Geeber recently wrote one of the best overviews I have ever seen about why Chrysler’s dealer networks became so dysfunctional. His comment (below) was in response to, “Lynn Townsend failed to solve Chrysler’s warfare between divisions.”
Chrysler Corporation’s problems with its divisions were rooted in its history and structure. The purchase of Dodge in 1928 had vaulted Chrysler Corporation into the ranks of the Big Three. Dodge had been in existence for a decade before Walter P. Chrysler produced the first car to bear his name. Dodge production facilities were crucial to Chrysler’s future growth (particularly during the early years of the Great Depression). Most Chrysler Corporation top executives before Lynn Townsend had come up through the Dodge Division.
As a result, the division wielded an inordinate amount of power in corporate politics. But the corporation’s most important division from an organizational standpoint – Dodge – was not the most important from the sales standpoint. Plymouth was the corporation’s best-selling brand. It was one of the “Low-Price Three,” and had regularly held down third place, behind Chevrolet and Ford. During the 1940 model year, Plymouth almost knocked Ford out of second place.
Aggravating the situation was the decision by Walter P. Chrysler to give all three dealer networks – Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler – a Plymouth franchise during the early 1930s. That greatly increased Plymouth’s retail footprint, but also meant that at both the dealer and corporate level, it was treated as a “companion make” compared to its corporate brethren.
Dodge Division’s influence with the corporation resulted in head-scratching decisions like the 1960 Dart, which was a direct competitor to the Plymouth. But Dodge dealers were furious when corporate management took away their Plymouth franchise for 1960, and they had enough influence within the corporation to demand – and receive – a direct replacement in the form of the Dart.
Also see ‘Ford did better than Chrysler in differentiating its 1970s mid-sized coupes’
In a perfect world, Walter P. Chrysler would not have created Plymouth. Instead, he would have expanded the Dodge range into the low-price field. Dodge trucks would have competed with Chevrolet and Ford trucks. This would have given DeSoto and Chrysler more room to grow in the medium-price field.
For all of his later mistakes, Townsend initially did realize that there was too much competition between Plymouth and Dodge. The first Charger, for example, was given to Dodge as a compensation for being denied a version of the Barracuda. Townsend was determined to reserve the less expensive Barracuda for Plymouth. By the end of the 1960s, it appears as though Townsend had given up trying to enforce this separation. He was hardly alone in this regard – from 1971 through 1973, Buick, Oldsmobile and Pontiac all received lightly changed versions of the Chevrolet Nova, and the 1975 Buick Skyhawk and Oldsmobile Starfire were badge-engineered versions of the Chevrolet Monza.
— Geeber
RE:SOURCES
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge Dart (1960)
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Would the company have been better off consisting of just Dodge and Chrysler or Dodge, Chrysler and possibly Imperial? Because from a non-US POV it appears DeSoto would have still been a needless proliferation similar to Plymouth.
If Dodge had moved down market, it would have given DeSoto more breathing room. DeSoto would have competed with Pontiac and the Oldsmobile sixes, with Chrysler taking on Buick and the Oldsmobile eights.
In the US, could Chrysler have survived as a stand-alone franchise? Maybe pair DeSoto with Plymouth or eliminate Desoto prior to MY 1961 and allow Plymouth dealers to be stand alone franchises, with Dodge/Trucks on also on their own? Thoughts?