(EXPANDED FROM 3/4/2022)
Automotive historians, both professional and armchair, tend to beat up too much on Roy Abernethy’s leadership of American Motors. Thus, Geeber (2021) offered useful context in responding to a denunciation of Abernethy.
“AMC was increasingly hemmed in from all sides,” Geeber (2021) wrote in a Curbside Classic comment. As an example, he noted how the compact “Dodge Dart and Plymouth Valiant sedans with the slant six and Torqueflite were successfully attracting buyers who wanted a practical, sturdy and economical car.” That invariably took sales away from the compact Rambler American.
This is a key point, so I would like to add some additional thoughts. After Romney stepped away from American Motors to run for governor of Michigan in 1962, Abernethy faced threats on three major fronts: The Big Three was invading its core markets, product proliferation escalated the costs of competing model for model, and import sales would soon take off.
These three threats would have been just as daunting to Romney, although I suspect that he would have navigated them at least somewhat better (go here for further discussion). By the same token, Abernethy’s successor, Roy D. Chapin Jr., mostly displayed even less dexterity in navigating these threats in the 1970s, when they loomed even larger (go here).
Threat 1: Big Three invaded AMC’s smaller-car markets
AMC’s core markets were under attack by a veritable Spanish armada of new entries from the Big Three. Between 1960 and 1961 every popularly priced brand except Chrysler had introduced one or more compact cars. Then, in 1962-64, Detroit unleashed a wave of mid-sized cars. I am hard-pressed to remember another time when U.S. automakers introduced so many new entries in such a short time.
Given the sheer size of this attack, Rambler output was remarkably stable up through 1965, hovering around 400,000 units per year. If Abernethy had managed to keep sales at that level American Motors should have been solidly profitable. Instead, production collapsed in 1966-67.
One could quite rightly argue that Abernethy made a series of bad decisions, such as coming out with the ill-fated Marlin and marketing the Ambassador as a full-sized car even though it was merely a stretched intermediate (go here for further discussion). However, AMC sales would likely have still sagged even if he had not made those mistakes.
The most important reason why is that the mid-sized field, which had been AMC’s biggest source of sales, turned brutally competitive. By 1966 the Big Three fielded eight entries, and they were substantially redesigned every two years. Even if American Motors had been operating at the top of its game, it still could have had trouble keeping up because the automaker was so small and resource strapped.
This was not the case in the compact field once the Big Three shifted its attention to mid-sized and “pony” cars. Even though the Rambler American saw its output decline by 62 percent between 1964-67, its share of the compact market remained relatively steady at around 10-12 percent.
Chrysler was the only automaker that boosted its investment — and that paid off handsomely. Between 1962-67 its market share increased from under 11 percent to over 50 percent. This suggests that the American might have done better if it had been given more ongoing attention.
Threat 2: Detroit went big on product proliferation
To make matters worse, AMC had to dice and slice its already meager resources into smaller pieces if it hoped to directly compete against the Big Three’s expanding product range.
Consider the Mustang. The car’s exceptional popularity resulted in a stampede by the rest of the industry to offer similar entries. And because Ford gave the Mustang unique sheetmetal, that upped the bar as to what was considered a competitive design. This presumably informed Abernethy’s decision to approve the development of the Javelin, which had a unique body.
The money that went into developing the Javelin couldn’t be spent on keeping the compact American up to date. So, not surprisingly, that car received only modest changes during a six-year production run after it was redesigned in 1964. Is it any wonder that the American lost altitude when all of its competitors came out with new designs from 1966-68?
American Motors was arguably not large enough to profitably produce a stand-alone pony car. Abernethy may have recognized the financial risk but supported the Javelin anyway because pony cars were one of the biggest fads of that era.
Also see ‘Collectible Automobile puffs up the 1971-74 AMC Javelin’
A somewhat similar situation occurred in the mid-sized field. During the second half of the 1960s every automaker expanded their lineups. Abernethy followed suit by adding two-door hardtops, convertibles and a fastback halo model called the Marlin. He also accelerated the frequency of redesigns and split off the Ambassador as a separate lineup with distinctive sheetmetal.
This aggressive effort to compete model for model against the Big Three backfired so spectacularly that by early 1967 it almost threw American Motors into insolvency. For this Abernethy has been rightly criticized by AMC historian Patrick Foster, who described his tenure as a “disaster” (2013, p. 93).
Threat 3: Sales of imported cars took off
During the first half of the 1960s the Big Three’s compacts held back the imports. However, sales of foreign brands took off as soon as Detroit shifted its attention to mid-sized and pony cars. In 1965 the market share of imported cars and trucks tallied only 4.8 percent; by 1970 it had more than doubled to 13.6 percent.
Abernethy got off to a good start in the 1963 model year, when AMC matched the market share of imports at 4.9 percent. Alas, it was all downhill from there. By 1967 American Motors saw its market share fall to under 2.5 percent. Abernethy was forced into retirement in early 1967 (Wikipedia, 2021).
Car and Driver magazine’s brutal take down of the new-for-1964 American may have been unfair in some respects, but it pointed to a key reason why the car was increasingly uncompetitive with the imports: It wasn’t very fun to drive.
We have discussed elsewhere that giving the American more sporting mechanicals and a Plymouth Duster-style coupe design might have better sparked sales (go here for further discussion). Alas, Abernethy stuck with traditional Rambler dowdiness combined with prices that did not adequately undersell domestic competition.
Abernethy’s biggest mistake: Trying not to be different
The 1965 model year was the first one where Abernethy was able to shift American Motors in major ways. At the time Motor Trend magazine expressed optimism for his new approach. For example, an upsized Ambassador was pointed to as giving the automaker “an out if their compact an intermediate cars lose sales” (Lamm, 1964; p. 24).
In another article, Motor Trend stated that American Motors “found out what it takes to get out and really compete against the giants. From now on, we can expect them to go with regular three-year-styling changes (major/minor/minor/major) right along with the Big Three. With an estimated eight million sales up for grabs, AMC can’t afford to be different” (1964, p. 39; original italics).
I mention this to underline how Abernethy’s strategy operated very much within the mainstream of Detroit thinking. Indeed, it represented a return to normalcy compared to the Romney years, when American Motors routinely violated Detroit’s standard practices.
Even today I sense that all too many folks criticize Abernethy primarily on superficial issues of execution, such as that the Marlin should have been placed on the compact American platform. My core criticism is that he did not recognize that maintaining Romney’s iconoclastic strategy could have been a more promising way to respond to the above-three threats that he faced.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on March 4, 2022 and expanded on February 7, 2025. Production figures are calculated with data drawn from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2020). Product specifications are from the above as well as the Classic Car Database (2021). Market share graph data is from Wards Auto (2017) and includes cars and trucks of all types.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 2013. American Motors Corporation: The Rise and Fall of America’s Last Independent Automaker. MBI Publishing Co., Minneapolis, MN.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Lamm, Micheal; 1964. “More on the ’65s!” Motor Trend. September issue: pp. 22-27.
- Motor Trend; 1964. “American Motors Corporation.” November issue: pp. 38-39.
- Wards Auto; 2017. “U.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.”
- Wikipedia; 2020. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Page last edited Oct. 4.
- ——; 2021. “Roy Abernethy.” Page last modified Aug. 7.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- marlinautoclub.com: Rambler Tarpon (1964)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Rambler American (1964)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Rambler (1963, 1965)
To be sure, Abernathy was dealt a bad hand. Not only in terms of competition from the big 3 but also the knock to AMC’s reputation for reliability that came from the problematic aluminum block 6 of 1961, something that was determined under Romney’s watch. But surely it would have been better to do one thing well rather that several things on a shoestring budget.
Chrysler’s A bodies consistently sold between 150k and 200k units per year under Abernathy’s tenure. They covered the larger end of the compact space, with the Dart effectively offering as much usable space as a mid size. The platform was adaptable enough to produce a Barracuda that could compete for a small share of the pony car market. Surely the logical thing for Abernathy’s AM to do instead of replacing the Classic and Ambassador 2 years ahead of schedule in 67 and then engineering the Javelin would have been to replace both the American and Classic with one platform aimed squarely at competing with Chrysler, and doing it well.
If that succeeded, there might have been money to do something with the Ambassador in ’69, which was the original schedule.
From my view, A.M.C.’s last “hurrah” was the Hornet. Other than the adaption of the Jeep 4-w-d system to the Hornet, Sportabout and Gremlin platforms, like Studebaker, the company had begun its death spiral. The real, bankable assets: The 232 / 258 cu.-in. OHV six, Jeep and maybe what was left of the dealer-network. One wonders if A.M.C. had offers from other interested parties prior to Renault ?
Abernethy was faced with serious challenges, but he responded in the wrong way. AMC simply didn’t have the resources to pay for several platforms and keep restyling the Classic/Rebel and Ambassador every two years. Romney, at least, understood this key fact. Trying to compete with the Big Three on their terms was a losing bet. Even Chrysler was having trouble keeping up with GM and Ford by the early 1970s.
The proper course was to offer something that the Big Three didn’t. As you have said, he needed to look at the imports. Emphasize quality, efficiency and improved handling and braking (AMC was already offering disc brakes in 1965, so this wouldn’t have been a stretch). Those efforts would not have cost a bundle of money that AMC didn’t have.
Second, eliminate the features that made AMC cars look outdated even compared to the Big Three – the flathead six, standard vacuum-powered windshield wipers, trunnion front suspension and manual gearboxes with non-synchro first gears. These features made AMC cars look stale and old-fashioned. In the case of flathead six and vacuum-powered windshield wipers, AMC was already offering the modern alternative as an option…so it would not have cost much, if anything, to eliminate them.
It’s a mystery to me as to why AMC retained these clearly outmoded features as it desperately tried to make its cars seem as “hip” and up-to-date as the Big Three competition. That is a real head-scratcher. Didn’t ANYBODY within the company bring up this obvious contradiction?
Geeber, you make an excellent point about AMC offering more “advanced” features but making buyers have to pay extra for them. That may have partly reflected the general tendency of U.S. automakers to strip their cars to the bare basics so they could advertise a low list price . . . but then buyers would have to pay more to make their cars reasonably drivable. Of course, AMC pushed this practice to the extreme. Their low-end cars such as the American and Gremlin weren’t so bad if you properly optioned them with the likes of disc brakes, quick-ratio manual steering, electric wipers and a heavy-duty suspension.
One useful aspect of the Buyer Protection Plan was that, at least for the time being, AMC dropped its entry-level models in favor of those equipped with a bit fancier trim and popular features. AMC even ditched vacuum-powered wipers. However, even at that point AMC didn’t recognize how the rise of the imports was changing the expectations of car buyers as to what constituted a basic level of equipment. For example, when the Pacer was introduced it only offered an optional four-speed manual transmission rather than a five speed (which could have helped the car’s slow acceleration and mediocre fuel economy). And the standard transmission was an archaic three speed.
I suspect that the biggest reason why AMC was so slow to adapt in the late-60s and early-70s was CEO Roy D. Chapin Jr.’s fixation with trendy styling. The 1970 Hornet is a particularly revealing example of this. They could have saved themselves a whole lot of money by reskinning the American or drawing upon the Javelin’s relatively up-to-date body. Instead, they redesigned the body from scratch in order to offer the latest fads, such as fuselage body-side curvature. Yet even though the Hornet was more “modern” looking than the Ford Maverick, it didn’t sell nearly as well. Compare that experience with the early-60s, where dowdy Ramblers sold quite well compared to the shiny new Falcon.
The irony here is that, by the early 1970s, the more upright style of the 1963-64 Classic and Ambassadors, and 1964-69 Americans, was coming back in style, thanks to the rising popularity of Mercedes-Benz and BMW.
A restyled American, with updated mechanicals and an upgraded interior, probably would have sold well. AMC could have then expanded the Javelin line-up to include a four-door sedan and wagon (with styling that was later applied to the Hornet Sportabout), as was shown in the Chris Zinn book. It was all there for the taking…
Steve, I’ve never understood the idea of deliberately de-contenting a car to be able to advertise a lower price, when hardly anyone actually buys the car like that. How much of a factor is this – really? Has its importance been overplayed?
I wouldn’t have known a suspension trunnion from a fried onion, but vacuum wipers? No way! No synchro on first? Really? You want me to pay more for proper wipers and an up-to-date gearbox? This customer would be smelling a rat. I’d be wondering what other relics I might discover.
I would much rather be sold a car with the good stuff standard. It gives the customer a good feeling to know their car is better than it needs to be. Better than what the competition offers. Simplifies things for the parts and service guys too.
The die was cast when both Nash and Hudson were dropped at the same time. A Hudson or Nash Ambassador would have preserved one marque as a premium product instead of AMC being stuck with a budget image. Only by going premium could an independent survive medium term. That option wasn’t available by 1966 when Rambler was phased out.