Aaron Severson (2024) recently suggested that auto history counterfactuals almost always focus on design, engineering and product-planning choices rather than what he considers “far more decisive and dominant factors,” which he argues are “capital investment and production logistics.”
Severson notes that this bias is understandable given that it reflects what most auto enthusiasts are interested in. I would add that there is often much less information available about the business side of an auto manufacturer than there is about product attributes.
A big reason for this is that U.S. automotive history has not gained much traction in academia. The number of U.S. scholars who write about this topic is so small that it effectively has no academic programs, journals or conferences. That has left a void which has been only partly filled by the business press.
Also see ‘Why Collectible Automobile reflects a ‘systems problem’ in auto history field’
Something is better than nothing, but articles in the likes of Fortune, Forbes and Business Week have all too often suffered from a pop-culture quality that has had more puffery about chief executives than nuts-and-bolts analysis.
One result is that even relatively rare scholarly books, such as Charles Hyde’s histories of American Motors (2009) and Chrysler Corporation (2003), draw a meaningful amount of his analysis from the business press. That arguably gives Hyde’s books a more superficial quality than if he had been able to draw from a wider range of scholarly studies — and had more robust debates with other scholars about the theoretical underpinnings of his writing.
There is a way out of this wilderness . . .
If a wealthy person would like to have an impact on American auto history, they might consider underwriting the cost of a center for automotive history at an amenable university. That center might launch a variety of initiatives, such as a scholarly journal. However, one of the most important things it could do is create a pipeline of talent. For example, imagine the body of work that someone of Severson’s caliber could produce through a well-paid fellowship.
All this leads me to wonder: Where is the next generation of auto history scholars? Literally — who are they? What are they working on right now? What are their career goals? And are there ways to cultivate a greater sense of common purpose in their research agendas?
If there are any academics among Indie Auto readers, I would be particularly interested in hearing your thoughts. I recognize that this post will likely be read by less than 20 people and get zero comments, but it never hurts to try.
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Hyde, Charles K.; 2003. Riding the Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- 2009. Storied Independent Automakers: Nash, Hudson, and American Motors. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Severson, Aaron; 2024. “Not So Cuckoo After All.” Ate Up With Motor Patreon site. Posted Aug. 12.
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Okay. Here goes. I was once an academic. It was a short tenure. I had problems working with people who had never worked. Work being labor. Sweat of your brow. Achy back stuff. But I navigated the halls of academia for a short time. Less than a decade. But I was there. Swear to God. And now I am commenting. So there.
Jim, my sense is that the scholarly realm has always been difficult to navigate . . . and has become even more so recently due to challenges such as enrollment drops and legislative incursions into academic freedom. In addition, a research center dependent on external funding can find its intellectual wings clipped rather quickly (which may help explain the content limitations of the Automobile in American Life and Society).
So I don’t mean to suggest that building automotive history’s presence in higher education is a panacea. It just seems to me that the field’s current dependence on the car buff media doesn’t get us to where we need to go. It’s a structural problem that requires more than a GoFundMe campaign to solve.
As Reddit’s r/AskHistorians explained in a thousand voices (https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/96yf9h/monday_methods_why_you_should_not_get_a_history/), entering historical academia in both the USA and other countries mentioned is an undertaking that borders on foolish.
With how hard to break into even the “mainstream” fields are, most people capable of researching automotive history see far more potential in transferring their skills to other, more secure and better paying fields instead of trying their luck in a niche part of a niche job. That was definitely what happened to me.
Oh, I get that “history” is a particularly problematic discipline right now given enrollment declines. However, you can legitimately do auto history research through a number of other disciplines. For example, one could argue that business management programs which significantly serve the auto industry would benefit from hiring scholars who are adept at showing the historical context of current industry challenges.
Part of the problem is that the key individuals who know the real story seldom open up about it in a scholarly way. When noted historian / author Robert Lacey finally interviewed Hank the Deuce at the Ford World Headquarters, H.F.II spent the entire time shredding documents. (“History is bunk !” and the converse, “Bunkie is history !”) Most financial documents are shared with board members, but little else. I know from serving on a board of a non-profit, there are non-disclosure agreements that are legally binding. Most disclosures are made in statements that have been sanitized by corporate attorneys. (Most attorneys hate to go on-the-record.) Board minutes are often incomplete. (I have been in board meetings where the board chair advises the recording secretary to stop taking notes.) Dedicated analysts like Maryann Keller (1943-2022) are quite credible because they understand the true dynamics of public companies like G.M. Part of the problem with personalities like Bob Lutz, is that they are so opinionated, that they often lose perspective trying to defend their own personal Pontiac Aztecs. Was Chrysler’s Bob Eaton as bad as Lutz made him out to be, for example ? Was Abraham M. Sonnebend (1896-1964) the real villain in the demise of Studebaker-Packard ? These are the real issues about people and their decisions that are not fully disclosed yet are important to the full history of an automobile company. People like Alfred P. Sloan did write down his take on General Motors and Peter F. Drucker analyzed G.M.’s system of corporate management in 1946. But who is more trustworthy ? Lee Iacocca or George Romney ? My money’s on Romney !