A July 1966 Car and Driver road test of the Toyota Corona insisted that if this car was “typical of what the Japanese automobile industry is producing, European manufacturers deserve to lose a healthy slice of the American market.”
The magazine lauded the shaver-nosed Corona for being a “better buy than practically any car being imported from Europe” (1966, p. 31). For under $2,000 one got a subcompact with an unusual amount of room and custom features combined with competitive performance and a solid build.
“The car is designed to an excellent scale — bigger than most economy cars, yet quite a bit smaller than the compacts,” Car and Driver wrote. “The engine is just the right size and produces the proper amount of power to ensure quiet running, fuel economy and durability” (1966, p. 32).
In a way I am surprised that Car and Driver would be so enthusiastic about a four-door sedan with a front bench seat and two-speed automatic transmission. Perhaps this was partly because road testers were impressed that here was finally an import that didn’t feel so fragile on American highways. The magazine concluded that the Corona “does everything that a European economy sedan does, and it’ll probably do it longer” (1966, p. 32).
Also see ‘Four-door subcompacts were not exotic in late-60s and early-70s’
The luxury of hindsight would suggest that this turned out to be true. And thanks to the reputation the Corona developed, by 1968 Toyota became the third-best-selling import, behind Volkswagen and Opel. In 1969, with the introduction of the entry-level Corolla, Toyota would rise to second place. By 1971 the automaker was selling more than 300,000 units in the U.S.
Focus on building market share over profits paid off
Japanese automakers such as Toyota have come to so dominate the U.S. market that even us old timers can forget how once upon a time that their products were not highly regarded here.
David Halberstam wrote that when Japanese cars were first imported in the 1950s, some Americans were surprised that they made their own cars. Yet the prescience of Car and Driver was shared by other U.S. observers, such as industrial consultant James Abegglen. David Halberstam summed up his thinking way back in 1960:
“It was important for American auto manufacturers not to underestimate their Japanese competition, Abegglen felt. Having watched the process in other businesses he knew that once the Japanese edged toward mass production and a growing market, they did battle domestically with a single-mindedness that went well beyond American levels of competition. Abegglen felt that the auto competition would be especially bitter.” (1986, p. 304)
Abegglen also recognized that a key advantage the Japanese automakers would possess was their relentless focus on cutting costs while forsaking short-term profits in a quest to build long-term market share. That’s exactly what Toyota did with the Corona: They packed the car with an impressive array of features for its price. Car and Driver was rightly impressed. So too were car buyers.
NOTES:
U.S. sales and production figures are from Flammang (1992), the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006) and Gunnell (2002).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Car and Driver; 1966. “Toyota Corona.” July issue: pp. 31-34.
- Flammang, James M.; 1992. Standard Catalog of Imported Cars, 1946-1990. First Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Halberstam, David; 1986. The Reckoning. William Morrow & Co., New York, NY.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “Toyota Corona.” Page last modified April 23.
PHOTOGRAPHY:
- 1969 Australian Toyota Corona photo by Fitzroy via Wikipedia (public domain)
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It might be interesting to look at how the product lines grew with Toyota and Datsun as by 1973 they had multiple car lines as well as their pick-up trucks.
Fiat probably should be in this chart since they did have a good US presence.
For the German cars it is also a notable point that they would have to deal with the revaluing of the DM/$ from 4DM = $1 to it only took 2.65 DM for $1 during 1973.
I didn’t have complete US Fiat sales for the time period covered — and this story was about Toyota’s rise. I could see doing a separate story on third-tier imports.
In understanding the success of Toyota, and even the other Japanese brands, it may be some consideration given to how they set up their US operation in SoCal which was a hot bed for automotive trends. By the middle of the 1970s they had moved from small market trend observation groups into full fledged design studio/product development operations. They were clearly making sure that their new products were fitting the US market. At that time SoCal was viewed as being 5 years in front of the majority of the US on where “next” was. Toyota created Calty Design in Newport Beach, Nissan has Nissan Design International in La Jolla, Mazda is/was in Irvine, Honda is in Torrance. Although these large scale design operations came a bit later than 1973 some were already at early stage by that time.
Jeff, there’s a reason people say Fix It Again Tony.
True, but they were a notable presence in the market for a good period of time. In addition to the reliability issues they also had the dreaded tin worm too.
Tin worm was a problem with most European cars of the time too, and as far as that goes, US cars compared to modern ones. The foreign manufacturers had no comprehension how we abused our vehicles, or the mountains of salt we poured on the road in winter. I worked for a chain car painting outfit in the mid-70s and cars five or six years old would typically have rust through on lower panels.
The article highlights what many forget today – the first victims of the Japanese were the low-cost European marques. By 1990, even VW was on the ropes in the U.S. (and seriously considering an exit from the North American market). With this car, the Corolla and the Datsun 510, the Japanese were ready for prime time.
As for Fiat – it’s my understanding it did sell well in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And not just the sports cars. The 128 was actually recommended by Consumer Reports as a top subcompact for a few years. But, by 1975, owners were reporting so many problems, and there were so many complaints about subpar dealer service, that the magazine withdrew its recommendation.
Fiat could have had a decent level of success if it had worked to improve reliability, and built up a better dealer network. The Japanese, led by Toyota, were the ones to take that approach.
The problems with most Japanese cars, especially Toyota, Mitsubishis and Hondas in the
early 1970s, were three-fold: 1.) Thinner sheet-metal; 2.) Rust-prone in the Rust Belt where salt was used on the roads in the winter; and 3.) Engines that were simply not meant for prolonged running (Interstates) at speeds above 55-m.p.h. But Fiats were among the most rust-prone vehicles (at least in Indiana) of all of the vehicles I have ever encountered. One of my announcer friends at WIBC-AM purchased a new Fiat 124 roadster in the spring of 1975. Spots of rust started to appear by the third month of ownership. He traded it for a new MGB-GT !
I have always wondered how Datsun spiraled downward against Toyota in the late 1960s and 1970s. The chart shows Datsun selling more than Toyota then for a while nearly the same.
Datsun had the 510 that was clearly a sophisticated car for its time with IRS and OHC (design by Pininfarina). They had the 1600 then 2000 sports cars and before them the 600 and 800. By 1970 they had the 240Z. A great little pick-up.
Would any of the rise of Toyota be caused by their independent regional distributorship organization?
The thing that really caught my eye in this story was that Opel ranked #2 behind Volkswagen. Imagine if GM had started building Opels in the US prior, to German standards of quality, prior to the revaluing of the DM. Instead of the Vega, a Chevy subcompact could have been either a rebodied or badge-engineered Opel (long before the Chevette). I’ll go out on a limb – lol – to guess that such ideas never crossed the minds of any American GM exec in the late 60s.