Our recent story on the 1962 Chrysler B-body (go here) has generated a debate among auto history writers. In the article, I sided with those who had argued that the downsized Plymouth and Dodge were not merely stretched compacts. I would like to add another layer to the conversation, but it makes more sense to write a new article rather than continue to write a drip, drip, drip of comments or modify the previous piece.
Paul Niedermeyer (2024a) stopped by the other day to clarify his previous writing at Curbside Classic. He still says that the B-body was not a stretched A-body compact but now calls that take “partly a matter of semantics.” In a follow-up comment Niedermeyer (2024b) adds that he “can see why some would use the term ‘stretch.’ It’s not completely outside of the elastic definition of that word.”
In contrast, Bill McGuire (2024) argues that it is “a relatively simple matter to take the drawings for the 1960 A platform and stretch them on two axes to create the 1962 B body. Far easier, and more importantly, much quicker than starting from scratch as the engineers were on a short schedule. If you look at the two chassis and floorpans it’s easy to see.”
Before proceeding, we might acknowledge that we don’t have enough information to fully answer key questions about the B-body’s development. However, based on what I have seen to date, Niedermeyer’s (2023) original take strikes me as closest to the mark. The narrative that the B-body was a stretched compact is problematic for five reasons.
1. Today’s ‘platform’ definitions may not apply in 1960s
The meta question is what constitutes a platform. In recent decades I have noticed a tendency in the auto industry to use the term with increasing looseness. That may be significantly driven by technological advances in the development and manufacturing of automobiles, which apparently allow platforms to have more design flexibility. That said, I also suspect that p.r. considerations have played a role. In an era of rampant product proliferation, an automaker can look more financially prudent to Wall Street when it brags about how much it emphasizes platform sharing.
So, yes, semantics would seem to loom large in how we currently talk about platforms. Can we apply that same mentality to the American auto industry in the first half of the 1960s? That doesn’t make sense to me — both the technology and the business strategies were meaningfully different back then.
Also see ‘Peter DeLorenzo: Groupthink has driven model proliferation among automakers’
Here it is important to remember that the first half of the 1960s represented the beginning of Detroit’s embrace of product proliferation. Before that point the dominant approach among Big Three automakers was to create variations of one basic platform for high-volume passenger cars.
For example, through the 1950s the Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto and Chrysler-brand passenger cars were all developed from one body and chassis. They may have varied in wheelbase, length and external sheetmetal treatments, but aside from the post-1956 Imperial they shared major body parts such as cowls, windshields, inner-door frames and often rooflines. This approach was patterned along the lines of what General Motors had pioneered decades earlier, although Chrysler’s lineup tended to have fewer unique components because it was a much smaller automaker.
2. The B-body was closer to full size than compact
The introduction of Chrysler’s compact A-body in 1960 represented a sea change. The Plymouth Valiant and Dodge Lancer were not merely shortened versions of its “standard-sized” cars — they were shrunk to such a degree that the none of their most costly body parts could be shared. It made sense to say that the cars were on a different platform than the automaker’s big cars.
Later, when Chrysler decided to come out with the B-body, it made sense to draw from the corporate parts bin as much as possible, both to reduce development time and increase economies of scale. And since a major goal was to cut weight and increase space utilization, product planners, engineers and designers would have been foolish not to apply the lessons learned from developing the A-body.
Engineers likely did save some time by drawing upon elements of the A-body in developing the B-body. However, it is literally not a stretched compact if you define the term purely by the length of the car. That’s a key point, because it can be much more expensive to widen a car rather than lengthen it because you can’t stretch a cowl (Niedermeyer, 2023).
The B-body Plymouth was longer than the Valiant by 15.8 inches and wider by 5.2 inches. Some of that was bulked out fenders, but the front track and hip room were still wider (by 3.5 inches and 4 inches, respectively). The latter required widening the passenger cabin — and thus a new cowl and windshield.
Another thing to consider is that the B-body was closer in size and weight to the 1961 big Plymouth. For example, the 1962 models were narrower in front track by only 1.5 inches and hip room by three inches; weight was only 350 pounds less (compared to 460 pounds more than a Valiant). Beefed-up components were presumably required to handle the greater size and weight.
3. Ford drew more from its compacts than Chrysler
Chrysler’s approach with the B-body was different than Ford’s, which also introduced a mid-sized car in 1962. The new Fairlane was only 0.8 inches wider than the compact Falcon. That was accompanied by an increase in the front track (2 inches) and hip room (1.5 inches). Weight increased by 231 pounds.
You could more reasonably argue that Ford’s mid-sized platform was a stretched compact than the Chrysler B-body. But even here, the Fairlane was not like the Mercury Comet, which shared with the Falcon numerous parts such as the windshield and some sheetmetal.
In contrast, the Fairlane and its corporate sibling the Mercury Meteor had a slightly wider and taller body. Did the Fairlane need a different cowl to accommodate the greater width of the passenger cabin? I suspect so.
In addition, a more recent Niedermeyer (2024c) comment notes how the Fairlane’s suspension “had to be completely scaled up in strength.”
While Ford undoubtedly saved development time and increased manufacturing economies of scale by using Falcon parts, it wasn’t a shared platform in the traditional way that Detroit had applied that term. This stood in contrast to the 1966 Fairlane, which was a textbook example of a stretched Falcon.
If Chrysler management wanted to maximize saving money and development time, they could have gone a similar route as Ford did in either 1962 or 1966. Why didn’t they? Because Chrysler was trying to position its mid-sized cars differently than was Ford. Whereas the B-body replaced Plymouth’s full-sized car, Ford was merely filling a hole between the Falcon and big Galaxie.
4. B-body had to compete with the big Chevy and Ford
The 1962 B-body Plymouth may have been somewhat smaller than its predecessor, but Motor Trend noted that the new car still competed in the “standard-size, low-priced class” (Werner, 1961).
You can see that in pricing. B-body prices were slightly lower in 1962 than they had been the previous year. This gave entry-level models a price advantage over the big Chevrolet and Ford, but they were still higher than the Fairlane.
Just as significantly, the 1962 Plymouth’s top-end prices were much higher than the Fairlane’s. The new Plymouth wasn’t merely a junior model designed to bring in incremental sales – it was intended to be the highest-volume car in Chrysler’s entire lineup.
By the same token, the B-body needed to be roomy enough for six passengers so that it was viewed as an acceptable alternative to a big car. Motor Trend writer Don Werner (1961) noted that although exterior dimensions had been pruned, “interior dimensions have not been significantly reduced, and in some instances have been increased.”
Not surprisingly, the Plymouth surpassed the Fairlane across the board in its interior dimensions. This was not unusual – the B-body Plymouth was generally bigger, roomier and heavier than all of its direct competitors, such as the Chevrolet Chevelle and Rambler Classic.
Also see ‘Ford got crushed in 1960s mid-sized field despite early entrance’
Chrysler had designed a more substantial car than other intermediates. The question wasn’t whether the B-body could have been derived from the A-body, but whether the opposite was possible. John Katz reported that this was a management directive until late in the development process. Alas, they “couldn’t make a Valiant and a Lancer that were saleable and economical to manufacture” (1995, p. 62; original italics).
The B-body was simply too big to be used for a compact. This is not surprising — even penny-pinching American Motors didn’t place its compact American on the same platform as its mid-sized Classic when they were redesigned in 1963-64.
5. B-body was a failed attempt at a modular platform
In my own life I can think of plenty of more important things to debate than this topic, e.g., the future of American democracy. However, if we are trying to advance automotive history, it makes sense to gain more widespread agreement on the basic terms that we use in our writing.
I do not have background as an automotive engineer, but I would imagine that there is some truth to McGuire’s (2024) argument that it is “a relatively simple matter to take the drawings for the 1960 A platform and stretch them on two axes” to create a larger body.
Even so, I suspect that what today could be accomplished through fairly quick changes in a computer-modeling program might have required considerably more effort due to the less sophisticated design tools and manufacturing processes used in the first half of the 1960s.
Also see ‘Did the 1960-64 big Ford sell so poorly because of cannibalization?’
More importantly, even if the B-body had been heavily inspired by the A-body, it still did not achieve the economies of scale that was typical for a shared platform during that time period.
Indeed, if we take seriously John Katz’s reporting, one of the most newsworthy aspects of the B-body’s development was that it was a failed attempt to create a modular platform used for both Chrysler’s compacts and mid-sized cars.
I get why one might consider the B-body a stretched A-body, but I think it obscures more than illuminates what was significant about the new platform.
NOTES:
Specifications are from Automobile Catalog (2024), Consumer Reports (1963) and Flory (2004).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Automobile Catalog; 2024. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.” Accessed Sept. 24.
- Consumer Reports; 1963. “Basic Body Dimensions.” April issue: pp. 164-165.
- ——; 1970. “Basic body dimensions.” Auto Buying Issue, pp. 221-223.
- Flory, J. “Kelly” Jr.; 2004. American Cars, 1960-1972. McFarland & Co., Inc.
- Katz, John; 1995. “1962-64 Plymouth: Pivotal, Panic-Driven Mopars.” Collectible Automobile. Published April, pp. 57-69.
- McGuire, Bill; 2024. Commentator in “Were the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge based on a stretched compact?” Indie Auto. Posted on Oct. at 5:44 pm.
- Niedermeyer, Paul; 2023. “Brilliant Blunder: 1962 Plymouth & Dodge – The Real Reason They Were Downsized.” Curbside Classic. Posted on Dec. 4.
- ——; 2024a. Commentator in “Were the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge based on a stretched compact?” Indie Auto. Posted on Oct. 5 at 8:40 am.
- ——; 2024b. Commentator in “Were the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge based on a stretched compact?” Indie Auto. Posted on Oct. 5 at 8:40 am.
- ——; 2024c. Commentator in “Were the downsized 1962 Plymouth and Dodge based on a stretched compact?” Indie Auto. Posted Oct. 8 at 8:57 am.
- Werner, Don; 1961. “Profile of the ’62 Plymouth.” Motor Trend. October issue: pp. 50-53.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- aacalibrary.org: Plymouth (1962)
- fordheritagevault.media: Ford (1962)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Ford Fairlane (1962); Plymouth Valiant (1962)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Plymouth (1961, 1962); Plymouth Valiant (1963)
Okay, let’s look at the timeline for the 1960 Chrysler full-size cars and the 1960 Valiant. The unit-body full-size cars were begun in the later months of 1957 because of the flaws in the rust-prone 1957 models. Likely, the Valiant was started in 1957, too, to be introduced by the fall of 1959. The “downsized”, definned “plucked chicken” 1962 Plymouth / Darts were spun off of Exner’s “S-cars” which were abandoned in the later months of 1960. I cannot imagine that the 116-inch wheelbase was to be a foundation of a modular platform any more than the 106.5-inch wheelbase Valiant. More likely the real “modular” platform was the full-size Chrysler-Dodge 880 unit-body which stretched from 122-inches to as much as 126-127-inches.
Yup. The only friendly amendment I’d offer is that the S-series may have been cancelled sometime in the summer of 1959 (go here for further discussion).
Look underneath 1) a ’61 Dodge/Ply 2) a Valiant 3) a ’62 Dodge/Ply. All will be revealed.
Thomas Kuhn wrote that the theoretical paradigms of the natural sciences were most likely to shift when there was a changing of the guard rather than through robust debate. If this dynamic also holds for American automotive history, our conversation may be most useful to those who are younger and/or newer to the field, so aren’t already committed to a particular perspective.
I’m familiar with Thomas Kuhn’s _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ and his now-famous phrase, “paradigm shift,” but I’m not clear how it applies here. Could you please expand on that?
I don’t see how photos are dispositive . . . and this discussion is getting repetitive. So one more time: The B-body was wider, slightly taller and quite a bit heavier than the A-body. It needed a new cowl and presumably a beefed-up structure due to the car’s greater size, weight, carrying capacity and performance needs. So if your point is that the A-body’s design informed the B-body and was a source of some parts, I wasn’t contesting that in my posts. I’m questioning the narrative that the B-body was a “stretched” A-body. It was a distinct platform even if it had a family resemblance to the A-body.
The supreme irony of this debate is Katz’s reporting that the management directive through most of the B-body’s development process was to base the next-generation A-body on it. If they had succeeded in doing so, the A-body would have been a shrunken B-body! They couldn’t pull that off because the needs of each car were too different.
Standing under the cars and looking is even better, but photos will clearly show that the ’62 Dodge/Plymouth Unibody is not a continuation of the ’60-’61 car, but an enlarged version of the Valiant design.
No offense, but this is not a debate. This is me schooling you on the physical reality of these cars.