In retrospect, Studebaker shouldn’t have assigned Brooks Stevens to restyle its Lark for 1964. He may have had a more mainstream design sensibility than Raymond Loewy, but Stevens was also the guy who coined the term “planned obsolescence” (Adamson, 2002; p. 129). He was very much grounded in the Detroit way of doing things, with its emphasis on annual model changes and a revolving door of trendy nameplates. Stevens was also an early champion of the brougham look.
Not surprisingly, that’s what Studebaker got. Also not surprising: Stevens’s approach failed to revive sales. By October 1963 the automaker had an 86-day supply of unsold cars (Bonsall, 2000). Two months later production in Studebaker’s main South Bend plant permanently ended.
One could describe this as inevitable. One could also blame a long list of factors that caused Studebaker’s demise. However, Stevens’s handiwork arguably represented the final nail in the coffin.
Stevens was not just responsible for updating the styling on the Lark and Hawk, which reportedly cost $7.5 million. He also “convinced management to de-emphasize the Lark” nameplate (Langworth, 1979, 1993; p. 150).
Keeping up with the Big Four was a losing battle
What Stevens — and apparently Studebaker management — didn’t realize was that trying to be trendy would backfire. The compact Lark’s body dated back to 1953, which made it even older than the venerable Checker. Although the body’s basic design was admirably adaptable, Studebaker had struggled to keep it even partially up to date.
For example, it wasn’t until 1963 that a dogleg windshield and thick door-window frames were finally replaced with a more contemporary greenhouse. Meanwhile, the Lark’s weirdly stubby front fenders were kept in production for five years even though they were stylistically problematic even when they were introduced in 1959.
One could reasonably argue that by 1964 the Lark’s body was so hopelessly obsolete that nothing could have made it competitive. Indeed, Studebaker’s best bet was arguably to ease out of passenger-car production in favor of a line of compact cabs, sport-utility vehicles and trucks based on the Lark body but using beefed-up underpinnings. If nothing else, that might have made Studebaker a more appealing merger partner to International-Harvester or Kaiser-Jeep.
Studebaker’s investment in an updated 1962 Hawk and the Avanti took badly needed money away from this more plausible direction. Stevens’s final redesign of the Lark also didn’t help matters.
Stevens tried to make the Lark look trendy
The 1964 redesign was heavily laden with trendy styling cues. Stevens slapped on a Thunderbird-style roofline and gave the front end a rectangular shape similar to many cars of that period. In back he fashioned a new horizontal treatment that made the deck flatter and more angular.
The overall result was not as bad as the “bug-eyed” 1958 Studebaker. Even so, the car still looked archaic compared to the brand-new compact Rambler American and mid-sized cars from General Motors.
Even older and more stolid competitors such as the Ford Fairlane and Chevrolet Chevy II had more contemporary lines.
In the process of trying to make the Studebaker more like its Big Four competition, Stevens stepped away from the automaker’s design heritage. This included a radiator-style grille, a tapered roofline and clean, rounded contours. Stevens may very well have been embarrassed by these features, which were rooted in the 1950s. In other words, they were “obsolete.”
Studebaker could have learned from Porsche
Stevens’s approach was very different from the one used by other smaller-scale automakers such as Porsche, where stylistic continuity was emphasized. Here continuity wasn’t viewed as a weakness, but instead as a crucial part of branding. I would suggest that the smaller the automaker, the more important stylistic continuity is for survival.
Note that continuity does not mean a refusal to evolve. As a case in point, the Porsche 911 was substantially changed from it predecessor, the 356. Those changes were partly grounded in functional improvements but also included some stylistic advancements. That served to give the 911 a fresh appearance while still looking unmistakably like a Porsche (go here for further discussion).
Also see ‘1959 Studebaker: Throwing the baby out with the bath water’
In contrast, Stevens’s 1964 design did not look unmistakably like a Studebaker. This problem was compounded by the demotion of the Lark nameplate.
Studebaker deemphasized Lark to go upmarket
For 1962 Studebaker expanded the Lark’s number of trim levels — and gave each its own series name. That included Deluxe, Regal, Daytona and Cruiser. However, all of these cars were still referred to as Larks.
For 1964 the strategy shifted. The Lark nameplate prefixed the lower-priced Challenger and Commander. However, the Daytona and Cruiser were made stand-alone nameplates.
The underlying strategy was presumably to move Studebaker upmarket while keeping a foothold in the bottom end of the market. For example, the Challenger competed against economy compacts such as the Ford Falcon. Meanwhile, the top-of-line Cruiser was priced above the mid-sized Ford Fairlane but below the Rambler Ambassador.
One might argue that placing a greater emphasis on upmarket sales gave Studebaker a more profitable model mix. In 1964 the higher-priced series — the Daytona and Cruiser — surpassed 18,000 units. That represented almost 40 percent of the automaker’s family car production. This was up from 8 percent in 1961, when the Cruiser’s output only reached 5,200 units.
The problem was that top-end models were not coming anywhere close to compensating for a collapse in sales of lower-priced models. As a case in point, the production of six-cylinder models fell from almost 100,000 units in 1959 to under 20,000 in 1964. This, in turn, was making it increasingly unlikely that Studebaker could reach its breakeven point, which was around 120,000 units (Ebert, 2013).
During the 1963 model year only 84,000 passenger cars left the factory. Much of the media attention focused on the Avanti and Hawk, but together they only tallied 10 percent of total output. Low-volume coupes could not save Studebaker.
The automaker’s board of directors quite rightly decided that the continuation of U.S. passenger-car operations depended on the success of Stevens’s Lark restyling (Bonsall, 2000).
Stevens had bigger plans for Studebaker
The 1964 models were seen as a stopgap measure by Stevens. He had developed three concept cars — a sedan, wagon and coupe — with an all-new body. While these cars were much more contemporary looking, they still used Studebaker’s ancient engines and chassis.
At least in theory, Studebaker could have found another source of engines. However, the automaker would still have been stuck with a chassis that did not allow a “step-down” passenger compartment. This would have resulted in cramped interior accommodations because the new body was low slung.
Implicit in Stevens’s approach was that trendy styling could keep Studebaker alive in the passenger-car business. A big stumbling block was that putting an all-new body into production could have cost roughly $20 million even if it drew upon existing components, according to Thomas E. Bonsall (2000). Studebaker’s lenders weren’t keen on funding such a risky proposition.
Also see ‘Brooks Stevens’s 1965 Studebaker Lark concept: Almost a baby Continental’
So while Stevens’s concept cars are interesting from a historical perspective, they weren’t a viable option. Neither were the Avanti-inspired designs that Loewy had developed.
If Studebaker had made it through 1964, a more plausible next step could have been Stevens’s proposed reskinning. Once again he went for generic glitz. The front end is so anonymous that you can only tell it is a Studebaker because of the lettering and hood ornament. In back, the full-width taillights were trendy but resulted in an unusually high trunk liftover height. Not exactly a plus for the cab market — which the car would otherwise have been well suited for because of its tall, roomy body with unusually flat floors.
What would styling continuity have looked like?
I would suggest that Studebaker’s best bet was to buy some time to transition from a car to a truck manufacturer. Such a gambit was more likely to succeed if the automaker made a commitment to stylistic continuity with its 1964 redesign of the Lark.
Stevens was on the right track when he gave the front end a slightly longer overhang and a higher-mounted bumper. This resulted in a much more modern look. However, the radiator grille should have been kept, albeit with a more horizontal shape. The goal should have been to develop new front-end sheetmetal that would have worked well on both cars and a redesigned Champ truck.
Meanwhile, the roofline should have been carried over from 1963. This is partly because the more rounded contours better fit the Studebaker body. Just as importantly, redoing part of the greenhouse after only one year was a waste of scarce resources.
A better way to have spent those funds would have been to redesign the rear-quarter sheetmetal, which had badly aged despite being in production only two years. The rear bumper needed to be mounted higher and the overly busy side sculpting toned way down. In addition, the gas cap should have been moved to the side of the car. That would have allowed a lower trunk lid.
That last point illustrates how Studebaker’s main focus should have been improving the usability of its family compacts. At that point they weren’t going to win any awards for stylishness, so they needed to maximize their practicality.
Marketing the Lark as what it was — a family compact
Just as the styling changes should have been more incremental, so too should have been the Studebaker’s product positioning. The Lark name had far too much brand awareness to be demoted.
By the same token, the Lark should have been marketed as a family compact similar to a Dodge Dart or a Mercury Comet. This is because the Studebaker body was more comparable in size to larger compacts than most mid-sized cars. Nor did it hurt that competition in the compact field was easing as the Big Three focused more attention on the mid-sized field. With George Romney’s departure, even American Motors would lose interest in compacts.
Of course, Studebaker instead joined the race to make bigger, glitzier and more powerful cars. And after its 1964 models were introduced, the auto buff media applauded. For example, Car Life admired a Daytona R-4 two-door hardtop’s “striking new styling” and performance chops (1964, p. 190).
Alas, by the time that particular road test was published, Studebaker was effectively dead as a viable automaker.
NOTES:
Dimensions, prices and other product specifications were from the Automobile Catalog (2021), John Gunnell (2002) and auto editors of Consumer Guide (1993, 2006).
Share your reactions to this post with a comment below or a note to the editor.
RE:SOURCES
- Adamson, Glenn; 2003. Industrial Strength Design: How Brooks Stevens Shaped Your World. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Auto editors of Consumer Guide; 1993, 2006. Encyclopedia of American Cars. Publications International, Lincolnwood, IL.
- Automobile Catalog; 2021. “Full detailed specifications listing and photo gallery.” Accessed April 13.
- Bonsall, Thomas E.; 2000. More Than They Promised: The Studebaker Story. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
- Car Life; 1964. “1964 Studebaker R-4 Daytona Hardtop: A Lark With Class And Calories Turns Into a Bird of Prey.” Feb. issue. Republished in Studebaker 1946-1966: Ultimate Portfolio. Compiled by R. M. Clarke. Brooklands Books: pp. 190-192.
- Ebert, Robert R.; 2013. Champion of the Lark: Harold Churchill and the Presidency of Studebaker-Packard, 1956-1961. McFarland & Company, London.
- Gunnell, John; 2002. Standard Catalog of American Cars, 1946-1975. Revised Fourth Ed. Krause Publications, Iola, WI.
- Langworth, Richard M.; 1979, 1993. Studebaker 1946-1966: The Classic Postwar Years. Motorbooks International, Osceola, WI.
ADVERTISEMENTS & BROCHURES:
- oldcaradvertising.com: Studebaker (1959)
- oldcarbrochures.org: Chevrolet Chevy II (1962); Studebaker (1961, 1963, 1964
PHOTOGRAPHY & SKETCHES:
- Milwaukee Art Museum Brooks Stevens Archives
- Photo gallery: 1964 Studebaker Daytona 2-door convertible
While this is an interesting perspective, I think one must go back to 1960 and 1961, when the designs and budgets were being planned. Sherwood Egbert was hired to revive Studebaker. He had the Lark and the Hawk, an update OHV-6 and a relatively modern V-8. Yes, the chassis architecture date back to 1952 (for the 1953 model year), but the banks refused to help Studebaker-Packard in 1956 and Curtiss-Wright controlled the purse-strings thereafter. Then Egbert became mortally-ill. I think Studebaker did the best they could with very little money. Abraham Sonnebend, Chair of Studebaker’s board of directors, drove the nails in the coffin. By the time the 1964 Studebakers were in the showrooms (Fall, 1963), it was over. The restyle made no difference. I have ridden in 1964 Studebakers, both the Lark Cruiser and the Hawk (and a 1963 Avanti). Yes, they were not as all-in-one-piece as the 1964 G.M. intermediates or the great 1963 Rambler Classic. But I think this is a hatchet-job on Brooks Stevens.
Restylings are generally judged by whether they boost sales or not. The 1964 models apparently did not. If you’d like to bring to the table additional data, that would be great.
I would also invite you to consider more seriously the core of my point: A fancier, upmarket redesign wasn’t going to solve Studebaker’s problem of deciining economy car sales. In a way AMC had a parallel situation a few years later with the Ambassador vis a vis the Classic/Rebel/Matador — the quest for higher profits ended up backfiring.
Stevens tried to design the car that he wanted rather than the one the situation needed. Look at the proposed 1965 reskinning — he tried to graft trendy styling cues such as full-width taillights on a body that was more appropriately used as a cab, SUV or truck. Now, perhaps that’s what Studebaker management wanted, but since he started working with the Lark in 1961 he was pushing the luxury look.
I agree. Stevens, and Duncan McRae did an admirable job in attempting to keep Studebaker’s styling fresh, with very little money.
Even if the $20 million for a new body had been found, starting in 1967 three were new EPA/DOT regulations that Studebaker could not have afforded to meet.
Studebaker’s vehicle business was doomed from the beginning of the 1960’s. The temporary success of the Lark in 1959 bought them 5 more years.
I think the article was well researched but too hard on Stevens. His redesign of the Hawk in 1962 was masterful. The ’64 Lark redesign was OK given with what Stevens had to work with and the money problems. There was really no way out for Studebaker when you looked at the Chevrolets and Fords of the same era—1963 Chevrolet Impala.
The Avanti was actually pretty well engineered and a terrific design (IMHO) by Loewy’s team. Again, nothing much really could save the corporation other than a merger with International and concentrating on heavy trucks but who would want Studebaker’s liabilities and union work force.
Overall, I think Stevens was a terrific designer who worked miracles with what he had to work with. His later Excalibur roadsters were pretty nice (the early ones before they went too neo-classic). I’m surprised that no one has written his biography because he produced some outstanding designs (re: the 1962-1964 GT Hawks).
I agree that Stevens was a talented designer. If you’re looking for a good biography about him, check out Glenn Adamson’s. Very nicely done, with lots of photographs of his designs (go here).
I would also agree that the 1964 Lark redesign wasn’t terrible like, say, the 1956 Hudson. The problem was that the board insisted that the redesign needed to revive sales. That didn’t happen. Of course, styling wasn’t the only factor in declining sales, but that was the biggest card Studebaker had to play in the fall of 1963.
In my article I suggest a different approach. Of course, it’s all speculation. I think what most matters is the underlying argument — that Studebaker’s most plausible way to keep its automotive operations alive was to pivot to producing compact cabs, SUVs and trucks. A more practical redesign could have helped make that pivot. Instead, the focus seemed to be on building sales of higher-priced sporty and luxury models.
I look at the 63 Lark side view and I am amazed they sold so many. The 64 was better looking. The article keeps coming back to the need for a modern step down chassis. The Avanti budget could perhaps have filled that budget gap. The proposed 65 redesign has AMC written all over it. A second tier Rambler Classic, just putting dollar store lipstick on a pig. How would Studebaker becoming a taxi, SUV and truck division work? IH had its own trucks and SUVs. Studebaker pushed compact taxis from 59 on, and they couldn’t draw flies. There is no way you could afford to keep a separate automobile line running on four figure annual production. You can’tjust take a rust magnet like the Lark, slap a taximeter on it,and expect to compete with Checker.
I have seen varying estimates of how much the Avanti cost, but I suspect that it wouldn’t have added up to enough money to do a new chassis, e.g., a fiberglass body was used to keep the costs down.
I’d agree that Studebaker couldn’t survive solely on cabs — they would have needed to be matched with sales from compact trucks and wagons, the latter of which could have been offered in two- and four-wheel drive. Studebaker could have also come up with a short-wheelbase Scout-type vehicle using the same front end as the rest of the lineup.
Studebaker could have carved out a decent market niche, particularly in the 1970s. The Studebaker body was smaller than the big Jeep and more car-like than the Scout or first-generation Bronco.
Note that unlike Jeep or International, Studebaker would have had only one modular platform, which would have contributed to a lower breakeven point. Studebaker also had other advantages, such as more dealers in the suburbs, which is where truck and SUV sales were growing the fastest.
You make a good point about Studebakers being rust magnets. Surely it wasn’t rocket science to fix that problem. Assuming quality glitches could have been addressed, in the long run the Studebaker’s more compact body could have been more viable than the Checker’s.
I’m not sure how a compact cab would work. I don’t think cab riders of the 60s would accept the limited rear seat leg room we have resigned ourselves to today. What was the legroom of the Lark compared with the Checker or the low priced 3 full size cars?
According to Consumer Reports, a 1963 Studebaker Lark four-door sedan had as much “rear effective room” (a proxy for legroom) as a Buick Electra 225 — and considerably more than other compacts or intermediates of the time.
It actually wouldn’t have mattered much how well Studebaker did in the cab business in the late-60s. The automaker would have succeeded or failed largely on truck and SUV sales. Also note that Checker ultimately went out of business because its cabs were too big. At that point the Studebaker could have still had a viable entry.
I disagree with this. I live in Louisville, and am old enough to remember the many Studebaker Taxis around downtown, and on the X-ways. They were very common right up to 1966 models. They were not cramped, but spacious cars for their outside dimensions. Of course they weren’t Checkers, but then nothing matched those rolling tanks. This fanciful idea of SUV’s, and taxi’s only tho is pure hogwash. Strictly 2021 thinking, not 1964. International Harvester couldn’t survive, nor would have Studebaker. It would take several decades to get to the point where Jeep was a profitable and growing concern we know today. Back in the 50’s and 60’s, they were very rare vehicles on the highways of any major city.
Neil, I agree with you that Lark body styles with the 113-inch wheelbase were pretty roomy for smaller cars. Indeed, I wrote in the story that the Lark was “well suited” for the cab market “because of its tall, roomy body with unusually flat floors.” I was expressing a concern about the roominess of Brooks Stevens’s proposed new body, which appears in photos to be both sleeker and less roomy (go here).
International historian Patrick Foster has argued that a big reason that the company did not keep up with the tremendous growth in the truck market during the 1960s was because it didn’t have enough suburban dealers (go here for further discussion). He thought that buying Studebaker could have helped to resolve that problem. That makes sense to me. And in order to fully integrate those dealers into its own network, International would presumably have had to maintain the Studebaker brand for at least a few years.
So under that scenario, it was much more likely that the Studebaker brand could have survived in the market place longer than if it had continued to focus on passenger cars. I have no idea how long that might have been. My meta point is that by the mid-60s Studebaker’s basic components were too obsolete to be competitive as passenger cars but arguably still had some potential viability when used for a line of compact trucks, four-wheel drive wagons and cabs.
You say that it would “take several decades” for Jeep to be profitable. Patrick Foster’s books on American Motors suggest that profits from Jeep carried the company after passenger-car sales collapsed in the second half of the 1970s. By 1977 Jeep volume had surpassed 150,000 units per year (go here for further discussion).
Kim, you’re looking at the wrong movies (New York City with Checkers as far as the eye can see!)! In ’59 and for a coupe of years, the Studebaker heavy-duty 113-inch wheelbase Y-body made really significant in-roads in the taxi bizz in NYC and elsewhere. It was second in taxi fleet sales in that city in ’59 (up from third the year before when the Scotsman-based models were used).
l look at ANY side of a ’61 Plymouth and am amazed that ANY were sold! The side view of an early ’60s Falcon is dumpy – look how they sold!
The discussion is interesting (l’m a self-confessed Studebaker enthusiast), but it leaves out a big important point. Sherwood Egbert fought for and promoted the automotive division, but many on the board of directors were not of the same persuasion. Since 1959, the profits of the corporation were made thanks to their subsidiaries and not the automotive division, whose business swings over the previous decade had become too boom/bust/close-call for corporate management. The investments they had made in the subsidiaries were doing well and the long-term survival of the corporation looked better without the cyclical “albatross” of vehicle manufacturing. So, now it’s the fall of 1963, and yes, l’ve previously read that the 1964 model year, on the back of much-improved styling of the “Lark-types” and good performance and other innovations throughout the line, it seemed competitive, but was to be a make-or-break year.
THEN its dynamic president, Sherwood Egbert, was forced to resign due to his on-going cancer, so a big advocate for automobiles was “gone”. THEN a certain guy named John F. Kennedy was assassinated and the entire North American continent did not buy cars for a whole month and Studebaker’s launch of their important ’64’s got “broadsided”. The new president, Mr. Burlingame, now acted on the “new reality” for the board of directors, the plan that had been on the minds of many of them – and the rest is history. They NEVER intended to keep the Canadian operation going for more than a short term. The end of Studebaker’s vehicle production was, in effect, a done deal even a month before the US plant closing announcement was made Dec. 9th.
The only thing at that time being made that could be termed an SUV was the Jeep Wagoneer and it was not yet a proven success. Making them or taxis or compact trucks would not have had snowball’s chance in heck in that boardroom.
The corporation did survive that crisis and prospered. It carried on as Studebaker-Worthington and, after 1979, the name disappeared as it was absorbed into the giant McGraw-Edison Corporation.
Sorry to be negative toward your scenario.
Stewdi, you offer an entirely reasonable scenario — and one more likely to have succeeded than the one I suggested. That said, I flesh out my scenario in greater depth here and speculate on Studebaker’s future if Egbert had not been sidelined due to illness here.
The main thing that I am pushing back against is the idea that Studebaker could have survived if it had just managed to put into production the proposed new designs from either Stevens or Loewy. And as I’ve argued here, the Avanti was a wonderful design . . . and a bad idea.
Much like Stewdi, I am also an avowed Studebaker enthusiast. I prefer to consider the 1964 restyling of the Lark models as a “successful failure” (I own a 1964 Daytona convertible) given the available budget, what Stevens did was a remarkable modernization. Unlike many, I in fact like the renaming that occurred. Not that Lark was a bad name, but those Larks really looked so last decade by 1963 and breaking away from the old name with a bold new look was for the best – even if sales didn’t follow.
The 1964 models sported an up to date look, competitive with other available compacts of the era. Unfortunately, by the fall of 1963, too many had already given up on Studebaker (most notably customers, dealers, the press and even worse, Studebaker’s management) – simply put you can’t sell what people won’t buy. Studebaker’s market failure represented a self fulfilling prophecy of sorts. That Studebaker survived in the automobile business as long as they did was remarkable. Despite an 11 year old platform in 1964, Studebaker managed to update the Lark in a competitive manner, all the way up to end, in 1966.
However, as safety and environmental laws were changing, it is unlikely that even a more successful 1964 launch would have done much to stem the inevitable demise of a grand old name. Some have said if the dynamic Sherwood Egbert’s health hadn’t failed him in November 1963, that perhaps Studebaker would have somehow survived a bit longer. Of course sometimes history can be cruel.
It’s very appearant that Studebaker was struggling to keep up with the other automakers by the early sixties . One of the main reasons was , that there was too much competition with the Chevrolet Nova , the Impala , the Ford Falcon , and of course the very popular Ford Mustang ! Nearly all of these cars set sales records , which resulted in poor sales for Studebaker . By 1965 , Studebaker was almost out of business with ” declining sales .” The writing was now on the wall . Sadly , they closed their doors for good in March 1966 closing another chapter in automotive history .