The 1959 Studebaker Lark’s design was initially so successful that it was described by historian Robert Ebert as a “miracle” (2013, p. 55). Studebaker-Packard Corporation, which was on the verge of liquidating its automotive operations, suddenly found itself with a hot-selling car and — for one year — no direct competition from the Big Three. Alas, unlike the Rambler, Studebaker’s prospects quickly fizzled with the arrival of compacts from General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. Why?
In 1960 Studebaker used a six-foot model to show how flat floors and tall doors were an advantage (Old Car Brochures).
Let’s start by acknowledging that the 1959 Studebaker’s designers had three big — and perhaps insurmountable — challenges:
Body architecture — The basic Studebaker body dated back to 1953, so did not possess design features found in forthcoming Big Three compacts such as a step-down chassis, which allowed a lower body without compromising interior room. The senior Rambler’s body was only three years newer than Studebaker’s so also did not have this feature. However, the Rambler possessed more modern features such as thin-frame doors. Perhaps most importantly, Ramblers had redeeming practical advantages such as unitized construction and a boxy shape that was exceptionally roomy. In contrast, Studebaker suffered from a rattle-prone, body-on-frame design and less rear headroom due to the car’s more teardrop shape.
Engines — The Studebaker V8 lacked hydraulic valve lifters and was unduly heavy for a compact; this accentuated the car’s already awkward handling compared to more modern competitors. Meanwhile, Studebaker’s six had an anemic L-head design that, when finally converted to overhead valves in 1961, was still not very competitive in fuel economy, power and reliability.
Market positioning — American Motors was well poised to benefit from skyrocketing interest in compacts in the early-60s because it had been a champion of smaller cars for a decade. In contrast, Studebaker spent much of the 1950s vainly trying to reposition its fairly compact cars as direct competitors to the Big Three’s full-size cars by stretching them in ungainly ways (go here for further discussion).
The 1958 Studebaker emphasized big luxury in a year when the public began turning to compacts and imports in significant numbers. Note how the illustration (top image) exaggerates the car’s size (Old Car Brochures).
Despite these challenges, newly installed CEO Harold Churchill was determined to move Studebaker-Packard Corporation in a different direction than his predecessor. James Nance had brought the automaker to the brink of insolvency by recklessly trying to offer a full line of cars that competed directly against General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. In contrast, Churchill’s goal was to move “away from head on competition with the Big Three” (Critchlow, 1996; p. 168).
Churchill had the right idea but unwittingly steered Studebaker toward more — not less — direct competition. A big reason why is that he essentially threw away the good parts of Studebaker’s legacy in his understandable efforts to give the struggling automaker a fresh and compelling new image.
Studebaker designers take out their meat axes
A proposal to develop a compact was among a number of options presented to Studebaker-Packard’s board of directors in late-October of 1957. Other options included 1) restyling the existing line of larger models and 2) offering a compact in addition to current offerings.
The board went with the compact-focused proposal; the larger Studebakers and Packards would be discontinued but the Hawk sporty coupe would be kept in production without major changes. Development of the compact was projected to cost $5.8 million, which was somewhere between the cost of maintaining the existing line — the cheapest option — and offering both compact and larger cars (Ebert, 2013).
The 1959 Lark was positioned in size and price between the senior Rambler and American (Old Car Advertisements).
This decision made sense. Maintaining the status quo was not a viable option in light of the terrible sales for the existing models. Offering a mix of compact and larger cars would have had a lower break-even point (115,000 rather than 121,000 per year) because the larger cars would have pumped up profit margins (Ebert, 2013). However, the board may have been hesitant to seek $1.4 million in additional financing from banks that had expressed skepticism about Studebaker’s continued viability as an automaker.
What is most striking about the 1959 Studebaker is the degree to which it attempted to make a clean break with the automaker’s past. The resulting compact, which was called the Lark, was a good 31.4 inches shorter than the previous year’s top-of-line President sedan. At 175 inches in length, the Lark was shorter than all other early-60s compacts.
Even so, the Lark had a fairly long wheelbase. At 108.5-inches, it was a half-inch more than a senior Rambler’s. This was accomplished by taking a meat axe to the Studebaker body’s front and rear overhangs. That gave the Lark considerably more interior room than a Rambler American, whose 100-inch wheelbase severely restricted rear-seat room.
Studebaker designers had reservations about the shortness of the front overhang. Bob Doehler said that it looked “like one of those cross-country trucks, with no meat ahead of the wheels. The Lark was skimpy in that respect” (Langworth, 1993; p. 104).
“Skimpy” is an understatement. I’m hard-pressed to a remember another post-war American passenger-car with such a radically short front end. All of the Big Three trucks in the late-50s and early-60s had longer snouts, although Kaiser-Jeep’s Wagoneer-based truck was similarly shaped.
The downside to the Lark’s truncated look is that it didn’t wear well once the Big Three’s compacts arrived. Even the restyled 1961 American had a front end that looked less dated than the Lark’s despite being based upon an older platform.
The 1961-63 Rambler American’s front end had a more modern, horizontal look than the Lark. Pictured is a 1963 American two-door hardtop (top image) and a 1960 Lark wagon.
What about the Plymouth Valiant, which also had a fairly tall radiator grille? The Valiant’s front looks much more contemporary than the Lark’s. This is partly because the Valiant’s cowl is lower and the front overhang is considerably longer. However, the Valiant was also given a Europeanesque bumper that was thin, wide and placed relatively high on the body. The look was sporty rather than agricultural.
The Valiant had the oddest styling of the Big Three compacts, but its radiator grille looked much sleeker than the Lark’s (Old Car Brochures).
Although the Lark’s front end had a vague family resemblance to the Hawk’s, the casual observer might have mistaken the car as a Rambler rather than a Studebaker. That’s because the Lark’s overall look was so much smaller and less pretentious than its predecessors. Gone were the tacked-on fins, multi-tone trim and chrome-laden grilles.
This 1960 Lark is the antithesis of the low-slung and tri-colored 1955 President Speedster in the background — tall, stubby and plain. Note that the hardtop used the same roofline as the sedans.
Also gone was a large trunk. When the Studebaker sedans were last given a major restyling in 1956, trunk space reportedly increased by more than 30 percent. This was accomplished by lengthening the rear overhang four inches and squaring off the fenders’ teardrop shape.
Such a high trunk lid was unheard of in that era (Old Car Brochures).
The Lark kept the squared-off fenders but pruned rear overhang more than nine inches. In addition, the trunk lid no longer extended to the bumper. This made the Lark less practical as a family car.
The wagon did not see a reduction in cargo space behind the rear wheels because the basic shape of the D-pillar wasn’t changed (although a number of inches were taken out of the wheelbase in the passenger compartment, thereby requiring redesigned rear-seat doors). Nevertheless, as the photos below show, the Lark looked strikingly different from the 1958 models.
Instead of trying to make the rear end look artificially longer, Studebaker designers worked with the natural contour of the wagon’s greenhouse. The result was not particularly modern looking but it was clean and honest . . . almost like a truck-based wagon.
Rarely, if ever, has a wagon’s reskinning resulted in such a dramatically different look. Pictured is a 1960 Lark (top image) and a 1958 Commander Provincial wagon.
Why weren’t all Larks the same size as the wagon?
The wagon was 9.5 inches longer than the Lark sedans. That’s because it had a 4.5-inch longer wheelbase and its rear overhang wasn’t chopped beyond the original design for that body style, which was introduced in 1954. In retrospect, it’s surprising that Studebaker didn’t give its entire family car line the wagon’s larger footprint.
Nothing was gained by making the Lark so short. Even after Studebaker designers were done with their meat axes, the Lark was still roughly 300 pounds heavier than the Falcon and Corvair. That was too much to be truly competitive when it came to fuel economy, particularly with Studebaker’s ancient L-head six. Meanwhile, the Lark had been pruned too much to be as roomy as larger compacts such as the senior Rambler.
Studebaker eventually realized this. For 1962 the Lark was given a bigger trunk and four-door sedans were moved to the wagon’s 113-inch wheelbase. Entry-level models continued to compete price-wise at the bottom of the compact market, but Studebaker added high-end models.
As you can see from the above graph, Studebaker moved upmarket along with many of its competitors. In doing so, the automaker was returning to the family compact market pioneered by the 1939-52 Champion — which had been the source of Studebaker’s greatest success.
Studebaker marketing takes a different approach
For 1959 Studebaker could have maintained continuity by calling its new compact the Champion. Instead, marketeers went with the Lark because it would be a companion to the existing Hawk name (Langworth, 1993). Studebaker also ditched its ad agency, Burke, Dowling, Adams, Inc. in favor of D’Arcy Advertising (Ebert, 2013).
The new agency developed ads that were dramatically different. The most obvious change was how they looked — the terribly stodgy design used in 1958 was replaced with one that was more youthful. Interestingly, ad typography de-emphasized the Studebaker brand in favor of the Lark nameplate. This suggests that management thought the brand was tarnished.
Advertisements also tried to turn the Lark’s tall body into a selling point.
For example, the ad to the right does a nice job of presenting the unusually upright fascia as a virtue rather than as ugly. Indeed, that old-fashioned radiator grille epitomized how the Lark was a practical and honest car.
This was a potent message because of public dissatisfaction with late-50s Detroit iron, which had reached a peak of sci-fi stylistic exuberance and quality lapses. The simplicity and directness of this ad anticipated the classic Volkswagen campaigns of the 1960s. Unfortunately, Studebaker did not stick with this approach when it most needed it — after the much swoopier Big Three compacts appeared.
By 1962 advertising had slipped back into the old pattern of mimicking Big Three ad-speak. Larks were touted as “America’s new action car” and a “thrilling new definition of glamorous excitement on wheels!” Functional qualities that made Studebaker unique were either de-emphasized or ignored, such as a tall body and no step down that made entry and exit less contorting.
Studebaker advertising in 1962 pretended that the Daytona was not tall and stubby (Old Car Brochures).
Perhaps the most incongruous advertising involved the new-for-1962 Daytona line. An emphasis was placed on itemizing fairly generic sporty features while doing little to justify buying a Studebaker rather than a more modern and conventionally stylish car. In addition, Studebaker returned to its mid-50s practice of using illustrations to make its cars look lower, longer and wider than they actually were.
Sales start strong but then take a nosedive
Management’s decision to take a sharp turn downmarket worked quite well in 1959, before the Big Three entered the compact field. Studebaker’s family car sales almost tripled from 1958, with six-cylinder volume reaching just under 100,000 units.
Alas, it was mostly downhill from there. In 1960 sales fell by a relatively modest 6 percent. More significant was that V8s jumped from a quarter of Lark production to 47 percent. This may reflect that the Big Three did not start to offer V8 compacts until the following year — whereupon Lark V8 production dropped by 55 percent.
Studebaker may have also modestly benefitted in 1960 by offering a two-door hardtop and convertible. Production for both almost reached 16,000, but then plummeted 65 percent in 1961. Direct competition was not the culprit because these two body styles were not widely available in the compact field until 1963. Then what was the problem?
Overall Lark sales were down 45 percent in 1961, but six-cylinder and low-end models saw smaller declines. That suggests Studebaker may have faced its greatest competition from newly introduced premium-priced compacts such as the Pontiac Tempest, Oldsmobile F-85, Buick Special and Mercury Comet.
For 1960 Studebaker added a convertible — the brand’s first since 1952. This typically low-volume body style actually outsold the two-door hardtop by almost 400 units in its first year of production.
How much did dealers contribute to falling sales?
Part of the problem was Studebaker’s increasingly weak dealer network. Thomas E. Bonsall (2000) noted that many of the automaker’s dealers also had franchises with Big Three brands. Between 1960 and 1961, GM, Ford and Chrysler introduced eight compact entries — one for every dealer network serving a popularly priced brand. Not so coincidentally, during that time period 356 “dual” dealers cancelled their Studebaker franchises. There went 14 percent of the automaker’s dealers — “and many of the best,” according to Bonsall (2000, p. 342).
Patrick R. Foster pointed to “charges that certain Big Three divisions were actively luring old-line Studebaker dealers to drop their Studebaker-Packard franchises and take on theirs” (2008, p. 125). But Richard M. Langworth suggested that “dealer raids” were “all very natural in the dog-eat-cat world that is the auto business” (1993, p. 164).
By 1961 even the most stylish Lark, the two-door hardtop, looked downright frumpy compared to the more modern Big Three competition (Old Car Brochures).
To add an additional layer of mystery, in 1967 the Wall Street Journal reported on a draft antitrust complaint written by the Justice Department — but never filed with the courts — that accused GM of violating U.S. antitrust laws. Among the allegations: GM’s dealership strategy was anti-competitive because it had forbidden its dealers from selling anything but GM cars. This practice apparently began around 1919 (Sherefkin, 2008). If this is accurate, Studebaker would not have had any dealers dualed with a GM brand. It is also hard to visualize GM trying to raid Studebaker’s dealers given their relative weakness compared to those of larger automakers.
At any rate, the loss of dealers to the Big Three was not the inevitable plight of an independent automaker. For 1961, Rambler production was down by 18 percent in this recessionary year but still managed to become the third best-selling brand. American Motors’ achievement was all the more remarkable because its narrow product line was based upon platforms that were roughly as old as Studebaker’s.
The Rambler American almost outsold the Lark in 1960 despite ancient styling. After a reskinning for 1961, the American trounced the Lark by more than a two-to-one margin (Old Car Brochures).
So why was Rambler flying so high while Studebaker was sliding toward death? At the outset of this post we introduced three big — and perhaps insurmountable — challenges that the South Bend-based automaker faced in its 1959 redesign. Studebaker was mostly unable to work around them. Let’s discuss a few key decisions that, if nothing else, might have pushed death further into the future.
Myopic zigs and zags proved costly
Studebaker made a number of fatal errors with its 1959 redesign. The automaker vainly tried to use the family car platform in ways that did not maximize its strengths and minimize its weaknesses. This primarily occurred because management focused too much on landing short-term sales.
Coming out with a compact roughly the size of the Lark represented the trendy thing to do in 1959-60. That’s the direction the Big Three went with its first wave of compacts. However, in the long run this was a dead end for Studebaker, both because its basic body was too heavy and tall, and its engines could not deliver competitive gas mileage.
Although Studebaker eventually realized this, by the time the Lark was moved upmarket it was a case of too little, too late. The 1959 Studebaker should have been sized similarly to the 1962 sedan and wagon, with a wheelbase of 113 inches and a length of around 188 inches. Although entry-level models could have been priced within the ballpark of the Rambler American, Studebaker’s primary competitors would have been the senior Rambler, Mercury Comet and post-1962 Dodge Dart. This market positioning would have required a larger and more accessible trunk than even the 1962 Lark’s.
The 1962 sedans were given a longer wheelbase, which revived a longstanding Studebaker strength — exceptionally good rear-seat legroom (Old Car Brochures).
Minimizing front overhang was a laudable goal in light of Studebaker’s nose-heavy V8 engines. However, designers should have focused more on coming up with sheetmetal that would still be competitive at least three years out. That required a much more horizontal look. This was achievable with high-mounted bumpers and a downward curve to the front fenders and hood.
The same principles that governed front-end styling should have applied to the rear. High-mounted bumpers and more horizontal sculpting would have had more staying power than the Lark’s tall and concave shape.
The senior Rambler’s platform was only three years newer than Studebaker’s but was kept more current. For example, in 1962 the rear end was redesigned with a more horizontal look and a high-mounted bumper (Old Car Brochures).
A two-door hardtop and convertible were not terribly viable body styles for the Lark once the Big Three came out with much lower and more modern-looking models. Thus, development dollars might have been better spent elsewhere, such as more quickly switching to thin-frame doors (which did not occur until 1963).
But since Studebaker had already introduced a two-door hardtop in 1958, designers might have been able to adapt the nicely shaped roofline to the 113-inch wheelbase. Presumably that would have been impossible on the Lark’s 108.5-inch wheelbase.
In light of Studebaker’s meager resources, it was unfortunate that the two-door hardtop’s unique roofline was used for only one year. Note the high-mounted front bumper (Old Car Brochures).
The photoshopped 1960 Lark hardtop (see below) illustrates some — but not all — of these ideas. A more horizontal look is given to the front and rear but the 108.5-inch wheelbase and swept-back roofline from the sedans were kept. A key takeaway is that the short overhangs did not necessitate an excessively upright, agricultural appearance.
The direction sketched here is evolutionary enough that it could have included keeping the Champion nameplate. That might have achieved two useful goals: rehabilitating Studebaker’s all-time-biggest-selling nameplate and emphasizing that the automaker created the first family compact in 1939.
An even more important goal was to avoid having to make costly shifts in the positioning of Studebaker’s family cars. The automaker was simply too small and financially fragile to zig-zag around like it did between 1958 and 1962, when Studebakers were positioned first as full-sized, then as entry-level compacts and then as as family-sized compacts. Compare that to Rambler and VW, both of which had strikingly consistent positioning during this period.
It’s true that the deficiencies in Studebaker’s platform and engines would have kept it at a disadvantage to the senior Ramblers. Even so, a larger family compact could have been more competitive — and profitable — than an entry-level compact in 1960-61. If automotive operations had stayed in the black both of those years, the banks might have looked more favorably on financing a more substantial redesign.
Ironically, Churchill — the definitive Studebaker company man — helped kill the automaker by walking away from its legacy.
NOTES:
This is a mildly expanded version of a story originally posted on May 22, 2015. Market share for brands were calculated from figures listed in Wikipedia (2013). Market share and production figures for individual nameplates were calculated from base data found in the Encyclopedia of American Cars (auto editors of Consumer Guide, 2006) and the Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975 (Gunnell, 2002). In instances where data from one source appeared to be erroneous, data from the other source was substituted. Dimensions are from the Classic Car Database (2014).
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13 Comments
There is an old saying “When you are up to your neck in alligators, you forget your original plan was to drain the swamp”. When you have years and years of barely breaking even if you are lucky, you simply do not have the wherewithall for long term planning. Yes, your platform is obsolescent, but you can’t afford a new one. You keep the old sheet metal wherever possible. The dies certainly aren’t worn out. The strategy of going to markets where the big 3 aren’t finds you beta testing the markets. If you are successful, the majors will enter it and swamp you. If you do poorly, you eat the losses. Heads they win, tails you lose.
A very thoughtful article. I had a chance to walk the Marion County, Indianapolis, IN fairgrounds this past Saturday, (09/11/2021), where the International Studebaker Drivers Club was meeting. Lots of old Studebakers, some restored, some preserved (and a few Hudsons, a 1949 Plymouth driver and a 1956 Oldsmobile Holiday driver.) Most of the Studebakers were post-war, with many Hawks, Larks and Avantis. Most of the Hawks were in excellent shape. There were a couple of 1964 Gran Turismo Hawks in pristine condition. (My favorite Studebaker.) Frankly, I find the 1963-1966 Daytona very desirable, too. There was a perfect 1966 Canadian Commander two-door with a Chevy II 194-cu.in. six, in refrigerator white with a gray interior. (To me, a very desirable candidate for purchase preservation.) Studebaker probably should not have continued after 1958, but “pride goeth before the fall”. I think Studebaker did the best they could with very little money and deteriorating forecasts. After all, most of the technology was basically 1952-era. The dashboards, for example, between 1963 and 1966 showed that some people in the organization knew what they were doing. The interiors were smart, even if the floorboard were not step-down from the door-sills, especially the upper-series Hawks, Daytonas and Avantis. (My next-door neighbor had a new 1963 Avanti, which he loved more than his family, frankly. I rode in it a couple of times. To my 13-year-old senses, it seemed like a driver’s car !) Maybe if Studebaker in 1962 had designed a car as brilliant as the 1963 Rambler Classic, and if it had been engineered with a modern architecture and lower cowl, and styled like the Brook Stevens’ designs, Studebaker might have clung to survival. But alas, even Romney’s Rambler did not survive stupid executive and management decisions. Studebaker, after 1958 and James Nance, never had a chance.
Had Studebaker called it the Champion, could they have then introduced a stretched wheelbase version with some styling modifications and called it the Commander? Your interpretation of the Lark is astoundingly lighter and quite European in appearance, which could have gone a long way toward making a Commander at least look competitive with Comet, F-85, et al.
I think one fundemental thing you’re not accepting or realizing is this idea or concept that Studebaker should have had “designers should have focused more on coming up with sheetmetal that would still be competitive at least three years out. That required a much more horizontal look. ” What you’re not realizing or accepting is that designers design what they like….and everyone has different ideas. Today, cars all look the same and there’s nor real difference. That was not the case in this time period. I would imagine that the designers of the Lark felt it would hold up and could be modified and was attractive. Chrysler, Studebaker, AMC and International Harvester and European Brands like Rootes Group were all using a similiar style which was very different than the Ford or GM approach that turned out more acceptable or attractive to the consumer. Saying someone should have designed something differently with 20/20 hindsight really doesn’t add value or explain what was happening at the time. Studebaker had advanced photos and designs of the Valiant and decided to mimic the Valiant……and overall, the Studebaker platform did evolve bu the styling wasn’t as good as GM or Fords compacts or intermediates
Welcome to Indie Auto, Francis. Hindsight is indeed a luxury. Perhaps it would help to know that the overarching goal of Indie Auto is to offer content that is different from the usual names-and-dates automotive histories. I write articles like this one with the understanding that it isn’t everyone’s cup of tea. Perhaps it’s not yours.
If you’d like to learn more about the method to my madness, go here. And if you’d like to learn more about why I do fake car designs, go here.
You’ll notice that this essay deals with more than styling — I question how Studebaker positioned the Lark in the market. I explore is why Studebaker’s fortunes tipped over so quickly when Rambler continued to do quite well for a number of years.
I would agree with you that designers like what they like. The problem is that car design can have commercial consequences. Short-sighted decisions can undercut the viability of an automaker. We can clearly see that with the Lark, where the styling aged so quickly that sales tanked in 1961. If that had not happened, Studebaker’s financiers might have been more willing to cover the cost of a new-generation design.
I think it would have been a good thing if Studebaker had survived longer as an automobile manufacturer. My basic premise: More competition = a stronger U.S. auto industry. A stronger U.S. auto industry would have had a better chance to hold back a rising tide of imports. Feel free to disagree with that logic chain and the underlying values behind it, but that’s what Indie Auto is all about.
Studebaker aka AMC:
The halo coupes killed them both of money.
Hawk could had been on a Packard chassis (bof), so as to use the powerful Packard V8.
The last managers turned both companies (AMC, Studebaker) into more direct competition with the establishment; same mistake.
The didn’t use established brand names, Hornet, Champion and eventually Rambler. Coincidentally, changing their names changed their unique selling proposition/ focus of each car.
Their merger hadn’t consummated in many directions.
Studebaker could had been an alternative Jeep. Even if it was the most terrible companion for Packard, they hadn’t made the most out of it.
Maybe a merger Studebaker with Nash (maybe with international Harvester as a companion) was a much better solution? On the other side Packard, Hudson with Willys, kind of the AMC and Jeep merger many years later.
Can we expect an article about their parallel directions?
E=Go, hyou have come to the right place. Here among other things we play musical chairs on the Titanic. Go through previous articles and many of these ideas were touched upon. Check these articles out, and add your comments. Even though the articles may be older, your by line will pop up. This is my special interest, and I am eager to read your input. If I may add to your thoughts. You say the indies were short sighted. However it’s hard to plan and invest long range when your sales are slumping and you can predict with almost actuarial certainty when your doors will close. Another problem with thinking outside the box is you just end up beta testing for the Big 3. Your product is a miss (AMC Pacer) your unique vehicle costs you a fortune in un amortized development costs. If it’s a hit like the Lark, the Big three fill the market with compacts in every division but their lux marques. Your sales tank and it costs you a fortune in un amortized development costs. Another problem with the mergers is what you saw. The main thing you are striving for is economy of scale. This inevitably leads to production moved to one location using one platform. It can;t be helped. However it turns one make into a badge engineered copy and no real reason to exist. International Harvester had a well respected light truck and SUV line and could and did make a Jeep clone. Studebaker had lots of urban and suburban dealerships. Also, both built different classes of vehicles so could stay somewhat separate. Not great, but better than nothing. Again, welcome aboard.
Thank you for replying!
My point is that there are some grater lines and themes overall, which the site and the other independents (media that you cite mostly) have already brought to our knowledge. It would be better (for me of course) to build more and more the articles around these themes and trends or highlight parallel (or not) themes/stories when they already exist.
Maybe, this is the kind of co-operation, I had said between the independents history sites, at a much broader sence; or should I wait for AI to do some kind of data, writing and historical consolidation?
We could wonder what if James Nance didn’t gone to Packard and Studebaker and Harold Churchill became president of Studebaler a couple of years earlier? Then what if the Lark was called Champion instead?
A Lark by a any other name would still be a Lark, and it would still get pantsed by the big 3 when they all got compacts throughout their lines.The only hope for any of the independents was to have some major patent worthy breakthrough that would be exclusive to them. AMC was lucky. They had a reputation to build on and they bought the Jeep at the right time. They then developed the AWD system for the Eagle, which bought them a few years. Studebaker was just another indy playing out its hand. It had a halo car that was getting long in the tooth when personal luxury cars became a thing. they never made a convertible, in fact none in the whole 53-58 Loewy line. When they didn’t bother to lead in the door seams on their two door sedans they announced to the world they didn’t care any more.
The white hardtop rounded roofline of the blue car would be ideal at the Studebaker Lark II (1962 and beyond) models with their more straight beltline and overall design.
It could be reminiscent of the Mercedes w111, especially the coupé one. We all know that it was the same dealership then for Studebaker and Mercedes in US, so the designers would come across with both models.
I don’t know what that roofline is called (parabola?). Every car had that roofline in the late 50s, but by 1962 it was history. Even if it was new, people would look at that and say they pulled the 1959 hardtop dies out of the junkyard. Studebaker had enough problems without creating more orphan speculation. BTW, I remember seeing those 58 hardtops in the wild, back in the day. They had certain 57 Plymouth design cues which made them appear to be a deformed Plymouth.
There is an old saying “When you are up to your neck in alligators, you forget your original plan was to drain the swamp”. When you have years and years of barely breaking even if you are lucky, you simply do not have the wherewithall for long term planning. Yes, your platform is obsolescent, but you can’t afford a new one. You keep the old sheet metal wherever possible. The dies certainly aren’t worn out. The strategy of going to markets where the big 3 aren’t finds you beta testing the markets. If you are successful, the majors will enter it and swamp you. If you do poorly, you eat the losses. Heads they win, tails you lose.
A surprisingly good article!
A very thoughtful article. I had a chance to walk the Marion County, Indianapolis, IN fairgrounds this past Saturday, (09/11/2021), where the International Studebaker Drivers Club was meeting. Lots of old Studebakers, some restored, some preserved (and a few Hudsons, a 1949 Plymouth driver and a 1956 Oldsmobile Holiday driver.) Most of the Studebakers were post-war, with many Hawks, Larks and Avantis. Most of the Hawks were in excellent shape. There were a couple of 1964 Gran Turismo Hawks in pristine condition. (My favorite Studebaker.) Frankly, I find the 1963-1966 Daytona very desirable, too. There was a perfect 1966 Canadian Commander two-door with a Chevy II 194-cu.in. six, in refrigerator white with a gray interior. (To me, a very desirable candidate for purchase preservation.) Studebaker probably should not have continued after 1958, but “pride goeth before the fall”. I think Studebaker did the best they could with very little money and deteriorating forecasts. After all, most of the technology was basically 1952-era. The dashboards, for example, between 1963 and 1966 showed that some people in the organization knew what they were doing. The interiors were smart, even if the floorboard were not step-down from the door-sills, especially the upper-series Hawks, Daytonas and Avantis. (My next-door neighbor had a new 1963 Avanti, which he loved more than his family, frankly. I rode in it a couple of times. To my 13-year-old senses, it seemed like a driver’s car !) Maybe if Studebaker in 1962 had designed a car as brilliant as the 1963 Rambler Classic, and if it had been engineered with a modern architecture and lower cowl, and styled like the Brook Stevens’ designs, Studebaker might have clung to survival. But alas, even Romney’s Rambler did not survive stupid executive and management decisions. Studebaker, after 1958 and James Nance, never had a chance.
Had Studebaker called it the Champion, could they have then introduced a stretched wheelbase version with some styling modifications and called it the Commander? Your interpretation of the Lark is astoundingly lighter and quite European in appearance, which could have gone a long way toward making a Commander at least look competitive with Comet, F-85, et al.
I think one fundemental thing you’re not accepting or realizing is this idea or concept that Studebaker should have had “designers should have focused more on coming up with sheetmetal that would still be competitive at least three years out. That required a much more horizontal look. ” What you’re not realizing or accepting is that designers design what they like….and everyone has different ideas. Today, cars all look the same and there’s nor real difference. That was not the case in this time period. I would imagine that the designers of the Lark felt it would hold up and could be modified and was attractive. Chrysler, Studebaker, AMC and International Harvester and European Brands like Rootes Group were all using a similiar style which was very different than the Ford or GM approach that turned out more acceptable or attractive to the consumer. Saying someone should have designed something differently with 20/20 hindsight really doesn’t add value or explain what was happening at the time. Studebaker had advanced photos and designs of the Valiant and decided to mimic the Valiant……and overall, the Studebaker platform did evolve bu the styling wasn’t as good as GM or Fords compacts or intermediates
Welcome to Indie Auto, Francis. Hindsight is indeed a luxury. Perhaps it would help to know that the overarching goal of Indie Auto is to offer content that is different from the usual names-and-dates automotive histories. I write articles like this one with the understanding that it isn’t everyone’s cup of tea. Perhaps it’s not yours.
If you’d like to learn more about the method to my madness, go here. And if you’d like to learn more about why I do fake car designs, go here.
You’ll notice that this essay deals with more than styling — I question how Studebaker positioned the Lark in the market. I explore is why Studebaker’s fortunes tipped over so quickly when Rambler continued to do quite well for a number of years.
I would agree with you that designers like what they like. The problem is that car design can have commercial consequences. Short-sighted decisions can undercut the viability of an automaker. We can clearly see that with the Lark, where the styling aged so quickly that sales tanked in 1961. If that had not happened, Studebaker’s financiers might have been more willing to cover the cost of a new-generation design.
I think it would have been a good thing if Studebaker had survived longer as an automobile manufacturer. My basic premise: More competition = a stronger U.S. auto industry. A stronger U.S. auto industry would have had a better chance to hold back a rising tide of imports. Feel free to disagree with that logic chain and the underlying values behind it, but that’s what Indie Auto is all about.
Studebaker aka AMC:
The halo coupes killed them both of money.
Hawk could had been on a Packard chassis (bof), so as to use the powerful Packard V8.
The last managers turned both companies (AMC, Studebaker) into more direct competition with the establishment; same mistake.
The didn’t use established brand names, Hornet, Champion and eventually Rambler. Coincidentally, changing their names changed their unique selling proposition/ focus of each car.
Their merger hadn’t consummated in many directions.
Studebaker could had been an alternative Jeep. Even if it was the most terrible companion for Packard, they hadn’t made the most out of it.
Maybe a merger Studebaker with Nash (maybe with international Harvester as a companion) was a much better solution? On the other side Packard, Hudson with Willys, kind of the AMC and Jeep merger many years later.
Can we expect an article about their parallel directions?
E=Go, hyou have come to the right place. Here among other things we play musical chairs on the Titanic. Go through previous articles and many of these ideas were touched upon. Check these articles out, and add your comments. Even though the articles may be older, your by line will pop up. This is my special interest, and I am eager to read your input. If I may add to your thoughts. You say the indies were short sighted. However it’s hard to plan and invest long range when your sales are slumping and you can predict with almost actuarial certainty when your doors will close. Another problem with thinking outside the box is you just end up beta testing for the Big 3. Your product is a miss (AMC Pacer) your unique vehicle costs you a fortune in un amortized development costs. If it’s a hit like the Lark, the Big three fill the market with compacts in every division but their lux marques. Your sales tank and it costs you a fortune in un amortized development costs. Another problem with the mergers is what you saw. The main thing you are striving for is economy of scale. This inevitably leads to production moved to one location using one platform. It can;t be helped. However it turns one make into a badge engineered copy and no real reason to exist. International Harvester had a well respected light truck and SUV line and could and did make a Jeep clone. Studebaker had lots of urban and suburban dealerships. Also, both built different classes of vehicles so could stay somewhat separate. Not great, but better than nothing. Again, welcome aboard.
Thank you for replying!
My point is that there are some grater lines and themes overall, which the site and the other independents (media that you cite mostly) have already brought to our knowledge. It would be better (for me of course) to build more and more the articles around these themes and trends or highlight parallel (or not) themes/stories when they already exist.
Maybe, this is the kind of co-operation, I had said between the independents history sites, at a much broader sence; or should I wait for AI to do some kind of data, writing and historical consolidation?
We could wonder what if James Nance didn’t gone to Packard and Studebaker and Harold Churchill became president of Studebaler a couple of years earlier? Then what if the Lark was called Champion instead?
A Lark by a any other name would still be a Lark, and it would still get pantsed by the big 3 when they all got compacts throughout their lines.The only hope for any of the independents was to have some major patent worthy breakthrough that would be exclusive to them. AMC was lucky. They had a reputation to build on and they bought the Jeep at the right time. They then developed the AWD system for the Eagle, which bought them a few years. Studebaker was just another indy playing out its hand. It had a halo car that was getting long in the tooth when personal luxury cars became a thing. they never made a convertible, in fact none in the whole 53-58 Loewy line. When they didn’t bother to lead in the door seams on their two door sedans they announced to the world they didn’t care any more.
The white hardtop rounded roofline of the blue car would be ideal at the Studebaker Lark II (1962 and beyond) models with their more straight beltline and overall design.
It could be reminiscent of the Mercedes w111, especially the coupé one. We all know that it was the same dealership then for Studebaker and Mercedes in US, so the designers would come across with both models.
I don’t know what that roofline is called (parabola?). Every car had that roofline in the late 50s, but by 1962 it was history. Even if it was new, people would look at that and say they pulled the 1959 hardtop dies out of the junkyard. Studebaker had enough problems without creating more orphan speculation. BTW, I remember seeing those 58 hardtops in the wild, back in the day. They had certain 57 Plymouth design cues which made them appear to be a deformed Plymouth.