John Beltz has been pointed to as one of the more forward-looking General Motors’ executives of the early-70s, but he came across as rather cautious in a lengthy Motor Trend (1970) interview. He was the general manager of Oldsmobile from 1969 until his untimely death in 1972 (Wikipedia, 2022).
Beltz sounded like a buttoned-down GM executive when addressing contentious issues such as a UAW strike and government regulations. And while he expressed enthusiasm for the superior packaging and roadworthiness of larger European cars, he suggested that Detroit’s wares weren’t going to change very quickly.
Why? For one thing, he argued that over the “next three or four years” the U.S. auto industry wouldn’t “do any particular innovating aside from the immediate problems that we face, which are smog, emission reduction, and improvement in crashworthiness of the car. . . . Those things present such enormous problems and are going to take so much of our energy and facilities, that any other areas of innovation are going to have to be deferred until those things are taken care of” (Motor Trend, 1970; p. 70).
That argument makes sense, but from there his logic went downhill.
When did GM get burned by shrinking its big cars?
Beltz went on to argue that shrinking the size of big American cars would not happen quickly because of consumer resistance:
“To illustrate my point, back in 1966 we became convinced that cars had gotten too big — I’m talking about General Motors — we thought we should make our full size cars smaller. We restyled them and we really made them smaller. We not only made them smaller in overall length, but smaller in bulk, that is, they looked smaller. And it was one of the biggest mistakes we ever made; it was very poorly received. People perceived that for the same amount of money, there was a big reduction in value.” (Motor Trend, 1970; p. 72)
It’s not clear to me what downsizing Beltz was referring to. After World War II the full-sized Chevrolet bulked up with only a few minor exceptions prior to a major downsizing in 1977.
A standard four-door sedan peaked in shipping weight at 3,600 pounds in 1959 but by 1963 was gradually pruned back to 3,280 pounds. Along the way length hovered between 211 and 209 inches — such a small amount that I question whether anyone would have noticed unless Chevrolet ads had pointed that out.
From 1964 to 1970 weight grew back to 3,600 pounds, reflecting length increases to 216 inches. Where was this disastrous downsizing he spoke of?
It’s true that output for the slightly trimmed 1961 Chevrolet was off, but by under 4 percent — well below the 14 percent of the total domestic industry. Meanwhile, sales of GM’s premium brands fell by 33 percent, but this was arguably a product of a recession, the introduction of compacts and the collapse of the premium-priced, big-car field.
What’s particularly curious about Beltz’s fretting that the public would see a downsized car as a reduction in value is that in 1970 mid-sized cars overtook big cars in sales for the first time.
In addition, Beltz had surely noticed that Pontiac saw a major jump in sales when it moved its Grand Prix in 1969 from a big to a mid-sized platform. Might Oldsmobile’s poor-selling Toronado have experienced a similar revival if it had followed suit?
Toronado would appeal to potential Mercedes buyers?
When asked whether Oldsmobile was looking at offering a car that targeted potential buyers of more expensive imports such as the Mercedes-Benz, Beltz pointed to the just-introduced 1971 Toronado: “I think we’ve done everything I know of at the moment in our car, to not compromise it and be able to meet the needs of this kind of person” (Motor Trend, 1970; p. 92).
Beltz’s assumption seemed to be that the Toronado could compete against the Mercedes even though it had been upsized to the point where it was a whopping three feet longer than a 250C. Nor did he sound concerned about the increasing popularity of premium-priced imported cars such as the Audi, which he described as “overpriced” (Motor Trend, 1970; p. 74).
The interviewer was clearly concerned that Detroit was being outgunned by the imports because Beltz was asked if American cars would be “better if our design centers were not so concentrated in Detroit?” (Motor Trend, 1970; p. 74).
Also see ‘Popular Science pans premium cars for cost cutting and impractical styling’
“I don’t think so,” Beltz answered. “I think that American automobiles have been optimized for what our automotive needs in this country have been. That doesn’t mean that those needs aren’t changing, and that our philosophies and the public demand isn’t changing. But up to this point, we’ve done a pretty good job of designing” (Motor Trend, 1970; p. 74).
If that was the case, then why did the market share of imported cars and trucks soar from only 5 percent in 1965 to 14 percent in 1970? Beltz didn’t go there.
Perhaps that merely reflected his public-relations skills, but I suspect that if Beltz had lived longer that his tenure at GM would have been marked by a less forward-thinking sensibility than his mercurial colleague, John Z. DeLorean.
NOTES:
Production figures and product specifications are from Gunnell (2002), Flammang and Kowalke, 1999), Flory (2004), the Automobile Catalog (2021) and the Classic Car Database (2021). Graph with shipping weights includes entry-level four-door sedan models with six-cylinder engines (unless a V8 was standard). Market share figures from Wards Auto (2017).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Automobile Catalog; 2021. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.”
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Classic Car Database; 2021. “Search for Specifications.”
- Flammang, James M. and Ron Kowalke; 1999. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1976-1999. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Motor Trend; 1970. “John Beltz.” December issue: pp. 72-76, 92-93.
- Wards Auto; 2017. “U.S. Total Vehicle Sales Market Share by Company.”
- Wikipedia; 2022. “John Beltz.” Page last edited Oct. 4.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chevrolet (1961)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Oldsmobile Toronado (1971); Pontiac Grand Prix (1969)
In the book Setting the Pace: Oldsmobile’s First Hundred Years, it’s claimed that Beltz did push for a direct competitor to the BMW 2002, but was shot down by GM management because it would have cost too much to develop. (This sounds plausible, given how reluctant GM was to invest in a new platform for what became the Cadillac Seville, even though it was obvious that Mercedes was making inroads with potential Cadillac customers.)
I’m guessing he was thus towing the corporate line in this interview, because all of that would have transpired before 1970.
That’s a good point. I’ll check out that book.
Geeber is correct ! By 1964, Fred Donner’s G.M.A.D. consolidation was the law of the land at G.M., so developing new platforms was going nowhere other than the Camaro-Firebird in the fall of 1966. The Toronado-Eldorado-conventional second-generation Riviera platform was already in the development phase in 1964 for introduction in the fall of 1965. The 1968 Nova was spun out of the Camaro-Firebird platform. Ed Cole was championing his Vegly-2300 to replace his Corvair. G.M. was firmly in the control of the finance guys in New York. So, if John Beltz wanted to keep his job, he could not go off the reservation.
I’m also curious as to why the Motor Trend writer didn’t push back on the claim that GM had downsized its full-size cars in 1966. GM had just introduced an all-new platform for its B- and C-bodies in 1965, and the cars had sold well. Even GM wasn’t going to make major changes to a successful line of cars that had only been on the market for one year. So Beltz’s claim makes no sense.
He’s obviously referring to the 1961 models, which were made slightly smaller than the 1959-60 generation. They were also taller and more upright, which was a welcome relief. Popular Mechanics surveyed owners of the 1961 Chevrolet as part of its regular “Owners Report” series, and several mentioned that they bought the car because of the more rational styling and greater ease of entry and exit.
The problem wasn’t the cars…there was a mild recession in 1961, and it hurt car sales. The new-car market came roaring back in 1962 for everyone except Chrysler, but that was because many customers hated the offbeat styling of the 1962 Dodge and Plymouth.
I wasn’t sure how to interpret Beltz’s reference to 1966 given auto-development lead times. As you say, it didn’t make sense to be talking about 1966 models, nor was there a hint of downsizing over the next few years. This was clearly a fact error and I’m surprised that Motor Trend didn’t fix it during the editing process.
Even the 1961 models were only mildly trimmed, e.g., the Chevrolet by 1.5 inches in length, 2.4 inches in width and around 50 pounds. So if this was what Beltz was actually referring to, why did he describe it in such a negative way? Was GM’s corporate culture so conservative that he felt like he had to show his loyalty to “bigger = better” even if that looked retrograde to external audiences?
It could be that Beltz was more focused on premium-priced cars such as the Oldsmobile 88, which was pruned in 1961 by 5.6 inches in length, 3.4 inches in width and 60 pounds. But while sales were down substantially for GM’s premium big cars in 1961, total market share for Pontiac, Oldsmobile and Buick actually went up 1.4 percent. That was likely because of the introduction of the new Y-body compacts (go here for further discussion). And while big-car sales rebounded in 1962, that arguably wasn’t because the cars bulked out so much — the 88 carried over a meaningful amount of sheetmetal and was only 1.9 inches longer than in 1961.
First, expecting Motor Trend to be critical/challenge an industry executive in an interview is not credible. MoTrend was not going to bite the hand that filled the magazine with major ad pages – that cost managing editors their job.
I remember the original introduction of the 1976 Seville. It was considered a risk but it turned out quite well for GM. I was in west side Los Angeles at that time and they quickly were all over the place in the “nice neighborhoods”.
I was also around for the 1977 GM downsized; still in Los Angeles. Again, this was a big gamble for GM. It worked out extremely well as not only were the cars smaller but they ushered in a new sheer look aesthetic that made Ford and Chrysler look out of date (not that either company took that to heart). Although the downsizing was overdue it was a risk. Pre-first gas crisis (when this interview was done) it is easy to accept that the idea of notable downsizing would just not be taken seriously. This would be especially true at Oldsmobile where it was the one step down from Cadillac in the hierarchy. One might read some of the large car sales numbers versus the mid size market share as a case where those that would have been a candidate for the lower model range of the full size realized they could have a higher level mid size for the same money. The result would/could be that it was primarily the top trim levels of the full size that retained their buyers.
Beltz was very likely sticking to the basic script of GM’s PR mandates. The Wikipedia profile on him also references a Car & Driver interview.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Beltz
That link is in the first paragraph of the story.
I bet he compared the pony car craze at the time with the Corvair story. GM in 1966 was rushing with the prootype Camaro (FR layout) in order to regain some reputation that blew with Nader and the Corvair (RR layout) chapter in the book. The Corvair was such an european car made by americans that, at first, they loved and bought some 1.6 million units by 1966, selling the average of 250.000 units PER YEAR! More consistent between 1960 and 1966 than Ford. Talk about your Mustang now… Only in 1967 the Mustang would get close to 1.2 million units sold, and only because the bad reputation the Corvair earned for being a “risky” car to drive. GM did the basics and substituted it with the Camaro, also leading to a crazy internal competition between Corvair, Nova and Camaro.
The story as we know: Nova just gets minor updates as long as its chassis can last in 1979, Corvair ends up in 1969 selling very quiely few units, Camaro grows larger and more luxurious up to 1981.
But I understand why he was worried in 1966. The “flimsy” european look of thin pillars and overall style of the Corvair was a match enough between America and Europe, but the mechanical parts were not technically developed like some high-end european cars that had even fuel injection and OHC. All these high-tech wonders of the 1950s merely migrated to the competition niche market in the USA, far away from the homes and daily drivers of everyone. The semi-spherical Chrysler Hemi had compression problems exactly because wide valve angles, only very expensive COPO/SS/YEKNO Chevys had aluminium heads, Ford OHC “Cammer” wasn’t torquy enough at low rpms like the all Windsor/Cleveland/Y-Block/FE V8s… He was noticing that these ideas (also looked upon by the japanese) were being taken seriously in the old world with fantastic results even on smaller 6 cylinder engines.
This guy, Beltz, was basically on a foresight of the dark moments of the Malaise Era. People buying cars just because they were big, the false perception of more dollar per pound and size. No doubt a Ford Coupe 1951 was lighter and had better aerodynamics than a 1967 Ford Galaxie; it was also cheaper and more reliable 20 years later. Studebaker, Nash, Hudson, Kaiser… all of them trying to bring new things, just to be rebuked by overconfidence on the public about the “Big Three”. Yep, sometimes you are your worst enemy. AMC was always trying to be reasonable, but no one listened.
A car can be bigger, sure! But… it has more value? And… value by what, exactly? Even today, only Elon Musk is capable of predicting (along with some chinese and japanese auto makers, of course) and do that calculation in order to survive. There’s a reason why Acura is the top best selling brand per unit on the luxury market; they are carefully-built Hondas with a little extra perfume and more soft interior.