(EXPANDED FROM 8/9/2022)
A few years ago Corey Lewis (2022) wrote that the 1960 Lincoln’s entry-level model was “rebranded as simply ‘Lincoln,’ to compete with the new base model Chrysler New Yorker (1960-1962) and Series 62 Cadillac (1959-1960).” That got me to wondering: Did Lincoln move back downmarket in 1960 in response to a late-50s recession that hammered luxury-car sales?
If Lincoln had done so, that would have been pulling back from its aggressive efforts to move the brand upmarket in the second-half of the 1950s. In 1955 the base Lincoln four-door sedan listed for $3,563. This was only modestly higher than a Chrysler New Yorker ($3,494) but quite a bit lower than an entry-level Cadillac ($3,977) or Imperial ($4,483) in an equivalent body style.
By 1958 Lincoln’s entry-level prices competed more directly with the bottom end of the Cadillac and Imperial lineups. A Lincoln Capri four-door sedan listed for $4,951, which was a bit higher than the price tag for a Cadillac Series 62 ($4,891) or an entry-level Imperial ($4,945). In contrast, Chrysler priced its New Yorker four-door sedan at only $4,295.
Lincoln management presumably thought that the car’s all-new design would one-up Cadillac, but the opposite turned out to be true. Total Lincoln output (including its companion brand, the Continental) garnered under 18 percent of the luxury car market in 1958. Cadillac actually gained an additional 8 percent of market share despite a basic design that was carried over from the previous year.
To make matters worse, in 1959 Lincoln/Continental saw its production fall again to under 27,000 units whereas both Cadillac and Imperial saw increases. As a result, Ford’s share of the luxury-car market fell to 14.4 percent — which was the lowest it had been in 1950s. What to do?
In 1960 Lincoln goes further upmarket
One option could have been for Lincoln to shift back down market. Instead, entry- and mid-level models received across-the-board price increases of around $350, bringing them to $5,441 and $5,945, respectively, for a (base) Lincoln and (mid-level) Premiere. Only the top-end Continentals held the line on pricing: $6,845 for the four-door sedan.
Lincoln was not responding to price increases by Cadillac, which carried over from 1959 the same list prices for a base Series 62 ($5,080) and a mid-level De Ville ($5,498) four-door hardtop sedan. Those prices were maintained in 1961.
Imperial prices changed only a little between 1959-60, going up from $5,016 to $5,029 for the entry-level Custom four-door sedan. The mid-level Crown stayed the same at $5,647 and the top-of-line LeBaron went up from $6,103 to $6,318.
Meanwhile, the 1960 New Yorker four-door sedan was given a $16 price cut to $4,409; the four-door hardtop went down by a similar amount to $4,518. The base Lincoln was now more than $1,000 higher than the top-end Chrysler.
Note that the New Yorker was still priced on the high side for a premium-priced nameplate. The Buick Electra 225 four-door hardtop went for $4,300 while the base Electra four-door sedan listed for $3,856. Meanwhile, the Oldsmobile Ninety-Eight four-door hardtop was priced at $4,153 and the sedan at $3,887.
Lincoln market share hits a post-war low in 1960
Lincoln’s price increases probably didn’t help output, which was down almost 8 percent in 1960 even though Cadillac held steady and Imperial’s went up slightly. As a result, Lincoln’s market share of the luxury car field fell a whole point to only 13.4 percent. This was the lowest it had been in the post-war era — a remarkable turn of events given that the 1958 redesign included an all-new body, engine and assembly plant (go here for further discussion).
Also see ‘Corey Lewis offers a questionable take on the 1961-63 Imperial’
Historian Thomas E. Bonsall concluded that the “1958-60 Lincolns and Continentals were, in their own way, as big of a disappointment as the Edsel. What the Edsel was supposed to have done for the corporation’s penetration of the medium-priced class the Lincolns and Continentals were supposed to have done in the luxury field. Their failure was less only to the extent that the Lincoln nameplate managed to survive the fiasco.” (1981, p. 162).
Were price hikes made in anticipation of 1961?
For 1961 the Lincoln lineup was radically pruned to a single Continental series that included a four-door convertible and pillared hardtop. The list price for the latter was pegged at $6,067. This was almost $800 lower than the previous year’s Continental but more than $500 above a Cadillac De Ville and the mid-point between the Imperial’s Crown and LeBaron series.
While Lincoln was moving upmarket, the Chrysler brand went in the opposite direction. The price tag of a 1961 New Yorker dropped around $300 to $4,123.
Both Lincoln’s output and market share went up slightly for 1961. Ford presumably did better financially with the new Continental because of its loftier pricing, bare-bones lineup and platform sharing with the higher-volume Thunderbird.
Now, about the Lincoln versus the New Yorker . . .
As for the 1960 Lincoln, the above graph illustrates why I don’t get Lewis’s contention that entry-level models competed against the New Yorker. His comparison strikes me as questionable even if Lincoln merely made standard some equipment that was optional on the Chrysler.
Lincoln clearly moved upmarket — perhaps in anticipation of the radical reconfiguration of the brand in 1961. The relative success of the 1958-60 Continental may have given Ford the courage to abandon the lower reaches of the luxury car field.
NOTES:
This story was originally posted on Aug. 9. 2022 and expanded on Dec. 10, 2024. Production data and product specifications were drawn from the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Bonsall (1981), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2021). Price graph used four-door sedans unless only hardtops or pillared hardtops were offered (go here for Indie Auto’s methodology for calling a body style a pillared hardtop versus a sedan).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 1981. The Lincoln Motorcar: Sixty Years of Excellence. Bookman Dan!, Baltimore, MD.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Lewis, Corey; 2022. “Rare Rides Icons: The Lincoln Mark Series Cars, Feeling Continental (Part XI).” The Truth About Cars. Posted Aug. 4.
- Wikipedia; 2021. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Accessed March 5.
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES:
- autohistorypreservationsociety.org: Lincoln (1960)
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chrysler (1960); Imperial (1960)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Lincoln (1960)
Informative article, Steve. The ’60 price hike and pricey ’61 may have also been a case of Lincoln planners concluding that the designs were polarizing, with those who loved them being willing to pay more to get one. Also, Lincoln needed to charge as much as possible because there wasn’t anywhere near the economies of scale that Cadillac enjoyed.
The ’57 Turnpike Cruiser and ’58 Park Lane represented a major move upward in price for Mercury beginning in 1957. Perhaps Lincoln felt that they weren’t completely abandoning the upper medium or entry luxury space? Am not so sure about that. Seems it was primarily a scale issue, and they weren’t going to get much more volume going down-market so they might as well charge as much as the market would pay.
First, the 1961 Chryslers were a step back in styling with a few fussy changes to the 1960 Chryslers, so in my non-expert opinion, Chrysler cost themselves the lost sales in 1961.
More to the point of this interesting analysis from a pricing / marketing perspective, the 1955 and 1956 Lincolns were on the right track to improve Lincoln’s standing as a luxury / near-luxury brand. The launch of the 1956 Mark II was the first product of Francis Reith’s five brand 1952 plan to put Lincoln back in the minds of the public as a luxury brand. The 1957 Lincoln did not deviate from the plan, but other parts of the plan unraveled: The 1957 Mercurys were not quite the hits Ford Corporate expected, but the 1957 Fords beat the 1957 Chevrolet so all was looking up. Then came the summer of 1957, with the economy beginning to sour and the polarizing styling of both the Edsel and the Lincolns. The 1958 Fords, Mercurys, Edsels and Lincolns were major disappointments with only the four-place Thunderbirds gaining sales. Add in the debut of the 1959 Mercury Park Lane, and the Reith plan was a disaster with Robert S. McNamara stepping in to cut the losses, the Edsel and plan for a down-sized future for both Lincoln and Mercury. The big winner by 1960 was the Ford Falcon and later that spring, the Comet, which soaked up the excess production capacity that had been earmarked for a successful Edsel, which of course, was not a sales winner. Sadly, former “Whiz Kid” Jack Reith left Ford and later ended his life. Fellow “Whiz Kid” McNamara was a success and earned a spot in President Kennedy’s cabinet as Defense Secretary. Regardless of how historians portray McNamara, he did keep the momentum established by H.F.II and Ernest Breech going with the 1957 Ford, the four-seat Thunderbird, the Ford Falcon and Comet and the 1961 Lincoln Continental. Further, he appeared to maintain a detachment from the decisions he made at Ford, such that when, in his analytical mind he saw a losing situation, he quickly stepped up and cut his losses, like the styling of the 1958 Ford and the excess of the 1960 Ford, so that the 1959 and 1961 Fords regained sales lost.
Remember, putting Mercury upmarket and dropping the “Lincoln” marque down was due to Ford’s Five Brand strategy. All around they were risky moves. Edsel was to take Mercury’s place in the lineup and move Mercury to move up to DeSoto and Oldsmobile terrority. It is very hard to move a product upscale. Lincoln would be moved down to Buick Chrysler territory where it usually was postwar. Since the demise of the Cosmopolitan, Lincoln kept too many visual clues to Ford and Mercury. This gave Lincoln the chance to compete in the territory consumers expected it to be in, and use the new full line Continental to go head to head with Imperial and Cadillac. Unfortunately, it did not work.
Ford’s planners seemed more interested in the number of brands that GM carried than in how GM was able to efficiently carry them. Related to that there’s something curious about the ’58 T-Bird, a program that has long sat inconspicuously in the middle of all the mayhem. Its very existence caused a lot a decisions to be made that otherwise would not have.
Interesting. Both Ford and Chrysler tried the Five Brands approach with Ford putting Edsel in the wrong slot and Chrysler all over the place as usual. Except for the Studebaker Hawk no one had anything like it. Could you amplify on this?
Ironically, Ford did tried the Five Brands approach, well sort of, in the Great White North with the Meteor and Monarch in Canada.
http://oldcarbrochures.org/Canada/Ford-Canada/Meteor/index.html
http://oldcarbrochures.org/Canada/Ford-Canada/Monarch/index.html
There is a great recap in the book by Thomas Bonsall listed in Steve’s “Resources” section above. In summary, during 1955 Lincoln’s planners had the ’58 model year using the ’57 body. Meanwhile, McNamara determined correctly that a 4-passenger car was required for T-Bird in 1958, and Earle MacPherson, the company’s chief engineer, insisted that it be of unibody construction, which required a new assembly plant. There wasn’t enough volume to justify the plant so in early 1956 Lincoln was ordered to be a part of the ’58 Wixom unibody program. John Najjar was assigned the styling and told to make the car look different from the competition.
Harley Copp, Lincoln’s chief engineer, insisted that there wasn’t time to do an entirely new Lincoln for ’58, especially given the new technology, and unibody was inappropriate for Lincoln given the inability to make annual model changes, which the market segment demanded (according to Copp).
In retrospect, one counterfactual would have had Mercury continue to use Ford’s body, now mated to a 4-5 inch longer axle-dash and again with its own styling front and rear. T-Bird would use a shortened floorpan and Skyliner’s top, now fixed, together with Mercury’s longer axle-dash. A T-Bird convertible would also be offered, and there would be no Ford Skyliner. The new T-Bird could have arrived as early as 1957.
The originally planned ’59 Park Lane’s body and C-pillar would have been repurposed for Lincoln, which would have looked similar to ’57-58 Lincoln C-pillar design. The all-new 1959 Continental would use the new body too, with unique sheet metal front and rear, a longer axle-dash and pricing beginning at Cadillac’s upper end. Lincoln pricing would be expanded downward into Chrysler and Buick’s upper ranges.
The middle of the market would have admittedly been weak but at least the company would have remained lean. I like the idea of Mercury picking up Edsel’s front, and Continental having a version of it too, and both with hidden headlights!
Another counterfactual would have T-Bird on unibody built in Wixom, and a second car -the Continental – built alongside it. Both would be 2-door cars only and share the same body structure/roof/glass. Continental would probably do well to drop the Mark naming. Its pricing would come down to Cadillac Eldorado.
The next step up from Ford would be Edsel. Ranger and Pacer would be the only cars and and would benefit from a longer axle-dash.
Mercury would be what it became. For ’59, Lincoln would use Mercury’s hardtop body and get new sheet metal and a longer axle-dash, and would compete with Cadillac.
Still another counterfactual would have been to buy the Packard name and sell the ’58 Wixom Lincoln body as a Packard so that Lincoln could continue with its original pre-Wixom plan. Had Lincoln’s planners paid Packard a visit in the first half of ’56 they would have seen that William Schmidt had used the same basic body design that Najjar was moving towards. Schmidt had just come from Ford and did the ’56 Lincoln so it probably would not have been surprising.
Packard would have only needed a 4-door, the Thunderbird-based Continental providing the 2-door coupe and convertible for the showroom. What was left of Packard’s dealers could have added Continental and possibly Lincoln, and those dealers could have added Packard. Mercury Park Lane would never have been offered. Instead, Lincoln would have used that body exclusively and added a less expensive entry model.
This scenario would have had too many bodies and platforms compared to GM, and too many pet designs unless Lincoln’s planners could have shut down Engle’s slanted headlights, but at least FoMoCo would have been strong at the top end of the market where there was potentially good money to be made. I especially like what could have been a happy marriage between the Wixom Lincoln’s rear design and subtly curvaceous body sides (minus the scallops) and the Predictor’s front including hidden headlights.
Paul, you hit on a real woulda shoulda coulda thing of mine. In the early 50s when Packard was looking for a partner, there was talk of body sharing with Lincoln or even a merger. Here is my idea. Ford needed a new factory for the unibody T Bird, Packard was building a new factory. (I do not know what the annual production potential of this factory was). Packard joins Ford. Ford’s line is like the factual world, with the Custom and Fairlane. Mercury fits into Edsel’s real world slot with a Fordish Montclair and a Mercuryish Park Lane, like Edsels Pacer/Corsair. Packard now, gets the Clipper as a Turnpike Cruiserish vehicle with say, a Predictor front. They also get the 2 door Mercury commuter. For the senior line, they get the real world Lincoln body Lincoln now is the real world Continental body, with a coupe and convertible called “Continental” based on the T Bird platform, mostly as a placeholder, with the intent of moving Continental to a full line in 1960 based on the Lincoln Continental real world of 1961. You have five separate marques based on four bodies, all with recognized names and pretty much in the slots consumers expected.
Very interesting Kim! In terms of rank it sounds like it would be Ford, Mercury, Clipper (or Packard Clipper), Packard, and Lincoln Continental.
What would the senior Packard look like up front? Same as Clipper; i.e., Predictor?
Actually I was thinking of Clipper being a Packard model, and like the Turnpike Cruiser, and something of an early adopter or beta tester for the rest of FOMOCO. Continental would be a separate make, leaning to true personal luxury though not in the Mk 2 stratosphere. Consider something like the70ish Tbird with a coupe, close coupled sedan, and convertible.
‘For 1961 the Lincoln lineup was radically pruned to a single Continental series that included a four-door hardtop sedan and convertible’
The ’60 Lincoln as featured in your piece is a four door hardtop sedan. The 61-65 Continental is a four door sedan. It has a ‘B’ pillar. Hardtops do not.
It’s not described as a hardtop sedan in the brochures because it isn’t.
http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Lincoln/1961_Lincoln/1961_Lincoln_Continental_Brochure/1961%20Continental-02.html
http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Lincoln/1962_Lincoln/1962_Lincoln_Continental_Brochure/1962
http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Lincoln/1963%20Lincoln/1963%20Lincoln%20Continental%20B&W%20Brochure/image9.html
http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Lincoln/1964_Lincoln/1964_Lincoln_Continental_Brochure/1964%20Lincoln%20Continental-02-03.html
http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Lincoln/1965_Lincoln/1965_Lincoln_Continental_Brochure/1965%20Lincoln%20Continental-04.html
http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Lincoln/1962_Lincoln/1962_Lincoln_Continental_Brochure/1962%20Continental-06.html
Lincoln never referred to The Continental as a “four door hardtop sedan” anywhere. Not did the automotive press at the time. It was never sold to the public as a “hardtop”. Ever.
Frameless door glass and a B Pillar do not equate to a hardtop, yet the word hardtop gets misused constantly. The term “pillared hardtop” gets thrown around on IA as well as if it was a common thing or an actual body style offered.
Kaiser built one with a removable window/pillar. So yes, a “pillared hardtop”. Probably one of a very few ever built and offered to the public for sale. Hardtop is the exception, as in hardtop coupe, hardtop 2 or 4 door sedan, hardtop wagon. None of them have “B” pillars.
And while I’m at it, no manufacturer ever sold a “post” sedan, just a sedan. This has become common. It’s just adding words to sound better informed. Nor was a “crew cab” Chevelle or Biscayne ever been sold or built but suddenly they’re popping up on You Tube.
IA is so meticulous about it’s terminology and editorial content, I am surprised this confusion about what constitutes a “hardtop” is keeps coming up.The definition of a hardtop has been established for almost 70 years. Why muddy the waters?
Even other sites seem to twist themselves into knots trying to describe a body style designed to mimic a convertible with the top up by eliminating the “B” pillar.
Sporty, premium body style the look of a convertible without the rattles, cost of upkeep [periodic top replacement], freedom from leaks and drafts. Add a vinyl top and the faux convertible look is complete.
I’ve had three and still own one of them. I know what they are. The 61-65 Continental was not like 1966-69, which had a 2 door hardtop, four door sedan and four door convertible. But still no four door hardtop sedan.