The domestic luxury-car field saw output rise by a healthy 11 percent in 1968, but the Imperial went in the opposite direction — down by almost 13 points.
At least on paper, the Imperial should have done much better. It had a newer body and a broader range of models than the Lincoln Continental, yet it was outsold by a three-to-one margin. The Imperial’s share of the luxury-car market fell to 5.2 percent, which was close to the lowest it had been since being spun off as a stand-alone brand in 1955.
What went wrong? The Imperial arguably had some meaningful advantages, such as superior roadworthiness for an American luxury car partly due to its torsion-bar suspension and Torqueflite automatic transmission.
The Imperial’s styling wasn’t iconic, but it had trendy features such as brougham-style rooflines, full-width taillights and a trunk-lid logo big enough to be seen from outer space.
A new front end in 1968 fixed the biggest problem with the previous year’s design, which looked inordinately busy. In addition, the trim on the modernist dashboard was switched from a fairly generic woodgrain to more distinctive “antique bronze.”
Even so, Motor Trend magazine wasn’t impressed with the Imperial’s looks, suggesting that the car “may not turn many heads with its Dowager Queen styling” (Sanders, 1968; p. 68). Neither were Richard M. Langworth and Jan. P. Norbye, who described the Imperial’s design as “conservative and not very distinguished” (1985, p. 207).
Meanwhile, Popular Mechanics reported that in a survey of Imperial owners, almost 38 percent of respondents ranked workmanship as their biggest dislike (Hartford, 1968).
Workmanship issues undercut ownership experience
The Popular Mechanics owner report on the Imperial started off in a decidedly unflattering manner for a luxury car.
“Whistling down the pike isn’t the thrill to some Imperial owners that it is to others,” wrote auto editor Bill Hartford. “The problem is that high-speed driving only worsens the problem of air and water embarrassingly leaking into this regal automobile. Imperial owners tell us there’s only one reason for their discomfort: poor workmanship” (1968, p. 100).
Owners also complained about spotty paint jobs, doors not closing tight, and sloppy trim and upholstery fit. That’s not a good sign for an automobile that cost twice as much as the average new car in 1968. Yet a Popular Mechanics survey found that almost 48 percent of respondents bought an Imperial because of past experience with the brand. The average owner had had 2.65 Imperials — and some more than a dozen (Hartford, 1968).
“All in all, Imperial owners are an overwhelmingly faithful lot,” concluded Hartford. “They love their car and, even though there are some things that make ’em fighting mad, it’s obvious they’re not going to switch” (1968, p. 228).
Imperial didn’t grow with booming luxury-car market
Perhaps the core problem was that the Imperial inspired the loyalty of past owners but wasn’t winning over many new ones.
So while the luxury-car field saw total output soar by 74 percent between 1958-68, Imperial sales stayed relatively flat. To make matters worse, Imperial production in 1968 — a good year for the U.S. auto industry — was slightly lower than it was in the deep recession of 1958.
While Chrysler was having trouble simply maintaining the Imperial’s sales, Ford had an instant hit when it unveiled the Lincoln Continental Mark III. The personal coupe consistently outsold the entire Imperial lineup.
Ironically, the Imperial saw sales jump in 1969 after losing its unique sheetmetal. Alas, that was only a temporary reprieve. Sales continued to struggle through 1975, when the brand was mercifully discontinued.
Also see ‘Car Life’s faint praise for redesigned 1967 Imperial hints at why it wasn’t a hit’
Langworth and Norbye argued that making the Imperial share more body parts with the Chrysler “doomed” the brand because it “just wasn’t ‘different’ enough to cause many buyers to opt for one instead of a New Yorker” (1985, p. 210). That may not have helped, but until 1975 sales were comparable to the supposedly good-old days when the Imperial had unique sheetmetal.
The fundamental problem was that Chrysler was in over its head. The Imperial’s failure to gain traction illustrated how the automaker wasn’t big enough to compete model for model against a much bigger General Motors and Ford.
Instead of spending a boatload of money trying to build a stand-alone luxury brand, might the No. 3 automaker have been better off sticking with its previous strategy of only offering the Imperial as a limited-production, top-end Chrysler?
NOTES:
Production figures and specifications are from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Flory (2004, 2009), Gunnell (2002) and (Wikipedia (2022).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International; Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- ——; 2009. American Cars, 1946-1959: Every Model, Year by Year. McFarland & Co.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Hartford, Bill; 1968. “Chrysler Imperial: Gorgeous on the Outside, Gutsy on the Inside.” Popular Mechanics. April issue: pp. 100-101, 228 (linked via Imperial Webpages).
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Sanders, Bill; 1968. “Luxury: The great American dream.” Motor Trend. May issue: pp. 56-63 (linked via Imperial Webpages).
- Wikipedia; 2022. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Page last modified Jan. 26.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcaradvertising.com: Imperial (1968); Lincoln (1968)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Imperial (1968, 1969); Lincoln Continental Mark III (1971)
Thing is a lot of people still looked at Imperial as a limited edition top end Chrysler. I was going through images online of the 67-69 Chryslers and Imperials and quite a few pictures were labeled “Chrysler Imperial” To people back then moving up to luxury Imperial would always be a Chrysler, as to us it will always be “Dodge Ram”. Meanwhile, Chrysler Corp used as much Chrysler sheet metal as it could get away with starting in 67. I would imagine the 1967 Imperial buyers accepted that, and figured that at least they would get a car that was put together right. They were wrong and by the 68 model year word was out. As for Lincoln, they were offering a personal luxury coupe and personal luxury sedan, luxury cars you didn’t need a tugboat to help park. Imperial only carried a distinctive body from 57-66, and the Exner creations were an acquired taste. Cadillac was still the standard of the world then, Lincoln owns a niche market, and Imperial was for Mopar dealers and executives to drive to the country club.
Once again, Chrysler had two problems with the Imperial: In most urban areas it shared the same showroom floor with Plymouths and Newports, and the sheetmetal after 1967 was like a deluxe New Yorker. The second and bigger problem that after 1966 almost all of Chrysler’s full-size cars suffered a myriad of workmanship issues. G.M.’s C-bodies at least were distinctive enough apart in 1967-1968 to maintain their brand identity with the Cadillac at the top hierarchy, and did not suffer from the quality issues that the Chryslers did (even though the 1967 Olds 98 was butt-ugly, in my opinion).