A fairly common narrative in U.S. automotive history is how Virgil Exner saved Chrysler in the mid-50s. Some historians tell a dramatic tale of how he pulled the automaker out of a tailspin caused by a lineup of overly utilitarian cars. The flamboyantly restyled 1955 models led to a big jump in sales (e.g., Hyde, 2003; Langworth, 1993; Niedermeyer, 2016).
There is some truth to this myth. Chrysler Corporation’s passenger-car production rose by almost 58 percent from the 1954 model year. Plymouth even hit what was then an all-time record.
Even so, the automaker still lost ground to General Motors and Ford. In the 1955 model year Plymouth got knocked out of third place by Buick. Meanwhile, Chrysler’s total market share only reached 17.7 percent. This was well below its postwar peak of 20.9 percent in 1953 — back when Chryslers were supposedly too small and stolid to be cool.
Indeed, even total 1955 production was slightly lower than in 1953. How could that be in light of record-breaking U.S. auto industry sales and Exner’s costly new designs?
The point of this essay is not to blame Exner for Chrysler’s less-than-stellar sales in 1955-56. Rather, it is to cultivate a more data-driven discussion about the decline of Chrysler in the 1950s. I say this recognizing that there appear to be meaningful variances in production data (see “Notes” at bottom of story).
Plymouth falls farther behind Chevy and Ford
Chrysler’s improved sales from the recession year of 1954 masked two bigger problems: Even with Exner’s so-called “Forward Look” styling, the automaker was still falling behind in both the low- and premium-priced fields. Let’s talk about Plymouth first.
All of the low-priced brands saw their production decline as the post-war seller’s market faded away. However, from 1952-55 the Big Two rebounded much more than Plymouth did. Ford saw its output jump by 116 percent. Chevrolet was right behind with a 108-percent increase. In contrast, Plymouth volume only went up 78 percent.
If Plymouth had grown at the same rate as Chevy, it would have surpassed 800,000 units in 1955 — and stayed ahead of Buick. (Note that I’m only working with model-year figures in this article.)
For 1955 Plymouth’s market share hit 17.7 percent of the low-priced field. That was up a meaningful 1.4 percent from the previous year but a good 2 percent below the brand’s postwar high in 1951.
To make matters worse, in 1956 Plymouth’s market share fell to 15.4, which was almost a percent below the supposedly disastrous 1954.
If indeed making its cars bigger, glitzier and more powerful was the key to success, why did Plymouth not do better than that?
Chrysler surely can’t be criticized for not keeping up — and even going one step better than — GM and Ford. The 1955 Plymouth was longer than both the Ford (by five inches) and Chevrolet (by eight inches). In addition, the new Plymouth had the requisite flashy colors and V8 engines. In 1956 a trendy four-door hardtop was added, as were bigger tail fins and a high-performance model called the Fury.
So what went wrong? We’ll come back to that question in a moment.
Chrysler loses altitude in the premium-priced field
For all of Plymouth’s woes, it did a lot better than its premium-priced siblings in 1955-56. That was a big problem because Chrysler had historically been strongest in this field.
As with Plymouth, you wouldn’t see much wrong if you only compared 1955 output with the previous year. All of the automaker’s brands were way up: Dodge (79 percent), DeSoto (50 percent) and the Chrysler brand (46 percent).
The problem was that Chrysler’s premium-priced brands were getting blown out of the water by GM. Between 1952 and 1955, Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick collectively saw their output soar by 138 percent. In contrast, Chrysler’s brands only rose by 43 percent — even less than Plymouth.
Also see ‘Six myths about the misunderstood 1953-54 Plymouth’
One could point out that GM’s boom in sales went bust rather quickly. From 1955 to 1958 the automaker’s premium-priced brands saw output fall by almost 60 percent. However, GM’s market share in this field never went below 57 percent — and by 1959 had reached a positively monopolistic 69 percent.
But we’re getting ahead of ourselves. Chrysler’s situation in 1955 looks worse when you use 1953 as your data baseline. This was the year that the automaker captured a then-postwar high of almost 25 percent of the premium-priced field.
Alas, by 1955 GM’s output grew so dramatically that Chrysler’s market share fell to a postwar low of 18.4 percent. Although it inched back up to 19.9 percent in 1956, that was still a step down from the glory days of 1949-53, when more than 21 percent was the norm.
Most of Chrysler’s brands did worse in 1955-56
The most significant news of the mid-50s was that Plymouth held up better than Chrysler’s other three established brands. One indicator: Whereas Plymouth’s output was up in 1955 by 8.5 percent from 1953, all other brands saw declines: Dodge (13.5 percent), DeSoto (12 percent) and Chrysler (10.1 percent).
Indeed, Plymouth was the only Chrysler brand that did better in 1955 than in the postwar seller’s market of the early-50s.
Chrysler’s experience stood in stark contrast to GM and Ford, whose brands all had record-breaking years in 1955 (with the minor exception of Lincoln, whose new-product blitz — and postwar sales peak — was in 1956).
As the 1950s progressed, Plymouth represented an increasingly large proportion of the Chrysler Corporation’s output: from 48.3 percent in 1951 to 62.4 percent in 1958. In the graph below, note how the upward movement began in 1954 and eased off in 1955-56 before rising higher in 1957-58.
The biggest reason why Plymouth became more important to the automaker was the decline of Dodge. In 1954 Dodge’s output fell by 52 percent from the previous year. That was almost twice as much as Plymouth and more than any other Big Three brand.
Just as significantly, Dodge did not achieve new sales peaks in 1955 and 1957 like Plymouth did.
Low-priced field puts the squeeze on premium cars
One reason why Chrysler’s premium-priced brands lost altitude in the mid-50s was because the market was shifting toward lower-priced cars. As a case in point, between 1952 and 1955 output of premium-priced cars went up roughly 75 percent. That sounds impressive until you consider that the low-priced market grew by 94 percent during the same time period.
Then, in 1956, the premium-priced field began a dramatic contraction. Even after an uptick in 1959, output fell almost 49 percent from 1955. In contrast, the low-priced field ended the decade only 3 percent down from 1955 — and hit an even bigger record of almost 4.1 million units in 1957.
Another way to cut the numbers is to compare market share. Between 1952 and 1956, low-priced cars saw their proportion of the U.S. passenger-car market go up five points to 58 percent. Meanwhile, premium-priced cars fell by five points to 39 percent.
By 1959 the split was even more pronounced. The low-priced brands were up to 69 percent versus only 27 percent for premium brands.
This sales contraction heightened competition. As of 1956 there were still 10 premium brands.
To make matters worse, Chrysler’s economies of scale were much weaker than that of General Motors. In 1955-56 only one GM brand — Oldsmobile — sold more cars than Dodge, DeSoto and the Chrysler brand combined.
Chrysler looked more like an independent
All of this suggests that Chrysler’s situation looked more like that of the independent automakers than GM and Ford. All of the independents saw their sales and market share in 1955 fall sharply from the early-50s. Chrysler’s decline was mild in comparison, but it was still a far cry from the Big Two’s major expansion in the first half of the 1950s.
Most notably, GM volume went up from almost 1.7 million units in 1952 to over 3.7 million in 1955.
The graph below shows even more starkly how much the Big Two increasingly dominated the U.S. auto industry. GM and Ford’s combined market share went up from 64.2 percent in 1951 to 79.6 percent in 1956. That’s a 15.4 percent increase in a remarkably short amount of time. In addition, the increase was almost as large as Chrysler’s 17-percent market share in 1956.
Also see ‘Was the ‘Ford blitz’ to blame for the collapse of independent automakers?’
Let’s take a moment to reflect on these numbers. In 1956 GM and Ford controlled almost 80 percent of the U.S. passenger-car market. GM alone took 51 percent, with Ford at 28.6 percent.
This is an oligopoly. The term refers to an industry where a few producers control the majority of its market share. Investopedia summed up why oligopolies can be so problematic:
“The economic and legal concern is that an oligopoly can block new entrants, slow innovation, and increase prices, which harms consumers. Firms in an oligopoly set prices, whether collectively – in a cartel – or under the leadership of one firm, rather than taking prices from the market. Profit margins are thus higher than they would be in a more competitive market.” (Kenton, 2019)
In an oligopoly you would expect a company of Chrysler’s size to struggle to survive — regardless of its management’s caliber.
Chrysler management made some key mistakes
Chrysler compounded the disadvantages of its smaller size by vainly trying to copy the Big Two. One of the automaker’s biggest mistakes during the mid-50s was to launch a luxury-car brand. Imperial sales were so consistently low that I wonder whether the brand generated a net profit over its lifetime.
Another mistake management made was to maintain the DeSoto far too long (at least as a distinct brand). Dodge’s shakiness in the mid-50s may have been partly because of too much internal competition. Either getting rid of DeSoto or downsizing it to a nameplate under another brand could have created more room for Dodge — particularly when it came to pricing.
So how might the “Forward Look” have played into all this? Exner’s stylistic quirks could be seen even at this early stage (particularly on the overwrought Imperial). However, the overall look of the 1955-56 models seems admirably free of fatal mistakes (you know, like the 1956 Hudson Hornet). And some entries turned out quite well, such as the 1956 Chrysler and DeSoto.
To me the bigger question is whether playing the “mine’s bigger than yours” game was the right way to go. For example, did the 1955 Plymouth gain much of a competitive advantage by being as long as a premium-priced Pontiac? If so, then why was sales growth so much weaker than Ford and Chevrolet that Plymouth got bumped out of third place?
By the same token, why in 1956 did Ford and Chevy together gain 3.4 points of market share in the low-priced field whereas Plymouth lost 2.4 percent?
This could have been for any number of reasons, from the relative strength of dealer networks to perceived quality of workmanship. However, what we can say is that the “Forward Look” did not prove to be a magic bullet. Trying to outdo GM and Ford with bigger and glitzier cars did not single-handedly put Chrysler on an equal footing with them.
NOTES:
Production and market share figures were calculated with data drawn from the following sources: Auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2020). All figures should be for model-year production, so will be different than the numbers presented in histories using calendar-year data (e.g., Langworth, 1993). I have also mixed and matched data to correct for what appear to be obvious errors (see Notes section for one example). The sources I draw upon use slightly different data than Gerard Wilson (2012). The list prices graph does not include limited-production models.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Hyde, Charles K.; 2003. Riding The Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Kenton, Will; 2018. “Oligopoly.” Investopedia. Updated February 9.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993. Chrysler & Imperial 1946-1985: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2012. “Curbside Classic: 1955 Plymouth Belvedere Suburban — Suddenly It’s . . . 1956.” Curbside Classic. Posted Feb. 2; accessed November 15, 2015.
- Wilson, Gerard; 2012. “The Hundred Million Dollar Look: Chrysler for 1955-56.” allpar.com. Accessed Feb. 18, 2021.
- Wikipedia; 2020. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed March 28.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chrysler Corp. (1955, 1956); Dodge (1956); Plymouth (1955)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Chrysler brand (1955); Imperial (1955)
Interesting article. One factor that could have hampered 1955 sales was production difficulties. I’ve read that Chrysler Corporation had trouble keeping up with the demand for its 1955 models. At the big Macungie (Pa.) AACA show, there was an all-original 1955 Chrysler New Yorker sedan shown by the son of the original owner. He also showed a 1955 letter from Chrysler Corporation sent to his father. Chrysler apologized for the time he had to wait for delivery of his new car. Apparently he had ordered it, and the factory was behind in filling orders due to demand for the new cars. One can say that the letter was part “puffery” to make the 1955 models seem like a big success, but the bottom line is that the corporation DID see fit to send the buyer a letter that apologized for the delay and asked him (nicely) to be patient as he waited for his new Chrysler.
As for the sales difficulties of Chrysler’s premium marques – while it probably would have been best to phase out DeSoto, or at least combine it with Dodge or Chrysler, the corporation’s dealer structure made that difficult. There were three main dealer bodies – Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler-Imperial. Each of those dealer bodies was also given the Plymouth to sell (an arrangement that dated back to the early days of the Great Depression). I would imagine that Plymouth-DeSoto dealers would have howled if the corporation took away their DeSotos…while Dodge and Chrysler-Imperial dealers would not have appreciated existing Plymouth-DeSoto dealers being allowed to handle “Dodge-DeSotos” or “Chrysler-DeSotos. In the end, it was probably easier for the corporation to allow a sharp recession and dwindling medium-price market to make the decision for them – which is what happened by 1960-61.
The decision to “upsize” Plymouth also probably hurt the premium brands. By 1959, several industry observers (and critics) were noting that the low-price brands were making the medium-price siblings increasingly superfluous by offering powerful V-8s, more optional features and greater size. One could say that Chrysler led the way with the enlarged 1955 Plymouth. The corporation’s dealer structure only made the problem worse, as those big new Plymouths were were parked right next to their bigger corporate brothers in the showroom. The 1957 model year was especially telling, as Plymouth sales jumped dramatically, Dodge was up by a decent amount, but DeSoto only recorded a small jump – largely due to the introduction of the lower-price, Dodge-based Firesweep. Chrysler sales actually declined (despite what was probably the best-looking of the corporation’s 1957 cars).
Thank you for your nuanced thoughts — they really add to the article. I’m intrigued by your point about DeSoto. The brand has always struck me as redundant given Chrysler’s relatively small size. My most charitable guess is that the launch of DeSoto was too far advanced to be halted when Chrysler bought Dodge in 1928. Given your point about the strength of DeSoto dealers in the 1950s, perhaps the best time to have ditched or downgraded the brand was in the depths of the Great Depression. GM was pruning its excess brands, so Chrysler wouldn’t have looked so bad if it had followed suit.
Regarding Plymouth, I’m curious as to why it lost market share to Ford and Chevy in 1956. By that point there shouldn’t have been any production difficulties. Perhaps dual-brand dealers tried harder to up-sell potential Plymouth buyers into a premium-brand car.
Thank you for the kind words (and sorry for the delay in responding). Perhaps part of the problem in 1956 was that both Ford and Chevrolet were still aggressively gunning for each other. The 1956 model year was when Iacocca at Ford launched the “’56 for 56” sales campaign in the Philadelphia region. A buyer could buy a brand-new 1956 Ford with 20 percent down and for $56 a month. It boosted sales in the region so much that McNamara later applied it to the whole country, and brought Iacocca to Dearborn as a reward. Chevrolet wasn’t about to lose its grip on the number-one slot, so I’m sure it instituted similarly aggressive measures. Plymouth was undoubtedly caught in the middle – as it was in 1954 during the Ford Blitz, and with Buick’s aggressive push of the Special.
In a perfect world, Walter Chrysler would forego the introduction of the Plymouth. Instead, expand the Dodge range downward to make it the mass-market brand (with a full line of trucks, it was a more natural competitor to Chevrolet and Ford). That would give both DeSoto and Chrysler more breathing room. I’m convinced that a big part of Chrysler’s problems in the postwar era was that the strongest brand internally was Dodge (most Chrysler top executives had served time at Dodge, and Dodge controlled a large portion of the corporation’s production facilities), but the best-seller was Plymouth. So which one was more important…? At Ford, there was no doubt that Ford was number-one within the company, and even at GM the top brass realized that Chevrolet was the most important division.
Right — and the only way to fix the problem was for Plymouth to be bled to death. Which is what Chrysler ended up doing in a half-conscious way. Unfortunately, they took far too long to phase out the Plymouth brand.
In retrospect, it is pretty amazing how long Chrysler used badge engineering to prop up a hopelessly dysfunctional system. Chrysler was in enough trouble in the late-70s that Iacocca had a plausible window of opportunity to merge the Chrysler/Plymouth and Dodge dealer networks and either phase out Plymouth or make it a niche brand. I wonder whether he was too old-school to go that route or whether the political power of the dealers was still too strong.
Fascinating article, well-researched that poses more questions than answers. I always thought the 1953 restylings of the Plymouth and the Dodge was well done, better than the 1953 Chevrolet. The restylings of the DeSoto and Chrysler were restrained, but tasteful for 1953. But I think Chrysler corporately was simply out-marketed by Ford and G.M. in 1953 and 1954 going into 1955 and 1956. Advertising campaigns take time to sink in, and television was still a growing medium, not reaching the full-penetration of the late 1950s and early 1960s. In reviewing the TV shows sponsored by Chrysler when compared to those sponsored by Ford and G.M. (Chevrolet, Buick, Oldsmobile, especially), Chrysler did not reach the eyes and ears of viewers. “The Hundred-Million Dollar Look” was successful, but it was reaching people in print and TV, but not in the way that it reached the masses with Dinah Shore, Jackie Gleason and Tennessee Ernie Ford, among others. I also agree that by 1957, the DeSoto was an excess brand, taking up valuable resources that could have been used to market Plymouth, Dodge (beyond Lawrence Welk), Chrysler and Imperial. What if the Slant-Six had been introduced in 1955 instead of 1960 in the Plymouth and Dodge ? Yes, the world was V-8 crazy, but a thoroughly modern lighter six would have made a difference for Chrysler in 1955, especially for Plymouth. I believe.