packard models and the cobbled together prototype. To me it looks like more than another reskinned 1952, but something all new above the frame. Hopefully by now the new running gear’s bugs are worked out by now. At this stage it would not be ready for the 1957 model year, and you would be doing good to be ready for the 1958. Looking at the scale models it reminds me of the 1958 Lincoln/Continental, which I like but other readers regard as ponderous. Rather than the Predictor front, it resembles a 58 Edsel with the horse collar replaced by a blade. Once again, something I like but considering the Edsel’s reception probably laughed off the market. Packard production for 1955 was 55k, 1956 29k. Do you think a warmed over 1956 would do better moving into a recession? Even if some banker had a brain aneurysm and lent Packard the money, it would be throwing good money after bad.
I wonder whether the neo-classical direction suggested in Carl Evers’ 1952 Packard sketches would have had any chance of catching on in the 50s:
https://collection.cooperhewitt.org/objects/1108951105/
https://collection.cooperhewitt.org/objects/1108951099/
If so, it’s a look that might have avoided the need to re-body for many years.
It looks like the Jaguar of the period with 30s design grill and a bustle back. No. Just no.
Looked at the drawings. This body style, in addition to being conservative, could have projected the image that Packard was above style; that ever changing, increasingly more garish styling was vulgar, low brow and tasteless, that people with real taste and discrimination were above all that, and wanted timeless and tasteful styling.
To me it looks more like a James Young coachbuilt Bentley R Type.
One should also ponder the idea of when a car company has the impression of being in financial trouble to what degree potential buyers start to be concerned that they would be buying a soon to be orphan? It happened to Chrysler in the period before their bankruptcy in 1979. I expect that Packard’s declining production and financials was a topic of the business press.
It might also be interesting to understand the dealer count changes during the post war and in the pre-merger with Studebaker if the dealership were standalone Packard or had another brand. The dealers had their own self-interest of financial viability to be worried about. Were Packard dealers switching to other brands?
It was a concern. I was a kid in the 50s, born in 1951. I heard the word “orphan” when adults were discussing cars. By the time I was really aware the Hudson, Kaiser, Nash, and Packard nameplates were history, however I knew they were around and I could sort of recognize them.
It’s my understanding that the number of dealers began declining in the 1949-50 period, when it was obvious that Packard would never hit the 200,000 annual production goal proclaimed by George Christopher. Maintaining the dealer body was a constant challenge for Nance.
Were there any pushes by Packard for their dealers to expand or upgrade their facilities at that time?
Packard’s demise was due to management decisions. The six cylinder engine in the late 1930’s was a huge error. After WW2 ended, all Packard production should have been only the high priced models optioned to the hilt. Anything and everything sold then. Why were cheaper Packards even being built? The next major bad management decision was not designing an entirely new car for ‘48. The old Clipper bodies should have been replaced as Cadillac did.
The all new 1951 Packards looked old school when new. And now, Packard out of design sinc with GM. 1954 should have featured an all new Packard and not a redesign. Cadillac design was considered luxury and that’s why it was emulated. Packard was very late with a V-8. That hurt them badly. Instead, they spent too much money developing their own automatic transmission. Packard should have bought automatic transmissions from GM until their finances were better.
Nance should never have been hired. He sold refrigerators and not luxury automobiles! Studebaker should never had been bought. They were a terrible money pit. The Packard Automobile Company did not need to be all things to all people. And finally, Packard should have stayed in their old factory! Packard management was terrible. They could have survived with the correct management decisions.
Our own government could have bailed out Packard, but they refused. If I had a Time Machine, maybe I could save Packard? But it’s all just fantasy now.
Again, the Macauley regime in 1946 should have put Packard back on a two-car brand strategy after 1946. Six-cylinder cars could eventually be upgraded to a smaller displacement eight by 1948, but the less-expensive cars should have been branded “Clippers” and the senior Cadillac-competitors branded as Packards. I still think in 1947 or 1948, Packard, which was looking for a senior executive management team should have merged with Hudson, since integration would have been in the Detroit-area. But like most grave missteps in corporations, rancor in the boardroom put George T. Christopher in the president’s job after Max Gilman was fired by Macauley over an alleged adultery scandal in early 1942 against the board’s support of Gilman. Christopher, a competent production man, unfortunately did not understand the automobile marketing and selling process, and so his manta was to sell cheaper Packards after the war ended. With the success of the 1941 Clippers, then the war, production was the most important focus. But in late 1945, while resumption of production was important with steelworker strikes and materials shortages, cheaper production was Christopher’s message to Macauley. So, when Briggs offered to do all body structure production more cheaply, Macauley moved all Packard body production to Briggs, despite a background of labor stoppages and production problems, including a strike in early 1946. Macauley and Christoper cut the senior cars with the new Briggs-bodied 22nd Series “bathtubs” for 1948. Macauley resigned in 1948, then Christopher retired at the end of 1949. More boardroom battles and Hugh Ferry, Packard’s treasurer, with great reluctance, became President at the behest of the board. Then in 1951, entered James J. Nance, likely two-years too late. No wonder Packard was on its deathbed. https://automobilechronicles.com/the-real-reason-packard-died/