Indie Auto appreciates when readers give us a heads up about interesting content elsewhere on the web. In a recent comment, John Sutter pointed to an eye-opening review of Thomas E. Bonsall’s (2002) book, Disaster in Dearborn: The Story of the Edsel.
Reviewer Thomas R. Winpenny (2003) argued that if “you have a deep-seated need to hate Robert McNamara, then you are likely to enjoy this book” because “McNamara helped create the Edsel and also supported the F-111 [jet fighter] that came to be known as the ‘Flying Edsel.'”
Those are excerpts from Winpenny’s opening paragraph. When I read it I did a double take because he mischaracterized McNamara’s role with the Edsel — at least as Bonsall described it. So I wondered whether Winpenny, a history book author and college-level instructor, would present evidence that backed up his alternative take. Alas, he did not.
Instead, Winpenny (2003) went on to glibly state that “Henry Ford II, Robert McNamara, and others committed $250,000,000 to designing, building, and marketing” the 1958 Edsel. And after the ill-fated brand was discontinued a few years later, “Robert McNamara moved on to the World Bank.”
In the parallel universe that is Bonsall’s book. . .
Let’s not make too much of non-automotive details such as that McNamara went from president of the Ford Motor Company in early-1961 to defense secretary in a series of Democratic administrations before landing at the World Bank in 1968 (Wikipedia, 2023).
What’s most important about Winpenny’s review is that he ignored Bonsall’s blow-by-blow account of the executive-level infighting that swirled around the Edsel’s creation — which is arguably the most-valuable part of the book.
Bonsall set the table for his discussion about the Edsel by noting that in the mid-1950s the Ford Motor Company’s executive ranks were dominated by a rivalry between those aligned with Ernest R. Breech and the so-called “Whiz kids” led by McNamara.
Also see ‘1958 Edsel with retractable roof hints at why the brand failed’
According to Bonsall, Breech allies Lewis Crusoe and Jack Reith championed a plan to move the Mercury brand upmarket and position it above a new car line eventually named the Edsel (2002, pp. 79-81). In contrast, McNamara was so antagonistic toward the brand that he reportedly made a comment about phasing out the Edsel around the time it was introduced (2002, pp. 129, 139).
It would “be unfair to say [McNamara] hated the Edsel per se, for it went deeper than that,” Bonsall wrote. “He hated complexity his bean-counter mind couldn’t understand. Later, as Secretary of Defense in the 1960s, he would achieve notoriety for his insistence that the Air Force and Navy share a common jet fighter. The resulting F-111 — known derisively as the ‘Flying Edsel’ — was a compromise aircraft that did nothing especially well, but he simply could not see why the Pentagon wanted to spend all that money to develop two or three jet fighters that all looked pretty much the same to him. So it was with cars” (2002, p. 143).
Bonsall presented McNamara negatively, such as by describing him as a “master at killing things through devious means” (2002, p. 139). However, I just don’t see how Winpenny could conclude that McNamara “helped to create the Edsel.”
What led Winpenny astray?
The thing that surprises me the most about Winpenny’s review is it was published by the Economic History Association. Apparently none of this scholarly group’s editors were knowledgeable enough about the U.S. auto industry to recognize such a flawed take.
We could chalk this up to the dangers of writing about automotive history when one doesn’t have much background in the field. Winpenny may have been a historian, but his books were focused on such topics as bridges (Amazon, 2023).
Also see ‘Wheel spinning happens when car buffs and scholarly historians don’t collaborate’
The above excuse might make more sense if Winpenny had made minor errors that only car buffs would typically catch. The problem with his review is more fundamental. Winpenny either did not comprehend portions of the book or chose to ignore whatever deviated from his own biases.
Might Winpenny’s approach to this review have been influenced by a “deep-seated need to hate Robert McNamara,” perhaps due to his post-Ford career?
My point in writing this isn’t to debate Winpenny, who has died (Snyder, 2017). Rather, it is to illustrate how a fully-charged bullshit detector can be useful even when reading academic works.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Amazon; 2023. “Thomas R. Winpenny.” Accessed Aug. 23.
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 2002. Disaster in Dearborn: The Story of the Edsel. Stanford General Books, Stanford, CA.
- Snyder; 2017. “Thomas R. Winpenny, III, 75.” Charles F. Snyder Funeral Homes & Crematory. Posted Feb. 8.
- Wikipedia; 2023. “Robert McNamara.” Page last modified Aug. 20.
- Winpenny, Thomas R.; 2003. “Disaster in Dearborn: The Story of the Edsel.” EH.net. Accessed Aug. 23, 2023.
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- oldcaradvertising.com: Edsel (1958)
I own both volumes of the Gayle Warnock books and the Thomas Bonsall “Disaster in Dearborn” book. which I have read several times. I believe having worked with both accountants, C.F.O.s and highly-degreed engineers, these talented people by-and-large are highly-focused on their tasks. From everything I have read about “The Whiz Kids”, while these Army-Air Force officers were very good at number=crunching, their commanding officer, “Tex” Thornton, recognized all ten men as able to see the bigger picture beyond the figures. Thornton convinced H.F.II and Ernest Breech that his officers could pull Ford together faster. Breech and Jack Reith wanted the multi-divisional FoMoCo in 1952.
The faction led by McNamara believed in the two-tiered wheelbase Ford, a mid-price level Mercury and the luxury Lincoln, which by the end of the 1960s proved to be just right. Does anybody have an idea what Ford would have been like in 1961 with Ford + Falcon + Thunderbird + trucks, Edsel + Comet, Mercury Monterey + Park Lane, Lincoln and Continental ? In the discussion of Chrysler’s brush with bankruptcy in late 1961, points have been raised about the turmoil in Chrysler’s boardroom, divisional realignment and with the corporate styling, would Ford have been able to sustain these ten platforms and the develop the Fairlane / Meteor-Montego / Mustang / Cougar / Mark III as the 1960s ticked off ?