Aaron Severson (2009) has argued that when Ford added the Falcon and Fairlane in the early-60s, they did well initially but “total sales during that period remained almost flat.” In other words, the brand suffered from cannibalization, whereby new models didn’t attract many new buyers but instead divided “existing customers into smaller subcategories.”
This argument makes intuitive sense, but a data dive suggests that an additional factor was at play — the full-sized Ford simply wasn’t as competitive in 1960-64 as it had previously been with the Chevrolet.
Here it is important to remember that General Motors’ low-priced brand also expanded its lineup during the first half of the 1960s, yet the sales of its big cars did not dip nearly as much as Ford’s.
The graph below tells a stark story. Up through 1959 Ford output stayed relatively close to the Chevrolet’s in the full-sized field. However, in 1960 Ford began to fall behind. By 1964 Chevrolet’s production almost reached 1.6 million units whereas Ford only tallied roughly 923,000 units.
What I find particularly striking about the trajectory of Ford’s 1960-64 models is that they did consistently worse than even in the recession of 1958. This stood in contrast to the big Chevrolet, which after bottoming out in 1961 bounced back to near record levels.
Output of smaller cars didn’t make up Ford’s deficit
It’s true that the Ford brand’s expanding lineup helped it close the sales gap with Chevrolet, but only partially. The graph below shows how in 1960-61 Ford’s non-big cars did better than Chevrolet’s by around 260,000 units. However, Ford’s advantage dramatically shrank to under 138,000 units in 1962, roughly 87,000 units in 1963 and around 106,000 units in 1964.
Only at the peak of the Mustang’s sales in 1965-66 did Ford’s advantage over Chevrolet once again soar.
The strong sales of non-big Fords weren’t nearly enough to keep the brand’s total output competitive. The key reason why was that Chevrolet saw its total production grow by a remarkable 53 percent between 1961 and 1964. During that same time period Ford only grew by 26 percent.
By 1964 total Chevrolet production had reached a record-smashing 2.27 million units. That year Ford also surpassed its previous record by building 1.7 million passenger cars. And largely due to the Mustang, which was introduced mid year, Ford was starting to catch up — and would actually surpass Chevrolet in 1966.
Even so, the damage had been done. Between 1960 and 1964 the Chevrolet brand built almost 2.1 million more passenger cars than Ford did.
Chevrolet was more reliant on big-car sales than Ford
Comparing the output of individual nameplates can give us a more granular sense of why Chevrolet was more successful than Ford in the first half of the 1960s. In 1960-61 Ford’s Falcon sold much better than the Chevrolet Corvair. In addition, the Thunderbird was at the peak of its popularity — vastly outselling the Corvette.
Chevrolet began to whittle down Ford’s advantage with non-big cars by introducing the compact Chevy II in 1962 and the mid-sized Chevelle in 1964. In the latter year the Chevy II and Corvair together eclipsed the Falcon in output while the Chevelle outsold the Fairlane. Ford’s main bright spots were the hot-selling Thunderbird and Mustang.
Chevrolet’s utter dominance of the full-sized field didn’t last forever. Beginning in 1966 the Chevy saw its popularity begin to slide through most of the rest of the decade whereas Ford maintained relatively stable sales. This partly reflected the growing popularity of mid-sized cars but also the success of Ford’s new top-of-line LTD series (go here).
What was wrong with the 1960-64 big Ford?
If we can’t solely blame the 1960-64 big Ford’s weak sales on cannibalization, then what might have been other factors? This topic deserves a longer article, but for now I would brainstorm two potential problem areas.
The first problem was that the new body introduced in 1960 and used through 1964 was arguably too heavy. Whereas a 1959 base Ford four-door sedan with a six-cylinder had a shipping weight of 3,385 pounds, the equivalent 1960 model came in at 3,605 pounds. For 1961 weight declined slightly because the car was given a rapid-fire reskinning that shrunk its size. Width declined from 81.5 to 79.9 inches and length dropped from 213.7 to 209.9 inches.
The 1961-64 Ford was roughly the same size as the Chevrolet but upwards of 300 pounds heavier. In 1963 Consumer Reports complained that even though the Ford had a “surprisingly high total weight,” its body was only “fairly staunch on really rough roads” and the trunk was shallow (1963, p. 184). The car’s weight was deemed a particular problem with a six-cylinder engine, which gave “the least satisfactory performance” and was noisier than the Chevrolet (1963, p. 181).
Ford learned its lesson. An all-new body for 1965 was put on enough of a diet that it was slightly lighter and smaller than the also-new Chevrolet.
Also see ‘1963 Mercury Marauder: Ford tries to do a premium-priced car on the cheap
A second problem was styling, particularly in 1962. A partial — and decidedly bland — facelift was matched with the discontinuation of a semi-fastback, two-door hardtop. For the next year and a half the only hardtop would share its roofline with fairly utilitarian four-door models.
Sales began to bounce back with a more attractive reskinning in 1963 and the reintroduction of a sportier two-door hardtop at mid year.
Did Ford try to stretch its limited resources too thin?
I have previously written that the 1962 Fairlane may have cannibalized the big Ford (go here). However, the data also suggests that — particularly in 1963-64 — Ford’s problem was not all that much greater than Chevrolet’s.
In addition, I suspect that the problem wasn’t just that some potential buyers of the big Ford instead chose a Falcon or Fairlane, but rather that senior models lost out on development and marketing dollars spent on these new entries.
The Ford Motor Company did not have as deep of pockets as GM, particularly after the failure of its hugely expensive invasion of the premium-priced and luxury-car fields in the late-50s (go here). This is but one example of how product proliferation tilted the playing field to the biggest American automaker.
Consider this: Might the big Ford have not hit rock bottom in sales during 1962 if it had been given a more substantial restyling and greater marketing that instead went to launching the mid-sized Fairlane?
NOTES:
Production figures and specifications are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Consumer Reports (1963); Flory (2004, 2009); Gunnell (2002) and (Wikipedia (2013).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Consumer Reports; 1963. “Auto Buying Guide for 1963.”
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2009. American Cars, 1946-1959: Every Model, Year by Year. McFarland & Co.
- ——; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Severson, Aaron; 2009. “How Big Is Too Big? The Midsize Ford Fairlane and Mercury Comet.” Ate Up With Motor. Posted May 30.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Page last modified Jan. 26.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Ford (1964)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Chevrolet (1962, 1964); Ford (1962, 1964)
I’ve read 1957 and 1960 Fords had poor quality. Perhaps that bad reputation resulted in poor sales for 1960 through 1964 models.
The 1957 models had workmanship issues and were notorious for early rust-out. The body panels also lacked sufficient stiffness. They were almost as bad as the 1957 Mopars.
The 1958 models were improved. The 1958 Ford features roof grooves, a hood scoop and a trunk lid with a depressed center – all of which were added to make those panels stiffer. The 1959 models were improved again, and were quite competitive in build quality and rust resistance.
Unfortunately, the 1960 models were rushed to market, and were a step backwards from the 1959 models.
Yeah, just imagine the 1958 models was as bad as the 1957, Ford was lucky to not lost its #2 position to Chrysler. I guess it might explain why Ford Australia had kept the 1955-56 body a bit longer for their 1957 and 1958 models althought another explaination is then the full-size Ford was sold in small numbers Down Under and Aussie buyers mainly flocked to the Zephyr and Consul until the Falcon and Cortina arrived and it wasn’t worth to get the new 1957 American body in Australia due to costs.
Here some scans of the Australian 1957 and 1958 Fords.
https://oldcarbrochures.org/Australia/Ford/Ford/1957-Ford-Family-Brochure/index.html
https://oldcarbrochures.org/Australia/Ford/Ford/1958-Ford/index.html
Ford Australia did an encore for 1960, using the 1959 body Down Under.
https://oldcarbrochures.org/Australia/Ford/Ford/1960%20Ford%20Fairlane/index.html
If I remember correctly, the 1960 to 1964 big Fords also had some rather serious reliability issues. Even called the most problematic of all big Ford cars built back in the 1960s by some people. “Inertia drive” starters on bigger V8’s until mid-1964, the dreaded eccentric offset shafts on the lower control arms which could change your caster, camber & toe-in settings while driving, zero caster for lighter steering without power steering, ram cylinder style power steering constantly weeping PS fluid, etc. Ford apparently wanted the big cars to have improved riding comfort compared to the Falcons & Fairlanes, and put a lot of rubber into the suspension – but as the result handling degraded pretty drastically. I own a 1970 Ford, and know for a fact that the front suspension was very substantially re-worked for 1965 to fix most of the above-mentioned problems (the general layout is the same, but many parts don’t interchange).
One factor was that Chevrolet’s quality control and reliability were much more consistent than that of Ford and Plymouth. Unlike the latter two, Chevrolet never botched the rollout of a new model during the late 1950s and early 1960s. By the early 1960s, it would not be surprising that Chevrolet’s reputation for superior reliability and build quality was boosting sales.
The performance image established by the small-block V-8 also helped Chevrolet. Chevrolet had a strong performance image by the early 1960s, while Ford and Plymouth were playing catch-up in this regard. This was even though Chevrolets remained saddled with the two-speed Powerglide automatics after Ford and Plymouth began offering three-speed automatics.
Chevrolet’s styling was also more youthful, and made the cars look light and fleet without looking too small or cheap. Ford’s styling was often stodgier – particularly, as the article notes, during 1962 when Ford ditched the semi-fastback Starliner body style.
From 1960 through 1962, meanwhile, Plymouth’s styling ranged from ugly to downright wacky.
This gave Chevrolet an advantage in the early 1960s, when big cars could still be considered youthful, and could be ordered with all of the performance goodies. By 1966, the Mustang and Pontiac GTO had flipped the script, and big cars became the cars your parents (or grandparents) drove. It’s thus no surprise that Ford’s big car sales held up better as the 1960s progressed. Ford simply did “brougham” better than Chevrolet did.
Also consider that the choices weren’t limited to Ford and Chevrolet during those years. It’s noteworthy that the market share of both Chevrolet and GM peaked in 1962 – the year that Chrysler Corporation virtually imploded due to the controversial styling of the Plymouth and Dodge. I believe that Chrysler Corporation’s market share for the 1962 model year actually fell below 10 percent! As Chrysler Corporation clawed its way back from the abyss, GM’s market share fell during the 1960s.
This is anecdotal, but it always seemed to me that people who were unhappy with a Chrysler Corporation product – either because of poor quality or unattractive styling – switched to GM, not Ford. (People unhappy with their Chevrolet generally bought a car from another GM division, as they were almost viewed as separate companies in those days.)
The biggest complaint I heard about Fords between 1960 and 1964 was the compared to a similar model of Chevrolet, the Fords’ interiors looked cheaper and rode rougher. My dad bought Chevrolet Bel Air station wagons and I rode often in a friend’s parents Ford Galaxies. The Bel Airs weren’t as fancy as Impalas but were nicer than the Galaxies. Plus, the Bel Airs were quieter. Fords, until 1965, may have been livelier, but were louder on the road !
I question using the full size Ford and Chevrolet weights using the 6 cylinder engines. My sense it that these had far lower sales than the V8s. Those were the people buying the cheapest strippo versions.
My main goal was to show the weight differential between the 1959 and 1960 Fords, so the type of engine didn’t matter. In general, I tend to use base four-door models in making comparisons — both between brands as well as between size classes — because it is easier to make apples-to-apples comparisons than with higher-level models, where there can be more variance in trim and equipment levels.
When I have a moment I will see if I can track down some data on the relative popularity of sixes versus eights in low-priced big cars. I would imagine that in 1960 there was still a meaningful minority who bought them, e.g., Consumer Reports still road tested them.
The Ford chassis for almost all of its vehicles after 1957 (1956 for the Mark II) utilized the Ford “cow belly” frame structure. It was a stiffer frame structure than G.M. and Chrysler frames (and marginally safer, too) as the frame side rails curved toward the side rocker sills of the car. The “cow belly” frame was heavier, depending on the wheelbase, averaging around 400-lb. for a Ford sedan to 500-lb. for a Ford Skyliner or Mercury convertible. The 1959 Skyliner retractable had a curb weight of 4,165-lb. The Ford Fairlane 500 convertible curb weight was only 3,800-pounds. The 1960 Ford Skyliner (non-retractable) had a curb weight of 3,950-lb. The lack of leadership by George Walker over FoMoCo styling was showing.
https://www.deansgarage.com/the-59-chevrolet-and-the-ford-quicksilver/ The original 1960 big Ford was to be another boxy 1959-like car, but when the confirmation of the production of the 1959 “batwing” Chevrolet was fact (a style those in Ford never believed that Chevy would field a car “so ugly”), Joe Oros’ sketches for a car he called “The Quicksilver” (but with 1959 Ford-like round taillights), became the basis for the 1960 big Ford. The 1960 Ford bodies were “illegal” in some states as the bodies exceeded the national width specification of 80-inches. (In states where 80-inch widths were in the road regulations, some in these states want to require Ford to put truck clearance lights on the front and rear fenders of their passenger cars !) But the 1960-1964 Fords were still overweight, thanks to their last-minute origins. Ford agreed to narrow its car bodies for the 1961-model year, which partly explains the restyle and minor downsizing for 1961 (but not like Bill Mitchell’s entire G.M. full-size passenger car dieting for 1961), reverting back to the 1957-1959 canted rear fins, round taillights styling theme.
All the reasons listed above could certainly be factors for Ford’s falling numbers. But I would suggest that those are all ideas put forth by well informed “car-guys” 65 years after the fact. Further, I would propose that the actual car buying public gave little thought to most of the technical factors mentioned. I think that the reasons for Ford’s struggles were self-inflicted missteps caused by misdirected efforts to try to beat GM at their own game.
(Full disclosure: I have a 1960 Ford Fairlane 500 parked in my garage and have always loved that year and the story that goes with it.)
Ford was stinging from several costly attempts to be just like GM during this time frame. The company increased in size to five divisions, attempting to match GM car line for car line. Creating the Continental Division and the Edsel Division robbed the company of valuable resources on gambles that didn’t pay off in the end. The Continental division lasted only two years, the Edsel division barely three.
The 1960 Ford division models were rushed to market as a reaction to the ’59 Chevrolets, as mentioned in the comment above. Again, chasing GM caused Ford to fumble the ball. The loss of sales in 1960 caused management to quickly abandon the direction they’d gone for the 1960 models, and make the 1961s look more like the 1959s that had actually outsold Chevrolet and won awards for their styling. They toned down that even further for ’62, making the line-up even more bland at a time when the GM lineup was much more attractive.
The two FoMoCo successes during this time period were the Thunderbird and the Falcon. The Thunderbird created a whole new market segment that would continue to expand for decades. Unfortunately, it wasn’t a large enough market to make up for the declining sales of the bread and butter full sized cars. The Falcon was a huge success because of its plain simplicity, especially when compared to Chevrolet’s crazy Corvair and Chrysler’s cosmic Valiant. However, the lower profit margins on compact cars didn’t offset the losses in sales of full sized models.
Sheer numbers would dictate that Ford, being half the size of monolithic General Motors, would never be able to compete head to head. Their success came from being innovative. The Thunderbird was a great example. An even better one was the Mustang at the end of the time period being discussed. A simple idea based on existing parts that created a new market that was ready to explode. Sixty years later, it has again become a market without domestic competition.
Sheer numbers can’t be ignored. There were a lot more Chevrolet dealers than there were Ford dealers. It was easier for Perry and Pauline Public to drive right down the street and purchase from the market leader than it was to drive across town and buy a Ford, especially if that Ford was deemed less attractive. That is, unless the Ford dealer had something the Chevy dealer didn’t. Perry probably didn’t even know which model had a cow-belly frame or how much rubber was in the suspension. Pauline just thought the interiors were more gussied up in the Impala.
Retractable hardtops, wood grained wagons, Magic-Door tailgates, Breezeway rear windows and other Ford innovations helped create buzz and some additional sales. But actual models that were unique to the brand like Thunderbird, Falcon, Mustang, and in 1966 the Bronco, should have proved that innovation beats imitation every time.
Indeed and if Henry Ford II hadn’t fired Iacocca, the minivan would have been probably a hit for Ford instead of Chrysler.
My understanding is Hal Sperlich deserves more credit for the K-car platform and minivan than Iacocca, but HF II fired him before he fired Iacocca. Ford did have a minivan proposal in the 70’s but I believe it was a V8 powered scaled down version of the Club Wagon.
The whole minivan concepts originates from making a van that would fit inside a garage. Evernyone in Detroit had toyed with this prior to Chrysler actually doing it. In 1977 I was told of GM having already looked at it. Even little AMC had done a show car of this concept.
I really like the styling of the big Fords from the early 60’s, especially the big round tail lights. I think that Ford did a better job with the flat tail fins that GM did. The lead photo is such a nice image. I’m saving it to use a screensaver. People had strong brand loyalty back then. My family was always GM oriented, but I switched my allegiance to Ford products twenty years ago.
“For the next year and a half the only hardtop would share its roofline with fairly utilitarian four-door models.”
In this era, Ford was using a version of the squared-off Thunderbird “formal” roof on lots of its cars up and down the line. Even our family’s “64 Comet had a version.