(UPDATED 9/23/2022)
The easiest way to sum up the spectacular failure of the DeLorean Motor Company is to say that its founder was exceptionally unlucky. I am hard pressed to think of a worse time for John Z. DeLorean to have begun production of his DMC-12 sports car than in early 1981. That was in the depths of a U.S. recession partly fueled by sky-high interest rates.
Might DeLorean’s car have had a better chance of survival if it had been launched either a few years earlier or later, when the economy was in much better shape? Perhaps, but that would not have changed a fundamental problem — John Z. appeared to suffer from a self-destructive streak that would likely have done him in regardless of external conditions.
Despite DeLorean’s indignant critique of General Motors’ stifling bureaucracy, it had arguably helped to keep in check his worst behavior patterns, which strike me as being colored by a serious psychological affliction such as an antisocial personality disorder (Harvard Medical School, 2019).
Also see ‘John Z. DeLorean: Downsizing GM cars for 1973 was opposed by Mitchell’
You might even call him a crook. Alex Pappademas (2018) has offered a useful overview of DeLorean’s darker side, so all I wish to suggest here is that what ailed the DeLorean Motor Company went well beyond choosing the wrong strategy.
That said, pondering counterfactuals for the DMC-12 can help us better understand why the U.S. automakers failed to effectively respond to a rising tide of imports in the 1970s and 1980s.
The DMC-12 was a great car to date but not to marry
The DMC-12’s best feature was its exotic styling. DeLorean reportedly said that the car “is aimed at a particular section of the market — the horny bachelor who’s made it!” (Pappademas, 2018).
Alas, the DMC-12 suffered from practical issues, mechanical gremlins and sloppy worksmanship. As a daily driver, the DeLorean was arguably not fully competitive with sports cars in its general price range.
The graph below uses the DeLorean’s list prices, which were $26,175 in 1981 and $29,825 in 1982. Dealer asking prices could be $8,000 lower (Flammang, 1992). That positioned the DMC-12 closest to the Chevrolet Corvette and Porsche 924.
One could argue that at least some of the car’s problems would have been sorted out if DeLorean had stayed in business longer. That may have been true, but the Japanese luxury brands launched a decade later didn’t need to make that excuse. In addition, a goodly portion of the factors that kept the DeLorean Motor Company from being successful were rooted in its basic strategy.
For example, substandard assembly quality was partly the result of DeLorean aggressively hustling government subsidies at the expense of getting a production facility with an experienced workforce.
By the same token, the company’s inability to come anywhere close to its breakeven point of around 11,000 units per year may have partly reflected the limited appeal of a two-seater sports car (Wikipedia, 2021). And because of the DMC-12’s rear-engine layout, the platform didn’t easily lend itself to higher-selling variants, such as a four-door sedan or even a four-seat coupe. DeLorean really boxed himself into a corner.
Bricklin’s approach had a better chance of success
The DMC-12 was a more sophisticated car than the Bricklin SV-1, but the latter actually had a better chance of long-term success. Bricklin’s economies of scale were less daunting because it used more off-the-shelf parts. Even more importantly, the car’s front-engine, rear-drive platform had greater flexibility to add models.
Car and Driver magazine judged the Bricklin to be within the same ballpark as the Chevrolet Corvette in size, weight, price and performance (Sherman, 1975). This was very much an American interpretation of a sports car, with V8 power and an emphasis on swoopy styling rather than space efficiency or engineering finesse.
Also see ‘DeLorean’s book is still one of best critiques of General Motors’
In contrast, the DeLorean mixed a European drivetrain and styling with a tight-fitting interior that belied the car’s exceptionally wide body — 78.3 inches. Despite the exotic mechanicals, Car and Driver found the DMC-12 to have weaker acceleration and more jittery high-speed handling than other higher-end sports cars such as the Corvette and Porsche 911 (Griffin, 1981).
Of course, the Bricklin also had its own issues, such as “the company’s inexperience working with Detroit auto companies, a host of unresolved design problems, company nepotism, supplier shortages, worker absenteeism and a series of rapid price escalations that saw the actual price of the car more than double over initial projections” (Wikipedia, 2021).
If DeLorean had been in charge of Bricklin, he might have had the managerial experience — and stature — necessary to overcome many of those problems.
DeLorean needed leadership akin to BMW’s Quandt
Ironically, the DeLorean Motor Company could have had a greater chance of survival if it had been launched by someone with the skills and temperament of BMW’s Herbert Quandt (Wikipedia, 2021). DeLorean models would undoubtably have been less flashy, but they also would have resulted in a more usable daily driver — and a more financially sustainable automaker. For example, I could see Quandt not betting the farm on a two-seat, mid-engined sports car.
In 1981 BMW’s global production almost reached 338,000 units. Roughly 42,000 units were sold in the United States — and 91 percent of BMW sales went to its lower-priced and more utilitarian 320 and 528 models.
Of course, one can point to the Corvette’s strong sales in the 1970s as evidence that a two-seater could do well. However, it had a much lower list price than what DeLorean was trying to charge.
In addition, the Corvette had been nursed by GM for decades and was sold through one of the largest dealer networks in the country. DeLorean was starting from scratch.
I have not mentioned the Datsun 280ZX because it was in a lower price class. In 1981 a base model listed for $11,299, which was $4,000 below the Corvette. However, the ZX sold almost 64,000 units in 1981 — quite a bit more than the Corvette’s roughly 41,000. Sales may have been helped by the availability of a 2+2 body style on a longer wheelbase.
But wasn’t a two-seater the best bet for survival?
When this article was first posted in 2018, the biggest critique of it was that the only successful postwar startups were those that focused on two-passenger sports cars. That may have been true for tiny producers such as TVR, but not for the larger ones.
Consider Porsche. It managed to survive for decades solely with a lineup of sports cars. However, the 356 and 911 coupes were 2+2s. That configuration arguably broadened the Porsche’s appeal beyond that of a pure two-seater. In addition, during the mid-70s Porsche added two front-engined four seaters, the 924 and 928.
Lotus followed a somewhat similar path. Although its first cars were two-seaters, in the mid-70s the automaker expanded its lineup with the front-engined Elite and Eclat four-seat models.
Porsche proved large enough to profitably support so many models. Lotus did not. During the early-80s the tiny British automaker went into a financial tailspin, arguably in part because it had divided its meager resources between a mid-engined and front-engined platform (Wikipedia, 2021).
Nevertheless, the shift by both automakers to front-engined four-seaters illustrates the direction of the sports car market in the 1970s.
DeLorean took a different — and riskier — road
When the DMC-12 was under development, DeLorean was well aware of diversification efforts by Porsche and Lotus. Corporate documents suggest that DeLorean (2018) agreed with the theory behind offering a broader product line than just a stand-alone two-seater. Unfortunately, his ideas would prove to be too blue sky for such a small, cash-strapped automaker.
Also see ‘How might John Z. DeLorean have done as head of AMC?‘
Mate Petrany (2013) showed sketches of proposed DeLoreans, which included an awkwardly stretched 2+2 coupe as well as a bus, sport-utility vehicle and gull-winged four-door sedan. The problem was that only the extended wheelbase 2+2 could be based off the existing DMC-12 body.
A proposed four-door sedan used a taller body but shared the existing rear-engined chassis. That strikes me as an evolutionary dead end. Even Porsche used a front-engine configuration when it later came out with a four-door model.
DeLorean’s lack of attention to economies of scale was surprising given his experience at General Motors. Surely he saw the cost-benefit analysis of rejected proposals for a mid-engined Corvette. And surely he recognized that GM had a fundamental advantage over DeLorean’s fledgling automobile company — it was big enough to subsidize a money-losing halo car when necessary.
Other automakers offered useful models for DeLorean
One could reasonably argue that GM had too much of a mass-market orientation to be a good point of comparison. So let’s take a look a three European luxury car manufacturers.
By the 1970s Mercedes-Benz was doing quite well financially. Even so, when the SL sports car was redesigned in 1971, it was placed on the same platform as the four-seat SLC. While the specific styling left something to be desired, sharing components gave the two-seater much better economies of scale.
Meanwhile, BMW came out with a mid-engined two-seater in 1978 called the M1. However, that car sold in very low volume — and only stayed in production until 1981 (Wikipedia, 2021). More significantly, BMW waited until it had successfully established itself in the luxury car field with high-volume models before coming out with a mid-engined halo car.
Also see ‘Mercedes-Benz W123: Back when form really did follow function’
Aston Martin should have been a cautionary tale to DeLorean because it struggled for survival in the 1970s. Even so, the automaker did pioneer an interesting idea that DeLorean could have built upon. In 1976 Aston Martin came out with a futuristic-looking four-door sedan that drew upon the mechanicals of its V8 sports cars. The Lagonda illustrates how a front-engined car could have had a low hoodline similar to the DMC-12’s.
Let’s bring all of these ideas together
With the luxury of hindsight I would guess that DeLorean’s best bet would have been a front-engined, rear-drive platform that was the basis for a two-seat sports car as well as a handful of variants. These could have included a four-place coupe, a four-door “coupe-sedan” and a sports wagon. Jensen-style four-wheel-drive might have also made sense as an option.
These models could have shared major body parts, such as windshields and some body panels. Sheetmetal may have been a better choice than fiberglass for higher volumes if DeLorean could afford the upfront costs.
Also see ‘Saab 99/900: The box that crushed a carmaker’
The DeLorean might have had stronger sales potential around the world if it had come out with a much narrower — and somewhat lighter — car. By the same token, gimmicks such as gull-wing doors and stainless steel surfaces were evolutionary dead ends.
The resulting cars would not have looked as exotic as the DMC-12, but they would have had the potential to collectively sell at higher volumes. And by using more off-the-shelf mechanicals, DeLorean might have been able to afford to introduce variants quickly enough to get production to a financially sustainable level.
What then would have been DeLorean’s niche? The basic design would have been more internationally sized than a Corvette and more futuristic looking than the German brands. The two-seater would have been a step up from the ZX, and four-door sedan and wagon would have been unusually low-slung and sporty.
DeLorean’s mistakes partly reflected ‘Detroit Mind’
Given DeLorean’s roaring success at GM, one might assume that he should have come up with a brilliant product-planning strategy for his own car company. He had learned from the best in the business about cost controls, but he also had a flair for interesting engineering and trendy styling.
Instead, his basic strategy was fundamentally flawed. DeLorean’s timing may have been unfortunate, but better luck arguably wouldn’t have saved his car company.
In key respects DeLorean may have been one of the better American automotive executives of his generation, but he still suffered from Detroit’s usual weaknesses, such as a fixation with styling over all else.
Also see ‘Is the decline in distinctive national approaches to car design a bad thing?‘
I would go as far as to argue that DeLorean was merely the most colorful case study of what Brock Yates (1983) referred to as “Detroit Mind.” This was a myopic mindset among U.S. auto executives that failed to recognize why foreign automakers were making serious inroads in the U.S. market.
The tragedy is that a new high-end brand with an international flavor could have done well in the United States during the 1980s. BMW and Mercedes saw their sales more than double between 1980 and 1986; Porsche sales almost tripled. With better management the DeLorean could have rode that wave to success.
NOTES:
This story that was originally posted Sept. 1, 2018, expanded on March 4, 2021 and updated on Sept. 23, 2022. Prices, specifications and production data came from Flammang (1992), Flammang and Kowalke (1999), as well as from the Automobile Catalog (2021).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Automobile Catalog; 2021. “Search Automobile Catalog.” Accessed March 4.
- DeLorean Museum; 2018. “DMCL Long Range Product Plan.” Posted January 20; accessed August 26.
- Flammang, James M.; 1992. Standard Catalog of Imported Cars, 1946-1990. First Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Flammang, James M. and Ron Kowalke; 1999. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1976-1999. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Griffin, Larry; 1981. “Tested: DeLorean vs. Chevy Corvette, Datsun 280-ZX, Ferrari 308GTS, Porsche 911.” Car and Driver. Published Dec. 1.
- Harvard Medical School; 2019. “Antisocial Personality Disorder.” Harvard Health Publishing. Posted March.
- Pappademas, Alex; 2018. “Demon Underneath: John DeLorean and the Invention of the Future.” The Outline. Posted Dec. 11.
- Petrany, Mate; 2013. “The Proposed DeLorean Sedan Is As Coke-Tastically ’80s As You’d Imagine.” Jalopnik. Posted April 11.
- Sherman, Don; 1975. “Chevrolet Corvette Stingray vs. Bricklin SV-1.” Car and Driver. Published May 1.
- Wikipedia; 2021. “BMW M1,” “Bricklin SV-1,” “DeLorean Motor Company,” “Herbert Quandt” and “Lotus Cars.” Accessed March 2.
- Yates, Brock; 1983. The Decline and Fall of the American Automobile Industry. Empire Books, New York, NY.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
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- oldcarbrochures.org: Bricklin (1975); DeLorean (1982)
I’ve read DeLorean’s critique of GM, as well as one about the man and his business. The car was an interesting vehicle when it was first presented, but it spent many years as a concept and came to market almost ten years after conception. This was a long time and the competition had surpassed his creation. The design of the car did not allow for the use of various engines and it had to use what would fit, which was under powered for this type of car. The gull wing doors are totally unsuited for a daily driven sports car, as rain water would drip in when they were opened, and a Grande Starbuck’s Coffee wouldn’t fit through that little toll fare slot. The stainless steel bodywork might never need painting, but it collected finger prints like crazy, as anyone who has bought new kitchen fixtures well knows. DeLorean should have emulated the British tradition of cottage car industry, which was suited to limited scale production. Instead he tried to build his business on large scale production which was unsuited to his market.
Well said. Of course, DeLorean’s ego — and bank account — wouldn’t have been adequately fed if he had gone the cottage carmaker route. Whatever else one might say about him, DeLorean was a pretty smart guy, so I’m perplexed as to why he came up with a business strategy so fraught with peril.
Would DeLorean have been better off acquiring the rights to not only the Triumph TR7/TR8 as attempted in real-life, but also the Rover SD1 as well as the Triumph SD2 and Triumph Lynx prototypes at a much earlier point or at least using the underpinnings of the aforementioned cars and clothing them with different exterior styling?
The same goes with the Reliant FW11 prototype, whose platform was said to have been planned to form the basis of a sportscar as well as a few other models. OTOH DeLorean himself was said to have been interested in acquiring Reliant and building 3-wheelers which horrified those at Reliant, based what the latter saw with various overambitious US 3-wheeler schemes of the period.
Good questions. It would have made a lot of sense to start with an existing platform. I hadn’t heard that DeLorean was interested in Reliant. It makes intuitive sense to me that the automaker would be hesitant to get involved with DeLorean if they had heard anything about his pattern of ethically questionable behavior. It’s also hard to imagine how DeLorean could have been terribly successful with three wheelers given everyone else’s experience and his own penchant for overspending. DeLorean is a good example of how executives from large automakers don’t tend to have the best track record when they subsequently run an independent automaker, which requires a vastly more frugal way of thinking.
The aforementioned BL models and prototypes come to mind as an example of a family of vehicles which were said to have made use of a common platform. In the case of Reliant in addition to FW11, there was the SE82 prototype and the Scimitar SS2 concept which also come to mind.
Via Barrie Wills, John DeLorean was impressed to learn Reliant manufactured and sold more three-wheel cars than any other company in the world so, in 1980, he planned to purchase Reliant. His idea was to use Reliant’s capacity to build a range of new three-wheelers, designed by the renowned engineer Clifford Brooks Stevens for the Californian market.
The idea horrified Wills as he was well aware from his time at Reliant in the 1970s that several Californian entrepreneurs had similar ideas, none of which ever made financial sense. Reliant was also loss-mmaking at the time and Wills wrote a paper to convince DeLorean that purchasing Reliant was a bad idea and DeLorean’s idea simply went away. (The Reliant Motor Company by Elvis Payne)
It would have been less costly to go with such a platform. However, British cars had a questionable reputation in the US. Some badge engineered second or third tier British car would be a non starter. Remember the Sterling? Anyway, his goal was not to create the next AC Cobra or Sunbeam Tiger. He wanted a clean sheet of paper design, a halo car. If it worked, he would have been the Elon Musk of the 80s. However it took a lot of time and money and several near failures for Tesla to be where it is today. DeLorean had none of that.
Those are good points. DeLorean would have been much better off trying to get major components from Japanese automakers. And, yes, his likelihood of success was low regardless of how few mistakes he made. I’m still surprised at how poorly he thought things out, though.
Reliant Robin engineering combined with DeLorean build quality? Oh. My. God.
To be fair Reliant did produce bodyshells for Ford RS200 rally cars and the MetroCab – the first to have full wheelchair provision as well as Ford fibreglass truck cabs and Ford Transit hightops along with bodies for trains, kitchen worktops and boat/jet ski hulls.
Even Saab US approached Reliant about producing a Sonnet IV for the US market that was to share the same production line as the Scimitar GTE, only for the idea to be abandoned as a result of the 1973 fuel crisis.
Otherwise agree DeLorean not acquiring Reliant was for the best.
My sense is that a good ownership experience tends to be more important to the success of a car than the fanciness of its technology or where it is built. The challenge for DeLorean was that the reputation of his brand — and thus its survival — significantly depended upon initial customer reactions. Whatever car he ended up building needed to hit the ground running in terms of quality of workmanship, reliability and general competence as a daily driver.
So how to best get there? Perhaps it would have made sense for an initial, lower-volume model to have borrowed someone else’s platform and even be built by another automaker in an existing factory. I don’t know enough about Reliant to have an opinion regarding the quality of its workmanship. However, Sterling provides a cautionary tale about how badly things could go even when an English car was based upon Honda-caliber components. Although Sterling’s manufacturing quality apparently improved over time, the early horror stories were quite damaging to the fledgling brand’s reputation. That’s too bad, because the Sterling had some good features.
In the late-70s and early-80s the Japanese were the clear leaders when it came to manufacturing quality, so it would have been logical for DeLorean to look in that direction rather than Europe. Alas, he was apparently driven more by which government would throw money at him.
I drove a 1982 DeLorean, fresh from an Indianapolis dealer sorting and prep. The fit and finish was okay, but the interior was cramped and stuffy, in my opinion, and of course, all black. It was hot as it was summer, so the air conditioning had to be on full-tilt. The engine was typical of diminished output of 1980s. It drove a lot like a Corvette, which then was a C-3, but not as responsive and the view over the hood was shorter, with the engine behind instead of in the front. I did not drive it out in the open at highway speeds, but around the city. It was okay, but it did not fit me well. (5’6″, 170 lbs.) It was not a “driver’s car”. Having driven BMW sedans and Triumph TR-7s, the DeLorean was not nearly in their class or as refined. Not enough development and a real disappointment. I am going to speculate that John DeLorean was not enthused in his soul of souls. My boss, at the time the top radio personality in Indianapolis, was going to buy it, but he didn’t like it either and bought a new Mercedes 450 SL with a hardtop.
I shall leave one more thought about the DeLorean DMC-12. Whereas I realize the need to create as much earned media by promotional tie-ins and free publicity, DeLorean on his own was no longer the top U.S. automotive industry newsmaker; Lee Iacocca was. It was pure arrogance to try to build a new automobile company out of a limited-edition sports car. If John DeLorean wanted to build a significant, ethical car, he should have started with bullet-proof, revolutionary four-door and two-door sedan, likely with front-wheel drive, but then internationally we had A.M.C., British-Leyland and Chrysler on-the-ropes. At least Iacocca had the industry sense to take Chrysler’s resources and assets to focus on the OmniRizons and Reliant/Aspen and sell off the Chrysler’s older models until replacements could be fashioned. Other than putting Chrysler badges on sporty Mitsubishis and adding convertible tops to the stretch K-Cars, Lee didn’t play around with limited-edition sports cars until the Viper.
Lot’s of great insights and a very good article. The consensus seems to be that DeLorean should have used an existing platform, which makes sense. One that came to mind is the mid-Seventies VW Passat:
https://www.pinterest.co.uk/pin/567735096755449029/
Just as the Scirocco was a cut down body based on the Golf, a DeLorean-styled coupe might have been successfully fashioned on the larger Passat platform, and built by Karmann alongside the Scirocco. No gullwing doors or stainless steel but a nice car at a competitive luxury price. The ’83 Scirocco actually had a slight DeLorean look about it.
https://bringatrailer.com/listing/1982-volkswagen-scirocco-4/
Another counterfactual would have had someone high up at GM recognizing in DeLorean a person who could potentially help the company, if the company would first help him. The platform would be the ’79 Eldorado the least costly approach would have been to forego a short-wheelbase 2-seat coupe for a 5-door based on the ’80 Seville. The bumpers would have presented a challenge, DeLorean’s design wanting to ride higher that Seville and be much more integrated with the body. The image at link (Old Car Brochures, AACA) raises the rear, which also has a shorter rear overhang than Seville, but leaves the front bumper alone because it would have been crash-tested and certified. But the stretch target would have been to design and certify DeLorean bumpers.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_09/655506202_1980CadillacSeville-basedDeLorean5-door.jpg.5df8c2044c9895801f576da77cdb7c41.jpg
Here’s the correct link to the mid-Seventies Passat. The coupe’s rear overhang would have needed shortened.
https://www.goodwood.com/grr/road/news/2017/11/grr-garage-vw-passat-alltrack—meet-the-ancestors/
Shades of DeLorean in the Cavalier hatchback. Had the Seville-based 5-door materialized, this car could have been added soon after as a more affordable entry model, with maybe the hatchback body being reserved exclusively for DeLorean. Powertrain and chassis would have needed major improvements. This strategy might have been a better play than Cadillac trying to enter the compact luxury market with a 4-door Cimarron. DeLorean could have helped GM compete in the sporty end of the luxury market.
https://www.ultimatespecs.com/wallpaper.php?id=6967
Now posted in the right story…
The Fiero could have instead launched as a DeLorean, looking much more like his original design and being the third and final model, or second and final if the Cavalier hatchback-based car didn’t happen.
Here’s a better effort with the DeLorean. Have put 16s on the car because the ’80 Porsche 928 had them. Performance suspension and bucket seats would have been the same as the later Eldorado Touring Coupe. Maybe Buick’s V6 Turbo under hood? If not, a more performance-tuned version of Cadillac’s V8. Rear bumper now low like Seville but rear overhang still reduced, driving a shortened fore/aft but taller fuel tank. MotorWeek said the Seville had Royal Seal puncture proof tires. If this meant no spare, would have allowed a lower trunk floor especially if the rear seat bottom flipped forward before the seatback flipped down.
Tall vertical surfaces at front and rear of car versus original coupe would have been a design challenge but acceptable solutions probably could have been found. Rear down-vison would have been a bit less than Seville but probably still acceptable. I/P could have been carried over from Seville but with no wood trim and as much other visual differentiation as possible.
DeLorean would have continued to own his company but kept on a somewhat short leash by GM. His cars would have been sold through GM dealerships, probably Cadillac because they would have wanted to bring in a new type of customer and their service department already handled Seville and Eldorado.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_09/1628796686_1980CadillacSevilleandDeLorean16wheelssidetrim.jpg.7abcf01a2ca696c2fa4959a3af8565c7.jpg
Please bear with as this get worked. Is about as far as can be taken without getting into the body and doors.
https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_09/1830506246_1980CadillacSevilleandDeLorean.jpg.9e3540e4c20c5ddba342372a5109a034.jpg
Paul, that’s a fascinating “what if?” design. It works quite well. Thank you for making it.
One additional problem that is not detailed here, but DeLorean’s business and engineering sense must have been totally overruled by his own sense of importance. When the ads in men’s magazines (Cutty Sark scotch for example: https://149777103.v2.pressablecdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/1980-cutty-sark-ad-290.jpg and Goodyear: https://149777103.v2.pressablecdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Goodyear-ad-610.jpg) appeared. I realize J.Z.D. was doing his best impersonation of William Crapo Durant to raise capital and public awareness, but look at what his ego was pushing him to do…He made dubious deals with individuals like Colin Chapman of Lotus and the politicians of Northern Ireland to produce an “ethical sportscar” that was uncomfortable, underpowered and an “orphan” from the start. What a waste of talent, skill and abilities ! While I understand why G.M. Vice Chair Thomas Murphy lost faith in DeLorean in late 1972 when DeLorean wrote his critique of G.M. outlining what needed to be done, a very brave act, these talks needed to be with Roche, Murphy and Gerstenberg. And coming from the flamboyant DeLorean, I can see why the rest of the 14th Floor was aghast and offended, even if DeLorean in principle was absolutely right on the money. Then, J.Z.D. wavered for four-years on his publication of “On A Clear Day, You Can See General Motors”. The impact in 1975-1976 instead of 1979, would have been astounding, in my opinion.