The January 1975 issue of Popular Mechanics offered a breathless peek at a new generation of smaller cars that would supposedly be “big on the inside but small outside.” Although the story included sketches of mini cars from both General Motors and Ford, most of the presentation focused on the AMC Pacer.
The Pacer had yet to be unveiled and American Motors was still keeping a tight lid on press leaks. As a result, the article by Bill Hartford and Robert Lund was heavily sprinkled with vague quotes from company executives and more specific intelligence from suppliers. Here we have an intriguing glimpse into how management wished to present a car that they knew would be controversial.
The article began by emphasizing that the Pacer was not a “do-or-die car. The company won’t go out of business if the Pacer flops,” Hartford and Lund wrote (1975; p. 59).
With the luxury of hindsight we know that this narrative defied credulity given that the initial Pacer model, a three-door hatchback, reportedly cost $60 million to develop. That was a good $20 million more than either the 1974 Matador or the the 1970 Hornet, according to Patrick Foster (1993).
The Pacer cost more to develop because it was the most substantially redesigned AMC of the 1970s. And when the car flopped, that effectively put an end to the automaker’s financial ability to survive on its own.
The most unusual U.S. car since a late-40s Studebaker?
Hartford and Lund wrote that although the Pacer’s mechanicals broke little new ground, its styling would be “the most different-looking car by a U.S. automaker since the which-way-is-it-headed Studebaker of the 1940s” (1975, p. 59).
The Pacer would look radically different partly because it had almost twice the glass area as a Cadillac. “We didn’t put in a lot of glass for the sake of using a lot of glass,” AMC executive Jerry Meyers stated. “We did it to give the driver a panoramic view of the world around him” (Hartford and Lund, 1975; p. 60).
Also see ‘Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors’
The authors acknowledged that all that glass could lead to problems, such as with heat. Meyers was quoted as saying that engineers compensated for that by increasing the capacity of the air conditioning.
This hinted that the car would need that option in order to counteract the tendency of all that glass to turn the interior into a greenhouse. Left unmentioned was that glass weighed more than steel, which would contribute to a weight problem that would undercut the Pacer’s gas mileage and acceleration.
Big promises for roominess that were not fulfilled
Meyers went on to describe how the Pacer was designed to have the roominess of AMC’s mid-sized sedan in a car whose external dimensions were smaller than the compact Hornet.
“I’ve referred to the car as a small car, but I don’t want to put that label on it,” said Meyers. “If you use interior dimensions as a yardstick, Pacer could qualify as an intermediate, maybe as a full-sized car. It’s that roomy inside” (Hartford and Lund, 1975; p. 60).
Also see ‘Automotive News treats Gerald C. Meyers’ tenure at AMC with kid gloves’
For all the spin about the Pacer’s packaging, it was just a somewhat roomier Gremlin with a 300-pound weight premium. The car had such steeply curved sides that front shoulder room was 2.5 inches less than a mid-sized Matador sedan despite being roughly as wide on the outside — and most Pacers had individual front seats that only fit two people anyway. The same was true in the back seat because it was sandwiched between rear-wheel wells. This was a strikingly inefficient four-passenger car compared to many imports.
If AMC wanted to be innovative, its 1977 “Concept 80” minivan held out more promise. The Pacer-based show car had far greater room and four-wheel-drive capability combined with an unusually aerodynamic shape (Appel, 2021).
AMC still expressed hope for a rotary engine
Hartford and Lund wrote that the Pacer was rumored to originally have been designed for a rotary engine supplied by GM. With that engine put on hold, AMC was expected to install one of its inline six-cylinder engines in the Pacer.
Meyers insisted that the car was designed to accept a variety of engines — and he left the door open to a rotary. “If our plans develop on the rotary as we anticipate, it could be used in Pacer later on. I’m not saying it will be used. I’m saying it could be used” (Hartford and Lund, 1975; p. 129).
Also see ‘Collectible Automobile’s 1974-83 Jeep Cherokee story avoids inconvenient questions’
Hartford and Lund got the impression that AMC executives were “much more optimistic” about the rotary engine than GM (Hartford and Lund, 1975; p. 129). In addition, AMC was exploring possibilities for buying the engine overseas.
Meyers debunked the rumor that using the six would intrude on the Pacer’s passenger space. Another AMC executive, Dale Dawkins, added that the car would be “as friendly to mechanics and do-it-yourselfers as our other cars” (Hartford and Lund, 1975; p. 129). That didn’t turn out to be true because the six was shoehorned under the cab-forward cowl, making it harder to service.
AMC expected to sell at least 100,000 Pacers a year
One of the biggest whoppers in the article was Meyers’ prediction that the Pacer was expected to sell “no less than 100,000 cars a year.” However, he implied that double this amount was possible.
Only initially did the Pacer meet its minimum sales goal. By 1977 output fell drastically to under 58,000 units despite the addition of a wagon body style.
American Motors CEO Roy Chapin told Popular Mechanics that this “is the first time in the history of the American auto industry that a car manufacturer has said in advance of bringing out a new product that some people may not like it” (Hartford and Lund, 1975; p. 129).
“That takes guts,” Hartford and Lund concluded (1975, p. 129). A less charitable assessment was that AMC management was exceptionally reckless.
NOTES:
Production figures were calculated from Kowalke (1999), Gunnell (2002), Flammang and Kowalke (1999), and the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006). Specifications are from those sources as well as from Automobile Catalog (2021) and auto manufacturers.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Appel, Tom; 2021. “Forgotten Concept: AMC AM Van.” The Daily Drive. Posted March 18.
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Automobile Catalog; 2021. “Search Automobile Catalog.” Accessed Jan. 27.
- Flammang, James M. and Ron Kowalke; 1999. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1976-1999. Third Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Foster, Patrick R.; 1993. American Motors: The Last Independent. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Hartford, Bill and Robert Lund; 1975. “Half-pints for higher mpg.” Popular Mechanics. January issue: pp. 58-61-129.
- Kowalke, Ron; 1999. Standard Catalog of Independents: The Struggle to Survive Among Giants. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
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- oldcarbrochures.org: AMC Pacer (1975, 1976, 1980)
In the view of late October, 1973, as the Pacer was being readied for production, a sales target of 100,000 Pacers per year was not unreasonable, but again, like most domestic automakers, instead of doing incremental steps to address a rapidly changing marketplace (like the Granada / Monarch), A.M.C. went the unconventional route, instead of readying a Gremlin replacement with less curb weight. Then they listened to G.M. President Ed Cole who sold A.M.C. that they would have the Wankel market-ready for the fall of 1974. What a crock of B.S. (Bachelor of Science)! Just remember after the Pacer was introduced to the masses via TV, the TV spot showed a chef making long “hero” sandwiches with the tag line: “No other car can make this sandwich !”
“I’ve referred to the car as a small car, but I don’t want to put that label on it,” said Meyers. “If you use interior dimensions as a yardstick, Pacer could qualify as an intermediate, maybe as a full-sized car. It’s that roomy inside”
The EPA put that claim to the test by measuring the interior volume of every car it tested for fuel economy.
It turned out that with 89 cu ft of interior volume the Pacer was no more than an ordinary 2-door compact. The Kenosha jellybean did beat the Mopar F-Body (87 cu ft), but was merely on par with the Granada/Monarch and one cubic foot behind the X-Body – and, embarassingly, the Hornet/Concord. What’s more, the 2-door Fairmont/Zephyr demolished the Pacer in interior volume comparisons, offering its passengers 95 cu ft of it.
It lagged even worse in trunk space – the 11 cu ft that the Pacer offered were the worst in class, ex aequo with the Hornet/Concord. The X-Body notchback/hatchback offered 14/16 cu ft, the F-Body and Granada/Monarch featured 15 cu ft of cargo space, and the Fairmont/Zephyr shone once again with a 17 cu ft trunk.
The station wagon was no good either – its 91 cu ft interior was 7 cu ft behind the Fox body and 8 cu ft behind the F-Body, and the 26 cu ft cargo space compared unfavorably to either the Mopar (39 cu ft) or the Ford (43 cu ft), or even the Hornet Sportabout (30 cu ft). Even subcompacts were enough to make a mockery of the AMC wagon – 30 cu ft trunk in the E30 Corolla, 31 in the Pinto.
I realize that the Pacer is the subject of many a lampoon and nasty criticism, some of which may be justified. But I’m not one of those. I thought the Pacer had one of the best-looking styles of any car of its class–certainly better than the Gremlin–and to this day, if I were drafted to make a list of the best-looking tiny cars of all time, the Pacer would be in my Top 5. It mimicked the look of the full-size GM wagons of ’71–6 (which in my book were *the* best-looking suv’s ever, bar none) quite well for a small car. As for the greenhouse effect, that could also probably be addressed by applying a sun-sensitive tint to the glass, the technology of which did exist in the ’70s, but was still probably beyond the meager budget of AMC.
As for the claim that the Pacer ended AMC, that is totally unjustified, and false. The Pacer did *not* sign the death-knell for AMC, which continued on for another decade after the Pacer’s sad demise. It was no Jet (the one car that *did* cause the death of its parent maker). If I were really committed to such a project, I’d see about restoring a Pacer, and upgrading it with sun-sensitive variable tint to its glass area and maybe a 2-liter inline VW 4-banger that Audi’s Series-80 model flaunted in the late-’80s.
I would invite you reread what I said: “. . . the car flopped [and that] effectively put an end to the automaker’s financial ability to survive on its own.” AMC was forced to seek a partnership with Renault because it could no longer afford to update its lineup enough to stay competitive. AMC became little more than the American arm of Renault once the French automaker took a significant stake in the company. How long the AMC brand name lasted is irrelevant to my argument.
It’s true that the Pacer did not do as poorly as the Hudson Jet, but that’s also irrelevant to my argument. Roughly 281,000 Pacers were built in four-and-a-half years, which was reportedly well below the car’s breakeven point. That was particularly problematic because 1) the Pacer cost the most to develop of any AMC car in the 1970s and 2) the rest of AMC’s passenger-car lineup didn’t sell well enough to pick up the slack. By 1977 AMC’s passenger-car output had fallen below the dismal days of 1967, when the automaker teetered on the brink of going out of business.
If you haven’t already read it, you might want to check out this story: “Six mistakes that killed the AMC Pacer — and American Motors.” You presumably won’t agree with my point of view, but I do offer considerably more background on why I think that the Pacer was such a huge mistake.
And just to be clear: We all should be able to like the cars that we like — regardless of whether they were successful in the marketplace. It just so happens that the Pacer wasn’t.