(EXPANDED FROM 1/4/2014)
American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent, is an update of sorts for a book Patrick Foster published 20 years earlier. However, Foster’s newer book includes quite a bit of fresh material, such as design proposals that never made it to production.
Rise and Fall is much fancier than its predecessor, American Motors: The Last Independent (Foster, 1993). The newer book has an oversized hard-cover format that uses glossy paper and many large color photographs.
The downside of the new format is that the smaller type, particularly when overlaid onto a colored background, can be harder to read. In addition, the greater emphasis on white space and graphics apparently led to a pruning of Foster’s analysis, such as his trenchant critique of the redesigned 1971 Javelin (go here for further discussion).
Foster also attempted to give the basic story a more dramatic narrative arc. Most notably, he played up 1986 as the pivotal year when AMC supposedly lost its independence. This was when Chrysler bought the company from Renault.
Foster argued that even though the French automaker gained effective control of AMC in 1980, “the company was still somewhat autonomous from Renault. It was still, the directors believed, an independent auto company. It was America’s last independent” (p. 13). In contrast, Chrysler quickly moved to fully absorb AMC into its own operations.
This narrative has nostalgic resonance but strikes me as overplaying AMC’s independence after 1980. From that point on, Renault dictated the direction of Jeep and began to phase out the AMC brand in favor of Renaults largely designed in France.
Foster went light on AMC head Roy D. Chapin Jr.
Even more so than in The Last Independent, Foster dealt with CEO Roy D. Chapin Jr. in a schizoid manner. The narrative and visuals in Rise and Fall give Chapin a level of prominence suggesting patron saint status. Yet Foster quite rightly criticized a string of fatally flawed decisions made during Chapin’s decade-long tenure as head of the corporation. What’s odd is that Foster did not explicitly point a finger at Chapin even though he vilified his predecessor Roy Abernethy for arguably far smaller sins (go here for further discussion).
By the same token, Foster painted Chapin’s early years as CEO in overly rosy colors. For example, he described the two-seater AMX in glowing terms even though it sold almost as poorly in its first two model years as the first-generation Marlin (go here for further discussion).
Also see ‘Richard Teague’s styling helped to kill American Motors’
Meanwhile, Foster stated that making air conditioning standard equipment on the 1968 Ambassador was a “brilliant marketing move” and that “sales of the Ambassador began to rebound strongly” (p. 99). The Ambassador actually saw both its production and market share modestly decline in 1968. The following year sales did surpass 76,000 units, which was a peak for the post-Nash Ambassador. However, a major restyling was arguably the main reason for that one-year spike in sales. By 1971 — only two years later — Ambassador volume had fallen by 45 percent.
It’s ironic that the book’s dust jacket is dominated by a photograph of a 1970 Rebel Machine. This may attract the eyeballs of collectors infatuated with muscle cars, but the Machine also symbolizes the incompetence of post-Abernethy AMC management. The cartoonish model was not just a classic example of “too little, too late” — it also illustrates how Chapin’s so-called “Philosophy of Difference” mostly focused on superficial styling and cheesy marketing schemes that deviated little from Detroit groupthink.
Was Foster’s hesitance to directly criticize Chapin colored by his acknowledged friendship with him (go here for further discussion)?
Foster criticized AMC for acting like a big automaker
As in his previous AMC book, Foster complained that the 1974 Matador coupe and 1976 Pacer did not share a body with any other AMC car. As he discussed in the second quote below, this would prove to be too expensive for such a small automaker. However, Foster did not include in his 2013 book other criticisms presented in The Last Independent. He had referred to the Matador’s shape as “a bit odd” and the Pacer as lacking in features offered by imports, such as a five-speed manual transmission (1993, p. 186, 192-193).
Also see ‘Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors’
On the other hand, Rise and Fall includes images of a proposed line of restyled AMC mid-sized cars that could have sold much better than the Matador coupe because they had more mainstream styling (as well as badly needed new sheetmetal for aging four-door models).
Foster did not explain AMC’s radical shift in plans aside from noting that a pictured mock up “was probably meant to go into production in either 1972 or 1973” (p. 134). Was this because of cashflow issues due to the purchase of Jeep and weak sales in the early-70s, or was the embrace of the ill-fated Matador coupe primarily a reflection of Chapin’s fixation with sporty coupes?
Analytical nuance versus big-and-glossy pictures?
The facts in Rise and Fall don’t always align with those included in Foster’s earlier book. In The Last Independent, he stated that Abernethy called for the Marlin’s roofline to be raised one inch (1993, p. 109); in Rise and Fall he wrote that it was three inches (p 85). As discussed here, the latter appears to be too large.
Despite these quibbles, Rise and Fall is a commendable effort. Foster displayed an endearing level of passion in presenting the history of one of the most fascinating American automakers. And while his 1993 book offers more detailed analysis, it won’t look as nice on an automobile collector’s coffee table as Rise and Fall. Judging from Amazon’s current list of the top 100 auto history books, big and glossy usually sells the best.
American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker
- Patrick Foster; 2013
- MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN
“Success didn’t come in 1956. Wholesale sales of cars to AMC’s dealer group were 126,575, down quite a bit for the year despite all the new product news. A big part of the problem was the 1956 Rambler; by moving it up a year earlier, the company ran into problems trying to ramp up production to a profitable pace and missed the market. Quality problems were rampant that year.” (p. 41)
“The shared-body idea was a strategy set down by George Romney back in AMC’s earlier days to reduce tooling costs dramatically, thereby offsetting some of the Big Three’s volume advantage. It began with the 1956 Rambler and was perfected in the 1963-1964 products. As the company found to its everlasting sorrow, when Roy Abernethy got away from that strategy and instead tried to match the Big Three car for car the company soon spent itself into financial trouble — the ‘dark days of 1967.’ Now, as could be seen in the annual report, the company product planners had two new cars planned, one for 1974, the other for 1975; neither would share a body with any other product and because of that capital expenses for the next two years were going to exceed $100 million annually.” (p. 126)
“But the fact remains that Chrysler shut down the AMC brand even though American Motors had a bright future ahead of it. Ironically, AMC was closed down just as it finally turned profitable and was on the road to new glory. Plans were to introduce the Allure coupe for 1989, the new Jeep ZJ — which became the Grand Cherokee — for 1990 while work continued on a new small Jeep JJ suited for world markets.” (p. 204)
OTHER REVIEWS:
Driving | Automoblog | Goodreads | Amazon
NOTES:
Production figures calculated from the Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975 (Gunnell, 2002).
RE:SOURCES
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: AMC Eagle (1981); Rambler (1956)
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Pacer (1976)
This is an expanded version of a review originally posted on Jan. 1, 2014.
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