David Burrell of Retroautos has written one of the better overviews of the downsized 1962 Dodge and Plymouth, but he also displays some of the genre’s limitations.
Unlike some other historical accounts, Burrell questioned the “legend” that Chrysler executive Bill Newberg unilaterally demanded that a just-completed redesign of the automaker’s entire lineup of full-sized cars — the so-called S-series — be ditched in favor of an 11th-hour downsizing of its two lowest-priced brands. They were placed on a new mid-sized B-body.
Burrell quite rightly noted that it is “very rare” that a senior executive in a large, publicly-listed company “has the sole power to make such key strategic product changes without reference to at least a couple of other senior executives, the chief financial officer and Board members” (2019, p. 21).
Instead, Burrell suggested that Newberg’s decision “was the outcome of a much longer discussion which had been going on, possibly in secret, for at least 12 months within the most senior management ranks about costs, declining sales, unease over Exner’s design direction and Chrysler’s survival into the future” (2019, p. 21).
This raises the intriguing question of whether Chrysler’s engineers were able to come up with a significantly more ambitious rethinking of the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth than their counterparts in the styling department because they got started before the switch to the B-body was announced. Whereas the downsized platform was all new, its styling looked like hastily shrunken versions of S-series cars.
Burrell is fuzzy on when the S-series was halted
Burrell did not weigh in on when the S-series was killed aside from recounting the “automotive folklore” that it was “sometime in late 1959” (2019, p. 19). However, he did offer an unusually comprehensive number of photographs of S-series mockups. Some photos were dated as late as July 22, 1959.
This would lead me to guess that the switch occurred in late summer or early fall in order for fairly advanced B-body mockups to have been completed by February, 1960. That was the date ascribed to a photograph of a Dodge which looks close to production ready (Langworth, 1993).
Also see ‘Defense of Virgil Exner’s 1962 Plymouth doesn’t add up’
Where Burrell’s timeline gets confusing is when he stated that as Chrysler Corp. sales fell the “design ideas for the S-series were starting to be challenged” (2019, p. 25). That makes sense in a general way, but then he added that U.S. small car buyers “delivered the verdict” on the “S-series design theme” because the Valiant placed third behind the Ford Falcon and Chevrolet Corvair (Burrell, 2019; p. 25).
One problem with this argument is that the Valiant sold respectably in 1960. By the end of the model year the car tallied 19.4 percent of entry-level compact market, which for present purposes also included the Ford Falcon, Chevrolet Corvair and Rambler American. This was 3.4 percent higher than the corporation’s overall passenger-car market share for that year.
A number of other key questions left unanswered
Burrell suggested that pulling the plug on the S-series was part of a corporate effort to “stem the financial losses and reassure investors and bankers” (2019, p. 26). That makes sense, particularly given that the cars had advanced features such as door frames that reached into the roof and V-shaped glass. All this fancy styling resulted in ‘(p)roblems, problems, problems, and all at a time when sales were dropping and money was scant” (2019, p. 25).
That brings up a question: If money was scarce, why did management decide to create a new mid-sized platform only two years after introducing a new big-car body that switched to unitized construction? As we discuss further here, the 1961 Plymouth was already 200-300 pounds lighter than its Big Three competition so could have presumably been pruned to a size similar to the B-body at far lower cost.
Burrell also did not assess the accuracy of the folklore that Newberg’s crash downsizing program was precipitated by hearing about what would turn out to be Chevrolet’s new 1962 compact, the Chevy II. Curtis Redgap (2019) stated that the wheelbase for the rumored car was around 115 inches. That was five inches longer than the Chevy II’s but the same size as the intermediate Chevelle, which Chevrolet introduced in 1964. Nor did Burrell wonder why Chrysler management apparently did not have on its radar screen Ford’s mid-sized cars, which were introduced in 1962.
Burrell’s narrative shows a bias toward big cars
One of Burrell’s most important themes was that Chrysler styling chief Virgil Exner made a mistake “to use the Valiant to launch the S-series design vision. The decision defied logic. The conventional automotive wisdom, which still operates in the 21st Century, is that new design ideas and technical/engineering advances are first applied to the expensive up-market brands and then cascaded down over subsequent years into lower order models” (Burrell, 2019; pp. 13-14).
I will leave for another day a critique of this general principle and instead suggest that it doesn’t strike me as the most compelling reason why the S-series’ styling did not work. The biggest problem wasn’t that the cars had a family resemblance to the smaller and cheaper Valiant, but rather than they were either downright ugly or — in the case of the Plymouth — looked rather old hat compared to the increasingly angular styling of competitors.
Also see ‘1957-58 Plymouth: Suddenly it could have been 1962!’
Burrell went on to argue that marketing for the 1962 Dodge Dart attempted to “cover up the downsizing project.” The key part of the pitch was that the Dart “features a new concept in standard-size car design which provides the owner with greater performance, economy and ease of handling. All useless weight and extra size have been ‘engineered out'” (Burrell, 2019; p. 17).
That doesn’t strike me as a cover up, but rather a clear description of the Dart’s advantages. A better target for criticism would be Plymouth’s marketing, which was more circumspect about the downsizing (go here for further discussion).
Burrell doesn’t get B-body’s size and price points right
Burrell noted that the 1962 models were “shorter and narrower than the Ford Galaxie and Chevrolet Bel Air/Impala but do not cost any less” (2019, p. 34). He stated that in the context of discussing the Dodge, which was slightly more expensive than the Plymouth. Nevertheless, a base Dart two-door sedan listed for $2,241 compared to a Chevrolet Biscayne at $2,324 and a Ford Galaxie at $2,453.
Since we’re making comparisons, a base Ford Fairlane listed for $2,154. I mention this car because Burrell inaccurately noted that Ford’s new mid-sized entry was “approximately the same dimensions as the Dodge and Plymouth, but cheaper” (2019, p. 30). The base Plymouth Savoy was only $52 more than a Fairlane but was roughly five inches longer, four inches wider and more than 100 pounds heavier. The B-body was a somewhat roomier and more substantial family car than the Fairlane, whose major components were often drawn from the compact Falcon (go here for further discussion).
I do give Burrell credit for stating that the styling of the 1962 models undercut their popularity more than the smaller size. However, he noted this in a back-handed manner: “The rebound in sales of the ’63 Plymouth is evidence that buyers overlooked the reduced dimensions provided the design was pleasing to the eye” (Burrell, 2019; p. 39).
Would Chrysler have done better without downsizing?
Burrell concluded his article by arguing that if Exner had “championed a more mainstream design direction for the S-series, as shown by the 1963 cars, and then followed them with the 1963 Valiant, Chrysler’s future might have been very different and much less fraught” (2019, p. 40).
I grant you that curved side glass could have given Chrysler’s big cars a meaningful, short-term design advantage. Even so, the automaker would still have had to develop some kind of presence in the mid-sized field.
In addition, a good argument can be made that Chrysler had more potential in the mid-sized and compact markets anyway. For example, Paul Niedermeyer (2022) has argued that the 1961 full-sized Plymouth should have been the last one because that market would go into serious decline over the next decade.
The graph below shows how output of mid-sized cars caught up with low-priced big cars by 1968 and began to leave them in the dust by 1972.
Burrell gets the context right but falls short in places
I have nitpicked some of the details of Burrell’s article, but I don’t want that to overshadow my main point: He gives the story of the S-series’ demise some badly needed context. The frequently told narrative of Newberg unilaterally demanding a crash program to introduce the B-body in 1962 has the over-simplified quality of a made-for-TV drama.
That said, I also wish folks would follow Niedermeyer’s lead and ditch the “bigger-is-better” mentality which still haunts American automotive history. The B-body wasn’t a mistake but rather a prescient move — and could have done quite well initially if Exner’s styling had not been so weird.
NOTES:
Brand production figures come from Wikipedia (2013); figures for individual nameplates were calculated from base data from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006) and Gunnell (2002). Prices and specifications are from the above sources as well as Automobile Catalog (2022) and the Classic Car Database (2022).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Automobile Catalog; 2022. “Specifications.” Accessed May 12.
- Burrell, David; 2019. “Design to Driveway: Almost!! Chrysler’s Still-born 1962 S-Cars.” Retroautos. Sept. issue: pp. 6-41.
- Classic Car Database; 2022. “Search for specifications.” Accessed May 12.
- Gunnell, John; 2002.Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993. Chrysler & Imperial 1946-1985: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2022. “Cohort Pic(k) of the Day: 1961 Plymouth – Maybe It Should Have Been The Last Big Plymouth Forever.” Curbside Classic. Posted May 8.
- Redgap, Curtis; 2019. “1962 Plymouth Sport Fury car reviews.” Allpar.com. Posting date unknown; first accessed August 16, 2019.
- Wikipedia; 2013. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed July 5.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge Dart (1961, 1962)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Plymouth Valiant (1960); Plymouth (1964)
In retrospect, the signs for a crisis at Chrysler were apparent in the fall of 1959 with the debut of the 1960 models. The Chrysler, DeSoto and Imperials had continuity with 1957-1959 models, and I love the 1960 Dodges, but the 1960 Plymouth was not an outstanding design. The Valiant was a take on a substantial compact car that was perhaps too European for American tastes. The 1961 Plymouths and Dodges were not good and thankfully the DeSoto went away quickly. While I think the 116-inch wheelbase “B’-bodies were a good future investment for Chrysler, because they were better cars than the intermediate Fords / Mercurys, the Dodges did not receive commercially-acceptible styling until 1964, which the Plymouths were put on the right road in 1963, although the 1964 Plymouths were much better. In retrospect, I now like the look of the 1962 Plymouths and Dodges, although the ’63 Dodges leave me cold (too bizarre). Elwood Engle cleaned up the Exner-inspired and approved cliches by 1964, and the restyled Valiant (and longer Dart) became the car(s) they should have been in the first place.
I have come to the conclusion that the real problem at Chrysler was turmoil in the executive suites: L.L. “Tex” Colbert had lost his touch, his protege, Bill Newburg, was compromised by conflict-of-interest allegations, and Virgil Exner Sr.’s health was deteriorating. On top of this was the dealer realignment with Plymouth and Dodge coupled with the end of DeSoto. Clearly, Chrysler needed competent leadership and in 1960-1961, the incumbent management had lost its way. In that environment, it is a miracle that the 1962 Plymouths and Dodges, down-sized as they were, ever made it to the showroom floors.
I’ll could go a step further, the first seeds of that turmoil go to where the desigers worked the 1959-60-61 models was done when Virgil Exner was in convalescence after he have an heart attack.
Then we could wonder what if Exner had gone for a more mainstream design like the 1962 Ford Fairlane or the 1963 Rambler if things could have been different?
It strikes me that in ’63 and ’64 Chrysler Corp. actually had the most rational product planning of all the big three. You had:
Plymouth A body — 106″ wb
Dodge A body — 111″ wb
Plymouth B body — 116″ wb
Dodge B body — 119″ wb
Dodge C body — 122″ wb
Chrysler C body — 122″ wb
Imperial — 129″ wb
In the case of the A and B body Dodges, the wheelbase stretch was aft of the B pillar rather than in front of the A pillar as on some other manufacturers’ stretched models, meaning they were actually a little roomier than their Plymouth siblings. So Chrysler was managing to cover many different customer needs without its brands and dealers competing directly with one another. And as far as intermediates go, the Dart was pretty darn close in size to the ’63 Fairlaine or Classic.
Was this a better model than Townsend’s shift to matching GM’s approach starting in ’65? It’s more logical but it’s hard to say it was likely to be more financially sustainable.
First, historically Chrysler needed to price the standard size Plymouth a bit higher than Chevrolet and Ford to make up for reduced economies of scale. It would have been hard to justify premium pricing for a large intermediate sized Plymouth over much bigger Chevrolets and Fords. The historical justification of superior engineering was less tangibly evidend.
Second, Dodge was a weak brand. The Dodge A and B bodies might have been just the right size for lots of families, but those families were much less likely to buy a Dodge than a Pontiac Tempest or Catalina.
I don’t think pricing would have been an insurmountable barrier to fewer platforms. The downsized 1969 Pontiac Grand Prix was successful despite its unusually high price for a mid-sized personal coupe. It all would have come down to quality of execution.
It’s interesting that you argue that Dodge was a weak brand. In the long run it overshadowed Plymouth. That may have been partly because of the market shift to trucks, but even in the second half of the 1960s Dodge’s compact and mid-sized entries tended to sell better than Plymouth’s. Dodge’s main problem was with its big cars (which it shouldn’t have bothered offering).
Platform streamlining would have been more difficult without also streamlining the dealer networks. Chrysler was too small to support both a Dodge and Chrysler-Plymouth network. They needed to be merged. Once that was done management could have shrunk the scope of each brand to a sustainable level.