Lynn Townsend led a remarkably quick turnaround of the Chrysler Corporation, but he started to lose altitude in the late-60s. One might debate what were key turning points, but I would suggest that the 1967-68 full-sized Dodge was the first sign of weakness in his strategy for competing in the U.S. passenger-car market.
Despite a reskinning, the 1967 big Dodge saw output significantly fall. Exactly how much varies by data source I have come across, but the one that appears to be most credible shows a production drop of almost 27 percent to under 116,000 units. For 1968 output rebounded somewhat to over 146,000 units, but Dodge’s share of the premium-priced, full-sized field was still only 8.9 percent. And while Dodge actually managed to edge out Mercury, that wasn’t a huge consolation since the brand was now merely in second to last place.
One could argue that the 1966 big Dodge was a tough act to follow because it almost hit 158,000 units. That wasn’t nearly as high as 1950, when Dodge produced around 342,000 passenger cars. Even so, 1966 would end up being the high-water mark for the big Dodge after it returned to offering a full lineup in 1965.
One could also argue that Dodge’s weak 1967 sales were due to a recession. But even though total U.S. production was down 12 percent, that was half as much as the big Dodge. More tellingly, Dodge’s share of the premium-priced, big-car market fell from 9.4 percent in 1966 to 7.8 percent in 1967.
So what went wrong with the 1967 Dodge?
One could argue that the styling of the 1967-68 models was considerably less successful than their immediate predecessors. The clean lines of the 1965-66 Dodges were replaced with a rather bulky and overamped look.
At least that’s my opinion. Richard M. Langworth and Jan P. Norbye instead argued that the redesign “was one of the best in Dodge history. Most of the 1967 restyle revolved around a ‘delta’ theme, with wedge taillights and similarly shaped grilles plus low sweeping rooflines.” So why didn’t the car sell well? “Exactly why this happened is hard to say” (1985, p. 109). So we’re punting then?
I would go a step further and suggest that problems with the Dodge’s styling masked what was a more fundamental issue: The Chrysler Corporation did not have adequate scale to field four competitive full-sized entries. Out of those four — Plymouth, Dodge, Chrysler and Imperial — Dodge was second only to the Imperial in being the weakest link. That would become even more apparent in the years ahead, when the brand fielded the poorest-selling premium-priced, full-sized cars.
American automotive historians tend to be much better at presenting factual minutiae than in asking analytical questions, such as did Dodge really need a full-sized entry? That, in turn, raises other questions, such as whether the Chrysler Corporation’s decision to field two dealer networks was a mistake. Once the dust settled on an early-60s reorganization, one dealer network focused solely on selling Dodge cars and trucks while the other one only handled Plymouths, Chryslers and Imperials.
The problem with asking such questions is that they inevitably require you to show the assumptions that undergird your analysis. And merely entertaining the idea that Dodge might have done better without a big car is a fundamental violation of postwar Detroit groupthink. Questioning a dual dealer network may be more acceptable because in recent years the automaker has shifted to an integrated dealer network, but such a discussion may still be dismissed as idle speculation. Coulda, woulda, shoulda.
So let us instead check our brains in at the door and admire the 1968 Dodge Monaco and Polara pictured here. They sure don’t make ’em like they used to.
NOTES:
Market share and production figures were calculated from base data provided by the auto editors of Consumer Guide (2006), Gunnell (2002) and Wikipedia (2022).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, Ill.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised 4th Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M. and Jan P. Norbye; 1985. The Complete History of Chrysler Corporation 1924-1985. Publications International, Skokie, IL.
- Wikipedia; 2022. “U.S. Automobile Production Figures.” Page last modified Jan. 26 (no longer available).
ADVERTISING & BROCHURES
- oldcarbrochures.org: Dodge (1967)
Steve, the same reasoning that you have written about that kept the Plymouth VIP from getting any sales traction would likely apply here as well. Plymouth had the lower end of the full-size market covered with the Fury range, however, why not move up to a Chrysler (as their ads in 1966 suggested) when buyers could get into a Newport for same or less money than a full-size Dodge.
I recall a number of years ago that Collectible Automobile contributor, Jeffrey Godshall (please correct me if I’m wrong here) wrote about how Dodge designers were enamoured by the success of Pontiac styling in the 60s and wanted the full-size Dodge to be the Pontiac of Chrysler. I have always liked the look of the 1967-68 Polara and Monaco but I can see how, compared to the 1965-66 models, they may have seemed a bit over the top. In that respect, perhaps Dodge loyalists recalled the overwrought styling of the 1959-62 models and were afraid to be stuck with a car that would soon look outdated and have poor resale value (that would actually be an interesting topic to dive into, Dodge vs Chrysler vs all other medium and upper medium-price makes’ worth on the used car market).
The Chrysler line up from Newport to New Yorker competed sufficiently with Buick, Oldsmobile and Pontiac, so a full-size Dodge was probably no longer a necessity after 1966, when Chrysler sales were on the rise. Finally, that makes me ask if the big Dodge was profitable enough to warrant continuation for another decade. Maybe the Monaco could have been a personal luxury variant of the Coronet with brougham-like styling, more specifically targeted at the Grand Prix. How would that have changed history for the Fratzog division and how might it have helped Plymouth survive as a viable alternative to the LTD and Caprice?
Good question, since at that era, most of the Dodge models sold was Coronet, Dart and the 1968-70 Charger.
The Monaco was originally planned to go against the Pontiac Grand Prix but they cancelled a proposed Custom 880 line-up for 1966 and the Monaco inherited the Custom 880 sedan and wagon and the Grand Prix fighter Monaco was renamed Monaco 500. https://auto.howstuffworks.com/1965-1968-dodge-monaco-and-500.htm
If Dodge had Monaco built on the Coronet chassis, I mean platform, it would have occupy the same floor as the Charger.
Also, the Monaco in Canada was available with a convertible model and having the small-block 318 V8 and the slant six. https://oldcarbrochures.org/Canada/Chrysler-Canada/Dodge/1965-Dodge-Full-Size-Brochure/index.html
The challenge here is the power of Dodge dealers, and Dodge Division, within the corporation. Note that, when the corporation took away Plymouth franchises from Dodge dealers in 1960, they were powerful enough to demand a replacement – the 1960 Dodge Dart – that enabled them to keep selling vehicles in the low-price field. The end result was the Dodge Dart cannibalizing sales from both the full-size Plymouth and medium-price Dodges.
Then, in 1962, when the downsized Dart and Polara left Dodge without a true full-size car, the dealers and Dodge Division demanded the corporation fill that gap. (Lousy sales of the downsized Dart and Polara helped their case, although that was more due to the bizarre styling than the reduced size). The Custom 880 was hastily cobbled together from Chrysler and Dodge parts, and rushed to market halfway through the 1962 model year.
Given their power, I have no doubt that Dodge dealers and Dodge Division would have stopped the phase-out of the full-size Dodge during the 1960s and early 1970s. Whether they could have stopped a complete re-alignment of the corporation’s dealer body is another question, but under state franchise laws (which are tilted in favor of the dealers), car companies usually only do this when faced with a real crisis.
The 100,000+ sales of the Dodge C-body helped pay for the C-body itself, and also boosted utilization of the factory that made these cars. From that standpoint, Chrysler would have been reluctant to walk away from that volume.
The sales of the full-size Dodge after 1964 are somewhat baffling…Chrysler and Plymouth were paired at the dealer level, but the C-body Chrysler and Plymouth each easily outsold their Dodge corporate cousin. This was even though the Dodge didn’t face a potential competitor being sold out of the same showroom. And the 1965-66 Dodge is more attractive than the Plymouth Fury, in my opinion.
The 1967-68 models are less successful, but I wonder if part of this is due to the power of the Coronet and Dart. Total Dodge Division sales were quite respectable after the recovery from the 1962 debacle. But the sales powerhouses for Dodge were the Dart and the Coronet. Dodge regularly promoted that Dart as the largest compact. The compact Darts were roomy, and looked substantial (particularly the post-1966 models). The Coronets also had those strengths. Perhaps many Dodge customers didn’t see the value in moving up to a C-body when the Dart and Coronet were attractive in their own right.
Good analysis. So the pivotal moment was the 1960 reorganization. I am surprised that Iacocca didn’t use Chrysler’s early-80s financial crisis to integrate the dealer networks, but he may not have been inclined to fight that battle because he presided over Mercury’s devolution to a largely badge-engineered brand (go here for further discussion).
A Dodge entry may have helped Chrysler generate additional volume for its C-body platform, but what is telling to me is that from 1965-71 the big Dodge usually received more unique sheetmetal than its mid-sized and compact siblings. I take this to mean that Chrysler management saw more profit potential with big cars. That may have been partly true in that the big cars likely generated more profit per vehicle (with the possible exception of high-end muscle cars). However, I wonder whether that theory actually panned out in practice due to the Big Dodge’s consistently weak sales. Note that in 1972 the big Dodge started to share front-door panels with the Chrysler and in 1974 a variety of parts with the Plymouth.
The Dart and Coronet may have cannibalized sales of the big Dodge, but each of GM’s premium-priced mid-sized cars often sold better than the Coronet/Charger during the second half of the 1960s and early-70s, yet their big cars did much better than Dodge’s. The key problem may have been that Dodge lost a huge amount of altitude in the big-car field during the first half of the 1960s and simply wasn’t able to claw its way back in the second half of the decade. By the early-70s it was too late because big cars were in decline.