Popular Science’s Jan P. Norbye and Jim Dunne criticized the quality and practicality of four 1972 premium-priced big cars. They road tested the Buick LeSabre, Chrysler Newport Royal, Mercury Monterey and Oldsmobile Delta 88.
“It’s apparent that the makers have cut back on the quality of materials and attention to detail in these cars,” the authors wrote. “They do not have the same finish and trim as their exact counterpart of five or six years ago. They are plain janes by comparison, hardly on a par with the latest Ford LTD, Chevrolet Caprice, and Fury Gran Sedan” (1972b, p. 56).
One area that automakers apparently cut corners on was with sound deadening. “Noise levels were surprisingly high,” according to Norbye and Dunne. “Some readings were no better than in compact cars sold at half the price” (1972b, p. 56).
In addition, the road testers noted that although the premium-priced cars were larger on the outside than their low-priced counterparts, “seating dimensions are about the same” (1972b, p. 56). To make matters worst, trendy styling made it harder to get in and out of the back seats.
GM’s cars were the worst offenders
“You have to be a contortionist to enter or leave the back seat,” Norbye and Dunne said of the LeSabre and Delta 88. “Curved side glass cuts off the door opening, and leg room is restricted. Even your approach to the driver’s seat must be made with care. Curved rear door posts cut into back-seat foot space at the base” (1972b, p. 56).
These problems were partly the result of GM’s 1971 redesign of its big cars. The automaker embraced Chrysler’s “fuselage” styling theme — and arguably went a step further. Side windows curved inward even more dramatically. It looked ultra modern but undercut the rationale for a family car.
Due to big-block V8 engines and curb weights that hovered around 4,600 pounds, gas mileage was only 10.5 to 12.5 mpg. Yet trunk space for three out of four of the test cars ranged from 17-18.2 cubic feet. That was no better than a mid-sized AMC Matador — a car that weighed around 1,100 pounds less and achieved almost 19 mph with roughly equivalent acceleration (1972a, p. 36).
So what was the point of buying a premium-priced car? Norbye and Dunne noted that the positive attributes of these models, such as a pleasant ride and extra passenger crash protection, were not necessarily better than in a low-priced car.
The headline of the article asked whether the premium-priced entries were “worth the extra cost,” but the authors didn’t do a direct price comparison. If they had, they might have found that the price tags of these premium cars were strikingly similar to a top-end Ford, Chevrolet and Plymouth.
As we discussed here, during the early-70s the LTD’s sales grew to such a degree that they started to run neck and neck with GM’s premium big cars. However, it would take two oil crises and a particularly punishing recession to tank the premium-priced, big-car market.
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RE:SOURCES
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Norbye, Jan. P. and Jim Dunne; 1972a. “How Good Are the ’72 INTERMEDIATES?” Popular Science. January issue: pp. 24-36, 123.
- ——; 1972b. “Medium Standards: Are They Worth the Extra Cost?” Popular Science. April issue: pp. 50-60.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcarbrochures.org: Buick (1972); Chrysler (1972); Mercury (1972); Oldsmobile (1972)
It was after 1972 that Consumer Reports stopped testing the medium-price full-size cars separately from their low-price counterparts. The magazine said that the cars no longer offered any serious advantages over their lower priced corporate brethren.
This was when the Sloan Brand Ladder really began collapsing. No doubt part of this was driven by model proliferation. If all of a corporation’s full-size cars are based on the same platform, and the leadership team is demanding more cross-divisional parts sharing (DeLorean documents this in his book), then it stands to reason that the cars will increasingly perform and “feel” alike.
This is why it was so important for GM to have different sheetmetal as discernable product differentiation, something Ford and Chrysler wouldn’t do.
Other reasons for a buyer to pick one of another are the quality of the dealership experience. Not that the lower priced brand’s dealership couldn’t deliver a great experience but more if dealership/brand A is lacking go to the other dealership with brand B to be satisfied. This was something that most Cadillac dealers did understand.
GM was platform based from at least the 1950s so it is inconceivable to expect a radically different interior space on any B body from any division would happen.
As General Motors Assembly Division plants, divided into Chevrolet plants and Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac plants, replaced Fisher Body, Fred Donner’s dream of putting the “car guys” back in their rightful place (in Donner’s scheme of things) became reality as divisional authority as watered down year after year beginning in 1958. While the 1964 G.M. intermediates came out of this post-Sloan regime to replace the Y-bodies, as well as the brilliant 1965 Bill Mitchell full-size cars, both the 1965 and 1970 U.A.W. strikes put all of the domestic automakers in a cost-profit squeeze in addition to the post-“Great Society” inflationary spiral. I remember the “chrome” aluminum trim on my father’s 1967 Bel Air which in 1966 had been stainless. By the early 1970s, materials in G.M. cars were of lesser quality than the earlier models of the same cars. Of course, G.M. has not learned its lessons as the current crop of G.M. cars at all price levels have been roundly panned for the shoddy interior materials.