CJ recently wrote an exceptionally thoughtful comment that I would like to highlight on the front page as a letter to the editor. This missive was in response to the story, “Historians differ on origins of 1965 Rambler Marlin.” There are some other excellent comments as well, so do check out the thread if you haven’t already.
In hindsight, I think that there is some potential for AMC CEO Roy Abernethy to have been caught between a rock and a hard place. He surely saw how Detroit was as quick to abandon compact cars as they were to adopt them. By 1966, even the lowly Falcon was really out of the compact class. Valiant and Chevy II had also grown and would become even bigger in 1967 and 1968 respectively. As sales of U.S. compacts slowed going further into the 1960s, Abernethy was not necessarily wrong to believe that AMC should catch up with Detroit by offering a broader, bigger range of cars that were closer to what Chrysler, Ford and GM were selling at the time. He was, however, not seeing the direction that I think AMC should have been driven towards.
What Abernethy likely wasn’t able to anticipate was how quickly the market was going to shift from compacts to mid-size cars. The biggest jump was in MY 1964 when GM abandoned three compact car lines, turning the F-85/Cutlass, Tempest/LeMans and Special/Skylark into intermediates. Mercury also began to shift its compact Comet upmarket in MY 1964 by introducing the Caliente and Cyclone luxury and performance models. AMC would have had their designs for the 1965-66 Classic and Ambassador locked in, therefore, it was too late to make them larger (yet not too late to spend money creating the too-niched Marlin).
Ford switched the Falcon/Comet over to their mid-size platform for the 1966 models and Mercury moved Comet up to the mid-size class. The Comet 202 became Mercury’s base “compact” albeit on a 116-inch wheelbase. The marketing money was, however, spent promoting the seven-inch longer “Big New Comet” models: Caliente, Capri, Cyclone and Cyclone GT (203″ vs. 195.6″ in 1966). Mercury took things further in 1967 when all but the 202 were marketed as Mercurys, not Comets.
Intermediates were THE hot segment of the decade and initially, AMC was initially lacking cars as big and stylish as some of the competition. Even the scaled up 1965-66 Ambassador (on a 116-inch wheelbase) was too small. A 1965 Olds F-85, for example, on a one-inch-shorter wheelbase was nearly four inches longer. However, because the Ambassador was so square in appearance, it looked much shorter.
AMC needed styling that was much better than that of the 1963-66 Classic/Ambassador. The 1967 Ambassador and newly-branded Rebel were steps in the right direction, but a dubious 1970 facelift and Abernethy’s stretching of the Ambassador ahead of the firewall to make it appear as big or bigger than a Caprice/LTD, was not that step.
Instead, this is what I think Abernethy might have done. . .
Given AMC’s much smaller size, resources and market, the Mercury strategy mentioned above might have worked well for them. As I suggested in a previous comment on this post, sedans and wagons could have been branded Ambassadors, starting in MY 1967, with coupes (no convertibles, that was a waste of money for AMC) marketed under another cooler, hipper sounding name. A Rebel-branded version of the coupe could have been offered as AMC’s muscle car, akin to the Mercury Cyclone, et al., instead of the tepid Classic 770-H. This cancels out the Marlin and paves the way for the Tarpon, which could then eventually have become the all-new 1968 Javelin.
The enormous profit potential in the mid-size segment was evidenced by its growth throughout the 1960s. For instance, looking at how GM successfully marketed the same cars on 116-inch sedan/wagon wheelbases and 112-inch coupe/convertible wheelbases starting in MY 1968, could AMC have not done the same thing?
Another possible path is illustrated by Ford’s creation of the Torino sub-brand in the Fairlane series of 1968. Torino gave mid-size buyers an affordable, aspirational car in the mid-size class. Eventually, the Torino was morphed into a baroque personal luxury coupe, the Gran Torino Elite of 1975. A similar plan at AMC could have resulted in their own profit-generating personal luxury coupe at that time, instead of the money-losing 1974 Matador coupe.
By paring down to just the Ambassador and American, I think that Abernethy would have saved the company considerable amounts of money during his tenure, allowing it to focus resources on engineering and quality improvements for the future.
Abernethy wasn’t necessarily wrong in wanting AMC products to get bigger as that was definitely the trend throughout the U.S. car industry during the 1960s. What he didn’t seem to recognize was that for a company of AMC’s size and limited finances, competing with the Caprice/LTD was going too far up the size ladder; growth needed to stop at the mid-size rung.
AMC’s later success with the Hornet and and the many iterations of vehicles that were subsequently produced based on it, shows us that the company was able to be both flexible and profitable using a single platform. Unfortunately, as we have read here on Indie Auto so often, money diverted into failures like the bloated Ambassador, Pacer and ’74 Matador coupe prevented AMC from creating modern, versatile platforms to aid the company in becoming the successful niche player it needed to be in order to properly transition from the 1970s to the 1980s.
Of course, hindsight is what drives us to imagine these scenarios where we look for alternative paths that might have corrected the blunders of history. Abernethy doubtless needed to satisfy his own egoist vision of what he wanted AMC to be vs. Romney’s, but he was not alone in this. Even mighty GM was toppled by its failure to curb management errors and excesses, increase efficiencies and eliminate redundancies.
The only lesson that doesn’t seem to have been learned by American car companies is that ego should not be the driving force behind what makes a car company good or great. Twenty-five to 30 years from now, history will inform us which American vehicle companies survived allowing us to speculate on what those companies should have done differently in 2022.
— CJ
RE:SOURCES
- oldcaradvertising.com: AMC Ambassador (1965)
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Ambassador (1965, 1967, 1969); Ford Elite (1976); Ford LTD (1969); Ford Torino (1968); Mercury Comet (1966); Oldsmobile F-85 (1965)
Indie Auto invites your comments (see below) or letters to the editor (go here). Letters may be lightly edited for style.
CJ, this is a good analysis. I didn’t know that the 1966 Comet 202 had a shorter deck; that was an interesting gambit. The 202 sold pretty well in 1966 — more than 56,000 units left the factory. That represented a third of total Comet output, which strikes me as decent given all of the marketing attention paid to the longer and more expensive models. In 1967 the 202 hung onto 30 percent of Comet output despite the arrival of the wildly popular Cougar (we talk a bit about the Cougar’s impact here).
Interestingly, the 202 outsold the entry-level Rambler Classic/Rebel 550 in both 1966 and 1967 (excluding wagons). Nevertheless, for 1968 Mercury ditched the idea of a short-decked, bargain-basement mid-sized series . . . just as import sales were accelerating. Mercury wouldn’t offer a compact until 1971, when it slapped a radiator grille on a Maverick and called it a Comet.
You make a compelling case that Abernethy didn’t need to embrace Romney’s tight focus on smaller cars in order to avoid the automaker’s collapse in the late-60s. Abernethy also quite-rightly recognized that AMC’s styling needed improvement; the 1967 redesign was apparently rushed to market. Yet even though AMC was the only producer of mid-sized cars who offered all-new styling for that year, sales tanked.
Why? Last year I offered some thoughts here, but your scenarios make a lot of sense as well.
I believe that it was a marketing error to have underestimated Rambler buyers desire for the kind of style and size, that, as the sales figures show, even Comet 202 buyers wanted, or more notably, that buyers of mid-size Buicks, Oldsmobiles and Pontiacs were after. As I pointed out in my previous comment, AMC was late to this party and it cost them sales and market share.
While handsome, the 1963-64 Classic and Ambassador were identical. Unfortunately, with the 1965 re-style, they did not appear appreciably different in size and therefore, in class. The 1965-66 Classic was too small, too plain and too sombre, a glass of milk in a sea of Coca-Cola.
The lukewarm reception to the attractively restyled 1967 Ambassador and Rebel was likely a case of AMC not being able to shake off the dowdy image of the Classic fast enough. Even in an off year, which 1967 was (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Automobile_Production_Figures), I agree that sales should have gone up but I also feel that the Rebel was still a bit too small to be taken seriously in the mid-size class. It should be pointed out, however, that Ford was also not as competitive against GMs mid-size cars – the segment leaders – as they needed to be during most of the 1960s. The redesigned 1966-67 Fairlanes were no match for the GM quartet when it came to looks and image. Hence, the Torino’s debut for 1968 followed by Ford’s complete reimagining of the Fairlane/Torino for 1970. AMC was unable to do something similar with the Rebel and subsequent Matador.
American car buyers have always perceived bigger as better. It was not by accident that cars like the Buick Special, Oldsmobile F-85, Pontiac Tempest of 1961-63, and the Mercury Comet of 1960 through to 1965, were referred to as senior compacts. As usual, Detroit hedged its bets and didn’t stray far from its mantra of “bigger is better”. Ironically, AMC did not come up short in being able to offer performance options to their customer base, rather, I believe it was the lack of size, style and marketing sizzle that was necessary to capture the vibe of the go-go 1960s that contributed to their sales slide from 1964 to 1971.
As a side note, I think there is an interesting comparison to be made between the woes of Mercury and AMC. Mercury’s tenuous position as a brand on the brink from the late 1950s to the early 60s (saved only by Comet) somewhat parallels AMC’s plunge from approximately 1965 to 1971 as they both struggled with brand identity and the right products to sell. It is interesting to note that AMC and Mercury alternated between 8th and 9th position in US car sales from 1964 to 1974 (with the exception of 1972). Another story for another day.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Automobile_Production_Figures
Quite a few of your recommendations were followed – but by Studebaker.
To your points, Studebaker increased the size of their bread and butter cars from 175 inches on a 108 wheelbase in ’59-’61 (Cruiser model excepted) to 194″ on 113 wheelbases for 4 doors and wagons in ’62 (’til ’66). The ’63-’66 Lark dash design was one the industry’s best, the ’64-and-up Lark-type cars were pleasingly styled and a cooler hardtop (and convertible) was available as a “hipper”-sounding Daytona model from ’62, as you recommended. An up-scale luxuriously-appointed 4 door was called the Cruiser model (begins in 1961). All these were available in ’63 and ’64 with front disc brakes, most usual power accessories, AND a supercharged engine with 4 speed T10 or a floor-mounted “selective gear” Powershift automatic transmission. If that wasn’t enough, it had a sliding-roofed station wagon, a high performance and high-styled fiberglass-bodied 4-seat car with many advanced standard features, AND a comprehensive line of trucks including new medium-duty offerings with GM two-stroke diesels powering them.
Studebaker also had a personal luxury coupe in a the Gran Turismo Hawk series, with the ’64 also being upgraded toward luxuriousness. If the ’56 Sky Hawk and any Golden Hawk from ’56 to ’58 (plus any GT Hawk) is not universally recognized as a personal luxury car, then there’s something wrong with the universe!
It is an exercise in the processing of a huge range of emotions (but you can count on frustration being one) for a Studebaker enthusiast/historian to try to analyze things. Why the public bought 375,000 1963 Chevy II’s, All of which had only 4 or 6 cylinder engines (Lark had 3 V8’s optional, up to 289 horsepower), exposed metal interior window sills (none on any ’63 and newer Lark), only three gauges on the dash (five on any ’63 and newer Lark), no dual master cylinder (but standard on all drum-braked ’63 and newer Larks), 13 inch wheels (all Studes after 1958 had 15 inch), no padded dash (?) (all ’61 and newer Studes had padded dashes). ALL Studebaker engines of the ’50’s and ’60’s had forged cranks and rods, exceptionally large main bearings, and timing gears (not chains). l could go on. But you’ll be glad to know that l won’t (today).
Excellent points, Stewdi! And an impressive list of achievements for any automaker.
What I think Studebaker lacked, however, was AMC’s rise and sustained, though brief success. From the brink to the Lark and back to the brink again did not inspire a lot of consumer confidence in Studebaker during the late 1950s through to the early and mid-1960s. Part of that I would further surmise has to do with how each company was portrayed in the popular press of the day… AMC the rising underdog, Studebaker, the decaying dowager?
The role that media has played in the rising and falling fortunes of independent US automakers would be an interesting topic to further explore.
CJ, you’re right. From the mid-50s on with the exception of the first couple years of the Lark there was a whiff of doom about Studebaker. The features Stewdie list are nice, but this is back of the brochure stuff.By 1962 there was a compact for every taste and pocketbook from the big 3. The bodies screamed work over mid 50s, and they never made it to modern stepdowm chassis. This was something a customer could see and feel on the showroom floor. As is often the case with the last years of dying independent cars, once you cut away the loyalists hype and look at it from a customer’s viewpoint the question becomes not “why did they sell so few?” but “How did they manage to sell so many?”
Kim, the “whiff” part of your comment and the part about the big 3 having a compact for every taste, “holds water” as Joe Pechi says in a favorite movie “My Cousin Vinnie”. But the rest of your post l’d love to pick big holes in (someone likely said that in a movie, too).
First, a lack of a step-down chassis is no significant basis for condemnation. Did Studebaker drivers look as if they sat up higher than other drivers to you? l don’t think so! Did the cars handle poorly? No! Many published road tests praised their cars for above average handling!
Secondly, for the first 3 years of the ’60s, Rambler bodies were also screaming ’50s work-over and it didn’t seem to slow them down. AMC took care of that problem for their ’63 Classic, Ambassador lines and for’64 in their American line. It’s easy to see that by the ’64, Studebaker cars lost all noticeable trace of ’50s body styling (except the exceptionally styled and exceptionally facelifted Gran Turismo Hawk). To “prove” this, and show that Studebaker did build competent, saleable bread-and-butter cars, l submit the following: Please compare a 1964 Studebaker Daytona with a 1976 Ford Granada – 2 or 4 door, take your pick.
l can speak to this because l owned both and used them both as daily drivers for over 2 years each. The Granada l bought new and the Stude l bought used in 1983. The body dimensions are close – length within 4 inches (Ford is longer), width within 2, and the wheelbase within 3 (Stude is longer!). The styling is somewhat similar, both having formal roof lines and blunt, upright fronts and rears. Both cars had attractive driver-centric instrument panels. In profile, a non-automotive person might mistake a pic of one for the another. The Studebaker should make NO apologies for it’s being a dozen years older! In my experience, the Studebaker was definitely more roomy and had full instrumentation compared to Ford’s meagre speedo and fuel gauges only. The Studebaker was superior in the winter for traction. The Ford rusted thru the trunk floor and bottoms of the front fenders in 3 years, despite reputable rust inhibiting treatment. Both had a basic front bench seat. The Granada (manual 3 speed on the floor – which cost me $31 extra for ’76 {a 4-speed was standard in ’77} – and 250 CI six) got 24 US MPG on the highway and the Stude (Borg-Warner automatic and 259 CI Stude V8) got just below 20 if l recall). The Granada handling was better, but the Stude was competent, too (it had a front anti-sway bar, of course). The Studebaker never left me at the side of the road (except for a botched “professional” gas tank repair), but the Granada quit on me a few times until the “weak” ignition module (common problem in those years of Fords) was replaced. The automatic in the Stude worked flawlessly, the gear ratios in the 3 speed manual Granada were poor (2nd was too “close” to 1st, and too “far” from 3rd, causing you to scream up a steep hill in 2nd, then lose speed/power when in third!), and dropping down a gear to execute a passing maneuver was just impossible at highway speed.
If l had to do it over again – well let’s just say l was more impressed with the Studebaker (which was not faultless, but was more pleasing and competent over-all) than the Granada. l could go on. A Studebaker Lark-type could be optioned to be almost anything you’d like to drive!
It was just too bad that Studebaker management was so bent on exiting from the auto manufacturing business that the ’64s and ’65s were not given a proper chance in the US. Of course, the emissions, safety and gas mileage laws, etc., were just on the horizon, and if there was a good time to exit the industry for a company that was low on funds, it was 1966, l guess! Your “whiff of doom” is correct, but your inferred incompetency built into the Studebaker product is NOT.
By the way, my “Agree with you completely” post refers to CJ’s post.
Agree with you on the above completely.
Ahh, yes the media’s role would be a great topic! Romney’s rise to “sainthood”, Tom McCahill’s postwar endorsement of Studebaker, the doom/gloom of Studebaker-Packard in ’56, and the rise/fall of the Pacer are just some points at which the media played influential roles – and lots more which the top of my head is preventing me from remembering!
Looking forward to it!
The people I knew in my early 70s childhood who had once owned Ramblers all drove Valiants and Darts. I wonder whether the American/Hornet were too small and the Rebel/Ambassador were too big to retain the core market which had propelled AMC to success under Romney.
That’s an interesting point. The Hornet body appears to have been primarily designed for sporty coupes because of its relative lowness as well as the steep slope of the windshield and side windows. I would imagine that this translated into less room — and perhaps just as importantly — a more claustrophobic feeling than when sitting in the more upright and glassy 1964-69 American.
The American was indeed on the small side; its wheelbase was six inches shorter and width around four inches narrower than a Classic. A longer version of the American could have competed quite well against the Dart/Valiant. That would have filled the gap AMC created when they upsized their intermediates in 1967. The Rebel was only two inches longer and three inches wider than the 1966 Classic, but it looked a lot bigger.
By the same token, the Rebel was only a few inches longer than a Dart, but it was a whopping seven inches wider.
Could agree on the Rebel/Ambassador needing to be smaller, yet could it could still worked on a modular Rambler American platform that varied by length rather then width as has been mentioned a few times?
Or would the Rebel/Ambassador have needed to only to be slightly smaller yet have increased component sharing with the Rambler American rather than simply being underpinned on a longer modular platform?
In the long run a modular platform was the way to go. The problem was that in 1963-64 AMC had invested in two platforms, so I could see the bean counters wanting to get their money’s worth from both. They could have kept costs down if they had stuck with Romney’s plan of sharing the outer sheetmetal of the doors on the compact and mid-sized cars.
In theory, the mid-sized platform could have been shortened enough to offer a car similar in size to the 1966-70 Falcon. The 1963-64 Classic was only 190 inches long, which was fairly compact. However, it was almost 200 pounds heavier than a 1966 Falcon. Not a perfect comparison because the Falcon was six inches shorter, but the mid-sized Ford platform was a bit narrower and lighter than AMC’s.
If the size to aim for with a mid-size platform was the 1966-1970 Classic, would the Ambassador have been better off not exceeding the size of the 1967-1968 model (with a modular Rambler American platform having the scope to possess enough stretch to underpin an Ambassador sized model)?
Stewdi, all I can say is ask the man who owned one! :+)