Automotive News’ obituary of Gerald C. Meyer treated his tenure at American Motors with kid gloves. Meyers died on June 19 at the age of 94.
Presenting a largely upbeat narrative would make sense if Meyers had been a private citizen and his obituary was mainly read by friends and family. However, Meyers arguably played a major role in the decline and fall of the last independent American automaker. From a journalistic perspective, a thorough overview of his hits and misses was in order.
Instead, Automotive News’ sketch of Meyers’ two-decade stint at American Motors was analytically light and factually loose hagiography. That this was published in the top U.S. automotive trade journal strikes me as an indicator that the industry continues to suffer from weak journalism standards.
Automotive News blurs sequence of events
Reporter David Phillips (2023) offered a terse overview of Meyers’ career — and cut some corners along the way. For example, he wrote that when Meyers took over as CEO in October 1977, the company’s passenger-car line included the Eagle. Actually, that nameplate wasn’t introduced until the 1980 model year.
Phillips (2023) also stated that Meyers sought to revive the automaker’s passenger-car business “by developing and marketing niche models such as the Concord, a luxury compact.” To be precise, the Concord was already developed when Meyers became CEO (Flammang and Kowalke, 1999). More importantly, by the 1978 model year a luxury compact was no longer a niche product.
Also see ‘Charles Hyde’s AMC book doesn’t get why automaker failed‘
AMC was arguably at least four years too late in reentering the booming luxury compact field, which it had pioneered way back in the early-60s with a then-small Ambassador. Phillips didn’t mention this.
The Eagle was arguably the most-important product decision Meyers made while CEO but Phillips said little about it. For example, he didn’t mention that the Eagle was the first U.S.-built crossover vehicle. If it had come out earlier, when the AMC brand wasn’t yet moribund, the Eagle could have plausibly played a more prominent role in the industry’s eventual shift to passenger cars with four- or all-wheel drive. Instead, AMC struggled in the early-80s to compete even with Subaru, a third-tier import that was the first to offer in the U.S. a broad lineup of crossover vehicles.
AMC’s decline is blamed on external factors
Phillips (2023) was a little glib in stating that American Motors “never reached the scale or profitability of the Detroit 3.” That’s true, but the automaker’s historical significance is that it was the largest and longest living U.S. independent. It strikes me as noteworthy that the Rambler brand became so popular that in 1961 it bumped Plymouth out of third place in sales.
Meyers’ tenure at American Motors was mostly marked by the automaker’s decline to the point where it was bought by the French automaker Renault. Nevertheless, Phillips largely avoided explicit criticisms of him and instead blamed external factors such as increasing regulatory costs, rising oil prices and greater competition from foreign automakers.
The story’s main criticism came from Meyers himself in a vague quote pulled from a Chicago Tribune interview (Franklin, 2000):
“The way we did it in the ’70s and ’80s was crude. We had blinders on. We were fighting for a competitive advantage and didn’t know that there was a world bigger than just what you had to do right now. People who didn’t fit or had unusual, outside-the-box thinking were ignored. That single-mindedness got us in trouble, all kinds of trouble, until the early 1990s when we took those blinders off.”
This is a provocative perspective that Phillips doesn’t connect to any of Meyers’ actions while at American Motors. Instead, he abruptly ended the article.
Repeating folklore rather than acknowledging mistakes
After Meyers was assigned to head the AMC Product Group in 1968 he oversaw the development of a series of important cars, such as the Hornet, Gremlin and Pacer. Phillips painted those efforts in entirely positive terms. Along the way he repeated AMC marketing-speak without any journalistic counterpoint.
For example, Phillips (2023) quoted Meyers as saying that the Pacer “wasn’t going to be just another car but a whole new method of transportation for the next decade.” How about a countervailing quote that offered a reality check? He also did not mention that after the car’s initially promising sales, Pacer output fell off so quickly that it likely lost a ton of money — and may have been the final nail in AMC’s coffin.
Also see ‘Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors’
Phillips repeated the folklore around the Gremlin’s creation but sidestepped questions about whether the car was competitive with real subcompacts, let alone adequately profitable (go here for further discussion). Phillips also did not address Meyers’ role in a product-proliferation spree that left AMC bleeding red ink due to flops such as the 1971 Javelin and 1974 Matador coupe.
Nor did Phillips mention that Meyers reportedly championed a Wankel-powered Pacer and an AMX/3 mid-engined sports car (Wikipedia, 2023). Both would likely have been failures if they had reached production. Are we detecting a pattern?
Meyers calls for the return of planned obsolescence
The most useful thing I got out of the article was a Meyers’ quote from 1981. When discussing the weak automotive sales of that time he stated, “I think we should return to the day of planned obsolescence.” He apparently wanted to go back to the U.S. auto industry’s approach in the 1950s and 1960s, when it emphasized rapid-fire restylings (Phillips, 2023).
Why would trendy styling spark sales during a deep recession marked by sky-high interest rates? Imports captured 25 percent of the U.S. car and truck market in 1981, yet they mostly emphasized practical attributes such as good gas mileage and build quality . . . much like what American Motors did with the Rambler at the peak of its success (go here for further discussion).
It wasn’t clear whether Meyers saw rapid-fire styling changes as crucial to AMC’s revival in the early-80s. If he did, I could see that as a reason why Renault removed him as CEO in a management shake up (Howard, 2023).
Also see ‘Collectible Automobile puffs up the 1971-74 AMC Javelin’
Meyers’ talk of planned obsolescence appears to align with AMC’s product strategy in the 1970s, when the automaker invested much of its development dollars in stylish two-door models — most of which failed to meet sales expectations. Phillips didn’t address how this hurt AMC’s viability, let alone whether it reflected errors of execution or a failure of the underlying strategy.
In short, Phillips ignored a crucial question about Meyers’ tenure at American Motors: whether his ambition was greater than his competence.
This article is disappointing, particularly since Automotive News has such a huge archive of historical material it could have drawn upon. Even worse, by not addressing basic questions about an automaker’s decline and fall, one could get the impression that Automotive News sees its role as dishing out thinly disguised public relations rather than substantive journalism.
NOTES:
Production and market share figures were calculated from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002), Flammang and Kowalke (1999), Wards Auto (2017) and Wikipedia (2020).
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Flammang, James M. and Ron Kowalke; 1999. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1976-1999. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Franklin, Stephen; 2000. “Gerald Meyers.” Chicago Tribune (subscription required). Posted April 9.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Howard, Phoebe Wall; 2023. “Automotive pioneer Gerald C. Meyers, former CEO of American Motors, dies at 94.” Detroit Free Press. Posted June 27.
- Phillips, David; 2023. “Gerald Meyers, CEO who steered American Motors during rocky period, dies.” Automotive News (subscription required). Posted June 27.
- Wards Auto; 2017. “U.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.”
- Wikipedia; 2020. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed March 28.
- ——; 2023. “Gerald C. Meyers.” Page last modified June 27.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC (1971, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1980)
This may be a more balanced take on Meyers from Hemmings.
https://www.hemmings.com/stories/former-ceo-american-motors-gerald-c-meyers-died/
Yet, I do believe that there is a lot of truth that American Motors was going to have a fundamental problem remaining independent in the long term.
It is fundamentally true that the US regulations were being written with the big 3 (really big 2) for consideration of ability to fund compliance. The requirements were evolving so they required new engineering and testing to ensure they functioned when in service. Chrysler suffered this too.
AMC had a sub standard dealer network. As a weaker manufacturer they were far less able to impose requirements upon their dealer body in the same way that GM or Ford could.
As pointed out in the Hemmings article and at least one of the related comments, AMC had disadvantages in labor cost and manufacturing efficiency.
AMC had some export operations with the Jeep line up that they could have exploited further, maybe. But, the export of American cars to other world markets was a highly limited proposition. This was not the case for the Europeans and the Japanese.
Yes, AMC missed some market opportunities. Yes, AMC made some decisions that would turn out to be ill-advised. Yet, there was an inevitability that would still come into play as the need for lots of funding to cover new platforms, powertrains and compliance were going to end their independence one way or another.
The Hemmings piece was a bit better but still rather terse . . . and lacking in much analysis.
I don’t mean to suggest in my writings about AMC that it had a high probability of surviving indefinitely. As you outline, there were considerable obstacles working against the automaker. However, other smaller-scale manufacturers managed to last longer — and a few are still alive today. And while one could point to any number of factors as to why, I would suggest that a commonality is effective management.
As I discuss further here, the American auto history field can be incestuous in ways that I don’t see nearly as much in other parts of the media. A good example of that is how little AMC’s management team of the 1970s has been criticized for astonishingly bad management.
How is it that Roy Abernethy has been widely criticized by historians while Roy D. Chapin largely gets a free pass when his team arguably made a series of much bigger mistakes? Buying Jeep may have been a major plus, but gambling on the 1971 Javelin, 1974 Matador coupe and 1976 Pacer pretty much killed AMC’s passenger-car aspirations. And those are only the top-layer decisions. We could also talk about their ill-fated embrace of the rotary engine and an expensive VW four-cylinder engine.
Meyers didn’t become CEO until 1977, but his product-planning decisions appear to have been mostly supported by higher ups. So he arguably bears significant responsibility for AMC’s demise as a independent passenger-car manufacturer. Why can’t we call a spade a spade?
First, as what are essentially obits, it is not really appropriate to crucify the subject with a litany of what may be questionable decisions. Save those discussions for other places, such as here where it is not an obit piece.
I would caution that in any review of the questionable decisions made one should try and understand the situation and the available information of that time. From that perspective, try to determine if the down-the-road results were from bad timing or truly bone headed decisions. Do keep in mind that many of the big decisions that drove the basic product/platform development were made 3-5 years in advance.
I have some very mixed feelings about the Matador coupe. It clearly did not do for the corporation what had been projected. Yet, one might wish to ponder if it being so different was a conscious decision to not be following the more traditional solution for its competitive market? On the other hand, it could have been a major mis-read of design trends that were heading to more formal roofs instead of the fastbacks of the Torino, 1971 flatback Mustang and the Chrysler winged cars?
I have found the 2nd generation Javelin as too contrived of a design, especially when compared to the cohesiveness of the first generation. Yet, to believe that there should not be any Javelin is probably going too far. Keep in mind that all the Pony cars were effectively parts bin creations. The components throughout the cars that went into the platform were all existing. Now what one could legitimately ask is if for a 1971 introduction one would have seen the rising interest in the import sport coupes in 1967/1968? The Capri did not start until 1970. The Celica was 1971. The Opel Rallye (manta) was 1970. As such seeing that trend was not available. If it had of been it might have made the Gremlin as the choice for the platform. One can also see that all of Detroit say the Pony cars in the same way during the time that the 2nd generation Javelin was being developed.
When it comes to the rotary engine one should give consideration to how revolutionary it was at its time. Mazda had come into the marketplace and was gaining traction based upon having this technology. GM had committed massively to this with a huge development program and payments to Curtiss Wright to own the US manufacturing rights royalty free. GM was developing vehicles based upon using these engines. So, was AMC wrong to believe, at that time, that this was not going to be a game changer? I remember it as being a shock that GM pulled the plug on the development which did put AMC in a very unexpected place. One might want to view this with a question if AMC knew they had insufficient resources (money and people) to undertake a serious engine development on their own (like a modern OHC with crossflow in 4 and 6 cylinder) when here was an opportunity to have the absolute latest developed by the most capable manufacturer in the world. It played out poorly for AMC but was it wrong at the time to believe that this was a great solution for them?
I do not see any discussion about how the AMC dealers were acting during all of this. Were they clamoring for “exciting” cars to get people into their showrooms? To what extent were the AMC product decisions to have a full line of product offerings, performance models, and be current style being driven by their dealers?
Put some other points into the consideration mix:
– Up until 1971 the German mark was seriously undervalued a 4 to $1.00. This gave them a huge cost advantage that they exploited.
– As the Japanese became more of a force in the market, they too enjoyed a major cost advantage even after the German mark was revalued. Their cost advantage also extended into their supply base Kiretsu system.
The word choice in your first paragraph is interesting: “crucify.” All too many people who don’t come out of journalism or academia seem to assume that offering a critique in an obituary is somehow extreme behavior. My experience with the better publications is that offering a full assessment of a public figure’s life — as opposed to a private figure — is not only considered appropriate, but necessary. After all, obituaries are a first draft of history. If you pretty up an obituary by ignoring controversial topics, then you’ve distorted the historical record.
The above story is an example of how I’m operating more from a journalistic/academic paradigm than that of a car buff. This is obviously not everyone’s cup of tea . . . which is fine; folks have plenty of other auto media choices (go here for our bibliography of links).
In saying all that I want to distinguish between your typical obituary run in a local newspaper and mainly read by family and friends (and likely written by the family). Those are a different animal from the major papers of record, where obituaries tend to be written by professional reporters and focus on public figures.
“I do not see any discussion about how the AMC dealers were acting during all of this. Were they clamoring for “exciting” cars to get people into their showrooms? To what extent were the AMC product decisions to have a full line of product offerings, performance models, and be current style being driven by their dealers? ” This hit me like a whack from a 2×4 on my head. Think about it. Just about all the Big 3 dealers except Cadillac had a full line of compact, midsize, full size, and pony and/or personal luxury cars. The Japanese invasion was starting to get serious, and AMC had to do SOMETHING-ANYTHING! to keep their dealers.
I would not doubt that dealers played a role. However, one might consider two things. First, in the late-60s Volkswagen dealers were among the most profitable around yet they sold an unusually narrow line of economy cars. What might an AMC dealer learn from that?
Also consider that when George Romney decided to pull the plug on full-sized cars in 1957, he faced a fair amount of resistance from within the company — and likely from dealers. Yet he went ahead with a focus on compact Ramblers . . . and it subsequently paid off quite nicely for the dealers in the first half of the 1960s. Sometimes being a leader means to deviate from the path of least resistance.
My guess is that a big reason why AMC under Chapin started to copy the Big Three’s emphasis on a full line of styling-oriented cars was because of the insidiousness of industry groupthink. That basic approach was likely considered normal and acceptable by most, if not all, of the AMC management team’s friends down at the country club. Not the VW Beetle or the early-60s Rambler.
Steve, I agree it just was’nt one thing. Romney probably saved AMC but 1957 was not 1967. Nash/AMC for some reason was the only car maker in that era to to have success with their small car line. Maybe because it was the strongest of the independents. In 57 the big 3 dealers each sold one type of car, maybe with slightly different wheelbases in the mix but still considered full size. Ten years later, the dealers had a huge range of sizes. A couple of variants of the Hornet platform simply would not cut it in the long run. Granted the Pacer was a flop but it offered an object lesson, don’t pin your hopes on some other companys vaporware.
Chrysler survived the 1980s with a modular small-car platform. And in the 1970s, Chrysler of Australia’s creative use of a compact platform hinted at a strategy American Motors could have adapted (go here for further discussion). Keep in mind that AMC needed relatively modest passenger-car volume to turn a profit, particularly if it had fielded only one platform — perhaps 250,000 to 275,000 units per year.
What do you mean by “in the long run”? I don’t like to stretch my counterfactuals too far beyond available historical facts. My main point is that Roy D. Chapin Jr. flushed a huge amount of money down the toilet in the 1970s. If those development dollars had been better spent, such as by introducing a more modern and broad lineup of compacts in the mid-70s, AMC would have been much more likely to have reached the end of the decade without needing a shotgun marriage.
What they might have done after that strikes me as a separate conversation that gets a whole lot more speculative.
I have always liked the design of the Hornet and its fundamentally sound aesthetic design allowed it to have a run from 1970 through 1988. So the question back would be if that one platform could have been sufficient to create enough mutations to sustain AMC? Would the Hornet have been able to fully fund all the financial needs for various product developments and ultimately its follow on platform?
But, by 1970 were too many of the underlying AMC issues already in place to the point where that this would not have been a viable solution?
As Romney left A.M.C., the brilliant “uniside” 1963 Classic and the 1964 American were in the pipeline. Romney had the virtue of focus at A.M.C. after almost seeing the company beached in 1956. I believe Romney knew by 1955 that his company’s sales salvation was the 1956 Rambler and in 1958, the American. The only positive moves for A.M.C. was the acquisition of Jeep from Kaiser and the 1970 Hornet. The Gremlin was a wash on a truncated Hornet platform, so it probably did not jeopardize the company coffers in the way the Javelin, AMX and the clumsy restyles of the Classic and stretched Ambassador. The 1974 Matador was a sad concept in search of a market. The adaption of four-wheel-drive to create the Eagle and Spirit was a development that A.M.C. needed in 1972, not in the 1980s. By then it was too late.
I do not know if “Automotive News” is journalistically tough enough anymore to bluntly, but objectively assess any the career of any top-tier automotive industry executive. One problem is that these journalists are NOT in the boardrooms. The decisions made in 1964 and later in the decade set the future course of A.M.C. Romney understood his mission and maintained his focus. His successors did not.