Richard Teague may have been a talented car designer and a nice guy, but he wasn’t the ideal match for what was needed at American Motors. Indeed, the cars developed under his tenure as head of design went a long ways toward killing the independent automaker.
I would imagine that these are fighting words for fans of Teague — particularly if they knew or worked with him. My goal isn’t to engage in a personal attack but rather to assess at a deeper level why AMC failed. The automaker’s styling clearly played a major role.
Although top management was ultimately responsible for mistakes such as the 1971 Javelin, 1974 Matador coupe and 1976 Pacer, these and other cars from that period suggest that styling had become the tail that wagged the corporate dog.
As a case in point, Patrick Foster noted that Teague “had championed the Pacer program, daring the company to take another risk on unique styling” (1993, p. 193). Unfortunately, top management listened to him. That proved to be the biggest mistake of all (go here for further discussion).
An emphasis on trendy styling ignored its dangers
By embracing highly styled cars by Teague, AMC management rejected former CEO George Romney’s contention that the best route to survival was a lineup of slow-changing cars which emphasized quality, reliability and value. In an interview with Collectible Automobile magazine, Romney pointed to the 1963 Rambler as embodying this approach:
“If you’ll take a look at it, you’ll see that the styling was really very simple. The concept was that style was no longer a major factor with people who were basically interested in a good, dependable piece of transportation — one that still looked good, along the lines of a Mercedes-Benz (Foster, 1993, p. 98).
Romney was prescient in seeing why imports would do increasingly well in the 1970s against style-focused Detroit fare. However, he also focused on practical cars under the theory that AMC could build them for longer periods of time without expensive redesigns. This would help counterbalance the enormous disadvantages an independent automaker faced when it came to economies of scale.
In other words, Romney quite rightly argued that competing directly against the Big Three with cars that required frequent styling changes was not an affordable long-term strategy. His successors at AMC ignored his warnings — with predictable results.
Teague gained status withheld from predecessor
An irony of Teague’s rise to design chief was that it came about because of his department’s weakness within AMC management’s hierarchy. Teague’s predecessor was Edmund E. Anderson. After completing the design of the 1963 senior Rambler, he asked to be promoted to vice president of styling. Anderson’s request was rejected, so he retired at the end of 1961 (Foster, 1993). I have previously suggested that not giving Anderson a promotion was one of Romney’s eight biggest mistakes.
Teague was in Anderson’s role for only a few years before he was elevated from director of styling to a vice president (Foster, 1993). And once Roy D. Chapin Jr. took over as CEO in 1967, Teague apparently had even more clout with executive management.
A big reason why may have been that Chapin was a kindred spirit when it came to sporty cars. Most of the new models introduced during his 10-year reign were two-door coupes and hatchbacks with flashy styling. For a while management even considered fielding a mid-engined Corvette competitor called the AMX/3 (Wikipedia, 2021). This represented a radical change from the Romney years, when the focus was on four-door sedans and wagons.
Automotive journalists tended to view Teague’s ascendency as a good thing. For example, in an otherwise trenchant critique of the 1964 Rambler American, Car and Driver magazine lauded Teague’s styling — and described him as “a real enthusiast” (1964, p. 62). This illustrated how Teague seemed to have a way with the auto buff media — and historians.
Also see ‘The downside of auto historians writing about their friends’
Teague’s stylistic efforts thus tended to get a good reception. For example, Car and Driver summed up the 1974 Matador coupe as “unquestionably this year’s style leader” (1974, p. 104). You’d never guess from reading the story that what the magazine described as “the world’s first 2+2 intermediate” might not be such a great idea in an era of rising fuel prices.
American Motors gave up its engineering leadership
The rise of AMC’s design department corresponded with the decline of its engineering leadership. That was problematic because the automaker’s success since prior to World War II had been heavily driven by functional innovation.
For example, both of AMC’s predecessor automakers, Nash and Hudson, pioneered unit-body construction, unusually aerodynamic styling and compact cars. In the late-50s and early-60s the Rambler gained popularity not just for its exceptionally efficient design, but also for practical features such as an integrated heater/air conditioner, reclining seats, a three- rather than two-speed automatic transmission, dual master-cylinder brakes and ceramic-coated mufflers.
In addition, Romney placed an unusual emphasis on manufacturing quality. As a result, Ramblers functioned as the Toyota Camrys of their time — rather dowdy but a good value.
By the late-60s AMC’s management culture had dramatically shifted. Styling and marketing were emphasized and engineering innovation became almost nonexistent. Indeed, one of AMC’s signature features — reclining seats — took a hit in 1970. The automaker’s bucket seats were given a trendy new shape but the reclining mechanism was removed.
This is but one example of how AMC engaged in the same kind of cost cutting then popular with the Big Three. The problem was that AMC cars became increasingly indistinguishable from their domestic competition — at least aside from the styling.
The Pacer epitomized how styling trumped engineering
The Pacer represented the beginning of a return to engineering innovation. As a case in point, the car’s front subframe and rack-and-pinion steering were not trailblazing like unit-body construction, but they were notable improvements. Even so, they were overshadowed by practical problems such as the car’s excessive weight.
Also see ‘Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors’
Richard Langworth blamed the car’s weight problem on the “production engineers” and argued that Teague’s “part was thoroughly good” (Langworth, 2014; p. 82). Meanwhile, AMC designer Bob Nixon stated that the car’s excessive width was the result of an 11th-hour demand by product planners and engineers (Foster, 2014).
The Pacer had enough problems that there is plenty of blame to go around. For example, CEO Roy D. Chapin Jr. badly misjudged reality when he assumed that the Pacer would sell 150,000 units per year (Hyde, 2009). However, giving Teague a free pass on this car strikes me as questionable unless more evidence is brought to the table.
So some questions: Who championed the idea of windows so tall that they didn’t roll down all the way? Or an inverted bathtub shape that robbed the rear of badly needed cargo room? Or a tumblehome so extreme that it wasted a goodly portion of the interior space created by a 77-inch exterior width?
My guess is that Teague was the primary driver behind all of these features. Contrary to how the Pacer was advertised, this car was first and foremost a styling exercise — a futuristic personal coupe.
Teague’s basic approach was often derivative
Teague may be most remembered for the quirky Pacer and Gremlin, but many of the cars designed under his leadership played “follow the leader.” This isn’t surprising to me because Teague’s approach tended to be derivative when he oversaw Packard’s styling during its dying years (go here for further discussion).
AMC cars styled under Teague often adapted ideas from the Big Three. For example, the front end of the 1964 American ditched the Rambler’s traditional Nash-style grille in favor of a fascia that looked more like a Dodge. The 1967 reskinned mid-sized Rebel was so anonymous looking that Teague might as well have thrown the Big Three’s competing entries into a blender.
Also see ‘How American Motors abandoned its uniqueness in the second half of the 1960s’
Meanwhile, AMC copied the Mustang’s upturned rear end and U-shaped bumper on its 1968 Javelin and the 1970 restyling of its larger cars. Even the Chevrolet’s iconic two-bullet taillights were not immune from being stolen by Teague, who slapped them on the 1973 Javelin and 1974 Matador coupe.
Or consider the 1970 Hornet. AMC threw away the compact Rambler’s almost European level of efficient packaging in favor of the latest Detroit styling trends, such as “fuselage” side curvature, flamboyant wheel openings and brougham-style C-pillars on sedans. Although the Hornet was one of the cleaner-looking cars of that era, it also had less room and weaker visibility than the car it replaced.
While AMC was chasing the latest styling fads, Chrysler’s aging compacts were selling much better. The Plymouth Valiant and Dodge Dart were heirs to the early-60s Rambler in providing dowdy but practical transportation.
Teague’s more distinctive cars had a gimmicky quality
When AMC did try to make its cars stand out, they tended to have gimmicks. Advertising for the 1968-70 AMX defied credulity in arguing that the car was “a legitimate two-seater sports car.” The Ambassador’s wheelbase was stretched to an awkwardly long 122 inches and the car was called full size even though it had no more room than its cheaper mid-sized sibling.
Meanwhile, the 1969 SC/Rambler and 1970 Rebel Machine were most notable for having cartoonish hood scoops and paint jobs. The 1971 Javelin tried to look more manly with exaggerated fender blisters that clumsily evoked the Chevrolet Corvette.
The gimmicks had their cost. The Gremlin was one of the most memorable designs of the early-70s, but it was a caricature of a real subcompact. The car was too wide and heavy to have competitive gas mileage. The wheelbase was too short for a compact platform, so handling was nose heavy and the back seat too small. Rear visibility was terrible and the cargo area was unnecessarily small.
Each of these gimmicky designs attempted to accomplish a different set of goals, but they had one commonality. AMC was attempting to create the illusion that it had a full line of cars to compete against the Big Three. That illusion required a gullible public — and auto buff media.
We still see the latter today, with Aaron Gold (2020) declaring that the Gremlin was an example of “pure corporate brilliance.”
It’s not fair to blame Teague for a subterfuge that may have been primarily driven by product-planning decisions, but his car design sensibilities were crucial to the enterprise. For example, Teague told Motor Trend magazine that the Gremlin wouldn’t win any styling awards but “at least the car has personality and character and it has a different-looking little image. It isn’t just another little funny-looking sedan” (Gold, 2020).
Funny looking to whom? The increasing number of car buyers who abandoned Detroit iron for imports?
Let’s grade Teague’s individual designs
To give a more granular sense of why I don’t think Teague was the right person to lead AMC design, let’s give letter grades to each of his major projects up through 1978. That’s when AMC ceased to be viable as an independent manufacturer of passenger cars.
1964-69 American — B-. Teague inherited door sheetmetal so had less design latitude than with subsequent projects. As mentioned above, the American’s front end was derivative but he did a decent job of updating the basic Rambler look in the rear. A 1966 facelift was too angular, and the 1966-67 Rogue’s trim and paint scheme made it look much more like an old-fogey car than it deserved (go here for further discussion).
1965-66 Classic/Ambassador — C-. Even if you accept the value of AMC moving upmarket, the reskinned senior Ramblers were not an improvement. Side sculpting was too chunky and the Ambassador’s front end was easily the weakest of Detroit’s fling with stacked headlights. No wonder sales were mediocre.
1965-67 Marlin — F. AMC’s first halo coupe was a failure. Historians tend to blame Romney’s successor, Roy Abernethy, for putting the fastback on the mid-sized platform and insisting on a higher roofline. Fair enough, but the fundamental problem was that Teague went for the gimmicktry of a fishtailed roofline and tiny trunk lid (go here for further discussion). The basic shape resulted in a short-hood, long-deck look that could only have worked if the deck and the wheelbase behind the B-pillar had been shortened — which AMC couldn’t afford to do. The tragedy is that Teague could have had a decent-looking fastback if the Marlin had been given an understated S-shaped roofline somewhat similar to the Hornet hatchback’s.
1967-70 Rebel/Ambassador — C-. The redesign was cleaner than 1965-66 models but too generic. Subsequent changes mostly made things worse. For example, the 1969 refreshing of the Rebel was one of the worst of the late-60s; it made a fairly new body look positively geriatric. The new rear-quarter sheetmetal for 1970 was both ugly and impractical (the much higher trunk lid made loading luggage harder). Rebel sales sank to a fraction of what they were only a few years earlier. This used to be AMC’s cash cow.
1968-70 Javelin/AMX — B. The Javelin was one of Teague’s best-executed designs but too derivative to be a home run. Meanwhile, the AMX was an evolutionary dead end. If AMC was going to invest in an additional body style, it should have built upon the Rambler’s reputation for practicality by offering a hatchback or sports wagon. Teague didn’t get this. Even in his retirement he still opposed management’s decision to discontinue the two-seater (Strohl, 2006).
1970-71 Hornet — C+. As we’ve discussed, the new body rejected the Rambler’s traditional emphasis on efficient packaging in favor of trendy styling. That may have helped with sporty models but it undercut AMC’s traditional strength with family sedans and wagons. Not giving the Sportabout a full liftgate would prove to be a particularly big mistake. Meanwhile, the two-door sedan arguably did not sell very well because it lacked a unique — and sportier — roofline. A coupe variant of the hatchback might have done better in 1970-72.
1971-77 Gremlin — C-. AMC essentially admitted the Gremlin’s limitations by displaying show cars using the Sportabout’s liftgate — and making the Pacer’s wheelbase four inches longer. It also didn’t help that the Gremlin’s adjustment to 5-mph bumpers was among the ugliest in the U.S. auto industry. The strong sales of the Plymouth Duster and Ford Maverick in the early-70s suggest that offering a Hornet coupe, hatchback and perhaps a sports wagon with a wheelbase of around 104 inches might have been more cost-effective than vainly trying to compete in the subcompact class with a design that AMC couldn’t afford to keep current.
1971-74 Javelin — D. This design was not as bad as the Marlin’s, but it significantly undercut the Javelin’s viability with overly-aggressive and derivative styling. Given AMC’s design heritage — including the legendary Hudson Hornet — why did Teague think it necessary to make the Javelin’s front end look like a cross between the 1969 Chevrolet Camaro and Shelby GT? And why did the 1973 refresh evoke the Corvette’s taillights? Playing “follow the leader” did not appear to help sales.
1973 Hornet hatchback — A-. This was Teague’s single best design. Although the front was generic and plasticky, the rest of the car showcased how AMC’s design DNA could be successfully applied to a sporty coupe. Unfortunately, 5-mph bumpers subsequently ruined the rear-end styling, which would have looked great with more rounded contours and a free-standing bumper as used on the Matador coupe.
1974 Matador/Ambassador — F. The coupe was a decently executed design but came out a good seven years too late to be commercially viable as a mid-sized car. However, the basic look might have sold well as a next-generation Javelin placed on the Hornet platform. Meanwhile, the facelifted family cars were among the ugliest ever produced by AMC. The Durante nose represented Detroit styling overkill at its worse, particularly on the Matador. Contrary to some AMC fans, the long nose was not needed to comply with 5-mph bumper standards (go here for further discussion).
1976-78 Pacer — F. The design details were fairly well executed but, as we’ve discussed, Teague was barking up the wrong tree. The 1977 wagon was workmanly but blurred the car’s identity. The 1978 facelift was too discordant with the rest of the car, and the lack of rectangular headlights worked against the otherwise upscaled trim.
1977 Concord — C. For a car that came out at least four years too late, the Concord had remarkably half-baked styling. The taillights looked awkward and cheap, the two-door’s opera-windowed vinyl roof had terrible proportions and the wagon still didn’t get a full liftgate. This from the automaker that was once a major player in station wagons.
Yes, but Teague didn’t have the funds to do it right
Perhaps the best defense of at least some of Teague’s questionable designs is that he was hamstrung by extremely limited budgets. For example, the 1974-76 Gremlin’s ugly styling was at least partly grounded in Teague’s apparent inability to give the car the sheetmetal changes needed to better integrate the 5-mph bumpers. The 1977 model’s partial reskinning showed what Teague could do — it was a nice job.
That said, at least some of Teague’s misfires don’t appear to have been grounded in lack of development dollars. The “fishtail” Marlin was simply a bad idea. So was the 1969 Rebel’s cross-eyed grille. And the 1974-78 Matador’s Durante nose. AMC might have actually saved some money if the 1974 Gremlin had used the Hornet’s better-styled front sheetmetal — which Teague did with show cars.
AMC’s biggest self-inflicted problem in the 1970s was that it had too broad of a lineup of cars to give each entry the resources needed to be competitive. That led to cost-cutting stylistic compromises, such as by giving the Hornet four-door and two-door body styles the same roofline. Chapin is ultimately to blame for vainly trying to compete against the Big Three model for model. However, Teague seems to have encouraged it with his championing of niche cars such as the two-seater AMX and Gremlin.
Was Teague a better fit with Chapin than Romney?
Teague’s designs would have inevitably been different if he had worked under Romney through the 1960s. By the same token, I assume that Teague gained the power that he did during the 1970s because his approach was in alignment with that of Chapin’s.
Thus, when I say that Teague’s styling helped kill American Motors, I could just as easily be talking about Chapin’s management (here I’m including his underlings such as product planners). Additional research would be needed to further flesh out where Teague’s decisions left off and the rest of the management team’s began.
Also see ‘Should AMC have given the 1974 Matador coupe a luxury spin-off?’
That said, at least some of Teague’s predilections seem to be pretty obvious. He had some quirky ideas but on the whole was heavily steeped in Detroit’s styling paradigm. I don’t think it was an accident that the 1970 Hornet — which was Teague’s first clean-sheet design — looked more like a shrunken Oldsmobile Cutlass than an Americanized Mercedes-Benz.
Not so coincidentally, Teague often gravitated toward adapting styling elements from the Big Three rather than building upon AMC’s design DNA. And when he did try to display originality it tended to be gimmicky. Teague seemed to be more interested in making a memorable styling statement than in enhancing a car’s practicality.
If Romney had stuck around and tried to turn Rambler into an American Mercedes, I wonder whether Teague would have drifted to another automaker. A more international approach to styling didn’t seem to be his cup of tea. Or might Teague have adapted, just like he did when Renault took over AMC?
Of course, Romney didn’t stay and Teague’s styling predilections appear to have encouraged rather than helped to counterbalance Chapin’s bad ideas. An independent automaker died in the process.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Car and Driver; 1964. “Rambler American: An improved Rambler is nobody’s Car of the Year in ’64.” April issue: pp. 62-64.
- ——–; 1973. “Matador X: It’s unquestionably, this year’s style leader. Nov. issue: pp. 41-46, 104.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——–; 2005. “American Motors’ Pacer: A Piece of Tomorrow.” Hemmings. Posted March; accessed October 4, 2014.
- ——–; 2014. “Bob Nixon: Designer of Iconic AMCs.”Collectible Automobile, pp. 74-81. June issue.
- Gold, Aaron; 2020. “How One of History’s Dorkiest Cars—the AMC Gremlin—Became a Sales Success.” Automobile. Posted Jan. 3; accessed March 16, 2021.
- Hyde, Charles K; 2009. Storied Independent Automakers: Nash, Hudson, and American Motors. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 2014. “Richard A. Teague: Life in the Bunker.” Collectible Automobile. Published December: pp. 76-83.
- Strohl, Daniel; 2006. “A Most Spectacular Failure: The Story of the Dick Teague AMX.” Hemmings. January issue of Muscle Machines.
- Wikipedia; 2021. “Dick Teague.” Page last edited Feb. 11; accessed March 16.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- wildaboutcarsonline.com: (Automotive History Preservation Society): AMC AMX (1970); Mercedes-Benz (1979); Rambler Classic (1962); Rambler Ambassador (1963); Rambler Rebel (1966)
- oldcaradvertising.com: AMC Hornet (1973)
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Concord (1978); AMC Gremlin (1970, 1976 1977); AMC Hornet (1970, 1972); AMC Javelin (1970, 1971, 1973); AMC Matador (1974, 1977); AMC Pacer (1978); AMC Rebel (1969); Rambler American (1967)
I am, overall, a Richard Teague fan. His adaption of the great 1963 Classic styling to the American for 1964 (engineering hard points) were excellent. Working for Roy Abernathy had to be difficult as Abernathy did not either share or value Romney’s vision. Abernathy tried to compete with the Big Three, but obviously A.M.C. never had the financial resources. I thought the 1967-1968 Classic and Ambassadors were very well-styled, if not totally original. I thought the ’67-’68 Ambassador was the best styled A.M.C. sedan, ever. My father’s best-friend bought a black 1967 Ambassador DPL, fully-equipped with a moderate V8, deluxe gold cloth interior: A car that A.M.C. management should have compared to the Buick Regal and LeSabre and Mercury sedans. The first Javelin and AMX were wonderfully styled, in my opinion. The restyle, I agree was exdessive. The Hornets were well-styled, but everything afterwards was either compromised or over-wrought. Only the too-little, too-late Concord / Spirit / Eagles tried to reclaim lost ground. Overall, I give Richard Teague a B- with a special note for trying to salvage, much like Studebaker in 1959, a losing hand that would be played out in the years ahead.
You make good points. I should clarify that I try very hard to separate my personal aesthetic sensibilities from my business analysis. For example, you mention the 1967 Ambassador DPL — that’s one of my favorite luxury coupe designs of the late-60s. Teague really redeemed himself from the odd-looking 1965-66 models. If the Ambassador had been sold as a luxury mid-sized entry it might have had a bright future given the popularity of such cars such as the Cutlass Supreme in the early-70s. However, AMC instead got greedy and tried to sell a thinly disguised mid-sized car for a full-sized price. Abernethy instigated this strategy but Chapin stuck with it as long as he could.
By the same token, I think that the 1968-69 Javelin was one of the best styled of the pony cars sold during those years (running neck and neck with the 1968 Cougar). However, it’s very likely AMC lost a meaningful amount of money on that car. An automaker that small simply couldn’t play the same game as the Big Three in offering a specialty coupe with a distinct body. Things might have penciled out a lot better if Chapin had based the Hornet on the Javelin body, but instead he spent a good $40 million on a completely new one.
My punchline is that AMC would likely have eventually died regardless of what it did, but post-Romney leadership was so incompetent that it hastened the end.
Let’s come back to Teague. It could be that the 1967 Rebel and 1968 Javelin had little AMC design DNA primarily because upper management wanted to run away as fast as possible from the Rambler. That said, in general Teague didn’t seem to have the same design sensibility as his counterparts at Mercedes, BMW or Porsche, who were quite disciplined in building upon their brand’s legacy.
Cannot really say if Edmund E. Anderson staying on would have been better for AMC compared to Richard Teague or not, let alone if Anderson was guiding Teague in a better direction under his longer tenure.
Looking further afield for other ideas on improving the styling department. Depending on (or regardless of) whether Romney’s proposal for an alliance / partnership / merger with BMC panned out or not, could AMC have benefited from its cars being clothed in Pininfarina styling as was the case with the Rambler American based Argentinian built IKA Torino?
It is interesting to note that quite a number of Pininfarina styled cars tended to have long production runs which might have been more suitable for AMC, the likes of Fiat, Lancia, Peugeot, BMC as well as Nissan come to mind from the late-1950s over the next few decades.
The same goes with Brooks Stevens had Studebaker-Packard joined AMC (ideally managing to sort out their own issues beforehand)?
Regarding the original Javelin – Teague had actually designed four-door sedan and wagon versions of the Javelin. One side of the wagon version looked very much like the production Hornet Sportabout. The four-door version featured a rear roof pillar and beltline that looked much like the one that appeared on the 1970 Rebel and Ambassador, except that it actually worked. One wonders how a full line of Javelins to replace the Rebel/Ambassador, along with a facelifted version of the more practical Rambler American, would have worked for the company.
While I agree that Teague’s and Chapin’s focus on coupes was a dead end for the company, there was another problem (and it was related to that focus). By the late 1960s, engineering was a problem, and not just because AMC had failed to add truly innovative features.
Its vehicles featured too many outdated features, which contributed to its stodgy image. Vacuum windshield wipers standard through 1971? A front suspension featuring trunnions instead of ball joints through 1969? An increasingly outdated automatic that didn’t offer the smoothness and flexibility of the Big Three’s three-speed automatics through 1971?
AMC needed to conquest buyers from the Big Three, or keep them from defecting to the imports. But those outdated features gave the cars a “Ma and Pa Kettle” aura that really downgraded their image with everyone except diehard AMC fans. AMC simply didn’t have a good image at the time. It tried to cultivate the image of a scrappy underdog with cars like the Gremlin and Rebel Machine, but too many customers found that the hardware lagged far behind the flashy styling.
As for manufacturing quality – I learned to drive on a 1973 AMC Gremlin. The instrument panels on the Gremlin and Hornet were made of multiple, cheap plastic parts that didn’t fit together particularly well. The assembly quality and finish would have embarrassed any self-respecting high school auto body class. The rest of the interior wasn’t much better. The only consolation was that the Chevrolet Vega was almost as bad, and GM couldn’t plead poverty as an excuse.
Right. C.L. Zinn has a good picture book on the Javelin that shows various four-door and sports wagon proposals. Some work better than others, but the general direction made sense from an economies-of-scale standpoint.
In the long run a modular platform would have offered the greatest economies of scale, but AMC also could have gone back to the approach used in 1964, where the compact and the mid-sized bodies shared the same inner-door construction and outer sheetmetal. That could have been applied to the Javelin, whose body was essentially a narrower and shorter version of the 1967 mid-sized cars. Patrick Foster’s 2013 AMC book has pictures of mid-sized prototypes that would appear to go at least partly back in that direction. Chapin ditched that design and went with the 1974 Matador coupe instead.
I’d agree that AMC’s reputation was undercut by obsolete technology. Romney was a mixed bag in sticking with trunnions while being an early adopter of dual master-cylinder brakes. In the late-60s and early-70s Chapin did a fair amount of decontenting but steadily improved the road performance characteristics of higher-end models (properly optioned, of course).
My perception is that the quality of AMCs started to improve with the adoption of the Buyer Protection Plan in 1972, which was probably the best thing they did during the entire 1970s. If I recall correctly, that’s when they also made some mechanical upgrades, such as finally ditching vacuum-operated wipers and switching to a Chrysler automatic transmission. I knew someone with a larger AMC built during the BPP era; it looked stodgy but seemed to have decent-quality fit and finish.
That said, I’ve never understood what they were thinking when they designed the dashboard for the Hornet and Gremlin. What a cheap and ugly design, especially compared to the Rambler it replaced.
You need to look at year over year sales trends for AMC and market share per model verses the competition in the same market segment in the same model year. You are picking out numbers as a failure when in reality the sales were just the opposite of your statements. Example, you give the Gremlin a C- but it’s the second highest selling car in AMC history and was a significantly better car than all the direct competitors including the Vega, Pinto, Beetle, and don’t forget the Plymouth Cricket. The Gremlin’s sales were a huge financial success for AMC. Looking at the numbers you can show Romney was slowly killing the company, Abernethy’s investment was expensive but laid the groundwork for some great financial success and Chapin and his take-over supporters road the coattails of Abernethy’s work. Teague was head of design and did the most with the least. Looking at the numbers the 2-seat AMX was a much bigger success to AMC than the Corvette was to GM. The numbers say Teague was right and you are wrong.
Thank you for stopping by, Curt. My impression is that you really like the Gremlin. If you think it was a “significantly better car” than all of its competitors, that’s your right. Obviously, I’ve come to a different conclusion — and, of course, that’s my right as well.
I would agree that the Gremlin had a few good years, such as 1974, when sales peaked due to the first oil crisis. Not sure how you come up with the Gremlin being the second-highest-selling car in AMC history. By my numbers (which supposedly represent model-year production), the Classic, American and Hornet all tallied higher total output.
I’m also skeptical that the Gremlin’s sales were a “huge financial success for AMC.” For one thing, it was an entry-level car, so the profit margin wasn’t going to be terribly great. To make matters worse, the Gremlin was essentially a compact that AMC was trying to sell at the lower price of a subcompact. For example, the 1971 Gremlin was only about 150 pounds lighter than a base Hornet two-door sedan, but the four-seat Gremlin listed for $175 less.
Now let’s compare the Gremlin with the Ford Pinto. The latter was a whopping 600 pounds lighter but listed for only about $80 less than the Gremlin’s four-seat model. Who covered the cost of the Gremlin’s extra mass?
I assume that you’ve read Patrick Foster, so you know that his analysis about Romney and Abernethy are rather different than yours. Why do you think Romney was “slowly killing the company” when its passenger-car sales were generally higher than at any other point in the automaker’s history?
Finally, it would be helpful if you would explain how the two-seater AMX was a much bigger success to AMC than the Corvette was to GM. For example, are you suggesting that the two-seater AMX made a profit over its life cycle? If so, what is your understanding of the car’s breakeven point?
All that said, I would agree that Teague did the most with the least.
Regarding Teague being “steeped in Detroit’s styling paradigm” – he was originally employed by GM’s design department in the late 1940s. Like virtually all stylists working for the Big Three (and AMC), he was initially trained by Harley Earl.
From a styling standpoint, he was a part of the “groupthink” you’ve identified as a problem with the domestic auto industry. The stylists were all trained by Harley Earl, and a part of that training was to view GM as the design leader.
I don’t believe that this mindset was broken until Jack Telnack was given free reign at Ford in the early 1980s to create its “aero look” models (a move that the company made out of desperation as much as anything else).
1977 Hornet AMX. Car & Driver cover car. By far achieving the most with the least, even if it was all sub-contracted bits. Stunning in red, even if the decals were typical 1970s over the top. The flares completed the Hornet’s rather bold wheelhouses, the spoiler finished the front and the rear slats were…. removable. It needed even a smogged 360 and four speed, but alas, one must now do that on their own.
Nope.
Bradley, the whole point of Indie Auto is to have discussions. Giving reasons for your opinion is basic to the enterprise. If you don’t wish to engage that much then perhaps this is not your cup of tea. Your comment led me to decide that first-time commentators who make “yes/no” grunts won’t be approved because they don’t add anything to the dialogue.
Am left to conclude that Dick Teague belonged in advanced design rather than on the production side.
He was very creative, the type of person who could get others to think differently. His ’67 Amitron EV concept showcased his out-of-box imagination. But because he was also responsible for new model programs, his ideas had a weak governor on them and sometimes found their way onto products that they probably shouldn’t have.
Look at the Amitron’s creased body sides. Similar to Matador X and Pacer? I think so. In fact, Amitron’s basic proportions seem to have influenced Pacer, just as the mid-engine AMX’s proportions influenced Matador X. The problem was that what looked good on a micro-EV and mid-engine sports car did not necessarily translate well to the more mundane proportions of a 5-passenger vehicle.
I think Amitron and mid-engine AMX were Dick Teague’s best whole vehicle designs, and Matador X and Pacer his worst. The rest of his production vehicles saw wonderful successes and regrettable failures in the form of design elements, sometimes on the same car. It does seem that his creative, experimental approach influenced the leadership at AMC, which as a company seemed to get more experimental with each passing year, culminating in the Pacer. It’s hard to imaging Romney approving that car.
If one could have magically taken Dick Teague’s best ideas and married them to much better portfolio strategy and planning from those responsible, then AMC probably would have survived and thrived. All they needed were two or three cars, but those cars needed to be exceptional. Small can be a big advantage in the auto industry if it allows the intense focus necessary to create singular products that set a new standard and go on to lead whole segments.
Paul, you offer a subtle critique of Teague. He strikes me as having been reasonably talented but with too much of an “old Detroit” design sensibility to fit what AMC most needed. The automaker was too small to be able to afford fashion statements that needed fairly rapid updating. Romney presumably could have reined him in, but Teague might not have been very happy about that.
First, I knew Dick and his whole family. He was a wonderful person that truly loved cars of all eras and types. A true “gasoline in his veins” person.
The article only touches on the real in the studio dynamics that go on. Design has, depending upon the circumstances, limited influence on the big decisions versus finance, product planning, some higher up the ladder directive to be more like X. Design regularly has to comply unless you were Harley Earl. Even Bill Mitchell did not win some of his battles although he was far better than most. I’ve seen Dick in an evening when he was working on one of his cars as he gripped about the daily battles.
As for the critique on the Hornet, I would rate the 2 door and the 4 doors as his great designs.
You complain about the battering ram 5 mph bumper treatments. Everyone’s, US and foreign, were bad originally. Car structures that were not designed for those railroad ties was a part of the problem. The testing criteria was also a significant driver with a diagonal requirement that most commentators forget about.
The author has a disdain for the performance models of AMC. Looking at the times when these were done, one might have a different take on how the brand needed some market excitement.
As much hate for the Matador coupe as the author has, it might be more appropriate to consider how the problem was timing. It managed to be released at exactly the wrong time as the market moved to formal looks.
Teague was not Bill Mitchell. But, when Mitchell did his departing interview with Automotive News he praised Dick; unlike his pointed non-answer about Gene Bordinat at Ford.
Jeff, I appreciate your respectful reply. Reasonable people can disagree on car design. For example, I can understand why you’d like the Hornet. In the story I do give Teague credit for coming up with a design that had such staying power. I also laud the hatchback. That said, I think that AMC lost some of its competitive uniqueness when it ditched taller and more efficient sedan and wagon designs. Note that it didn’t have to be either/or.
Regarding 5-mph bumpers, of course everyone struggled with them. And whatever else one might say about the Matador coupe and the Pacer, their bumpers were among the least ponderous of that era. That said, the 1974 Ambassador and Matador sedan and wagon were stylistic disasters. I grant you that a key part of the problem was likely that upper management didn’t want to spend more money on sheetmetal changes that could have updated the styling. A similar situation presumably occurred with the rear end of the Hornet and Gremlin. It wasn’t Teague’s fault that Chapin spread the automaker so thin that AMC couldn’t keep all of its products current. However, I assume that Teague had a say in the Durante nose of the Ambassador/Matador; as I discuss here, folks need to stop blaming that on 5-mph bumpers.
I don’t think it fair for you to suggest that I have disdain for AMC’s performance models. For example, I would invite you to reread the story before saying that I “hate” the Matador coupe. I stated that “the basic look might have sold well as a next-generation Javelin placed on the Hornet platform.” I also don’t buy the argument that AMC made a reasonable timing mistake on the Matador. The sales of mid-sized sporty coupes had been falling since 1969 (go here, here and here for further discussion).
You seem to have overlooked that I called Teague a “talented designer.” It’s also true that I suspect that he might have been better suited to working at one of the Big Three. His basic design sensibility was grounded in the Detroit way of doing things. I think that AMC needed a more international flavor to survive. A key reason why is that an automaker that small simply couldn’t afford to keep it cars current when emphasizing trendy styling. A good example of that was the Javelin (go here for further discussion).
In short, my argument is more nuanced that you have acknowledged.
Steve,
I have watched a VP of Design lose the aesthetic decision battles because someone else higher up the food chain had the clout to make that call. At that point Design is trying to do the best they can based upon the situation they have to work in. I’ve watched a Design studio have to do their best job of what they know is a turd; every opportunity for the picking the better choice was not taken by the leadership above Design. Does that absolve Design, or the head of Design, for the bad? No, but it does put into perspective that some directive may have been driving that answer.
GM’s operation was quite different. They had locked studios with extremely tight control on access. Everyone controlled access but GM made it that the non-Design executives were normally excluded too. Earl and Mitchell were far more successful at showing what they wanted seen. But, even that did not prevent Mitchell’s boat tail Riviera from being re-platformed to a far larger car during the development.
I do wonder if some of your viewpoints of what should have been product decisions are too clouded by 40 year hindsight instead of viewing the world as it existed when the decisions were being made. You lament the choice of 2 door cars instead of 4 doors car development yet, in those times all the market excitement was with the 2 doors. Did one lust for the Sedan de Ville or instead was it the Coupe de Ville?
As for Dick being better suited at the other Detroit companies, he had been GM. One went there initially and if someone left they never were brought back. He was at Chrysler and was on the wrong side of the political battle when Exner returned from his heart attack. Ford? Can’t say why he didn’t end up there but that was a wasteland under Bordinat as their primary tactic was to wait for GM’s latest so they could Fordize their copy.
Jeff, what’s confusing to me about your first paragraph is that I never argued that Teague was solely responsible for styling decisions. For example, on the 1974 Ambassador I acknowledged that his design choices could have been constrained by upper management. Let me be a bit more specific: His latitude on the rear end would have been heavily reduced if upper management had insisted that they would not pay for new rear fenders or even a new truck lid. With those constraints I can’t picture how he could have designed the car’s rear end any better.
Are you implying that management forced upon Teague the Durante-nosed front of the 1974 Ambassador and Matador? If so, that would be an interesting bit of historical trivia.
Regarding whether my views are “clouded” by the luxury of hindsight, perhaps it would be helpful for you to better understand what I’m trying to do with Indie Auto. If you’ve read the “Introduction” you know that I have an unusually narrow focus for an auto history website: To explore why the U.S. auto industry experienced one of the most spectacular industrial collapses of the last century. One of my major “theories” is that industry leadership often suffered from a sort of groupthink that heavily constrained their ability to respond more effectively to the rise of the imports.
I would argue that in the postwar era, George Romney challenged Detroit’s groupthink more than any other U.S. automotive executive. He better understood the nature of the import threat and took more clear-eyed steps to respond to it. His successors at AMC largely threw away his playbook in favor of corporate strategies that mostly mimicked the Big Three’s, such as by placing an emphasis on styling rather than practicality.
As a case in point, during Chapin’s 10-year leadership of AMC, he focused almost entirely on two-door models. It’s true that at that point in time two-door models were exceptionally popular. However, Chapin allowed AMC’s traditional strength in sedans and wagons to significantly deteriorate.
The Matador coupe is a good example. By giving the car unique sheetmetal, that meant that the rest of the lineup did not receive a badly needed update. Meanwhile, he bet what was an enormous amount of money for such a small automaker on whether there was still a big enough market for a mid-sized sporty coupe. And he didn’t even hedge his bets with a credible luxury coupe.
It didn’t matter if the Matador coupe was arguably well executed from a design standpoint. This was disastrous corporate strategy — and it didn’t take the luxury of hindsight to figure that out.
In suggesting that Teague’s basic approach would have fit better at the Big Three, my point wasn’t to game out his specific career options. Just to suggest that he didn’t fully get what it took for a small automaker to succeed. An example of that was his unrelenting advocacy for a two-seater AMX. However interesting that car might have been from a design standpoint, it was a dead end from a corporate strategy standpoint.
Steve,
You are forgetting the extreme popularity of the mid-sized coupes such as the Monte Carlo, Grand Prix, Cutlass Supreme, Regal, Torino Elite, Cougar, Cordoba, and the downsized Thunderbird. I agree that AMC made serious mistakes trying to compete line-for-line with the Big Three. They also made some poor product and styling decisions, and the Pacer is a good example of that.
Welcome to Indie Auto, Jim. I write more about the Matador coupe and the mid-sized coupe field here, here, here and here. There’s a truly nerdy amount of data on output for mid-sized coupes such as the Monte Carlo.
Steve, I agree with Jeff Kennedy’s diplomatic assessment of your viewpoint regarding Richard Teague, AMC and your apparent cherry picking of facts to support your analysis. Analysis is essentially educated opinion. You draw a conclusion from looking at facts and figures. But which ones do you pay attention to and which ones take a back seat? Depends on your own sensibilities and priorities. I would say that your opinion of Dick Teague’s styling prowess is just that, opinion. Were you to delve into his life’s work and really read Pat Foster’s books in detail and most important look at how he was assessed by his true peers – other stylists, maybe you’d walk away with a different view and perhaps you wouldn’t. That depends on whether immersing yourself in another set of facts, figures, analysis, and opinions truly hold sway. Bottom line leave your present day sensibilities off to the side and and look, really look, at the people, culture, and times that you are considering.
”.
Cyrus, this is a journal of opinion. That said, I do make a serious effort to ground my writing in facts and logic. For example, the essay we are discussing is more than 4,000 words in length. That’s exceptionally long for an automotive blog.
What’s interesting about your feedback is that you emphasize the importance of facts but you don’t actually bring any to the table to challenge specific things that I’ve written. So how about modeling what you want to see here?
I would also invite you to take a closer read of my essay. I’m not arguing that Teague was a bad designer. He might have done exceptionally well at a larger automaker that could afford to field the types of cars he seemed to prefer designing, such as trendy-looking sporty coupes.
In addition, any cars we might consider mistakes were ultimately approved by upper management. Roy D. Chapin Jr. could have rejected the 1974 Matador coupe as too risky, just as he could have pulled the plug on the ill-fated Pacer. He didn’t.
I don’t know how much you’ve looked around Indie Auto so will say in passing that I’ve discussed Foster’s works quite often. For example, go here and here for reviews of his AMC books. Here is a critique of his Collectible Car article on the 1971 Javelin and here I discuss the dangers of writing about your friends.
And this just skims the surface of Indie Auto’s coverage of AMC. You’ll find essays on the Matador coupe (here, here and here), the Pacer, the Hornet and Gremlin. If you’re interested in the Ambassador, go here, here and here. Or the AMX. And if you’re not tired of it all by then, here is an assessment of AMC’s styling in the late-60s that aligns with the above essay.
If you think I’m too hard on Dick Teague, know that I offered a somewhat similar take on Fred Hudson. So nothing personal.
Based on what you’ve written so far, I would imagine that there’s lots you may disagree with. Which is fine. However, I don’t think it fair to suggest that I have treated this subject lightly.
I have to admit that I’m a Teague fan. I think what he did with the ‘51 Packard body shell for Packard’s ‘55-‘56 models was nothing short of amazing.
Having said that, I’m also one of the fans of his ‘74 Matador coupe.
Your points about market timing, however, are more than likely correct.