(EXPANDED FROM 4/23/2021)
A few years ago our story on Brooks Stevens’s redesign of the 1964 Studebaker generated enough debate that I decided to further flesh out an alternative scenario. To wit, Studebaker would have had a better chance of survival if it eased out of passenger cars in favor of of compact trucks, sport-utility vehicles and even a few taxis on the side.
As usual, my goal in presenting a counterfactual was to explore how deeply groupthink contributed to the dramatic decline of the U.S. automakers. The same limited thinking that kept the Big Three from adequately responding to the rise of the imports also held back Studebaker from pivoting to more viable markets than sporty coupes and mid-sized family cars in the 1960s.
If Studebaker had instead shifted to trucks and SUVs, it might have not only survived, but rivaled Jeep’s success in the 1970s. That may sound implausible at first glance, but as we will discuss, Studebaker had big potential advantages over Jeep and International Harvester. The main ingredient necessary for Studebaker’s success was the ability of its management to think outside the box.
Note that this story has a subtext: Jeep’s remarkable success was, in a very real sense, a historical accident. If the past was any indication, International Harvester and Studebaker should have exited the 1970s in a stronger position. They did not due to fatal errors. In contrast, American Motors made a few mistakes once it bought Jeep in 1969, but they were more manageable.
Studebaker’s passenger cars were not salvageable
Studebaker’s basic hardware was no longer competitive for mass-market passenger cars by the early-1960s. The automaker’s family car and sporty coupe bodies were too tall, their shared chassis lacked a “step down,” and the engines were archaic.
At least in theory, all of these problems were solvable with enough money. However, Studebaker’s lenders were understandably hesitant about making big additional investments in an automaker with a weak record of profitability and more marginal economies of scale than even American Motors.
As a result, the strongest card Studebaker had left to play was to develop new market niches using its existing hardware. For example, the automaker’s family-car body may have been hopelessly uncompetitive with General Motors’ splashy new mid-sized cars in 1964, but it could have worked reasonably well for a line of compact trucks, SUVs and taxis.
Indeed, Studebaker could have had more success than either Kaiser Jeep or International Harvester in riding the boom in truck and SUV sales that began in the 1960s. Before explaining why, let’s sketch a scenario.
A new lease on life for relatively little money
The basic idea was for Studebaker to have continued to update its family-car body — but only to the extent that it helped build out its line of trucks, SUVs and taxis. That would have given Stevens a different set of priorities for restyling the Lark for 1964. As a case in point, a new trunk lid with a low liftover height would have been more important for taxi sales than a brougham-style roofline.
By the same token, the Lark desperately needed a more horizontal and angular front end, but it should have been designed to fit both passenger cars and the Champ truck.
Of course, the truck needed other changes to be viable, such as a new cab, doors and bed as well as a lower ride height. That really should have happened back when the Champ was introduced in 1960, but it still would have been a worthwhile investment in 1964.
Meanwhile, Studebaker could have easily entered the SUV market by giving the Wagonaire a four-wheel-drive variant. That could have been follow by a short-wheelbase, Scout-type vehicle which used Champ parts such as doors and tailgate.
The cost of these new models would have been far lower than Stevens’s proposed new passenger-car body (go here for further discussion). Yet these vehicles may very well have generated decent sales up through the late-70s without a complete redesign.
Studebaker had three structural advantages
Studebaker could have had three structural advantages over Kaiser Jeep and International Harvester if it had focused on compact trucks and SUVs.
First, even though Studebaker’s dealer network was comparatively weak when it came to passenger-car sales, Patrick Foster (2015) noted that it had a much stronger presence in cities and medium-sized towns than International Harvester’s. Kaiser Jeep’s dealer network was also “neither large nor strong” (Foster, 2014; p. 83).
This is why Studebaker may have had a better chance of tapping into sales from suburbanites, who were a crucial factor in the light-truck market’s significant growth during the 1960s (Foster, 2015).
Second, Studebaker could have fielded a broad lineup using only one platform. That would have been a big advantage over International and Jeep, which split their scarce resources between larger and smaller platforms. International saw its light-truck sales collapse in the 1970s partly because it couldn’t afford to keep both its full-sized and compact platforms current.
Jeep sales soared in the 1970s, arguably because of its access to AMC’s larger dealer network. However, output might have been even better if AMC had not overextended itself with so many passenger-car and truck platforms. That may have been the biggest reason why the large Jeep didn’t receive even minor improvements such as more modern front sheetmetal.
Third, the Studebaker’s body had been in production since 1953. Thus, a greater portion of its development costs had already been paid for than with the much newer Jeep Wagoneer and International Scout. This, combined with Studebaker’s modular platform, could have resulted in a lower breakeven point.
Also see ‘Patrick Foster shows how International Harvester failed to adapt’
That was a crucial consideration because Studebaker had struggled to make a profit since the end of the postwar seller’s market. When the Lark was introduced in 1959 the automaker’s breakeven point was reportedly 121,000 units (Ebert, 2013).
However, Studebaker’s cost structure would presumably have declined at least somewhat once it had phased out passenger cars. One reason why is that in the postwar era trucks were not typically restyled as frequently.
The Studebaker’s compact size had a big advantage
A paradox is that even though Studebaker’s platform was far older than Jeep’s or International’s, the particulars of its design could have given it at least as much — if not more — marketplace longevity.
This was partly because the Studebaker had more car-like qualities at a time when that was what a growing proportion of truck buyers wanted. Studebaker’s timing was also lucky in fielding a compact platform that could have been a good fit with the gas-price volatility of the 1970s.
Unlike International, Studebaker would not have had to abandon the full-sized truck market only a few years after investing in a major new design. In addition, the Studebaker body was somewhat smaller than the large Jeeps.
The 1964 Wagonaire was nine inches longer than the Wagoneer but four inches narrower, eight inches lower and weighed 250 pounds less than the equivalent two-wheel-drive model. Even so, the Studebaker still had a higher seating position and a taller cargo area than many of its mid-60s passenger-car competitors. That made the Wagonaire a good compromise between the two.
By the same token, a revamped Champ would have been the first credible compact truck. In other words, it would have been meaningfully smaller and lighter than the mid-sized Jeep Gladiator while offering greater capabilities than pseudo-trucks such as the Ford Falcon Ranchero or International Scout with a pickup cab.
The Champ would have had the market all to itself as a compromise between Detroit iron and imported subcompact trucks of the 1970s.
Studebakers were priced below larger competitors
Studebaker had the right idea in positioning the Champ as the lowest-priced U.S.-built “real” truck. Meanwhile, the automaker’s wagons straddled the compact and mid-sized passenger car fields.
Without four-wheel drive, the top-end, V8-powered 1964 Daytona Wagonaire was priced within the same ballpark as a base, six-cylinder Wagoneer and Travelall in two-wheel drive.
Of course, both the Jeep and International had top-end models that were considerably more expensive than Studebaker’s. It’s also worth noting that in 1964 the most costly Wagoneer had a higher list price than the Travelall even though the latter was considerably larger.
Were trucks and SUVs a large enough market?
Those skeptical about this scenario might argue that there wasn’t a big enough market for Studebaker to have successfully transitioned away from passenger cars.
The problem wasn’t with the size of the overall truck and SUV market, which roughly tripled in volume between 1960 and 1979. The key issue was that the Big Three’s control of that market increased from an already oligopolistic 77 percent in 1960 to more than 90 percent in 1979.
During the 1960s output was mostly flat for both International and Jeep. In the early-70s International experienced a brief boom in sales, presumably because all of its light trucks were redesigned. However, output dramatically fell in 1974-75, resulting in International abandoning the full-sized truck market.
The graph below, which uses data from the Standard Catalog of American Light-Duty Trucks (Gunnell, 1993), understates the scale of International’s collapse because it includes both light- and medium-duty trucks. In the 1978, when the U.S. truck market peaked at almost 3.5 million units, International produced less than 40,000 of its Scout-based light trucks.
If that sounds like a strikingly small number, note that calendar-year production for Jeep in 1970 was less than 46,000 units. The dramatic drop from 1969 appears to reflect the removal of vehicles built as part of government contracts. However, over the course of the 1970s Jeep output almost tripled — even outpacing the overall truck market’s growth during that time period.
Jeep’s rise may have counterbalanced International’s decline, but by 1979 all of the independents together only produced roughly the same number of trucks and SUVs as they did in the early-60s. The main good news was that Jeep’s performance after gaining access to AMC’s dealer network arguably validates the idea that Studebaker’s dealer network could have been a major advantage.
Taxis would have been only supplemental sales
We should be clear that the taxi market wouldn’t have been large enough for Studebaker to do more than gain incremental sales. That said, those sales could have been achieved with a relatively small investment. And unlike Checker, Studebaker wouldn’t have been largely dependent on this market niche.
To give you a sense of the taxi market’s size, in Checker’s peak year of 1963 it produced almost 8,200 units — 860 of which were private passenger cars and the rest were taxis.
In light of such low production, it is easy to see why Checker had far less capacity to keep its products up to date than Studebaker might have with a full line of trucks, SUVs and taxis.
How would passenger cars have been phased out?
The trickiest part of Studebaker’s pivot could have been ramping up truck and SUV sales before passenger-car output fell too low. The longer management waited to roll out its new lineup, the more difficult the transition might have been.
Waiting until 1964 to redo the Champ and introduce a four-wheel-drive Wagonaire might have been too late if Studebaker’s board of directors had not been willing to sustain potential short-term losses. Thus, the ideal scenario would have been for the pivot to have begun with the introduction of the Champ in 1960, perhaps followed by a four-wheel-drive wagon in 1961 and a Scout-type vehicle in 1962.
It should be acknowledged that Studebaker had a long way to go to generate decent sales for trucks, SUVs and taxis.
- The Champ would have had to triple its average annual output to match Studebaker’s 1955 truck production of roughly 27,000 units.
- The Wagonaire may not have been in production long enough to test how big of a market there was for a retractable roof, but in 1963 less than 12,000 U.S.-bound copies left the factory. In contrast, during 1959-60 the Lark wagon’s output hovered around 25,000 units per year.
- Studebaker’s best year for taxis was in 1962, when it produced around 2,600 units. That was half as many as Checker.
- A Scout-type vehicle would have been an inexpensive way to add sales, but if it had matched the International and Ford Bronco, that would have been around 20,000 units.
What this suggests is that hitting 75,000 units could have initially been a challenge. That said, even declining passenger-car production could have helped tip the scales to profitability.
Phasing out cars could have opened door to a merger
The above timeline invariably brings up the question: Might Studebaker have been better off if it had tried to merge with another automaker? Foster (2015) argued that International Harvester should have bought Studebaker.
I am more partial to a merger with Kaiser Jeep, which was better run and had a more complementary lineup. If the new combine was created early enough, it could have avoided the cost of developing the new large Jeep platform, which came out in 1963.
Indeed, Studebaker might have made a better merger partner than American Motors because both Jeep and Studebaker used separate body-on-frame construction. That would have allowed production to be more easily consolidated in one plant, thereby increasing the combine’s economies of scale.
Of course, Studebaker’s board might not have agreed to a pivot to trucks, let alone a merger with Kaiser Jeep, simply because it wanted to exit automobile manufacturing altogether. This sentiment may have been fueled by a desire to get out from under significant pension obligations (Beatty and Craig, 1983).
Letting go of a corporate identity is hard to do
Leaving the passenger-car business would have required Studebaker management to let go of the automaker’s long-held sense of identity. A succession of corporate leaders apparently couldn’t make that psychological leap — despite Studebaker being the only independent U.S. passenger-car manufacturer that also had a foothold in the truck field.
When the Lark proved to be initially successful, Studebaker head Harold Churchill tried to capitalize on it by developing a more modern compact with a junior model powered by a new, horizontally opposed four-cylinder engine (Ebert, 2013). He couldn’t come up with the funds to get the car into production.
Then Churchill’s successor, Sherwood Egbert, focused on sporty coupes while bumping up the Lark in size and price.
Brooks Stevens was obviously not the most powerful player in this drama. As a hypothetical, he could have been commissioned by Egbert to design a new Champ with the funding that otherwise would have been used to create the Avanti. After all, Stevens also designed the 1963 Wagoneer. That said, his proposals tended to push management in the wrong direction.
For example, in 1961 he came up with a concept car called the Lark Splendide, which slapped a broughamtastic roofline onto an otherwise plebeian Lark body. The Splendide symbolized the Egbert era — a vain attempt to stay competitive with hardware that was hopelessly obsolete. Yet that same hardware, when used in a somewhat different way, could have allowed Studebaker to follow in the footsteps of Jeep.
A variety of additional decisions would have determined whether Studebaker managed to rival Jeep by the end of the 1970s. But at the very least, by pivoting to trucks, SUVs and taxis in the 1960s, Studebaker could have had better chance of making it into the next decade.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on April 23, 2021 and expanded on Oct. 21, 2024. Prices and specifications were from the Automobile Catalog (2024), the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006) and Flory (2004). Volume and market-share figures were calculated from Gunnell (1993, 2002) and Langworth (1979, 1993). Truck volume graphs should only be viewed for general patterns because its source, Gunnell (1993), frequently included inconsistent types of data, such as calendar vs. model years, production vs. sales, light trucks vs. total line, and U.S. vs. global output. Whenever possible I tried to use calendar-year U.S. production of light trucks. The list price graph does not include all specialized models. Jeep wagon’s price band for 1964 includes the aging F-134 as well as the Wagoneer, whose entry-level model listed for $2,629.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Beatty, Michael and Scott Craig; 1983. Less Than They Promised. Scott Craig Productions Inc. Posted on YouTube January 20, 2015 by Damian Penny (video no longer available).
- Automobile Catalog; 2024. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.” Accessed Oct. 31.
- Ebert, Robert R.; 2013. Champion of the Lark: Harold Churchill and the Presidency of Studebaker-Packard, 1956-1961. McFarland & Company, London.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Foster, Patrick; 2014. Jeep: The History of America’s Greatest Vehicle. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- ——–; 2015. International Harvester: The Complete History. Quarto Publishing Group, Minneapolis, MN: pp. 106, 132.
- Gunnell, John; 1993. Standard Catalog of American Light-Duty Trucks, 1896-1986. Second Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- ——–; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1979, 1993. Studebaker 1946-1966: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- autohistorypreservationsociety.org: Studebaker Avanti (1963)
- oldcaradvertising.com: International (1964, 1966); Studebaker (1958, 1960)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Checker (1969); Ford (1986); International (1975, 1976); Jeep (1965, 1967, 1979); Studebaker (1962, 1963, 1964)
PHOTOGRAPHY & SKETCHES:
- Milwaukee Art Museum Brooks Stevens Archives
While this is an interesting “what-if”, none of this actually addresses the problem of Studebaker and its high labor costs in South Bend, which was also becoming an issue in Fort Wayne (I-H) and in Toledo (Kaiser Jeep). Then there is the buzz-saw of what happened in the late 1960s and 1970s: Even Chrysler had fewer cars and trucks to spread costs of government mandates of emissions and safety development to stay solvent as the tumultuous 1970s wound out ! Critical mass (in business terms) was the key to survival in the late 1970s and into the 1980s. Studebaker, I-H, Kaiser-Jeep and A.M.C. had very little critical mass, while G.M. and Ford barely had enough. Chrysler survived on the strength of a government loan until the mini-van profits kicked in to pay off the loan guarantees. Who would have guaranteed loans for I-H / Studebaker or Kaiser-Jeep / Studebaker ?
My question for you: Were labor costs that big of problem for Studebaker by circa 1963? I don’t get that impression from what I’ve read about the 1962 strike that huge issues were at play like they were in 1955. This film offers some interesting interviews about the 1962 strike.
I get that safety and emission regulations would make it more difficult for the smaller-scale automakers to compete with the Big Three as well as a rising tide of imports. However, AMC could have gotten through the 1970s just fine if it hadn’t overextended itself with too many platforms and trendy designs that didn’t pay for themselves (go here for further discussion). I don’t say that to suggest AMC could have survived indefinitely — it would have taken some extremely talented management and some lucky breaks for that to have occurred. And even in the rosiest scenario a merger or strong partnership would have been likely at some point.
Here is my punchline: The standard Detroit argument that scale is pretty much all that matters has some utility but can also obscure other factors. Those include the quality of management decisions. Studebaker and International made a series of really bad decisions. Jeep did not.
It seems the best choice would be a Studebaker-IH merger because of their complimentary dealer networks. Also, they both had plenty of non-automotive endeavors that could tide over the feast or famine independent existence. However, something would have to be done about that godawful platform. Look at that Champ picture, and keep in mind this is from a sales brochure. You have 4wd ride hight on a 2wd platform. what could happen is make a true midsize pickup on the IH frame with some carlike features and call it the Champ, and something to compete with the Jeep Commando, call it the Daytona. This would be done hopefully to introduce the Brooks Stevens sheetmetal for those two vehicles. Say, an earlier ’62 merger in time for the ’64 model year. This is about the only worthwhile hardware Studebaker had to offer.
That’s an interesting idea. I haven’t come across complete dimensions for the 1958-68 International pickup. It doesn’t look “full-sized” — but looks can be deceiving. Do you know how wide the body is?
Um, no. I lived in Chicago from the early 60s to 2010. As a kid in Green Bay, I remember the IH pickups were looked upon as the vehicle of choice for penny pinching old men. In Chicago, there was no real IH presence except for the occasional Scout.
Steve, you hit the nail right on the head with your comment about Stude corp leaders not being able to make the psychological leap necessary to put the company ahead of any of their perceived legacies. An Avanti may be a desirable collector car now but it was an ill-afforded attempt at saving Studebaker then… 0 legacy wins all-around.
A couple things. I’ve always thought that Studebaker would have been a better merger partner with Kaiser Jeep in the early 60’s for a few reasons:
1. Studebaker was in the military vehicle production business which would have been a good fit with Kaiser due to the profitability of military contract. Kaiser did acquire in 1964 Studebaker’s military division.
2. Brooks Stevens was doing the design work for both companies, he could have developed something for Studebaker in 1964 more SUV like similar to the Wagoneer and then had a truck based off it too.
3. You’ve left out Studebaker’s ownership of Mercedes Benz of North American. Studebaker’s dealers were weak selling Studebakers but the MB dealership was very strong due to the Luxury car image and this too could have help Kaiser with Luxury Jeep Market.
The real problem with all of this is that the Management of Studebaker from 1958 forward were not really ever committed to staying in the car business. They had funds but used it to diversified. There was plenty of money to spend, particularly after 1959 and 1960. but it got diverted. I have no doubt it was something that could have been turned around had the BOD wanted to, but they weren’t committed. They used the funds to buy STP, Olan Engine, McCullagh chain saw Wheel Horse Tractor, etc etc etc.
Living most of my life in Indiana, I can attest that in the 1950s and early 1960s, Friday night in most rural county seats, the I-H dealers were open until 9:00 p.m. The Studebaker dealer down the street closed at 8:00. Of course, with Scout-based vehicles made in Ft. Wayne, a significant number of these vehicles were sold in Indiana. If Studebaker had wanted to stay in the motor vehicle business, merging with I-H would have made sense. In terms of Kaiser-Jeep, Henry John Kaiser died at age 85 on August 24th, 1967, and by February 5th, 1970, A.M.C. acquired Jeep. But by 1970, even Studebaker was out of the vehicle business. The first thing A.M.C. did was get rid of the Buick V-6, replacing it with the 232-cu.-in. straight six. In retrospect, Packard and Hudson should have merged in 1948 and collected Studebaker as a trucks-only manufacturer in 1951 or 1952, leaving Nash to go it alone or to hook up with I-H later.
Not quite sold on the scenario of Studebaker completely retreating from passenger cars over a brief alliance with AMC to replace the old platforms with its own take on the Junior / Senior platforms, do wonder though what it would have taken to bolster Studebaker’s position to be able to take over or merge with the likes of International Harvester as well as possibly take over Checker Motors.
Perhaps Studebaker could have benefited from what both International Harvester and Checker Motors were developing as far as projects were concerned to help carve out its own niche. The former included many ideas such as a Mini-Van project (plus own engines up to later the IDI and T444E), the latter meanwhile had the Checker Centurion by Ghia commissioned and the Galva projects.
The Galva projects in particular dovetail nicely with Raymond Loewy’s involvement with the Moskvitch MXRL project during the 1970s as well as harks back to the Avanti.
What would have motivated AMC to share platforms with Studebaker? How would that have worked logistically since AMC used unitized construction whereas Studebaker’s production facilities were geared toward body-on-frame construction? Might the conversion of Studebaker’s passenger-car plant have been potentially costly? And why do you think Studebaker would have been any more successful than other independents that vainly tried to recycle someone else’s designs? For one thing, Studebaker needed more than bodies — it also needed more up-to-date engines.
More broadly, it may be helpful to know that I don’t present counterfactuals because I expect widespread agreement. Usually the opposite is the case when an aspect of Detroit groupthink is questioned. My main goal is to bring some intellectual diversity to the conversation.
It is partly based on an idea George Romney himself was said to have put forward as an alternative to full-mergers.
“As an alternative to full mergers, Romney had also put forth what would be called an alliance today, with major reciprocal buying and selling of parts and components to each other, to achieve necessary scale. This “reciprocity concept” was seen as an essential fallback in lieu of a full merger.”
https://www.curbsideclassic.com/automotive-histories/automotive-history-nash-rambler-amc-during-the-romney-years-1947-1962-filling-in-a-lot-of-blanks-and-correcting-a-lot-of-assumptions/
Ideally Studebaker needed better points of divergence before it merged with Packard from during the interwar period to get its house in order and begin switching over from body-on-frame to unitized construction.
I would agree that the independents could have navigated the 1950s much more easily if they had looked for more ways to cooperate rather than compete against each other. However, the failure of the reciprocity agreement between American Motors and Studebaker-Packard in 1956 illustrates the difficulties of such arrangements.
Historians debate who caused the agreement’s collapse, but Foster blames S-P’s head James Nance (go here for further discussion). However, once he was gone, AMC head George Romney apparently did not try to work with Nance’s successors on a new agreement. And if they couldn’t even manage to share engines, why would you think they could share platforms?
There’s a bigger issue here: Why would a Studebaker have sold very well if it was merely a disguised Rambler? Note how poorly the Hudson did once it was shifted to the Nash platform in 1955 (go here).
It is possible the alliance would begin slowly as opposed to the approach taken after AMC itself was created out of Nash and Hudson, allowing for a grace period if not repositioning of Studebaker’s body-on-frame models and shift towards creating trucks, SUVs, taxis along the way as it began to build the AMC-based unitized constructed Studebaker-Packards.
Would like to believe there would some degree of differentiation for the AMC-based Studebaker-Packards both exterior-wise by the likes of Raymond Loewy, Brook Stevens, Dick Teague, etc up to the early/mid-1960s as well as engines before maybe considering other alternatives in the event it acquires IH and Checker (e.g. Ghia, etc).
Essentially it would be similar in concept to Fiat’s Dante Giacosa’s idea of standardising the chassis of the then upcoming Fiat 1300/1500 (e.g. Project 116) with Simca’s own 1300/1500, with the two models differentiated only through their engines and coachwork.
“While the “116” project gradually took shape in Turin, Montabone in Paris was directing operations for the design of an auto with independent suspension
all round and a 1.500 cc engine derived, through some ingenious developments,
from the 1100.
For economic reasons it would have been a good idea to standardize the chassis of our “116” and this Simca 1500, differentiating the two models only through their engines and coachwork. But this idea, which might have led to immense savings in investments, servicing organization and the distribution of spare parts, was for some incomprehensible reason opposed by Fiat’s General Management. In fact the decisions of the President and the General Management were always an obstacle to standardization with Simca.”
One challenge for Studebaker-Packard would be how to update if not replace its engines. Ideally their sixes should have been converted to OHVs earlier and Studebaker itself should have copied more from the Cadillac V8, especially key elements that gave the Cadillac V8 many of its inherent qualities and scaled it down to reduce the deck height of the block, save weight and create a more compact engine without experiencing the costly early teething problems.
Or simply put roughly similar to the pre-SBC 3785cc / 231 cubic inch Chevrolet V8 prototype that was also a scaling down of the Cadillac V8, yet allowing for a new six to be developed along the likes of how the SBC and Turbo-Thrift share bore-spacing and other elements.
IH also displayed an ability to develop a Slant-Four from its V8 and even experimenting with dieselisation IIRC, which is something Studebaker-Packard could utilize to its own advantage in the event it acquires or merges with IH.
One another potential divergence idea for Studebaker during the 1950s-1960s at least before they embraced a project like Raymond Loewy’s 1975 Moskovitch MXRL proposal, would to establish some short-term ties with the likes of Rootes Group via Raymond Loewy as well as to Isuzu, who themselves had a 1953 technical agreement with Rootes and whose cars (Bellel, Bellett/Wasp, Florian/117 Coupe/Faster, Unicab, etc) and engines (both petrol & diesel) were distantly related to the Minx. With Studebaker’s possessing the resourcefulness of IH, they could have probably developed a decent six out of the Isuzu G petrol & C diesel engines.
Especially since Studebaker at one time were considering selling rebadged Isuzu Bellett, with the Florian saloon over the next few decades going on to spin-off the Faster pick-up with its mechanicals even underpinning the Fargo, Amigo and Panther (unsure if the original Trooper/Big Horn is related to any degree).
Which along with the body-on-frame models as well as Checker and IH’s own projects would provide Studebaker with yet another avenue to tap into trucks, minivans/SUVs and taxis, etc.
AMC by way of Nash already had ties to Austin via the Metropolitan, as did IH with the 1.5-litre B-Series Metro-Mite and testing of bigger Austin/BMC engines in the Scout. So such collaboration would not be unusual for Studebaker, it would have arguably been more relevant to Studebaker than adopting Porsche’s Type 542 and Type 633 projects.
Perhaps Studebaker could have also benefited from producing a joint-developed sportscar with AMC. One based on the Rambler and along the lines of the Palm Beach concept, yet still Raymond Lowey styled and being loosely reminiscent of a Studebaker precursor to the Lowey styled Sunbeam Alpine and Tiger.
The problem is to achieve synergy with the real world mergers. The logical move to shut one factory will obviously lead to the transferred car becoming a badge engineered version of the host car, heading toward irrelevance. I don’t know if this was Romney’s original intent, but phasing out the Nash and Hudson brands and creating a new identity, abandoning the crowded mid price/premium market ad going with a concept that worked for Nash, a well appoionted small car and right sized but still roomy, up to date and modern looking. Since the goal of this thought experiment is apparently to keep all four marques alive let’s see what we can do. Nash keeps the Rambler and a nice mid size mid price car. For Hudson? There is a photoshop version of the Nash Pininfarina prototype worked with a Hudson fastback. Go for it. However, put a Hudson egg crate and triangle grille on the front, and put the headlights outboard where they belong. The XP 161 and ItaLia were too gingerbready. Make it decently appointed, but make it HOT. Work with aftermarket outfits. Parallel it with a Euro style sports car. I have come to realize Studebaker’s real value is it’s dealer network. International has real pickups and SUVs. Have a marketing partnership with IH covering full size contractor grade vehicles and Studebaker going to mid size consumer grade Brooks Stevens styled midsized wagon/SUVs and stylish but truly trucklike pickups.Screw the Avanti and create a Commando like Daytona. What do you do with Packard? By the 1955 model year Packard was in fourth place. Lincoln was in it’s Fancy Mercury stage, Imperial was a m series upgraded to marque, and was simply a stretched, fancy Chrysler. The new AMC doesn’t have the resources to make Packard competitiive. Sell it to Ford. It would save them the trouble of reinventing the wheel trying to push Lincoln back iupmarket and would give consumers confidence Packard would be around for a while.
But by the fall of 1960, was there a consumer need and a viable market for Studebaker of 250,000 vehicles ? (I know that is above the break-even point, but why be in business to lose money ?) The G.M. “senior” compacts were out and the Chevy II and Fairlane / Meteor were being readied for the 1962 model year with the downsized Plymouth / Dart in the coming attractions’ mix, too. Plus, the preliminary thinking on the 1964 G.M. intermediates and the 1964-1/2 Mustang had to be in the gossip stages in the Detroit grapevines. I am not a friend of Studebaker board member Abraham M. Sonnebend (1894-1964), but even in 1961, Studebaker had no future without a modern replacement for the Lark. When the financier and legendary squash player sold all of his S.-P. stock on December 30th, 1960, following an attempted boardroom coup, his signal to the bankers was that the automaker had no future, Sherwood Egbert or no Egbert. Brooke Stevens’ designs were a band-aid to nowhere and the while the Avanti was a nice concept, spending money which did not address S.-P.’s core weaknesses was first-class, U.S.D.A.-choice stupid. To think this was happening in a vacuum of secrecy and confidentiality is absurd as bankers and stock analysts talk amongst themselves. Maybe the bankers and analysts were so focused on Chrysler’s problems in 1960-1961 that Studebaker was too small about which to worry. Regardless, as brilliant as the Lark may have been in being resourceful in the fall of 1958, the handwriting must have been on the wall in South Bend by September, 1962.
Oh easily. A brief look at independent history for the last 30 years and Studebaker sales charts would tell the bankers and analysts all they needed to know. There was no need for any gossip unless it was over/under for when South Bend would close its doors. Were I a lender I would insist S-P get out of the car business as fast as possible as a prerequesite for financing.