Paul Niedermeyer (2023) recently suggested that the 1961 Rambler American’s “two-box” styling “just doesn’t work for me.” That makes sense. The newly reskinned car represented one of the most extreme — and awkward — examples of angular styling to come out of Detroit in the early-1960s.
The overall theme might have worked better if the American had been given an entirely new body, with a lower beltline, less thick fender “shoulders” and a more modern greenhouse shape.
Instead, AMC design chief Ed Anderson was reportedly required to carry over all inner body panels (Foster, 1993). That would have been a challenge for anyone given that the car’s platform was the oldest in the U.S. auto industry, dating back to 1950. Even the decidedly untrendy Studebaker Lark and Checker had newer bodies.
Anderson pushed the angular look too far
The design that reached production was less angular than an early sketch, where a flat hood and deck were connected by a sharp side crease evoking an airplane’s wing (Foster, 1993). One of the goals may have been to make the American look lower despite being taller than all other compacts except for the Lark.
Patrick Foster wrote that Anderson was asked by CEO George Romney to come up with a design that “would maintain a family resemblance with the current line of big Ramblers, and be handsome enough to sell in volume” (1993; p. 58).
Given these considerations, I try to not be too hard on Anderson for the American’s stylistic weirdnesses. Even so, I wouldn’t give him a free pass — the angular look was pushed too far.
The biggest problem was the unusually flat and wide fender shoulders, which accentuated the car’s turret-top look. In addition, the slab-sided roofline and flat rear window threw off the greenhouse’s proportions.
The American could have looked better even if it had maintained all of its inner body panels. However, to better understand Anderson’s predicament, let’s discuss why the 1961 American wasn’t just a simple reskinning.
The American’s role shifted in Rambler’s lineup
The 1961 American’s styling may have been partly determined by its shifting role. For one thing, the Metropolitan was going away, so Rambler dealers would no longer offer a convertible. The American was a better prospect for that body style than the big Rambler because it was slightly lower and AMC could target the bottom end of the market.
The problem with an American convertible was that it could never be as stylish as a newer Big Three compact. Even after the 1961 redesign shaved an inch from the American’s height, it was still taller than a Ford Falcon (by almost two inches) and a Chevrolet Corvair (by almost five inches).
Another change was that four-door body styles were given greater emphasis. In a way this made sense because in 1960 a newly-added, four-door sedan outsold its two-door sibling.
The problem was that the 100-inch wheelbase was too short for a four-door model. This showed up in the styling, where the back door looked like it was shoehorned into the car. In addition, Consumer Reports (1963) complained about the American’s “cramped, hard-to-enter rear compartment.”
The biggest change for 1961 was the addition of a four-door wagon. To keep costs down, this body style shared a roofline and rear-quarter windows with the two-door wagon.
American sold okay in spite of its age and eccentricities
The bottom line is that despite the 1961 American’s shiny new sheetmetal, the car was still showing its age. Even Consumer Reports, which tended to view early-60s Ramblers in a positive light, rated the American as possessing “significantly lower quality” than all other compacts in 1963 except for the Pontiac Tempest.
Also see ‘Lee Iacocca got lucky with the 1964-66 Ford Mustang’
In addition to a tight back seat mentioned earlier, the American was also dinged for a bouncy ride. CU concluded that the junior Rambler was “not a pleasant or a comfortable car to drive or ride in.” However, the magazine did give the American points for average gas mileage, an “especially powerful” heater, “very liberal” tire capacity, good visibility and low price (1963, p. 176).
When you consider the American’s weaknesses as well as the aggressiveness of the Big Three’s assault on the compact field, its sales would seem to be respectable. In 1961 output rose 12 percent over the previous year to around 136,000 units. That was only 7,000 units lower than the Plymouth Valiant.
Production would taper off to under 96,000 by 1963, but that makes sense given Rambler’s hot-selling new mid-sized cars as well as the redesigned Valiant/Dart.
Foster (1993) stated that a primary goal of the 1961 American was to be a stop-gap model until a complete redesign could be introduced for the 1964 model year. If that was indeed the case, one could reasonably argue that Anderson did an adequate job on the car’s reskinning.
Was the 1961 American an opportunity missed?
Even if the 1961-63 American sold respectably, I would nevertheless suggest that it undercut Rambler’s reputation. The car’s styling was so rough around the edges that it could have been mistaken for something designed in a Third World country. While a tight development budget certainly contributed to the American’s stylistic eccentricities, I don’t think you can blame it all on money.
Anderson might not have been able to add a few inches to the wheelbase of four-door models. He also might not have been able to convince Romney to ditch the two-door convertible and wagon for a better-looking two-door sedan and hardtop.
However, AMC’s design chief apparently did have the power to give the American extreme two-box styling, replete with overly square fender shoulders and greenhouse. He also appears to have chosen to make the rear-wheel cutouts off center.
That’s too bad. The 1961-63 American was the smallest and lowest-priced compact. With better styling the car might have sold well enough to encourage American Motors management to stick with that market positioning rather than boosting the American’s size and price when it was redesigned in 1964.
Why even bother giving the American a restyling?
At least in theory, AMC could have gone in the opposite direction by giving the American more evolutionary changes. I don’t think Romney could have adopted a pure Volkswagen Beetle approach of only making practical changes because the American’s body was too inefficient.
However, a reskinning that reduced the car’s width and length — and toned down the inverted bathtub shape — but kept the basic look could have worked fine as an entry-level economy car. A high-end, two-door hardtop would have been reaching, but the American could have solidified its niche as the closest thing to an import fighter. That type of car would prove to be what Detroit most needed in the second half of the 1960s.
NOTES:
Specifications are from and Automobile Catalog (2023), Gunnell (2002) and Consumer Reports (1963). Production figures from auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Automobile Catalog; 2023. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.” Accessed Feb. 21.
- Consumer Reports; 1963. “Basic Body Dimensions.” April issue: pp. 164-165.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2023. “Vintage Car Life Road Test: 1961 Rambler American With Aluminum OHV Six – Why Don’t Cars Of “Great Merit” Sell As Well As They Should?” Curbside Classic. Posted Feb. 20.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcarbrochures.org: Rambler American (1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963); Rambler Ambassador (1961)
I’m going tot take a contrarian view here, and suggest that AMC should have been more aggressive in completely revamping both the Classic/Ambassador and American.
The 1963 Classic/Ambassador and 1964 American were handsome, well-styled vehicles, but they were simply overwhelmed by the all-new 1964 GM A-bodies and restyled and improved 1963 Chrysler A-bodies. If AMC had debuted the handsome 1963 Classic/Ambassador in 1961, and 1964 American in 1962, they would have had more time to gain momentum, and perhaps better withstand the Big Three onslaught.
AMC should also have ditched the trunnion front-suspension, standard vacuum-powered windshield wipers, non-synchro first-gear manual transmission and torque-tube drive much sooner than it did. The 1963 and 1964 models looked handsome and modern, and offered some genuine improvements over the competition (uniside construction; dual-circuit braking system). Unfortunately, they retained outdated features that turned off potential conquest customers. Dumping the outdated flathead six was something else that needed to be done.
My sense is that Romney was right to try to squeeze at least six years out of the 1956 senior Rambler platform. He understood more than any other leader of a postwar independent the importance of economies of scale. Going for a seventh year was more debatable but understandable — the senior Rambler was still selling reasonably well.
I think that Romney’s biggest mistake was to not phase in the new platform. The Rambler had developed an admirable reputation in the early-60s for superior manufacturing quality. That took a hit with the redesigned 1963 models. This may have partly reflected how his successor, Abernethy, was less focused on quality control. However, even in the best of circumstances it can be a real challenge going from zero to full production.
That raises a question: What if Romney had introduced a relatively low-volume variant of the new body — say, a well-trimmed two-door hardtop and convertible — and gotten the production kinks out before introducing the rest of the senior Ramblers the following year?
This particular article is focused on styling so I’m not going to delve too far into the mechanical side of things. However, I suspect that if Romney had stuck around longer that American Motors would have moved faster on updating some of its more ancient features. He recognized that the Rambler couldn’t sell primarily on styling so had to possess other attributes valuable to consumers. In contrast, Abernethy emphasized frequent styling changes — not realizing that AMC simply didn’t have the resources to keep up with the Big Three on that score.
I’ve always felt that, when it came to styling, the 1963 Classic/Ambassador and 1964 American were good enough to soldier on through at least the remainder of the decade with facelifts. If they had debuted a little earlier, they could have remained in production for even longer than the 1956 body and platform.
In particular, the Argentinian version of the American showed what was possible. By the mid-1970s, cars with the basic proportions of the 1963 Classic/Ambassador were back in style, thanks to the growing popularity of BMW, Mercedes and Volvo. The interiors of the 1963-64 Ambassadors were also quite plush for the time, and predicted the popularity of luxury compacts in the mid-1970s.
A possible low-volume variant of the new platform could have been a true hardtop version of the 1963-64 Classic/Ambassador, but with the more formal two-door roofline used on the two-door sedans (as opposed to the hardtop roofline AMC did use for 1964).
I belive that the business plan was for the ’63 Classic and ’64 American bodies to each be used for 6 years. But when Abernathy replaced Romney they accelerated replacement of the larger body by two years as part of the (failed) strategy of competing head to head with the Big 3. That acceleration was in part responsible for the quality issues on the ’67 Rebel and Ambassador.
If you look up the word “clunky” in the dictionary, there are pictures of the ’61-’63 Rambler American – as well as a more recent Toyota RAV4 with the square wheel wells. Plus, the “face” of the American looked “pissed off”. l’ve never understood how that design of American got approved. It only looks half-way acceptable in 2 door hardtop form.
Too bad AMC didn’t purchase Jeep sooner – they could have brought back the quite competent and relatively pretty Willys Aero instead of the American in ’58 and sold a lot of them until ’64-ish with only minor updating.
What Geeber says about AMC’s ’63-’64 Classic models is the same sort of thing that may have benefitted Studebaker. If the poor selling ’61 Larks could be “erased” and the more attractive ’62s and ’64’s each introduced a year sooner (along with the planned 185 cube OHV six), before the Chevelle and revised Falcon/Comet, things would have gone better a little longer. Wishful thinking.
Stewdi, go online and look forpictures of the planned 1956 Aero reskinning. Maybe a little more finny quarter panel and if possible a dogleg windshield to 1958 and this could really solidly compete for a while. No, cancel the dogleg. It was just a fad.
1) No need to give a new look, just to mildly facelift it and rectify mechanical issues/ oddities
2) Big mistake that AMC didn’t use the lwb platform of the Nash Rambler. Same design, 2 lengths at the sub- compact and compact categories
3) Senior and (sub)compact Ramblers should had the exact same design. Of course the initial Rambler Rebel design didn’t need all that redesigns; consider Mercedes Benz that retained the same lines more or less across all its line up during the 50s, 60s and mid 70s. Que surprise!
As a BMW official said in the 80s, his company produced the exact same car in 3 different lengths (wheelbases). Of course a bit exaggerating, but absolute truth
Many of the comments are spot on, but those who say “introduce earlier” and “just mild facelift” are a bit off. If AMC had the money (and time) to introduce the new models earlier they would have! As far as just a mild facelift of the American… well, it would have just looked more outdated than it did. The car was “chunky” no matter what, even the rounded older model was by 1960. Looking at the 62 line-up illustration the 61-63 American does blend in rather well with the big car styling.
A lot can be said with the advantage of hindsight that AMC didn’t have at the time. they did about all they could do within the time and money constraints they had. When AMC had a big failure (like the Pacer) it hurt a lot more than when GM or Ford did in the 60s and 70s. In the end they just didn’t have the money to compete. A few bad decisions (like axing the 63-66 body early and trying to move a bit more upscale, and competing with the big boys head to head, then the totally unique Pacer that shared few components with anything else, plus the advanced styling…) could be said to have killed AMC, but in the end it was just not a big enough company to compete as time went on.
Sticking to a niche market might have allowed them to survive longer, but who knows? they had Jeep and practically owned the 4×4 market up until about 1980-81, but then the market pretty much crashed, leaving them without a big money maker. If Renault hadn’t stepped in with a big bankroll AMC would have died then instead of 7-8 years later when Chrysler bought them out.
Frank, I agree that American Motors may very well have been eaten by a bigger fish regardless of what management did in the 1970s. That said, other relatively small automakers managed to make it into the 1980s intact. In addition, I think that there is a big difference between a corporation dying a natural death versus through managerial recklessness. I would put AMC under Roy D. Chapin Jr. in the latter category.
It was bad enough that Chapin guessed way wrong on the Pacer (go here for further discussion). However, he also made a big mistake with the 1974 Matador coupe (go here). And while the Javelin sold okay initially, it may very well have lost money — and diverted scarce resources from senior — and much-higher-volume — models during a time period when they were really struggling (go here).
I have argued that a key reason why AMC went downhill so fast in the 1970s was that it abandoned George Romney’s focus on a narrow range of cars that did not try to stay on top of the latest styling trends. Chapin instead expanded AMC’s lineup well beyond what such a small automaker could keep current and emphasized flashy styling — that tended to become obsolete too quickly (go here).
It’s true that we are basking in the luxury of hindsight, but I think it is also fair to criticize automotive history when it sugar coats the past. Chapin’s tenure at American Motors strikes me as a case study in rank incompetence — yet he is typically canonized while his predecessor Roy Abernethy is heavily criticized for smaller mistakes.
All of the previous comments are valid here. Let’s go back to Romney’s ascension to the C.E.O. after the death of George Walter Mason on October 8th, 1954: A.M.C. had the Rambler, Nash and Hudson, all based on Nash platforms. The “new” Rambler was in development for the fall of 1955 as a 1956-model year car. 1955 had not been kind for any A.M.C. model and the dealers were probably up in arms. Romney and his board (and bankers) bet the farm on a restyled the Rambler for the fall of 1957…sedans and station wagons. Nash and Hudson went away, and I guess nobody really cared as the 1958 Ramblers were a success, saving the company. Then in the fall of 1957, Romney pulls out the old 1955 Rambler tooling for the American. The problem is we don’t have access to the board notes concerning the discussions after the board presentations and how much the bankers agreed to lend for new model development for a restyled American. It has been documented in “Hemmings” and “Collectible Automobile” that Ed Anderson had major disagreements with Romney (perhaps over the hiring of Richard Teague), which may have led to Anderson’s eventual departure. In my opinion. the only 1961-1963 American that looked right in exterior views was the four-door station wagon. Otherwise, the intrusion of the rear wheelwells into the back seat space was a major issue, at least in the four-door sedan. But quirky styling was tolerated and (at some point, I guess) expected by buyers of foreign cars, although Mercedes-Benz and B.M.W. adopted much more conservative “mainstream” styling in 1961. But with the 1961 American, the “Ordinance Wagen” nickname stuck. It was the perfect convertible for The Solomon “family” of Rutherford, Ohio, on “Third Rock from the Sun”!
The thing that always struck me is that Romney usually always drove the base models of his company’s cars. (His last A.M.C. car was allegedly a 1963 Rambler Classic 550 two-door sedan !) If this is true he had to know about the trunnions, the vacuum windshield wipers, the unsynchronized first gear and the torque-tube with the radius rods. I am guessing that the bankers were never given the option to upgrade the chassis componentry, at least starting with the bigger 1967 Rebel.
That’s the thing about A.M.C.: They had the chance to upgrade the 1963 Classic platform, improve their quality after 1964, and aspire by adopting the finest materials to create the “American” Volvo / Mercedes. Whether or not Romney would have agreed to pursue that path, I don’t know. Just think, with A.M.C.’s three 1964 platforms. modern thinwall casting sixes and V-8s and a renewed production of high-quality domestic vehicles (with no Marin, no Javelin / AMX) combined with the addition of Jeep, A.M.C. might have avoided the disasterous 1970s and purchase by Renault.
Anderson had an issue with the AMC board (maybe Romney, but i doubt it…) over his status. Design was under engineering in Anderson’s days. He wanted it to be independent, and the engineering department heads didn’t like that idea. Company politics prevented him being promoted to a VP with his own design department. When he retired (a bit early) in frustration, Teague (whom Anderson had hired, no ill will there!) was promoted and design became it’s own department, a slap in the face to Anderson in some ways. In reality it was company politics — Anderson had worked under the engineering department heads for a long time and they didn’t want him promoted as an equal. Teague was still new, and didn’t cause any ego issues.
Frank, I’ve read a number of scenarios about why Anderson left. For example, Patrick Foster’s 1993 AMC book paints a picture similar to yours. However, his 2013 book blames Anderson’s sudden departure on Romney forcing him to resign after Anderson resisted Romney’s penchant for drawing upon outside designers. The latter scenario presumably reflects Foster’s newer research.
I’m pretty good friends with Pat Foster. He has had the opportunity to talk to a number of former AMC execs, so he may have come across additional information between 1993 and 2013. The deal with Anderson having to put the Pinin Farina name on what was basically his design (with only a little influence from Farina… if any) was part of the reason he left. That was as much Mason as Romney, as I believe Mason was still alive at the time. The Pinin Farina design was too European for the board’s taste and Anderson was tasked with making it more acceptable, but the board wanted to put the Farina name on it for marketing. So Anderson had to swallow his pride and accept giving someone else all the credit for his work. That and the failure to advance him were both good reasons to leave!