(EXPANDED FROM 1/28/2022)
Indie Auto commentator Geeber recently discussed how premium-priced big cars did better than their lower-priced brethren as the 1970s progressed. His comment, which is worth reading in full (go here), spurred me to do more data diving. I thought I would start by expanding upon a story I wrote two years ago.
As the headline suggests, this article assesses the impact of the Ford LTD on Mercury sales. That question emerged from a reader discussion.
The short answer: Perhaps somewhat — but in the grand scheme of things not significantly because Mercury had such a minor presence in the big-car field.
However, the data also shows how the Ford Motor Company’s situation was different from that of General Motors. Sales of GM’s premium-priced big cars held up much better than Chevrolet’s. That must have been a relief to GM executives because the automaker’s dominance of the U.S. market had been partially dependent on the strength of its premium brands.
Let’s walk through the data.
The LTD may have hurt Chevrolet more than Mercury
The LTD arguably had the biggest impact on the full-size Chevrolet, whose share of the total domestic market fell by more than half from 1964-73 — from 19 percent to under 9 percent. Ford’s market share also declined, but only by a third — from 12 percent in 1969 to 8 percent in 1973. The biggest reason why Ford had a softer landing was the LTD, whose soaring sales outdistanced the Caprice by a more than two-to-one margin from 1969-73.
Meanwhile, the big Mercury’s market share fell from 2.1 percent in 1969 to 1.7 percent in 1973. Those are tiny numbers but represented a meaningful decline for the brand. After output dropped off due to a recession in 1970, it gradually increased through 1973 — but not enough to keep up with the growth of GM’s premium-priced brands in 1972-73.
Mercury’s one bright spot was its high-end Marquis (in base and Brougham versions). Output increased 27 percent from 1969-73 from roughly 82,000 units over 103,000 units.
The problem was that these gains didn’t outweigh declines by Mercury’s low-end Monterey (in base and Custom versions). Production fell by roughly 12 percent from roughly 53,000 to under 47,000 units between 1969-73.
The Montereys were priced similarly to the Ford LTD models but they were less lavishly trimmed, both inside and out. Might some buyers have decided that the greater size and prestige of the Mercury wasn’t worth the extra money?
GM’s premium brands edge past Chevrolet and Ford
The graph shows how market share for GM and Ford’s premium-priced big cars held up better than for their low-priced siblings. Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick together drifted downward less than 2 percent from 1969-73 — but ended up with a higher collective market share than either Chevrolet or Ford.
The output of GM’s premium-priced big cars may have been relatively stable, but the popularity of its individual brands shifted over time. For example, Pontiac usually had the top-selling, premium-priced big car in the 1960s, peaking at 494,000 units in 1965. However, from 1971-73 the brand took a back seat to Oldsmobile and Buick.
From 1967 to 1973 Buick’s full-sized lineup consistently outsold Oldsmobile’s. For example, in 1973, Buick production almost reached 456,000 units, which was a good 55,000 units higher than Oldsmobile’s output.
Buick took the lead in big-car sales partly because its top-end Electra 225 sold so well. In 1973 production almost reached 178,000 units. That wasn’t very far behind the low-end LeSabre, which tallied roughly 197,000 units.
Mid-sized cars began to overshadow big cars
So what’s going on here? My guess is that an increasing number of people who in the past would have bought a mid-level Chevrolet Impala or Ford Galaxie 500 went instead with a smaller car, such as an intermediate. As you can see from the graph below, beginning in 1968 mid-sized cars challenged low-priced, full-sized cars for sales leadership.
Even in the 1973 model year — which ended before an oil embargo spiked the popularity of more fuel-efficient cars — the production of mid-sized cars had soared above big cars by almost 870,000 units. This was the end of an era.
Buyers of big cars gravitated to higher-priced models
Of those who stayed with big cars, an increasing proportion of them chose higher-priced models. As a case in point, the LTD went from contributing relatively little to Ford’s big-car output to overtaking the Galaxie 500 to become the most popular series. By 1973 over 48 percent of big Fords were LTDs.
Mercury had a somewhat similar situation. In 1969 a new design and a reshuffled model range resulted in a dramatic shift. In prior years, the lower-priced Monterey and Montclair series dominated Mercury sales. However, from 1969 onward the higher-priced Marquis and Marquis Brougham were more popular.
Other premium-priced brands also their higher-end nameplates take up a greater percentage of sales compared to their entry-level models. For example, Buick’s top-end Electra grew from 26 percent of total big Buick output in 1965 to 39 percent in 1973.
The Buick’s somewhat more stable sales patterns may have at least partly reflected that the brand was better established than Mercury in the upper reaches of the premium-priced class.
LTD sales dwarfed those of the big-Mercury lineup
As we have discussed above, one could plausibly argue that at least some of the Monterey’s sales decline resulted from the LTD’s increasing popularity. One reason why is the degree to which LTD output rose so dramatically in comparison to Mercury’s.
By 1971 more than twice as many LTDs were produced as the entire lineup of full-sized Mercurys. This gives fuel to the question: Did the Ford Motor Company really need the Mercury brand? Or could Ford dealers have been just as successful selling a high-end big car in a similar manner as it did the Thunderbird?
On the other side of the coin, the big Ford’s market share declined much more steeply than Mercury’s in the early-70s despite the presence of the LTD. Might the prestige of a Lincoln-Mercury dealership have helped?
The LTD gives GM’s premium brands a rare scare
Add all of this up and I don’t have the confidence to say that the LTD impacted Mercury all that much. I would be more inclined to suggest that the LTD showed how marginal Mercury’s sales were to the automaker.
General Motors had the opposite situation. The Caprice was a minor player compared to the full-sized Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick.
By the early-70s the LTD began to give GM’s premium brands a run for their money. The above graph shows how in 1973 LTD production surpassed that of the full-sized Pontiac and Oldsmobile — and was within shouting distance of Buick.
This was clearly a victory for Ford Motor Company President Lee Iacocca. Like his boss Henry Ford II, Iacocca “wanted big, creamy, plush cars,” noted David Halberstam (1986, p. 375).
That victory proved to be short lived. An oil embargo began in Oct. 19, 1973 that resulted in the price of a barrel of oil going up by almost 80 percent by the time it ended five months later (Amadeo, 2020).
Full-sized car sales would take a tumble that they would never fully recover from. Along the way, Chevrolet would figure out how to be more competitive with the LTD — ironically after GM downsized its big-car body. The LTD’s moment in the sun was quickly over.
NOTES:
This article was originally posted on Jan. 28, 2022 and expanded on April 11, 2024. Production and market share figures were calculated from data published by the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006), Flory (2013), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2013). Data from different sources did not always align so editorial judgments were made as to which was more accurate.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Amadeo, Kimberly; 2020. “OPEC Oil Embargo, Its Causes, and the Effects of the Crisis.” The Balance. Posted Aug. 30.
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2013. American Cars, 1973-1980. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Halberstam, David; 1986. The Reckoning. William Morrow & Co., New York, NY.
- Wikipedia; 2013. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed July 5.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcaradvertising.com: Ford (1973)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Buick (1973); Chevrolet (1973); Chevrolet Chevelle (1973); Chevrolet Monte Carlo (1973); Ford (1973); Mercury (1972, 1973, 1976)
Excellent presentation, Steve. You nicely illustrate the important things about the LTD that contributed to it’s popularity.
While I prefer the sleeker styling of most of GM’s full-size 1971-73 models, I can see how the LTD’s beefier A & C pillars might have created a more substantial, desirable big car look for buyers than GMs airy greenhouses of the that era did.
Looking at the presentation you chose of the LTD and Marquis coupes, the use of high angles, dramatic lighting and a striking colour combo on the Marquis, is visually much more exciting when compared to the Caprice and LeSabre layouts. Only the Bonneville photo comes close, but what is with that downbeat colour choice (one of GMs ugliest colours, ever, IMO)?
Next, we see how the LTD’s uplevel Brougham trim easily out-luxed Caprice, which got noticeably cheaper looking from 1971 onward. The Brougham’s interior is far nicer than that of the Pontiac Bonneville and also the 1973 top-line Grand Ville, which was not that upscale unless you paid to get the Custom trim package (see link below). Blame and shame on GM for their use of awful, cheap hard plastic lower door panels that even the Grand Ville was forced to share with Chevy’s Bel Air!
Your market share chart for Ford, Mercury and LTD shows what I think is the true impact that LTD had on Mercury sales; they stagnated during the time period illustrated. I am inclined to think that unless Ford had pushed Mercury into Lincoln territory, thereby pushing Lincoln and Continental up past Cadillac, there was not a lot of room for full-size Mercury sales to grow. Additionally, from 1975 onward, there was very little other than styling to choose from between an LTD and a Marquis.
Ironically, according to this Wikipedia page – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercury_Grand_Marquis – Mercury received its own body for 1992, sharing only the front doors and windshield with the Ford Crown Victoria. The Grand Marquis eventually became the division’s 2nd best selling nameplate (older generation base Marquis models not included) but Ford also kept it around well past the expiry dates of both Oldsmobile and Pontiac. This suggests to me that Grand Marquis owners might have been extremely loyal (if in small numbers). According to the aforementioned Wiki article, Grand Marquis actually outsold the Crown Vic in 1994 & 1997 which is apparently why the Crown Vic adopted the Grand Marquis look for 1998. No doubt the Crown Vic’s wide-spread fleet usage made the Grand Marquis more appealing in it’s small market segment.
Again, this is my opinion, but I feel that based on market share and sales ranking over several years from the 1960s to the 80s, when Mercury division production often ranked #8 or #9 among American-made cars, the full-size Big M never really had a renaissance or a fair chance at one; blame it on the LTD! That it did outsell its Ford counterpart a couple times late in its lifespan and outlived two of it’s primary GM competitors is something, however. Thanks for providing hard data, Steve and for giving further insight into the impact that the Ford LTD had on the full-size car market during its peak years.
http://www.oldcarbrochures.org/United%20States/Pontiac/1973%20Pontiac/1973-Pontiac-Grand-Ville-Brochure/1973_Pontiac_Grand_Ville-01.jpg
CJ, my sense is that the main reason for the LTD’s appearance was that Ford had failed to make much headway against the Chevrolet Impala’s utter dominance of the low-priced, big-car field. So my question: If Ford had not tried to move upmarket with the LTD, what else could the brand have done to level the playing field?
Perhaps Ford might have attacked GM even more vigourously in the mid-size class; they had the car to do it with in the form of the 1970-71 Torino. Could Ford have dropped all of it’s full-size cars (except Lincoln) at the end of the 1976 model year and gone into 1977 with their restyled Torinos fully rebranded as the new full-size LTDs? They would have met GM head on with equally new “downsized” big cars. I would go further to suggest Mercury could have been tasked to focus on boutique models such as Cougar XR-7 coupes and Colony Park luxury wagons, priced, equipped and marketed significantly above any equivalent Ford models.
Also as I once suggested, Mercury could have borrowed a page from Dodge by calling all its mid-size 2-door coupes Cougar and all the 4-door sedans Marquis or Montego or they could have gone more extreme by morphing the 1975 Granada/Monarch as the new downsized LTD/Marquis. Ironically, the 1982 Fox-body Granada was replaced by the 1983 Fox-body LTD.
1977 LTD II was not remotely competitive with GM’s 1977 downsized full size cars, with their cramped interiors, small trunks, long hoods, and poor visibility. I believe Ford’s big cars did relatively well in 1977 and 1978, although CAFE and high fuel prices would have prevented them from being produced past 1978. I think LTD II was a waste of Ford’s development money, but it probably was a cheap program. I would have just kept Torino through 1977, then dropped it when Fairmont debuted. 1977 Thunderbird was a good investment
I can see that working better for Mercury than for Dodge, Stèphane, as I think the Cougar and XR-7 nameplates had more luxury car equity than Charger at the time. If I could, I would render a Cougar coupe and Marquis sedan with sufficient sheetmetal differences to distinguish them from the equivalent Ford models to illustrate what you are suggesting.
I realize that the 1974 cars and station wagons were already in production when the Arab-Israeli War began on October 6th, 1973, which triggered the 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo, but the domestic automobile manufacturers chose to ignore the danger signs as Arab oil imports were up to 83 % of ALL crude oil imports by 1972. In hindsight, John Z. DeLorean was right in advocating for downsized intermediate cars for 1972 (which got shoved back to the 1973 model-year due to the U.A.W. strike). The G.M. full-size cars for 1971 were too big as were the 1973 G.M. Colonade intermediates. In my opinion, the styling of the 1974 full-size G.M. cars were already dated with awkward pillared-coupes, no hardtops and cheap-looking trim. Ford, too, stayed too big with the ugly (in my opinion) 1973 E.S.V.-styled L.T.D. / Marquis-Monterey. Ford had a platform that was rational with its Torino / Montego-Cougar intermediate, but again, the warning signs that the era of relatively cheap imported oil were totally ignored. Then there was poor, unfortunate Chrysler which unveiled a new line of totally renewed full-sized cars in the fall of 1973. I think the reason why the Ford L.T.D. outsold the Chevrolet Caprice / Impala was simply that the 1974-1975 full-size Chevys looked cheaper than the comparative model “Barnaby Jones” big Fords.
While I realize that there would have been dealer problems all along the line with this “1975 alternative parallel universe What If”, but what if Oldsmobile had dropped the Toronado, but kept the 88 and 98 and all of the Cutlass models; Buick had dropped the Riviera and the Centurion, but kept the Le Sabre and the Electra; and Pontiac limiting itself to the Grand Prix, Le Mans and Ventura / Phoenix models, with a Bonneville trimmed intermediate and no Astre but paired exclusively with G.M.C. Chevrolet could continue until the 1977 full-size downsizing but fixing its cheap looking trim across all of its models.
The numbers don’t lie. But I would have never thought, looking back, that the “luxury” Ford outsold the “luxury” Chevrolet. I remember there being Chevy Caprices everywhere and the LTD being rare. That might be because I lived in a town where there was a GM factory and the locals knew where their bread was buttered.
To my eyes, it’s hard to make an effective argument against the LTD, particularly since my family bought a 1972 Impala and I got to experience fist hand the deplorable quality that came standard during those years.
An AMC at the Romney’s footsteps (or better Railtracks) would be the sole beneficiary of the oil embargoes
I insist that the brands Chevrolet and Ford had killed GM and FoMoCo respectively, even since the affluent no outside competition (imports or from independents) 1950s
Geo, GMC and Saturn were the Chevrolet the buyers needed since the 1980s. Chevrolet competed image wise I dare to say (for instance, the V8 in the 1950s into a Chevrolet?) with the premium brands of the GM group, even with Cadillac (eg the Impala of the 1970s). This diluted the unique selling proposition of the premium brands. As long as the competition didn’t work (US is notorious how uncompetitive market internally is with huge mark ups in every sector) this wasn’t a problem; since globalisation occured the 2 groups went bankrupt. In my opinion in 2008-2009 uncle Sam (the govt) shouldn’t had bailed out not GM, not funded any automaker.
Ford was at the same territory as this article has proven; it didn’t give Mercury a shot since the 1950s (Crown Victoria of the 1990s even copied Grand Marquis)
To my eyes the premium badge engineered Mercury cars were a solution of dead end, quite a Ford but not a Lincoln. Did Lexus have something to do with Toyota?