“The company’s Product Planning Committee was considering anew the question of an economy (light) car. A report on February 17 (1949) held that there were 4,000,0000 potential customers for such a car and that the first company to produce one ‘would enjoy the distinct advantage of exclusive penetration’ of the market, and that public interest warranted at least ‘continuing and intensifying engineering development work’ in the field. However, Earle S. MacPherson of Engineering opposed such activity. ‘It has to be a kind of religion if the job is to be done successfully,’ he asserted, and felt that such an absorbing venture would interfere with the discharge of other engineering work. . . . (p. 350)
That the movement away from the small cars, evident in the 1940s, should continue was taken for granted. The Ford Division, brandishing the results of expert studies, told the Executive Committee that ‘as the general standard of living has increased, the consumer has tended to purchase a better car.’ It looked down its nose at the small car, that annoying incubus that every few years lifted a contentious head into the automotive scene. In 1952, as in earlier years, the Division had firmly opposed the intruder. ‘To the average American our present car and its size represent an outward symbol of prestige and well being.’ It again pointed to small cars struggling in the wake of Ford and Chevrolet sales: the Henry J, the Hudson Jet, the Nash, and the Willys. All but one would soon sink beneath the churning waters marking the progress of their betters.” (p. 379)
— Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill (1962)
RE:SOURCES
- Nevins, Allan and Frank Ernest Hill; 1962. Ford: Decline and Rebirth 1933-1962. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, NY.
Also see ‘Six myths about the misunderstood 1953-54 Plymouth’
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