(EXPANDED FROM 2/25/2022)
The 1954 Chevrolet’s greatest claim to fame — or, more accurately, infamy — was contributing to the demise of independent automakers by engaging Ford in a brutal price war. Less discussed is that the 1954 Chevy represented the beginning of the erosion of General Motors’ hierarchy of brands.
That hierarchy – where each of GM’s five passenger-car brands fit neatly into a prestige pecking order – had been a major factor in the automaker’s rise to dominance in the U.S. automobile market.
Chevrolet had traditionally been treated as the entry-level, economy-oriented brand. The Pontiac anchored the bottom end of the premium-priced field, followed by the Oldsmobile and Buick. During the 1950s the Buick Special often had lower prices than the Olds 88, but Buick could also inch into the luxury-car field, thereby giving Cadillac some competition.
GM’s brand hierarchy may be considered really basic information for an American car buff of that era, but it’s worth remembering that this was partly a result of the automaker’s deep-pocketed marketing campaigns.
The lines blur between low- and premium-priced cars
The 1955 Chevrolet took a meaningful step in eroding the rationale for GM’s premium-priced brands by offering a V8 engine for the first time. That gave the Chevy a level of performance that had been reserved for more costly brands.
However, in previous years Chevrolet had also begun to offer trendy features such as an automatic transmission, power steering and power brakes. Why pay more for a car that didn’t offer much in the way of unique features?
Also see ‘General Motors’ premium-priced brands illustrate the decline of big cars’
This didn’t prove to be an immediate problem. In 1955 GM’s premium brands collectively pumped out almost 1.9 million cars, thereby beating Chevrolet by more than 171,00 units. However, for the rest of the decade Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick saw their production decline much more sharply than Chevrolet. Although that may have partly reflected a recession that emerged during the 1957 model year, sales began collapsing in 1956.
The 1954 Bel Air was a perfectly nice, if boring, car
But let’s go back to the 1954 Chevrolets. Despite a recession, the top-of-line Bel Air garnered 42 percent of Chevrolet output. Almost 250,000 Bel Air four-door sedans left the factory, making it the brand’s single best-selling body style. In contrast, Ford’s most-popular four-door sedan was its mid-level Customline.
The Bel Air series was introduced in 1950 as a top-of-line two-door hardtop but gradually expanded to a full range of body styles (Wikipedia, 2022). For 1954 you could choose from more colors as well as new creature comforts such as power windows and front-seat adjustment (Langworth, 2019).
Even so, the Chevy was still stuck with a six-cylinder engine. Although it pumped out 125 horsepower – only five less than Ford’s V8 engine – it didn’t possess quite the pizzazz of its arch-rival.
The Bel Air was well appointed but would have still been quite affordable even in the absence of the price war, which could result in deep discounts (Langworth, 2019). A Bel Air four-door sedan listed for $1,884, which was $163 less than an entry-level Pontiac Chieftain Special. Or, if you wanted a V8 engine, you could pay $381 more for a Buick Special or $453 more for an Oldsmobile 88.
The situation was more convoluted with a Bel Air two-door hardtop, which listed for $2,061. The next step up was a Buick Special ($244 more) followed by a Pontiac Chieftain DeLuxe ($355 more) and an Olds 88 ($388 more). At that point Buick was trying to boost sales, particularly of its two-door hardtops — with great success (go here for further discussion).
Ford’s challenge may have led Chevrolet to panic
Despite the popularity of the Bel Air, Ford was breathing down Chevy’s neck. Between 1952 and 1954 Ford gained 6.8 percent of market share, enough to narrowly beat Chevrolet in model-year production. This may have spurred GM to shift gears.
“The ’55 completely reversed Chevrolet’s long-standing image as a reliable, inexpensive and rather dull family hauler,” Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye (1986; p. 208) concluded. “The division was still building those kinds of cars in the 150 and 210 series, but the colorful Be Airs with their novel body styles and the across-the-board V-8 option made Chevrolet the choice of millions of people who had never considered one before.”
The 1954 Chevrolet thus hints at the road not taken. Car enthusiasts would likely have viewed the brand less favorably in future years if it had focused on economical family haulers. And under that scenario Ford might have more frequently outsold Chevy. However, the value of GM fielding five passenger-car brands might not have declined so quickly in the years ahead.
That said, I can’t picture what Chevrolet would have been like if it had somehow eschewed GM’s fixation with bigger, glitzier and more powerful cars. That was too deeply ingrained in the corporate culture.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Dec. 1, 2019 and expanded on Feb. 25, 2022 and March 1, 2024. Specifications, production and market share figures were calculated from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2020). The price graph does not include limited-production models whose prices were much higher than the rest of a brand’s lineup, such as the 1956 Plymouth Fury.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth; 2019. “Chevrolet versus Ford in the Early Fifties: The Spoils of War.” Collectible Automobile. April issue: pp. 8-21.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of General Motors 1908-1986. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Wikipedia; 2020. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed March 28.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “Chevrolet Bel Air.” Page last modified Feb. 11.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: General Motors (1952, 1956)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Chevrolet (1954)
Except for the ridiculous raised white letter tires, this appears to be a very nice example of one of my least favourite Chevys. The 54 does have elegant taillamps and a more sophisticated grille than the 53 but this is otherwise quite a dowdy design. I hope Dinah Shore was well-reimbursed for convincing Americans to see the USA in this Chevrolet.
These cars lacked style and performance, but they offered very good reliability and build quality. In some respects, they were the Toyota Camry of that era.
Geeber, I think the comparison is almost on target, but drop it down one notch: The 1954 Chevrolet Bel Air was the equivalent of a fully-optioned Toyota Corolla, in my opinion. My Sunday school teacher had a 1954 Chevrolet Bel Air, and she one drove some of us to another church meeting in her car. Quiet, smooth and effortless, especially with PowerGlide !
Have read in the Hagerty article on the Chevy Small-Block V8 that the 1954 V8 was preceded by a stillborn 231 V8 OHV engine toiled over years prior by Ed Kelley’s team, which was for all intents a downsized Cadillac V8 (and itself brings to mind the off-claimed Cadillac background of the Studebaker V8).
Is it known how long the stillborn Ed Kelley designed 231 V8 OHV engine was active for before it was swept aside by the 265 Chevrolet V8?
Was the V8 that appeared in the 1954 Chevrolet Bel Air always envisaged as a 265 or were smaller displacements looked at, closer in size to the later all-alloy 215 BOP V8 (that was initially conceived as a 180) if not possibly serving as a catalyst for the BOP V8 (alongside maybe the all-alloy BMW OHV V8)?
I am not certain that this analysis is totally spot-on, with all due respect. The 1953-1954 Chevrolets were refreshes of the 1949 bodies, more of a response to the 1952 Fords.
Frankly, the 1955-1956-1957 Chevrolets were very much in the mode of the next generation of G.M. cars, with the 150 and 210 models basic, first two rungs of the G.M. hierarchy. The 1957 Bel Airs were dabbling in luxury, but were not as plush as the 1957 Pontiacs or Oldsmobiles. Now the 1958 Chevrolets, in my opinion, especially the Impala, was the beginning of the upscale divisional brand dilution of General Motors. The 348 cu.-in. V-8 was not necessary in a Chevrolet unless it was to be loaded up with all kinds of
continuation: luxury options !
Reading all the comments, I sense that we forget the march to lower, heavier, wider cars with options like air-conditioning, so by 1955, the Chevrolet needed chassis revisions for better handling and stopping, as well as to cope with the V-8, which even in 265-cu.-in. form, was a cast-iron hunk of metal. Charles Kettering drove this. Competition in the form of the Ford Y-block V-8s and the Chrysler 1951 V-8 drove this. Chevrolet and Pontiac had to react. Even A.M.C. knew they had to have a V-8 for their cars even if the Packard V-8 was too-big a lump of iron. (Do any Packard V-8 Nashes or Hudsons survive today ?)
The irony of George Mason working so hard to get access to the Packard V8 for the big Nash and Hudson was that sales turned out to be terrible (go here for further discussion). One could argue that this was at least partly because the unit cost was too high, but once AMC came out with its own in-house V8 sales were still so marginal that it arguably wasn’t worth the $10 million crash program given the company’s dire financial condition. The Rambler six sold well enough that AMC could have gotten away with waiting until the early-60s to come out with a V8.
Perhaps the Chevy was to be GMs basic solid if somewhat dull people hauler in the heirarchy. However if the Bel Aire is grabbing 42 per cent of the Chevy market it seems people’s interests were elsewhere. The real sign of the future to me was Buick undercutting Oldsmobile at the lower end and the one year only Limited* priced more than the least expensive cadillacs.
*I read the Limited was supposed to be a one year model to celebrate GM’s 50th anniversary. However the 58 body should have carried through the 1960 model year as things were done then. I wonder if it was intended to become Buick’s El Dorado but had to be scrapped due to the rushed redesign.
I would say the ’55 Chevrolet was the model that began the erosion of the Sloan ladder. As evidenced by my father, who owned a ’49 Buick fastback sedanette, followed by a ’53 Buick Special 4 dr sedan. Then came a switch- to a ’56 Bel Air wagon. The
tri-fives evidently were perceived to be a bump up in prestige. In my father’s case, it was short lived. He returned to the Buick fold in ’58, buying a Special Estate Wagon. It was all Buicks after that, right up to his last car, a ’96 Park Avenue. The real challenge to the Sloan ladder came later- from the Accord. The Accord was priced closer to Chevrolet, but was perceived to be classless. GM never identified a car to compete directly against the Accord in these classless sweepstakes, but the ’55 Bel Air offered a template to follow.
Some interesting points made yet there are certainly a lot of other considerations to look at.
I believe that Detroit did not like/allow multiple dealership ownerships until much later into the later 1970s or so. They wanted standalone brand stores with single store ownership, at least in the metro markets. If multi ownership and, if not paired brands, adjacent stores would the hierarchy of been able to be better maintained? There would need to be consideration of keeping the dealerships happy by remaining financially successful.
As we look at the mid 1950s I think it is completely understandable that Chevrolet would want to be far more than just a bare bones model line. The American consumer was more affluent and would be more willing to pay for more. It no longer was the depression mentality. Chevrolet would want to continue retaining their customers.
Until the proliferation of platforms in the early 1960s all the GM cars were being off the same platform with some differences in wheelbase. This meant massive volume of mostly common components. I am not sure, and would expect that any Division VP, would agree to letting their brand exit segments they had previously had; Chevrolet remaining as only Corvair and Chevy II. Would that mean that Pontiac would be A bodies, Buick would be B bodies and Oldsmobile C bodies? This would provide a hierarchy but the volume to sustain the brands might be in question.
My take is that as soon as Pontiac got their performance image they had a reason to exist above Chevy. A step up but not out of reach. Where I see the overlay problem was Buick and Oldsmobile. Two brands looking to be the step under a Cadillac in both price and perceived image.