(EXPANDED FROM 10/22/2021)
One of the most pervasive myths in US automotive history is that a V8 engine became essential to an automaker’s success in the first half of the 1950s. This narrative is summed up by Richard Langworth in his book about Hudson: “The importance of a V-8 in any automotive lineup around 1953 or 1954 cannot be underestimated” (1993, p. 126).
I don’t mean to suggest that V8s were irrelevant. However, I will share data that arguably show how a variety of other factors were frequently more important than whether an automaker offered a V8 rather than a straight six or an eight.
This topic is particularly important when assessing the viability of independent automakers. For example, one of the lingering questions about Hudson was whether it would have been better off investing in a V8 rather than the ill-fated compact Jet. While the Jet was a dud for a number of reasons, coming out with a big-block V8 would likely have not helped Hudson a whole lot more.
We will return to Hudson’s situation later in this essay. But first let’s walk through a number of market segments to see how those brands that had a V8 compared to those which did not.
Studebaker sales crash despite offering an early V8
The Ford brand’s advances on Chevrolet in 1950-54 can be pointed to as evidence of a V8’s importance. During that time period Chevrolet’s market share of the low-priced field was static whereas Ford jumped by eight points — and narrowly beat Chevy in 1954. However, we should also consider that Ford was so aggressive in boosting production that historians refer to it as the “Ford Blitz” (go here for further discussion).
If a V8 engine was central to success, then Studebaker should have also done unusually well. This low-priced brand came out with a V8 in 1951 — four years ahead of Chevrolet and Plymouth. Yet between 1950 and 1954 Studebaker’s market share in the low-priced field collapsed.
One could argue that Studebaker would all but inevitably lose ground to Ford and Chevrolet because they engaged in a titanic race for first place during this time period. However, Studebaker also did much worse than Plymouth despite having a V8 as well as some other advantages over Chrysler’s low-priced brand.
Between 1950 and 1954 Studebaker’s share of the low-priced field fell from 8.8 percent to 2.4 percent. In contrast, Plymouth fell only slightly — from 16.8 percent to 16.3 percent.
Common wisdom would suggest that Studebaker should have done better relative Plymouth, particularly in 1954. In addition to offering a V8, Studebaker also had an automatic transmission for the entire model year. And given how much auto historians have maligned the Plymouth’s tall and stubby styling, one would think that Studebaker’s longer, lower and sleeker design could have been at least somewhat more appealing.
Despite these advantages, Studebaker’s production fell by almost 55 percent from 1953 to 1954 — almost twice as much as Plymouth’s. Contributing factors to Studebaker’s collapse may have included quality issues in the previous year’s models as well as the fear of buying a car from a financially shaky automaker.
Why did other independents mostly do better?
What is harder to explain is Studebaker’s weak 1954 output compared to other independents. In 1954 the collective production of full-sized Hudsons, Kaisers, Nashes and Packards fell 53 percent from the previous year — 2 percent less than Studebaker’s. Yet none of them had a V8.
It’s true that Packard saw a 65 percent decline in output. That was a good 10 percent more than Studebaker’s. It’s also true that production of the entry-level Clipper models fell slightly less — around 4 percent — than senior Packards. So one might speculate that the importance of a V8 grew as you went upmarket. By 1954 Packard was the last brand in the high end of the premium-priced field with a straight eight. George Hamlin and Dwight Heinmuller (2002) pointed to this as a major reason for Packard’s falling sales.
Also see ‘1954 Packard Clipper: The car that ended the automaker’s independence’
But why then did Nash and Hudson see the greatest volume declines for their least-expensive big cars? Nash’s entry-level Statesman was off by 64 percent — almost twice as much as its top-end Ambassador — even though the latter competed against popular V8-powered models such as the Buick Century. Hudson saw a similar pattern. The entry-level Wasp declined by 35 percent while the top-end Hornet was down less than 9 percent.
The primary reason why Hudson and Nash’s entry-level models took the biggest hit was likely that Ford and Chevrolet were locked in a take-no-prisoners price war in the midst of a recession. This resulted in the two brands together producing 47.5 percent of total U.S. automotive output in 1954. This was almost 10 percent higher than 1951-52. Almost every other brand in the lower-reaches of the market felt the squeeze.
Buick saw sales decline in 1954 despite a new V8
A few brands did not do quite so badly. Buick was down by only 9 percent and Oldsmobile actually went up six points. The reason why may be that both brands (along with Cadillac) received the only major redesign for 1954. Their lower bodies and wraparound windshields proved to be trendy.
Yet even here we find another anomaly. Buick’s entry-level Special received its first V8 in 1954, yet volume was down almost 13 percent. In contrast, Oldsmobile’s 88 models saw an 11-percent jump in production even though they already had V8s.
That sounds even more counterintuitive because Buick was GM’s most successful premium-priced brand through the first half of the 1950s.
Did Mercury do better than Pontiac because of a V8?
Pontiac and Mercury make one of the better apples-to-apples comparisons. They were somewhat similarly placed in the lower end of the premium-priced field and both had only minor design changes for 1954. Yet Mercury saw its output drop 15 percent whereas Pontiac’s fell by double that amount.
1954 Mercury and Pontiac ads. Click on images to enlarge (Old Car Advertisements).
One factor could have been that Mercury benefitted from the Ford blitz. However, we should note that brand had offered V8s on all of its models since 1939. In contrast, Pontiac still sold only straight sixes and eights as of 1954. When the brand did switch entirely to V8s in 1955, output almost doubled whereas Mercury went up “only” 27 percent.
That said, Mercury hardly dominated Pontiac prior to 1955. For example, in 1952 and 1953 Pontiac output was higher by upwards of 100,000 units. So perhaps the lack of a V8 didn’t hurt Pontiac until 1954.
Plymouth sold better than its siblings despite lack of V8
Let’s return to Plymouth and compare how it did in 1954 with Dodge, its slightly more expensive corporate sibling. Conventional wisdom — which I have more pointedly called Detroit groupthink — would hold that Dodge should have done better because it offered a V8, an automatic transmission for the entire model year, and a longer body with less quirky styling.
Instead, Dodge’s production of V8 models fell by 36 percent — which was seven points more than Plymouth’s. Shouldn’t Dodge have done better because its V8s had a lower list price than all of its competitors except the Olds 88?
Meanwhile, Dodge’s output of sixes fell by a whopping 73 percent. That decimated total Dodge production because almost three times as many Meadowbrook sixes were produced as V8s. Some buyers may have moved over to a V8 model, but total output was still down by 52 percent — far more than Plymouth’s 29 percent.
As another point of comparison, in 1954 Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler saw their collective production drop 46 percent. This was only 7 percent less than the full-sized cars from Hudson, Kaiser, Nash and Packard. How could Chrysler do so badly when all of its premium brands offered V8s?
Also see ‘1955-56 Chryslers: ‘Forward Look’ wasn’t as successful as sometimes assumed’
When you add in production of compact models, the above independents saw a collective decline of only 41 percent. This was not much higher than for Chrysler Corporation as a whole, which was off by 38 percent. Indeed, Nash’s total production was only down by 15 percent due to increased Rambler sales.
This brings up a little-discussed fact: The independent automakers that had the biggest sales declines in 1954 were those without compact entries.
American Motors’ V8s didn’t sell well in the 1950s
If V8s were so crucial to success, you would think that they would have boosted Hudson and Nash sales once they were offered for the first time in 1955. Instead, the opposite occurred. Production of the full-sized Hudson fell by 44 percent and the Nash by 2 percent despite booming sales for the US auto industry in general and the premium-priced field in particular. In addition, V8 output made up only 30 percent of the full-sized Hudson’s output and 26 percent of Nash’s.
One reason why V8 sales were low may have been because the engines were priced around $300 more than sixes. That gave these cars tougher competition.
Also see ‘Five (arguably) unresolved mysteries of postwar independent automakers’
For example, a 1955 Nash Ambassador Super four-door sedan with a V8 had a list price of $2,775. That was well above any Pontiac four-door sedan and bumped up against the Buick Super ($2,876).
The reason for the high cost was that the engine and transmission were bought from Packard. The price dropped significantly once American Motors — the love child of Hudson and Nash — switched to an in-house V8 later in the 1956 model year. Output perked up, but V8s still represented only 45 percent of Hudson output and 42 percent of Nash’s.
A V8 engine was even less popular when added to the compact Rambler in 1957, when roughly 19 percent of buyers opted for one. By 1959 only 7 percent of senior Ramblers had V8s.
Why a big V8 wasn’t a good idea for Hudson
With all of this as background, let’s flesh out a counterfactual with Hudson. Visualize that the automaker did not come out with the Jet, which Langworth rightly described as Hudson’s “single greatest mistake.” He went on to note that the $16 million spent on the Jet “could have more than paid for that V-8 engine Hudson needed so badly in its big cars” (Langworth, 1993; p. 126).
Also see ‘1948 Hudson ‘step-down’ was a brilliant car with tragic flaws’
For the sake of discussion, let’s assume that $16 million could have bought both a V8 and at least a modest updating of its aging full-sized Hudson. Would that have “saved” the automaker?
I doubt it. If Hudson had tried to maintain its high-performance reputation, that would have likely meant a big-block V8 engine. Joining the horsepower race might have been helpful in 1955-56, but a large engine could have been a disadvantage from 1957-59, when fuel economy became increasingly important — and the premium-priced field collapsed.
A big-block V8 would have made it harder for Hudson to shift downmarket, which may have been essential to the automaker’s survival. For example, the big-car body could have been trimmed to a mid-sized footprint. American Motors ended up taking a somewhat similar step by ditching full-sized cars in favor of the compact Rambler.
This brings me to a point that often gets lost in all of the pom-pom waving about V8s: The Rambler was the most successful passenger car fielded by an independent in the 1950s. Although offering a V8 after 1956 resulted in incremental sales, the Rambler could have gotten away with only offering sixes.
The flip side of that story is how the Rambler overshadowed Studebaker as the 1950s progressed even though the latter sold more V8s.
The moral to this story: A V8 may have mattered somewhat to full-sized cars in 1953-56, but it was often less important than other factors.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Oct. 22, 2021 and expanded on Oct. 23, 2023. Market share for brands was calculated from figures listed in Wikipedia (2013). Market share, production figures and body specifications for individual nameplates were calculated from base data from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006) and Gunnell (2002). All data is supposed to be for model rather than calendar years. In instances where data from one source appeared to be erroneous, data from other source was substituted.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1993. Hudson 1946-1957: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
- Wikipedia; 2013. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed July 5.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Ford (1954); Mercury (1954); Plymouth (1954); Pontiac (1954); Rambler (1958, 1959)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge (1954); Studebaker (1954)
Clearly, as U.S. automobiles became larger, heavier and with more power-absorbing options, more horsepower, torque and efficiency was needed in their internal combustion engines. The G.M., Chrysler and Studebaker V-8s were much more efficient than their straight-eight counterparts, but the Ford Y-blocks and Chevrolet V-8s were superior in terms of efficiency. What was actually needed were efficient OHV-sixes, like the A.M.C. 232 / 258 cu.-in. six, the Chevy II 194 cu.-in. and the Chrysler Slant Six. A refined version of the Buick V-6 would have worked, too, but that did not happen until 1986 (?).By 1965-66, most full-size cars could make do with a 350 cu-in. or 396 cu.-in. The lumbering 400 cu.-in. plus V-8s were needed after 1970 for the Detroit dinosaurs that were making their last stands. B.M.W., Mercedes-Benz and Honda are shining examples of what could was and is done with a good six-cylinder engine !
James, your point is well taken that as automobiles became larger that more powerful engines were needed. A parallel argument can be made about power steering; a 1960s compact with a six could plausibly get by without it, but not so much with a V8, let alone with larger cars.
Notwithstanding the fact much more would have been required outside of engines to place the independents in a better position at the time (or that Studebaker could have done a better job in producing their V8 on more pre-SBC lines – particularly in terms of weight), yet it seems both Studebaker and Jeep (more specifically Frazer-Nash / Willys) could have done more to improve their sixes then they did.
Mitsubishi for example converted their version of the Hurricane engine to OHV (despite being diesel powered), while Studebaker needed an earlier Skybolt Six to replace both the Champion and Commander Six before essentially developing a “new six” by reverse-engineering another marque’s six to create their own (like Austin did with the 216 Chevy Six as well as other examples).
Lotus Rebel, please explain your comment! It does not “compute”!
Studebaker’s OHV 6, introduced for the 1961 model year, was a conversion of their flathead Champion 6 (introduced in 1939) and was not another marque’s engine. The use of GM’s 194 and 230 ohv sixes, starting in the 1965 model year, after the South Bend main factory was closed, was not a result of “reverse engineering”. Studebaker lost use of its foundry at that point and could no longer make engines, so it just used the GM engines as bought from them, unmodified except for paint colour!
You misunderstand me.
Am basically saying Studebaker needed a OHV Skybolt 6 or suitable equivalent (one without the weak stops and with scope for a bit more enlargement) in the post-war era from about the late-40s / early-50s instead of 1961.
Or had it been feasible, for Studebaker to be in a position to follow the example of Austin in the UK in reverse-engineering an existing OHV Six (the 216 Chevy) when they had the chance as one of the stronger US independents prior to the price war between Ford and Chevrolet.
Interesting to note when Chevrolet introduced the “Tri-five” in Australia for 1955, it was only available with the 6 cyl. engine Down Under.
http://oldcarbrochures.org/Australia/Chevrolet/Cars/1955-Chevrolet-Brochure/index.html
They have to wait the 1960 model year to see the V8.
Great article, Steve. I came across it looking for a story on the Jet.
Speaking of that car, had Ed Barit spent $16M not on the it (the money was only enough to tool a new body, not a new V8 too) but on a replacement for the large Hudson bodies, then Hudson would have taken an important step towards saving not only itself but Packard, because Packard could have used Hudson’s new body as early as 1954. Saving Packard was key to saving Hudson, because Hudson needed Packard’s V8 and both needed the other’s dealers.
Getting back to Steve’s article about the V8 being less important in this era than commonly believed, I have long felt that Packard’s V8 cost it its existence. Packard had enough money to tool either a V8 and a refreshed body for 1955, or an all-new, wider, lower body powered by the existing 359 Eight, with a new V8 coming 1-2 years later. Which would the market have preferred? I strongly suspect it was the new body, and the 1954 Panther show car represented the perfect design theme. That car was powered by a supercharged version of the 359 Eight and I have never heard anyone complain that it was an old-school inline flat-head.
Paul, you make some good points. One thing I have wondered is whether Packard could have gotten away with introducing a V8 later — and perhaps even much later — than it did. When I have brought up that idea in other venues it was roundly dismissed, so I haven’t mentioned it here. However, Packard without a V8 in the mid-1950s does raise some really interesting points about Detroit groupthink. So I am percolating on a little story.
There were a series of articles published, I believe, in The Packard Cormorant many years ago called The Nance Papers, and one of the items included was a paper written in 1954 by Frederick M. Rush in the lead-up to the Studebaker merger. It was titled: “Why I Broke with Jim Nance.” Rush was a former member of the PMCC Management Group (1952-54) and Chairman of the Packard Stockholders Committee. He was very critical of Nance and tried (unsuccessfully) to stop the merger in the courts. Of the many areas that he addressed, one was the Utica V8:
“The days when a V-8 engine was a selling point have long since passed in the industry. I had proved this by making a field survey among the dealers and field men to discover that the lack of a V-8 engine was having little effect on Packard sales opportunities. Packard’s Straight-8 engine has been the industry’s finest for years. It was sheer folly to throw it away at a cost of 18 or more millions!”
I think it was in the Nance Papers, if I recall correctly, that one of Packard’s shareholders in the lead-up to the Studebaker merger was very vocal about Packard spending too much money, particularly on the V8:
The Panther straight 8 was the least of the car’s problems. The big problem was it was ugly. I mean mud fence ugly. Worse than those other Packard two seater prototypes that looked like flower cars. Was the horsepower competitive with the contemporary V8s? Drop a 4 barrel or 2 on it and put it in an Executive coupe and make an Executive drop top also, and call it the Panther. Stress the power and smoothness of the engine, it would make a great Spring 1955 halo car.
I’ve heard quite a few folks dress down the Panther, dress it down pretty darn good. I don’t really understand why. Saw it in the early 90s at the Crawford Auto Museum when I was first getting interested in classic cars, thought it was a knock-out. Still do but only the original design with sore thumbs, not the update with cathedrals and two-tone paint.
Agree, the 359 Eight would have benefited from more carburation, which presumably it would have received for ’55. The Utica OHV V8 provided more power and efficiency, both of value in the market. By 1957 I suspect that it would have been hard to sell the old Eight given that the competition offered wider, lower cars in addition to modern V8s. Packard could have converted its Eight to OHVs the way AMC did its small Six, but even that would have been a stop-gap.
Everything but the front looked great on the Packard, but OMG??? What were they thinking?? Damned thing looks like a bucktoothed frog. No wonder Packard went under. I’d have been ashamed to drive it.
Did Packard imploding help Cadillac, Lincoln or Imperial in terms of sales?
The decline of Packard helped solidify Cadillac as the luxury leader, then Lincoln in 1956-1957 and Imperial between 1955 to 1959, but not huge extent. But Packard’s death-rattle began in 1948 with the bulbous connect-the-fenders of the 1941 Clipper re-body. The 1948 Cadillac was everything the Packard was not.
G.M.’s “Boss” Kettering studied the V-8s and straight sixes and eights as did Buick’s Chayne and Oldsmobile’s Gordon. The key to the new V-8 was tetraethyl lead to increase gasoline octane to keep high-compression engines from “knocking”. G.M. saw its post-war future in bigger, heavier, faster cars with all sorts of power accessories. The problem with every manufacturer’s engines were they were massive lumps of cast-iron. I guess the conventional wisdom was that as long as gas was cheap, gas-mileage didn’t matter. The need for the V-8 was propelled by the notion of faster acceleration and cruising speeds on better roads among the younger men returning from the war. The public felt the need for speed !