I am ambivalent about Charles K. Hyde’s book, Riding the Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation. The American automotive history field desperately needs more scholarly books, and Hyde is a relatively rare academic who has ventured into this realm not once but twice. He followed up his Chrysler history with one about American Motors (2009).
However, the downside of Riding the Roller Coaster is that it covers so much ground — from the automaker’s birth to its tie-up with Daimler-Benz in 1998 — that key moments don’t always get adequate attention.
In addition, Hyde is often more descriptive than analytical — and what analysis he includes tends to be drawn from the business and automotive press. Challenging the groupthink of a given era does not appear to be a priority.
By the same token, don’t look here for deep thoughts about why Chrysler rode a roller coaster beyond observations about the quality of the automaker’s management. Yes, it was uneven, but that would not have mattered so much if federal anti-trust policies had not allowed General Motors and Ford to capture an oligopolistic 78 percent of the domestic market by 1955.
Hyde didn’t tend to challenge Detroit groupthink
Riding the Roller Coaster has the vibe of a scholarly book — almost 400 pages are text heavy and sprinkled with data tables and small, black-and-white photographs. In addition, Hyde focused more on business strategies than histories oriented toward car collectors, where product specifics are emphasized. Folks who want the latter may be happier with Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye’s book, The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985 (1985).
In theory, a serious scholarly book like this one should be particularly helpful to me as an auto history writer. However, on topics I have researched so far, Riding the Roller Coaster hasn’t added all that much to what I already know.
Part of the problem is that Hyde’s narrative tends to race through events at a superficial level. For example, he offered no new factual details or analytical insights into why the 1962 Plymouth and Dodge were downsized (p. 190). Instead, he credulously repeated the groupthink that “management foolishly ‘downsized’ it (sic) entire line.” But then in the very next sentence he stated that the 1963 models “sold extremely well” (p. 177). If sales increased when the styling was improved, could it be that the problem wasn’t the downsizing?
Or consider Hyde’s discussion of Virgil Exner’s 1955 “Forward Look” design. He noted that the initiative cost $250 million and the automaker’s short-term goal was to capture 20 percent of the market. However, he did not point out that Chrysler fell far short of its goal. Hyde’s own data table listed only a 16.8 percent market share in 1955 and 15.5 percent in 1956 (p. 162). Nor did he explore why such an ambitious effort failed to make more inroads.
As a case in point, did Chrysler’s weak revival offer evidence that the US auto industry had become an oligopoly? Hyde didn’t meaningfully engage this topic even thought it was arguably central to understanding Chrysler’s shakiness.
My impression is that criticisms of the automaker’s management mostly originated from the automotive and business press. For example, Hyde noted that in the late-60s and early-70s “commentators constantly harped on Chrysler’s lack of small cars or plans to build small cars” (211-212).
He went on to present a revealing 1973 quote from Lynn Townsend: “The subcompacts are just too small. The American people won’t climb into them. They have to give up too much in creature comfort. I think even a compact’s a little small. I would think that probably the most popular car size you’ll see 15 years from now will be like our intermediates today” (p. 212).
Sometimes Hyde’s take was just plain wrong
Riding The Roller Coaster could make some basic mistakes, such by arguing that in 1969 Chrysler “had no competitive response to the newest small cars from its competitors, the Ford Maverick and the American Motors Javelin” (p. 212). Of course, the Javelin was a pony car that was beat to the market by the Plymouth Barracuda. In addition, roughly six months after the Maverick debuted, Plymouth came out with an entry-level compact coupe called the Valiant Duster.
It’s true that the Duster wasn’t as small and decontented as the Maverick — and that the US arm of Chrysler could have come out with a smaller version of the Valiant that was akin to the Australian Charger (go here for further discussion). However, Hyde later noted that the Duster was “a great sales success” (p. 215).
Meanwhile, Hyde could be overly credulous about Chrysler’s p.r. spin. For example, he argued that management was at “first trying to prevent the demise of DeSoto, attempting to promote the 1960 line and at the same time create the strong impression that DeSoto would be around forever” (p. 180).
Hyde presumably did not notice that the 1960 DeSoto lineup had been slashed from four series to two and no longer offered wagons or convertibles. Meanwhile, the Chrysler brand added the lower-priced Newport that competed against the DeSoto. J. “Kelly” Flory quite rightly pointed to these steps as showing how Chrysler was “preparing for the demise of DeSoto” (2004, p. 33).
These are examples of how a scholarly work by a non-car buff can benefit from drawing upon content experts (go here for further discussion).
I don’t mean to be dismissive of Riding The Roller Coaster — this is a useful contribution to the American auto history field. Indeed, it is a light-year’s better book than, say, Matt DeLorenzo’s Dodge: 100 years (2014). However, I would like to find a scholarly book that covers the postwar period with more analytical depth. One reviewer suggested Moritz and Seaman’s Going For Broke (1981), but I have not read it yet.
Riding The Roller Coaster: A History of the Chrysler Corporation
- Charles K. Hyde; 2003
- Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI
“A Forbes Magazine article published in 1948 named Keller one of ‘America’s 50 Foremost Business Leaders,” but noted no innovations in production methods or automotive design associated with him. The Forbes article noted that Keller personally designed the conference room, including the furniture, where he regularly met with his vice presidents. It is difficult to imagine how the president of the number two automaker could grasp the ‘big picture’ of Chrysler’s operations when he spent time on such trivia.” (p. 158-159)
“Any long-term assessment of Lynn Townsend’s tenure at the Chrysler helm must include all of his major decisions. The failed effort to make Chrysler a multinational producer was one of Townsend’s strategic blunders, perhaps the most important. The final fate of the overseas investments was a fire sale in 1978 to Peugeot. Another important mistake was the decision to diversify into real estate, which diverted resources away from Chrysler’s core business. Finally, Townsend’s rigid commitment to ‘production for the sales bank’ created serious problems for the company after 1965.” (p. 220)
“Over the lengthy stretch between K. T. Keller’s retirement in 1950 and Lee Iacocca’s arrival as a ‘white knight’ in 1978, the company suffered from weak management at the top. None of the men who served in the interim — Colbert, Townsend, or Riccardo — shared Walter Chrysler’s breadth of knowledge or his vision. Colbert was a brilliant but erratic salesman while Townsend and Riccardo were accountants — ‘bean counters,’ in auto industry parlance.” (p. 316)
OTHER REVIEWS:
Amazon | Goodreads | Project Muse | Cambridge Unversity Press
RE:SOURCES
- DeLorenzo, Matt; 2014. Dodge: 100 Years. Motorbooks, Minneapolis, MN.
- Hyde, Charles K.; 2009. Storied Independent Automakers: Nash, Hudson, and American Motors. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Moritz, Michael an Barrett Seaman; 1981. Going For Broke: The Chrysler Story. Doubleday.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Chrysler (1955)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Plymouth Fury (1964); Plymouth Valiant Duster (1970)
My biggest problem with this book is that I was hoping for a more detailed explanation of the “double-dipping” scandal among the senior executives in the late 50’s that led to Tex Colbert’s downfall. The book told me very little more of the scandal than I already knew…
Or consider Hyde’s discussion of Virgil Exner’s 1955 “Forward Look” design. He noted that the initiative cost $250 million and the automaker’s short-term goal was to capture 20 percent of the market. However, he did not point out that Chrysler fell far short of its goal. Hyde’s own data table listed only a 16.8 percent market share in 1955 and 15.5 percent in 1956 (p. 162). Nor did he explore why such an ambitious effort failed to make more inroads. Does he point out that Ford and GM also came out with a new product line for 1955, and GM releasing a taste in 1954 on the senior cars. Maybe I’m being too subtle here but the Chrysler cars have the hood bulge higher above the fencer line than Ford or GM. This gave them a slightly older look.