Geeber offers valuable additional layers of analysis to our story, “Was the ‘Ford blitz’ to blame for the collapse of independent automakers?” Thus, I’m elevating this comment to the front page.
While the focus has been on the Ford Blitz, I would argue that another factor was more critical in the long run – the increasing dominance of Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillac in the early 1950s, which was capped with the debut of GM’s all-new B- and C-bodies for 1954. The independents largely competed in the medium-price field. Packard did compete in both the luxury market and the medium-price field.
By 1954, Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillac had blanketed those segments with up-to-the-minute styling, modern OHV V-8s and fully automatic transmissions.
The wraparound windshield was just one feature of the GM cars. They offered flashy two-tone paint schemes for the medium-price market (Oldsmobile and “junior” Buicks), and features such as the fully radiused rear wheel openings on the Buick Special and Century hardtop coupes.
Also see ‘Five (arguably) unresolved mysteries of postwar independent automakers’
In the medium-price and luxury markets, image was (and is) critical, and added features and styling tricks played a key role in maintaining a marque’s image. (If buyers want to simply “get where they were going,” a Chevrolet, Ford or Plymouth were able to meet that need.) Nobody did that better than GM in the postwar period.
Meanwhile, the newest body from an independent competing in the medium-price field came from Studebaker. It had debuted in 1953, and the two- and four-door sedans very much looked like afterthoughts compared to the stylish coupes. They simply were not competitive in styling and size with the Oldsmobiles and Buicks. And thanks to Studebaker’s high labor costs and inefficient factory, Studebaker had to sell the Commander V-8 at Buick prices to make a profit…Robert Bourke had “costed it out” using GM’s price structure, and discovered that GM could have sold it at Chevrolet prices! Customers could likely sense the difference in quality and materials.
Hudson, Nash and Packard were competing with bodies introduced in 1948, 1952 and 1951, respectively. The Nash would have looked more modern if it had not been saddled with skirted front wheels, which required a narrow front track, which, in turn, affected the “stance” of the car.
Also see ‘1955-56 Chryslers: ‘Forward Look’ wasn’t as successful as sometimes assumed’
Packard’s body was handsome and up-to-date (and, considered in a vacuum, probably more attractive than the GM competition), but somewhat anonymous. It could have been sold as a Dodge or a DeSoto. Meanwhile, an Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillac were immediately identifiable, thanks to Harley Earl’s practice of carefully cultivating styling trademarks for each marque.
Chrysler Corporation’s experience is also instructive. Plymouth – the marque that competed directly with Ford and Chevrolet – suffered the least out of all of the company’s marques during the Ford Blitz. Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler were hammered harder. One would think that it would be the opposite, as Ford and Chevrolet competed directly with Plymouth.
Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler competed in the medium-price field against the GM marques. They all had modern OHV V-8s by 1953, but the styling looked dowdy compared to the GM trio (particularly DeSoto and Chrysler), and the corporation didn’t offer a fully automatic transmission until late 1953 – the last automaker to do so!
Another forgotten factor was GM extending the length of the loan period to customers who financed through GMAC. From what I’ve read, Buick, in particular, aggressively marketed the longer loan terms. This lowered monthly payments, and enabled customers to “step up” to a Buick Special. This goosed Buick’s sales – particularly in 1955 – but it also borrowed sales from the future (as customers were locked in to a longer payoff period). During the 1958 recession, there were several analysts who partially blamed the 1958 sales downturn on auto makers “borrowing sales from the future” during 1955.
— Geeber
RE:SOURCES
- wildaboutcarsonline.com (Automotive History Preservation Society): Buick (1954); Cadillac (1954); Oldsmobile (1954)
Indie Auto invites your comments (see below) or letters to the editor (go here). Letters may be lightly edited for style.
Geeber, you add quite a few nuances to the discussion so thank you for taking the time to flesh out such a thoughtful comment. You illustrate how there are multiple reasons why the independents tanked in the early-50s. Of course, in addition to industry-level factors, each independent had its own unique circumstances, and you sketch out some key issues.
I would agree that the ascendency of GM’s highest-prices brands was a big deal, particularly in 1954-55. That said, I suspect that the growing dominance of low-priced brands was even more important. For example, between 1952 and 1956 the low-priced field’s share of total domestic production went up five points to 58 percent . . . and then to 69 percent by 1959.
Said another way, from 1952 onward the only year that the premium-priced field saw an increase in domestic market share was in 1955. Might that have been at least partially bought by extending loan periods?
Of course, since most of the independents had at least one foot in the premium-priced field, they were getting hit from two sides — the growing market share of the low-priced field and the intensifying premium-brand competition. GM was the juggernaut but beginning in 1955 Chrysler made an aggressive effort to catch up. That even Chrysler’s premium brands didn’t do all that well illustrates GM’s strength.
By 1955 only Packard was still viable as a premium brand — and its production and reliability difficulties killed it in short order. There was no longer any room for error.
Thank you for the kind words!
Another factor to consider is the move upmarket by the low-price brands – led by Ford, particularly with the 1957 Fairlane 500. By 1955, it was possible to get a modern OHV V-8 in each of the Low-Price Three, and they offered all of the power options (steering, brakes, windows and seats) available in the medium-price brands. They offered sleek styling with vivid two-tone paint jobs. (In some cases, the cheapest brand was the best-looking – particularly the 1955-57 Fords as compared to the Mercurys of those years.)
On the performance front, the 1955 Chevrolet V-8 with the optional power pack could out-perform the offerings of the medium-price marques. Many industry observers and reviewers of that time openly questioned the value of moving up the corporate ladder to buy a medium-price make, when all of the goodies were available in a Chevrolet, Ford or Plymouth.
The medium-price marques that could survive best in that environment were those with the strongest image, and by 1957, that was the GM marques, along with, to a lesser extent, Chrysler and Dodge. Even Buick, however, experienced a huge drop in sales from 1955 through 1958, thanks to the poor quality reputation earned by the 1955 models.
The independents were thus initially competing in a shrinking market segment, and with offerings that weren’t as stylish or had the same image as their Big Three counterparts. That is why, by 1959, Studebaker was essentially out of the medium-price market, and American Motors was reduced to competing with the Ambassador – which was a standard Rambler with a longer hood, different grille and side trim, and fancier upholstery.
Right. What’s interesting about the 1957 Studebaker-based Packard is that although it sold in small numbers, it actually generated a profit because of a relatively high sticker price. Killing the Packard and high-end Studebakers in 1959 served to increase the automaker’s breakeven point because the Lark didn’t generate as much profit per car.
The failure of all the premium-priced independent brands may partly reflect that none of them managed to pivot fast enough to the new realities of the post-seller’s market. These brands could no longer afford to compete directly against the Big Three’s full-sized, premium-priced cars.
I should offer a caveat here. Four out of six independents came out with compacts during the early-50s, and three of them also fielded premium-priced entries. Alas, three out of four of the compact entries failed to gain traction.
One of the biggest lingering questions I have about the 1950s is how each of the independents that came out with compacts thought they would pencil out if their entries had been successful. For example, did Nash, Hudson and Kaiser management really think that they could afford to stay competitive in both the compact and full-sized, premium-priced markets simultaneously?
Just re-read this post which got me to think that the independents should have looked to Ford’s 1952 cars for inspiration. The ’52 Ford, largely a carryover of the previous generation model, had an all new, stylish body. The Victoria 2-door hardtop was especially attractive. The new Ford was far more contemporary than Chevrolet, Plymouth, and a number of other cars of that year, but it was not gimmicky. Although the flathead V8 continued, a new OHV 6 engine was introduced, so economy-minded buyers were not ignored. The 4-door station wagon was also an important addition to the line. What could the independents have learned from this? A modern OHV 6 cylinder engine was VERY important; 6 cylinder cars, as Indie Auto has pointed out, still sold very well in the 1950s but updates needed to be made. Stylistic continuity was important but not as important as a modern appearance that said 1950s not 1940s. Added-on chrome ornamentation, odd wheelhouse shapes, or garish two-toning were fashion faux pas. Four-door wagons that didn’t look like hearses were the shape of the suburban future. It all came down to putting on a good suit, one that had a modern cut but wasn’t too flashy or fashion-forward. I think the 1952 Ford is the best example of this. Buick, Oldsmobile and Cadillac were rather big, oafish cars throughout most of the 50s but the faddish element of the wraparound windshield as an example, made them seem super new at the time. The independents were definitely different but they paid the price for being too different. Had they followed Ford’s styling and engineering lead (definitely not Chevrolet’s) and invested in their bread-and-butter best sellers, not the compacts or the stripped out price leaders, they might have gone on to have a longer life.
What caught my eye was the 1954 Buick Century ad. The open wheel well, the swoopy trim line and two toning brings a whiff of the fine sporty luxury cars of the early 30s without looking overly retro.
Geeber and Steve, you are more correct here than I would have previously thought. The 1954 new C-bodies and up did as much damage (at least until 1957) as the Ford – Chevy sales blitz of the same year, then came the 1957 Ford domination of the two-wheelbase cars. I believe that the average car loan prior to 1954 was for 24-months. Ivan Wiles and his sales team at Buick really were good number crunchers.